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GERMANY

A. W. WARD

VOLUME I

1815-1852

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GERMANY
1815–1890

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GERMANY
1815–1890

BY

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GENERAL PREFACE

The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one or two cases the story commences at an earlier date: in the case of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better understood and the continuity of historical development more clearly displayed.

The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to understand the nature of existing political conditions. "The roots of the present lie deep in the past"; and the real significance of contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will be useful not only to beginners but to students who have already acquired some general knowledge of European History. For those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources of information and works of a more special character.

Considerable attention is paid to political geography; and each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may be requisite for the illustration of the text.

G. W. PROTHERO.

PREFACE

THE present volume forms part of a piece of work undertaken in times which already seem remote. After the outbreak of the war with Germany it would have been unnatural had I not felt forced to lay aside for the moment what I had begun as a congenial task, since one of the chief pleasures of my life had long been to contribute anything in my power to the promotion of a better understanding between two nations now estranged from each other for many a long day. But, on further reflexion, it seemed that nothing would be gained by postponing *sine die* the treatment of a chapter of history which, like other chapters, must be studied with care if its outcome is to be judged with candour. The Germany of 1915 cannot be understood, nor can the circumstances of its national growth and the development of its international relations be reasonably explained, unless the struggles and humiliations of the half-century after 1815 are taken into account as well as the successes of the ensuing years, and the extraordinary expansion of activities and ambitions with which we have at the present day to reckon.

It has been arranged, in accordance with my own wish, that this short History of Germany from 1815 shall terminate with the fall of Bismarck. A new era, with agencies

and influences to a large extent new in German political and social life, may be said to set in at that date; and, though a narrative of the quarter of a century of German history from 1890 to the present time would be of the utmost interest to our own and to the coming generation, I do not feel myself competent to attempt it even in outline. Into the story of the accomplishment, however imperfect, of the unity to which the best minds of Germany had long aspired I could enter with a whole-hearted sympathy; what followed is a skein which other hands must seek to disentangle.

For the second volume of this book I have been fortunate enough to induce Mr H. Spenser Wilkinson, Chichele Professor of Military History in the University of Oxford, to write three sections, on the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870 respectively, which it has been a great satisfaction as well as personal pleasure to me to place in his hands. The volume will I hope appear in the course of this year.

In the present volume I have made use of many authorities (of most of which a list is given in the bibliography), but more especially of the great works of Treitschke and Sybel. Of these two writers the former, by a work which will always hold a place of its own in modern historical literature, contributed more than any other historian to convince his fellow-countrymen of the necessity of accepting the hegemony of Prussia if the new German Empire was to be founded; while Sybel, a historical writer of a different type but equal eminence, wrote the history of the foundation of that Empire from its archives. It would have been mere

affectation not to draw constantly on these two great writers in treating, within the narrow limits imposed upon me, of the subject of their masterpieces; but I trust I have not done this uncritically.

I have to thank Dr K. Breul, Schroeder Professor of German in this University, for allowing me the use of many books in his own library, as well as in the valuable Beit library collected under his direction.

In conclusion, I desire to express my obligation to the Editor of this Series for his revision of my proofs, from which they have derived the greatest possible advantage.

A. W. W.

PETERHOUSE,
February 5th, 1916

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

On June 9th, 1815, the Act of the Congress of Vienna was signed, and the Second Peace of Paris followed on November 20th of the same year. For the second time in her history, Germany saw herself at the end of a war, or a connected series of wars, which, at some time in its course, had more or less affected every part of her vast territorial complex, and had lasted for the whole, or nearly the whole, of what is reckoned as a human generation. Like the Thirty Years' War, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of Germany, which were more closely connected with each other than were some of the successive stages of the great seventeenth century struggle, had left a large proportion of the country in a condition of economic prostration, while other parts of it had barely recovered from the ravages of fire and sword. But the differences between the results of the two great international conflicts of which Germany was the most constant theatre, were, for the land and people themselves, more important than the resemblances. The Peace of Westphalia brought to the nation (at that time less in number than one-sixth of the population of Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century) one distinct gain, hampered though it was by reservations and exceptions greatly diminishing its practical value. This gain was the establishment of the principle of parity among

the three chief religious confessions of Western Christendom. But a complete emancipation of the country from the yoke of foreign conquest was not achieved at the same time. The Vienna Act, and the two Paris pacifications which formed its basis and its complement, on the other hand, freed a large part of Germany from the direct dominion, and a much larger part from the controlling influence, of Napoleonic France; while Sweden, whose 'satisfaction' in 1648 had included a considerable extent of German territory, was now finally restricted to her own shore of the Baltic. France, however, to the dissatisfaction of widespread patriotic feeling, still retained those German lands which she had acquired in pre-Revolutionary times and whose political life and sentiment she had since assimilated to her own.

Had national feeling in Germany itself, after unmistakably contributing an inspiring influence to the final stage of the conflict, come forth from the long struggle as an assured main factor of the national future? In order to answer this question, as we are called upon to answer it, there seems no necessity, in this place, for going back at length upon the causes which, by the time of the close of the Thirty Years' War, had reduced the Imperial authority to a shadow, or to enquire what measure of national patriotism proper had, in earlier times, mingled with the traditional reverence yielded to the idea and forms of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. The Hohenstaufen dynasty, by becoming absorbed in their Italian wars, in which after the close of the contention with the Papacy the German people had almost ceased to take any interest, had dissipated the loyal devotion that had rallied their vassals round the earlier Emperor-Kings. The Habsburgs, in their turn, had, almost from the first, refused to subordinate their dynastic ends to the demands of their Imperial position. Thus, as the Middle Ages drew towards

their close, while the Emperor claimed an authority theoretically sovereign, and while this claim was nominally acknowledged by all the Electors, Imperial Princes, Counts, Knights and Towns composing the 'starry choir' around him, he was, as a matter of fact, without means for performing any of the functions—above all that of defence—incumbent upon a sovereign ruler. Finally, during the long and inglorious reign of Frederick III, the Imperial authority sank to a nadir perhaps not again reached—for, in the period immediately preceding the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the stolidity of Francis II, though quite on a par with that of Frederick III, was not, like his, due in part to sheer political impotence. Yet, even under Frederick III, the consciousness of the pristine grandeur of the Empire had not become utterly extinct, as is shown by the series of efforts for its reorganisation begun under his successor Maximilian I—on a basis, it is true, which might then fairly be called novel, and to which German statesmanship was to recur at the date from which the present narrative takes its start. The substance of the Imperial authority was, henceforth, to be no longer in the hands of the Emperor, but in that of a Council of the Empire (*Reichsrat*), composed of representatives of the Estates, to whom was to be entrusted the control of Imperial expenditure. That these early plans of federal reform fell to the ground was largely a consequence of the policy of 'the last German knight,' who was rarely known to care for a bargain with more sides than one.

Whether or not the history of the Empire and the solution of the problem of German national unity might have followed a different course, had the German patriotism of Maximilian I risen to the height of his dynastic aims or of his personal aspirations, it would be idle to discuss. His reign comprised the accomplishment of certain constitutional changes which, though they did not achieve the building-up

of a federal system of government, manifestly tended in this direction. The supreme judicial tribunal of the Empire (*Reichskammergericht*) was, in the matter of its composition, freed from dependence upon the arbitrary choice of the Emperor, and ultimately established in a fixed locality, instead of following him about, as hitherto, on his endless progresses. Furthermore, the division of the Empire into six, afterwards ten, Circles would have fulfilled its purpose of furnishing a useful machinery for the preservation of the public peace, had there been a supreme authority capable of enforcing the measures taken to that end. No system of taxation for Imperial objects—more especially that of defence—was actually set up; though in the following reign (that of Charles V) its place was inadequately supplied by the unwarranted use of a calculation devised for a campaign that was never fought—which calculation (*matricula*) continued in use so long as the Empire was in existence.

Meanwhile, however, German affairs, or affairs concerning the nation at large, were ceasing to occupy Mary of Burgundy's consort, mainly intent as he was upon laying the foundations of the world-monarchy which his grandson Charles V actually united under his sway. This vast design and its execution included neither the restoration nor the extension of the authority of the Holy Roman Empire, but was essentially confined to the establishment, within ever widening limits, of the dynastic power of the House of Habsburg. When the unprecedented opportunities of the Reformation—to be surpassed only by those of the Revolutionary era—were added to the openings afforded by the general political unrest of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, few German Princes omitted to take advantage of these chances for their own aggrandisement. It cannot be gainsaid that, in a sense, this concourse and conflict of ambitions helped, actually or prospectively, to free the nation as a whole from the despotic control of one preponderant power; but the

course of unity could not but be further impeded, and its advance retarded, by the process. And, in the meantime, the one great national opportunity of the Reformation itself was missed—the union of the Empire through and in a reformed religious faith which the vast majority of its population had already spontaneously adopted. Maximilian I could not make up his mind to what 'account to turn' the audacity of the Wittenberg monk; Frederick the Wise of Saxony was unable to summon the moral courage without which wisdom is naught, when the Imperial crown, and with it the future of the German Reformation, were almost within his grasp; Charles V, not unnaturally, and his successors after him, threw in their lot with Rome and the religious reaction. Thus, the Reformation, and the Counter-reformation which followed, virtually brought about a violent dismemberment of the Empire, which nothing short of an internecine struggle could either end or adjust; while, the glad tidings of the personal freedom of all religious opinion not having yet dawned upon the Christian world, the principle sanctioned by the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) announced itself as the issue to be decided in the great conflict awaiting the nation. *Cujus regio ejus est religio:* the God of battles must decide to whom, with the supreme lordship of the soil, should fall the choice of the faith of the souls upon it.

The Thirty Years' War, provoked, in the first instance, by a religious quarrel which native and foreign ambition rapidly developed into a political conflict, passed through a long succession of violent phases before it settled down, so far as Germany itself was concerned, into an aimless and hopeless continuance of strife. At one time, after the overthrow of the great Calvinistic (Palatine) design and the defeat of the first Northern (Danish) intervention, it seemed as if, in the breathless days of the Edict of Restitution, the pious Ferdinand II would succeed

in combining the process of Catholic recovery with the gratification of the most ambitious desires of his own House, and as if the Reaction might go far towards accomplishing at least a religious unity such as the Reformation had proved unable to bring to pass. But the Swedish liberator had swept away these daydreams; and so extraordinary had been the change effected by his victories that, for a moment, his conquests had, in their turn, appeared likely to unite North and South-West, and perhaps even South-East, under the hegemony of his strong arm and far-reaching statesmanship. But these striking passages of the contest were half-forgotten, and the greater part of the Empire had become a mere camping-ground for the troops of its invaders, their allies and their adversaries. When the War was at last over, its course and the conditions of the Peace which closed it left Germany, indeed, exempt from any future peril of absolute despotism, and fairly within reach of what political philosophers of the future might describe as her next constitutional stage—that of an aristocracy, formed by princes and potentates of the Empire and including even rulers of foreign states. In other words, the idea of Imperial or national unity of any sort or kind had become strange to sovereigns and populations alike, and Germany was no longer anything but a group of territories nominally united by a traditional bond, but in reality each of them autonomous, and possessed of the acknowledged right of concluding alliances with foreign Powers. The unity which was thus practically renounced cannot, in truth, be said to have been any longer an object of desire to the nation or to any part of it; the consolidation of the strength of particular states and their consequent progress to political independence and power was already becoming the great endeavour of the age; while the democratic revolution and the emancipation of the individual intellect remained problems to be solved by later times.

In the period which ensued—the second half of the seventeenth century—the golden age, as it has been called, of petty princedom and particularist policy is seen already setting in; but it was not so completely without examples of the survival either of Imperial traditions or of national sentiment as is sometimes supposed. But such incidents were either isolated or, as in the case of the later among the leagues and alliances of the period, called forth by direct French aggression, not to be encountered except by combined measures of defence. Towards the close of the century and during the protracted wars which followed, the freshly-gained glories of the House of Austria reacted upon its position in Germany, and the Emperor perceived to how many remembrances of the past he might still appeal. Above all, he still vindicated his claim to hold the Eastern Mark of the Empire as the chief defender of Germany and of Western Christendom at large against the Turk; and, though a Polish King immortalised himself by driving back the invaders from the gates of Vienna, it was under the Imperial standard that a series of latter-day crusades overran and recovered regions which earlier generations had allowed to fall under Ottoman dominion. In the period of the great war which, notwithstanding the brilliant victories of the Emperor's arms and of those of his British ally, ended with the frustration of his House's hope of securing the entire Spanish dominions, the Habsburg possessions were widely extended both east and south, and the sword of Prince Eugene successively added to them the whole of the long-disputed lands of Hungary and Transylvania, the now 'Austrian' Netherlands and Lombardy.

Simultaneously, however, Austrian statesmanship was far from neglectful of the possibility of recovering, in some respects at all events, part of the ascendancy in Germany which the House of Habsburg had lost by the sinking

of the Imperial authority. It is obvious in what directions this endeavour would most effectively, if not always most openly, be carried on. The Emperor, it must be remembered, still remained the supreme fountain of honour within the Empire—a fact of which the significance might, for instance, be illustrated by the story of the efforts made by the ducal House of Hanover to obtain its long-desired investment with the electoral dignity. Again, the Imperial service, both military and civil, could not but attract to it members of the German nobility not descended from families domesticated within the Habsburg dominions; and thus the Imperial (or Austrian) interest was continually reinforced by men drawn into it, primarily, by personal considerations. Moreover, the Imperial jurisdiction had not been suppressed when the Emperor's political supremacy dwindled; and the Imperial Cameral Tribunal (*Reichskammergericht*), which had been established under Maximilian I for the maintenance of the perpetual Peace of the Realm (*Landfrieden*), and of which the Emperor named the presidents, carried on its work with regularity, though not with promptitude; while the Imperial Aulic Council (*Reichshofrat*), which was nominated anew by each Emperor on his accession, maintained a more or less parallel jurisdiction. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the fidelity which, in good times as in bad, the House of Austria had as a rule exhibited towards the Church of Rome and her interests, and the concession to her clergy, down to a late period in the history of the House, of a continuous control over the intellectual as well as the spiritual life of its subjects, had not gone unrewarded. Thus, no modern Investiture conflict had interrupted the complete harmony between Empire and Papacy in the matter of appointments to the great sees and other ecclesiastical foundations in the Catholic parts of the Empire; and their occupants, who had seat and vote at the Diet, even when

without territorial power, were able to advance the interests of the Emperor and of the Imperial House in many ways, open or secret.

The Emperor's advisers, fully cognisant alike of the elements of authority and influence remaining to him and of the difficulty of reconciling his authority as head of the Empire with his interests as a territorial ruler, entered, in the reigns of Leopold I and Charles VI, into a course of action which, in a measure, anticipated the centralising endeavours of much later days. The purpose of these efforts was to consolidate, while it was yet time, the component parts of the Habsburg monarchy into a single state with a German centre. Before the effectiveness of these attempts could be tested, they were rudely interrupted by a series of events and transactions which entirely changed the future of German history. The House of Austria, in the person of a heroic Princess, weathered the storm which, at one time, had threatened both to uproot its dynastic power, and to put an end to the lien which, in defiance of deadly jealousy on the part of some of its German neighbours, and in the face of a continent in arms, it had maintained upon the Imperial succession. The House of Wittelsbach had, in the days of the Elector Maximilian Emmanuel (1679–1726), come to revive its earlier ambitions; since he had looked forward to the possession of the Spanish Netherlands, of which he held the governorship, and more especially since his son the Electoral Prince Joseph Ferdinand had, by the second will of King Charles II, been declared heir of the entire Spanish monarchy. The hand of fate had closed this brilliant prospect; but, during the War of the Spanish Succession, Bavaria had maintained a close alliance with France. In 1740, the death of the Emperor Charles VI suggested to the Elector Charles Albert the twofold design in which the historic ambition of the Wittelsbachers culminated—namely, that of supplanting the House of Habsburg

on the Imperial throne, and at the same time depriving it of the greater part of the Austrian hereditary lands, on which its enduring tenure of the Imperial dignity was really based. Charles VII, however, lost the game, and the Peace of Füssen (April 1745), by which he at last recovered his electorate, for ever excluded Bavaria from the German hegemony. With a well-trained and fairly numerous army, a full treasury and a great man at the head of her affairs, she might perhaps have secured a different result, if not so signal a one as that compassed by one of her allies. For, by the side of the House of Austria, and in its despite, a wholly new position was, within a marvellously short time, gained, both in the Empire and among the European Powers, by a dynasty which hitherto had never claimed to hold more than a secondary place in European politics, and which, even in Germany, had only within the last century stood forth as the most resolute, as well as one of the most considerable, among the electoral houses. The new kingdom of Prussia had now proved itself capable of holding its own—and what it had made its own—against threefold odds. A thrill—if the word suffices to express a feeling which expanded indefinitely as it arose, and at the same time deepened down to the roots of the national being—had pervaded the very marrow of German life; and the military achievements of the Seven Years' War had awakened, not indeed a steady and sustained patriotic determination (how could they have called forth this?), but a national selfconsciousness, such as had been unknown to German experience since the days, now half-legendary, of an earlier Frederick the Second and his grandsire.

In a word, the dualism had been called into existence which was destined to dominate German history, with few intervals, for rather more than a century, and, during that time, to form at once the indispensable condition of the achievement of any kind of German political unity, and

the irremovable obstacle in the way of any unity which could command continuous acceptance. And, as it were at the same instant, the German national movement, as one of principle and sentiment—however slow and intermittent its progress might prove to be—had actually begun[1].

No attempt will be made, either in these introductory pages or elsewhere in this work, to advance or insinuate the seductive theory that the 'German mission' of Prussia is manifest from the first appearance in history of the nucleus of the Prussian monarchy of the future, or even from the attainment by that monarchy under Frederick the Great to political prominence in Germany and Europe. No such theory or view can bear the simple test of juxtaposition with some of the leading events of Prussian history up to the time of the great King. Prussia, the land of the German Knights, the growth and greatness of whose Order exhibit a religious and political current to which the German North and South were alike contributory, fell, in due course, into the modern system of states, as a temporal and hereditary duchy under Albert of Hohenzollern, after he had divested himself of the High-mastership of the Order, and had, at the same time, accepted, in a sharply defined form, the Lutheran Reformation. Duke Albert's heritage passed to the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns, who, notwithstanding that the great majority of their subjects were Lutherans, themselves, before long, adopted the Calvinistic form of belief. It was not till the reign of the Great Elector —after the Thirty Years' War and the severance from the Brandenburg-Prussian state of the most important part of its Pomeranian acquisition—that the bond of vassalage tying the duchy of Prussia to the Polish Crown was broken. Most of the possessions of his House, which were scattered from the Rhine to the Elbe, Oder and Vistula, had suffered,

[1] F. K. von Moser's book *Von dem deutschen Nationalgeist* was, as Meinecke has pointed out, published in 1766.

as terribly as had any other part of Germany, from the ravages of the Great War; but his own perspicacious and resolute statecraft had brought him safely through all dangers and complications, and, though he had been prevented from carrying to a conclusion his victorious enterprise of freeing his dominions from the encumbrance of the Swedish interloper, the state which he had found weak and shattered he left behind him strong and self-confident. It is true that, in his last testament, he subdivided among his descendants the dominions which he had extended, and the government of which his hand had held together in an unfaltering grasp; and that he named as his executor the head of the House of Austria, which had done less than nothing to further his political designs. His eldest son, after laying hands, in spite of the paternal disposition, on the entire inheritance, raised himself to the rank of a king, though without incorporating with his electorate and remaining dominions the territory from which he took his regal title. But the administrative system which both he and his predecessor had carefully elaborated, and which the singleminded energy of his successor, Frederick William I—equally alive to the military and to the financial needs of his state—brought to a condition of great efficiency, for most practical purposes blended the aggregate into a whole.

Thus was prepared the reign of the great King, whose piercing insight and iron nerve enabled him to seize a unique opportunity, and to preserve, in the teeth of the most formidable combination of foes, the rewards of his unscrupulous daring. After he had succeeded in raising his aggrandised monarchy to a wholly new level of political power and influence, he perfected the working of the state-machine which his predecessors had handed down to him; and, what is more, he infused into all the servants of his state an active sense of responsibility towards

it, as embodied in himself as its chief servant. Unfortunately for the future both of his own kingdom and of Germany at large, his reign was not to end without his having added to his dominions his share in the partition of Poland—a transaction planned by him against the judgment of the brother (Prince Henry), whose political insight and military ability, had his opportunities been equally favourable, might have proved hardly inferior to the King's own. Henceforth, there remained the awkward fact—in later days confessed to be such by the greatest political genius that guided the fortunes of Prussia after Frederick the Great—that the Prussian state, whose essentially German character had hitherto stood in marked contrast to the miscellaneous texture of the Austrian monarchy, now included, together with its German or thoroughly Germanised populations, an ungermanised Slav element. It has been proclaimed as a distinctly German feature in the policy of Frederick the Great, that he bequeathed to his successors the duty of continuously increasing the extent and power of the Prussian monarchy; but it must not be overlooked that, as a matter of fact, the latest increase effected by himself, like the still larger additions made under his successor by the policy of Hertzberg, materially augmented the non-German population of the kingdom. It need hardly be said that this remark has no application to the systematic encouragement by the Hohenzollerns, from the Great Elector to Frederick II himself, of the immigration of foreigners whose industrial and commercial activities could not otherwise than beneficially affect the economic advance of Prussia itself. The countenance given by the Great Elector and King Frederick I to the settlement in Brandenburg-Prussia of French Huguenots of the middle and upper middle classes, entirely accorded with the religious tolerance which formed one of the truest glories of the dynasty; under Frederick II, also, considerable numbers

of foreign industrials, including numerous Rhinelanders and Palatines, immigrated—largely for conscience' sake—into the various provinces of the Prussian monarchy. During the years, from 1763 to 1777, Silesia alone is said to have received an accession of 30,000 inhabitants of this description. On the other hand, it is impossible to recognise in the purely domestic policy of Frederick the Great a prescience of the ideas of Stein, or of the measures founded on them, by which Prussia ultimately fitted herself for the leading part played by her in the liberation of Germany. Sybel allows that Frederick left the nobility (which, to be sure, had laid him under a deep debt of service) in the enjoyment of their inherited privileges, the towns hampered by multiform conditions of dependence, and the peasantry unenfranchised in a state of serfdom. The liberty of unlicensed printing allowed by him extended, in point of fact, only to matters of science, which he knew to be politically harmless, and to questions of religion, to which he was personally indifferent.

Still, whether consciously or not, the Prussian dominions were, by the relentless hand and the unceasing vigilance of the mightiest of his race, with the aid of machinery provided for him by his predecessors and under the control of a will inborn in himself, welded into a monarchy firm and coherent, albeit not geographically compact. Meanwhile, his younger but less fortunate rival, seated on the Imperial throne, was unable to achieve similar results in the yet more difficult conditions to which he had to address himself. The aspiring mind of Joseph II had in vain been filled with admiration for the organising powers of the sovereign whom the Emperor's highminded mother never forgave his initial act of spoliation. All the provinces of his composite monarchy were, according to Joseph II's earliest declaration, 'to form a single whole'; and, in all of them, the resources of the population were to be applied to one object—the

maintenance and advancement of the power of Austria. Inasmuch as the Empire, and the remnants of power or influence still possessed by it, were by Joseph II looked upon merely as means for increasing the authority of his own dynasty, the changes proposed by him in its framework met with uncompromising resistance from Frederick II. But the great Prussian King was very far indeed from pursuing, for his own part, a German policy based on any counter-ideas of constructive reform. The much-discussed League of Princes (*Fürstenbund*), called into life by Frederick, was intended merely as a move in the game carried on by him, as a matter of course, against the Austrian schemes. Nor could the effort (and it was, in truth, but a feeble one) made, after his death, to render this League the foundation of a genuine federal reform have even the faintest prospect of success, so long as Prussia and her allies declined to contemplate any organic change in the moribund Diet of the Empire. The voice of Duke Karl August cried in the wilderness, and he was coldly reminded by the Government of his kinsman the Saxon Elector that 'the purpose of the League of Princes was the preservation, not the amendment, of the Constitution of the Germanic Empire.' Well might a historian of even Johannes von Müller's limited measure of independence declare that this was to proclaim to the world a stagnation which must inevitably be followed by decomposition.

The German question, then—if it be possible to speak of a German question at a time when, as a problem of practical politics, it was ignored by nearly the whole of the German nation—had changed its character when Prussia had become a rival whose growth into a Great Power Austria had been unable to prevent, and when the dualism of Germany had thus been openly declared. Little was, as yet, said about the consequences for the whole nation, present or future, of this dualism, which had thus become one of the conditions

of its existence. Indeed, though German ways of thought and feeling were, in literature more especially, beginning at this very time to assert their claim to recognition as such, Germany, as a political idea, was still very rarely present to the minds of her own sons—and even more rarely as a political reality. Schiller is said to have been unable to find in Frederick the Great inspiration enough for applying to him the gigantic task of idealisation; nevertheless, the heroic conduct of the Seven Years' War and, more especially, the concrete experience of Frederick's victories over Frenchmen and Russians, as well as over the alien, half-Eastern troops in the Austrian service, most certainly suggested to many a German in all parts of the country that it could both command and use great moral and material resources of its own. This consciousness cannot be dissociated from the general advance of intellectual activity and the notable expansion of intellectual interests which marked German life from the third quarter of the eighteenth century onwards, and more especially from the latter part of this period. The advance in question is perceptible, not only in the chosen domicile of the *Aufklärung*, Berlin, but also in several of the small German Courts, among which Weimar by no means stood alone as a chosen home of literary culture—Gotha, and again Mannheim and Karlsruhe, may, in different ways, be mentioned by its side, although the harvest reaped in these centres may have been relatively slight. Bavaria had made a sustained effort for the advance of popular intelligence under the peaceful rule of Maximilian III Joseph; but in the next reign, that of Charles Theodore (1777–99), after the rise of the *Illuminati*, a kind of offshoot of the Freemasons, had been followed by their formal suppression, the reaction prevailed. Austria, meanwhile, continued, as she had throughout the century, to remain more or less outside the range of German intellectual life. The gradual growth of what, for the first time after long

centuries of decline, could really claim to be called a national imaginative literature, would hardly have been possible without the nascent consciousness of which we have spoken, and could not fail to strengthen it very materially. It was fostered by the noteworthy growth of periodical literature, which, in the age from Gottsched to Lessing, facilitated the intercommunion of thought, and encouraged freedom of comment and criticism. And it found direct expression in the aspiring lyrics of Klopstock, whose sentimentality could not impair the elevating force of his influence, and in Lessing's powerful comedy of real life, as well as in his endeavours to lay the foundation of a national theatre. It made ready the way for the advent of a great poet, Schiller, whose idealising creations in the end evoked the responsive enthusiasm of a whole nation. And, rather earlier, from an enthusiastic band of writers, intent upon new conquests in a world bounded by no limits terrestrial or celestial, there issued forth the master-spirit of German literature, who seemed to embody, together with the unwearying intellectual activity, the lyric emotion, the soaring fancy and the unfaltering faith in the perfectibility of human nature, which stirred the inmost heart of Goethe's compatriots.

But no ways were either sought or found for turning to account the growing national selfconsciousness which warmed itself at the literary hearth, so as to aid in preserving or reviving the principle of common action on the part of the nation at large, if only so far as to provide for its security and independence as against foreign encroachments. Everywhere, the middle and lower classes remained wholly devoid of that sense of political responsibility which is inseparable from the possession of some share in the task of government, while the upper classes stood aloof in uncompromising exclusiveness. Of the lesser Governments, the large majority had no thought beyond that of

maintaining their existing political relations with Austria and Prussia, or in some instances with foreign Powers, as supporting their own arbitrary authority. Some, in order to keep their expenditure on the level demanded by the vanity of the reigning Princes, saw no shame (since in this age all soldiers were mercenaries) in selling their subjects for service in Great Britain's American War. Others, it must be allowed, were desirous of proving that the benevolent despotism of the eighteenth century was by no means confined to the masters of great empires and kingdoms, but was eagerly practised by a considerable number of petty potentates. When the French Revolution came, these admirable rulers had their reward in hearing their subjects enquire where they could be better off than at home? This local contentment could not, however, be expected to foster national feeling, any more than special instances of misgovernment could suggest the general remedy of a coercive central authority. During all this time, the two German Great Powers confronted each other with steady jealousy, alike intent upon a self-aggrandisement of which expiring Poland still seemed the obvious victim-in-chief, but which also, in at least one signal instance, with good reason inspired continued fears within the borders of the Empire. (Austria's designs upon Bavaria were far from having been definitely abandoned at Teschen.) Into this heavily charged atmosphere fell the thunderbolt of the French Revolution.

It was not in response to public feeling in the German nation or as champions of its joint interests that the Emperor Francis I and King Frederick William combined for resistance against the propagandist advance of the French Republic, and that, for the first time after a long interval of hostility or suspicion, an active cooperation appeared to have been established between Austria and Prussia. No doubt, the sympathetic interest with which, in its

earlier stages, the French Revolution had been welcomed by a large section of the German public, and more especially by its intellectual leaders, had soon, except in certain western localities, made room for a very different kind of feeling. But the Conference of Pillnitz (August 25th to 27th, 1791) was a meeting of sovereigns whose common ground, though clearly set forth, was narrow, and whose mutual jealousy needed a stronger motive to counteract its continued growth than their joint adherence to the monarchical principle. Neither the Austrian army nor the populations of the Austrian dominions could find aught that was natural or fitting in a Prussian alliance; and the Prussian commanders were only too glad to excuse their own shortcomings by the more conspicuous incapacity of the Imperial generals. Moreover, the German policy of the House of Habsburg continued to be, actually as well as traditionally, opposed to the interests of Prussia; the scheme of the acquisition of Bavaria, as already hinted, still hovered before the vision of Austrian statesmen, and its latest phase was an exchange of Bavaria for Alsace and Lorraine with the Palatine House, so soon as these provinces should have been wrested from France.

The Empire, as such, did not declare war against France till eighteen months after the Declaration of Pillnitz; and, within less than two years, during which there was much tension between the allies, the King of Prussia, while parading on paper his character of *co-état de l'Empire*, concluded his separate peace with France at Bâle. By reason of his refusal to employ his troops for the defence of the Netherlands, he had forfeited the English subsidies (originally accepted by him under the pressure of the Polish insurrection of 1794). In the next month of the same year (1795), a line of demarcation was drawn, which declared the neutrality of northern Germany, in the war continued by its southern moiety against France. The

action of Prussia, it is virtually certain, had been largely determined by her knowledge of intrigues carried on against her by Austria. But, though this was the case, and though, for the time, her separate peace undeniably placed Prussia in a position of considerable advantage over that of the two other Eastern Powers, her alliance with Austria had, from the first, been a combination of rivals, not of friends. The decade of neutrality which hereupon followed for northern Germany (1796–1806) undoubtedly brought its blessings, as does every period of peace; and a great historian[1] has not deemed it amiss to reckon among these the fact that time was thus given for the full growth of the glories of the classical era of German literature.

But Prussia was not content with having, by the adoption of a policy of neutrality, freed herself from the necessity of following the lead of the other two Eastern Powers. After Austria had been promised, in some of the secret articles of the Peace of Campo Formio (1797), compensatory gains in certain neighbouring states, Prussia, at the Congress of Rastatt in the same year, manœuvred successfully for the prevention of an enduring pacific settlement between the Emperor and France. Soon, these two Powers were again at war, the Emperor posing as a liberator in whom an imaginative south-western patriotism could even discern the future ruler and regenerator of a *Kleindeutschland* on the southern banks of the Main[2]. Bavaria, which, notwithstanding the intrigues with Austria of the Elector Charles Theodore, had fared ill at Campo Formio, had, under the new Elector Maximilian IV Joseph (1799–1825) and his Minister Montgelas, become more friendly to France; though for some time it was peace, or at all events neutrality, which

[1] Ranke, who notes that Karl August of Weimar was the earliest German Prince to seek inclusion in the Neutrality.

[2] *Ideen eines patriotischen Deutschen* (1799). Cf. Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs*, etc., vol. I, p. 57.

they had at heart. In 1800, the Bavarian Government still thought itself obliged to conclude subsidy treaties with England; nor was it till after the defeat of the Austrian arms at Hohenlinden that it sought to enter into friendly relations with France, which the fear of further Austrian schemes of territorial acquisition soon converted into an *entente*, and ultimately into an alliance.

In 1801, the Emperor, on his own behalf and on that of the Empire, concluded peace with France at Lunéville; and the Imperial Government consented to the cheap sacrifice of the entire left bank of the Rhine, as well as to a prospective rearrangement of the whole territorial system of the Empire. The article providing for the compensation in other parts of the Empire of those hereditary, i.e., temporal, Princes who had been deprived of possessions on the left bank of the Rhine implied a sanction of the principle of secularisation, the application of which had first occurred to Hardenberg in the course of the negotiations preceding the Peace of Bâle. With the active concurrence of the two German Great Powers, who, necessarily, were the largest gainers by these proceedings, and under the 'mediation' of France and Russia—practically, under the direction of a commission appointed by the French First Consul and his diplomatist-in-chief, Talleyrand—a radical territorial reorganisation of Germany was, hereupon, carried through; and the notorious *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* of 1803 legalised a dynastic revolution which the reconstructed Imperial edifice as a whole could not possibly long survive. In accordance with an ominous clause of the Lunéville Treaty, the whole, or virtually the whole, of the spiritual principalities in the Empire were wiped out as with a sponge, in order, together with all but six of the fifty-one Free Imperial Cities and their territories, to form the material for 'compensations' which heavily outweighed the losses they were supposed to meet, and which, with a ruthless

cynicism unparalleled in modern political history, were made perpetual by a law of the Empire. The two great monarchies, as observed, were the principal gainers, and, next to them, the states of secondary importance, beginning with Bavaria, which absorbed six bishoprics, besides a number of abbacies and Free Towns; though, probably no south-western potentate was treated so well as the Margrave of Baden, who had recently concluded peace with France on his own account. (By favour of Russia, the see of Osnabrück was made over to Hanover.) How actively the smaller potentates exerted themselves in the scramble, may be deduced from the statement that the Duke of Nassau incorporated in his dominions, which thus came to amount to a total of eighty-five square miles, fragments of not less than seven-and-thirty formerly independent principalities and powers. Hardenberg, therefore, hardly said too much when, writing of the date 1804, he asserted that there then existed in Germany not a shadow of unity or common spirit, everyone only taking care of himself as he best might.

The time might seem to have come for the form, too, to be broken, out of which the spirit had fled. The end was, in truth, near at hand, although it was not yet. On August 4th, 1804, the Emperor Francis, following the example of the new Charlemagne, whose resistless star seemed at once to defy and to invite emulation, assumed the style of Francis I Emperor of Austria, without, however, as yet resigning the paramount dignity already held by him. For a little longer than another year, the mockery of the Holy Roman Empire dragged on its worse than meaningless existence; the Imperial Diet continued to have its meeting-place at Ratisbon; and the Imperial Cameral Tribunal forbore from committing formal suicide at Wetzlar.

But at last, and with a sudden stir, the sands ran out in the glass. When Napoleon announced himself as the champion of what remained of the Empire, all men—except

when they chose, like Goethe, to indulge in moments of imaginative speculation—perceived the real meaning beneath the pretence. In 1805, when making war upon Austria, in conjunction with the ruler of Bavaria (who had at last definitively chosen his side, and who united the destinies of his electorate to those of France by a dynastic as well as political tie), and those of Württemberg and Baden, Napoleon declared that he had drawn the sword for the independence of Germany, and in defence of the Constitution of the Germanic Empire. Neither the Prussian nor the Austrian Government of the time possessed the vigour which would have been necessary for the conclusion of an alliance between them; and the opportunity was thus lost of making a joint resistance while there was still time, and of uniting northern and southern Germany, at all events for the purpose of war, under the leadership of Prussia and of Austria respectively. As for Prussia, before the year was out, Napoleon had offered her Hanover, as the price of her alliance with himself. He had permitted her to hold that country for a short time, after which she had been weak enough to allow him, without any resistance on her part, to occupy it with his troops. In the meantime, the sun of Austerlitz had shone upon the overthrow of the twice-crowned Emperor and his Russian ally; and, in the Peace of Pressburg (December 26th, 1805), Francis I and II acknowledged the absolute sovereignty of the new Kings —Kings by the grace of Napoleon—whose dominions had been enlarged to adequate dimensions by their share of the plunder. This, in the case of Bavaria, included Tyrol. Talleyrand's scheme of a *troisième Allemagne* seemed to have some chance of realisation, and the sanction of Goethe was given to the long-lived but futile idea of a German *Trias*, in which a South-German Confederation under Bavarian leadership should prevent the preponderance of Austria and Prussia. But Napoleon preferred a more direct expedient;

and, in July 1806, the representatives of sixteen German Princes signed, at Paris, the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine (*Rheinbund*), in which they renounced their membership of the Empire and thereby precipitated its inglorious end. The list of these Princes included the names of the Kings of Bavaria (after some hesitation) and Württemberg, as well as that of the Grand-duke of Baden. It is quite possible that, among the members of this new Confederation, the foundation of which would have been almost inconceivable but for the fatal discord between the two German Great Powers, there were some who had intended that the league should be established on their own conditions and without any formal secession on their part from the still existent Empire. But Napoleon was not a 'Protector' to be dealt with after this fashion, or, indeed after any but that of accepting his absolute dictation. Indeed, while Bavaria and certain other larger states had to accept the new federal scheme as he proposed it to them, the lesser states were not made acquainted with the Act till the very day on which their representatives were called upon to sign it. And now (on August 6th, 1806), after an intimation from the Emperor of the French that he had ceased to recognise the Germanic Empire, its nominal head, the Emperor Francis, proclaimed its dissolution. Its end was brought about by the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and nothing could be more idle than to waste indignation upon the formal recognition of the inevitable.

Thus, already in 1806, Germany, even more distinctly than in later days, when her tripartite division was long a principal feature in the political situation, was divided into three rival groups. It was, therefore, far from wonderful, though the device, like the less notable scheme of a South-Western Confederation, has perhaps not received much attention, that the thought should have suggested itself of giving a clearer form and a firmer coherence to the one

group of the three with which (considering the recent disastrous experiences of Austria and the alien protectorship to which the Confederates of 'the Rhine' had subjected themselves) the best hopes for the future of Germany might seem to lie. After Napoleon had, in the Agreement of Schönbrunn (December 15th, 1805), insidiously[1] made over Hanover to Prussia in exchange for the remote and scattered possessions of Wesel, with part of Cleves, and Neuchâtel, Ansbach being at the same time ceded to Bavaria, the Prussian Government was, for a time, occupied with the scheme of a North-German Confederation under Prussian headship. It bears a superficial resemblance to the plan of that other North-German Confederation out of which, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the new German Empire was, ultimately, to grow; but the fundamental difference between the two designs needs no comment. Haugwitz's policy at the time was an alliance between the contemplated North-German Confederation and Napoleon, who signified his approval of the design, or at least seemed to do so. Austria, too, appeared to favour the proposal; and the Emperor Francis opined that the execution of it had been facilitated by his resignation of the headship of the Holy Roman Empire. But his goodwill was altogether Platonic. The notion was that the states of northern Germany which had formed part of the defunct Empire should be linked together by a federal bond. Prussia, Saxony and Hesse were to form the directory of the league, and the suggestion was actually made (it would seem by a French sympathiser) that the King of Prussia should assume the Imperial title. The tremendous catastrophe awaiting Prussia was soon to dissipate this daydream; but it would seem (though the

[1] He was, in fact, ready to return it to its lawful owner, if the question of Malta (the real *nodus* of his peace negotiations with England) could be successfully settled.

contrary has been asserted) that Saxony had not been unwilling to take the proposal into consideration, although Hesse-Cassel, characteristically, had counter-proposals which would have redounded to the advantage of nobody but its sovereign (now, by virtue of the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* of 1803, styled Elector of Hesse).

The fatal war with France broke out in October 1806, probably at the most unfavourable moment at which it could have been risked by Prussia. Actuated, as it would seem, by a desire that no doubt should remain of the bellicose mood into which he had suddenly entered, Haugwitz, who still directed Prussian policy, rushed into a war, of which he cannot have mistaken the hazard, and, instead of prolonging negotiations with France, sternly summoned her to withdraw her troops from German soil. When called to the Prussian headquarters, Gentz suggested a scheme of two allied Confederations under Austrian and Prussian headship; but there was no real confidence on either side, and Prussia had to fight alone, without the assistance even of Hesse-Cassel, while Bavaria furnished troops to her adversary. The Prussian army was commanded by a general (Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick) who, after taking up arms, continued to hope for peace. Indeed, the common belief that peace must soon again be made, disastrously influenced the subsequent conduct of the war after the first crushing defeats. The overrunning of the country followed, and then the unsuccessful attempt at a final stand with Russian aid; and the collapse of Prussia was declared by the Peace of Tilsit (July 7th and 9th, 1807), in which, as Hardenberg said, King Frederick William III lost everything but honour—and Tsar Alexander lost that. Prussia, no longer left with any will or policy of her own, was forced to become a partner in what was really an alliance between France and Russia against Great Britain. The dominions of the King of Prussia were reduced to less than one-half

of their former extent, and he was obliged to accept the Confederation of the Rhine and the inclusion in it of any future members. Saxony, to which had been transferred the greater part of the Polish possessions of Prussia, and which had been raised to the rank of a kingdom, speedily joined the Confederation of the Rhine, the Ernestine Dukes following the example of their Albertine kinsman, together with the Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and all the lesser Princes of the German north—with the exception of the Elector of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick. Their dominions, together with part of those ceded by Prussia and certain other territories, were formed into the kingdom of Westphalia, which in the following year (1808) likewise joined the Confederation. This now comprised a group of states about double in extent of that reached by the reduced kingdom of Prussia, and covered the whole of Germany except that kingdom and the Austrian monarchy, besides Swedish Pomerania and Holstein. From a constitutional point of view, perhaps the most noticeable fact with regard to this Confederation (to which it would be difficult to find anything like a close historical parallel) is that it completed the process for which the signal had been given at Lunéville, by annexing to the dominions of its several members the possessions of a large number (seventy-two) of petty Princes and Counts, as well as the whole of the lands hitherto held directly from the Empire by the Imperial Knights. Here was one of those Napoleonic lessons in political reform which no war and no peace could undo again, and which goes some way towards justifying the paradox of Gervinus, that Germany owed her earliest real chance of political unity to her conqueror.

We cannot pause to consider how the extraordinary political structure set up by Napoleon in the place of the fallen Empire was before long extended and, in part, unified by the Protector of the Confederation, according as

opportunities arose in the ruthless game which he played during these eventful years. In 1809, a surge of public opinion in the German provinces of the Austrian monarchy, such as is very rarely recorded in its history, induced, or helped to induce, the Government of Francis I to declare war anew against Napoleon; and the belief that the freedom of Europe had taken refuge under the Austrian standards found an echo even in the General Orders of Archduke Charles. Trodden down though Prussia was by the heel of the conqueror, she was, even after Wagram, disposed to ally herself with Austria; and, as it were after the eleventh hour, a scheme for the joint control of German affairs by the two Governments was momentarily taken up. But, before anything could come of these designs, Austria had once more been worsted in the conflict, and had concluded the Peace of Schönbrunn (October 14th, 1809)—a compact almost as humiliating as that of Tilsit. Bavaria (whose support Austria had at the last moment made a desperate attempt to gain) profited by some of the cessions imposed upon Austria, though she only with difficulty mastered the Tyrolese insurrection; while other portions of the monarchy (among them the great maritime outlet of Trieste) were directly incorporated in the French empire. And, in the following year (1810), the *réunions* carried out on behalf of that empire, with a cynical unscrupulousness surpassing that of Louis XIV himself, annexed considerable sections of the kingdom of Westphalia, including northern Hanover and the Hanse Towns, as well as the grand-duchy of Berg and the duchy of Oldenburg, to the French empire, of which they now became departments. This was the crowning outrage upon whatever remnants of patriotic sentiment still lingered among the inhabitants of these busy coasts; and the illwill provoked by the annexation and intensified by the endless petty extortions and persecutions which it inflicted upon victims not given to

forgetfulness survived unquenched till the hour of liberation drew near.

In the states forming the Confederation of the Rhine, as well as in the territories sooner or later incorporated in the French empire, the administrative system introduced by the new order of things necessarily varied according to the antecedents and actual conditions of each district. But all these territories had, for good or for evil, to undergo the experience of a forcible imposition of the principles of the French Revolution, in their Napoleonic form, the twofold purpose of rational improvement and official assimilation being everywhere simultaneously kept in view[1]. Most of the Confederated Governments, by means of a royal or princely fiat, made short work of the system of Estates to which their subjects, or sections of them, had been accustomed from time immemorial; and, where anything in the shape of a constitution had existed, it was ignored. Officialism ruled supreme; free speech and a free press alike were as impossible as they were in France itself. King Frederick I of Württemberg, the ancient constitution of whose inherited dominions called forth the admiration of British parliamentary politicians, abolished that venerable legacy of the past out of hand; and his example was speedily followed by the other principal Governments of the south-west. Conversely, so early as 1808, King Maximilian Joseph of Bavaria, on the advice of his minister Montgelas, the arch-reformer of a reforming age, followed the example set him by the proclamation of a constitution for the kingdom of Westphalia in the previous year, by

[1] In his doctor's dissertation (1808) young Börne speaks of the finger of fate as pointing to the consummation that Germany and France should form a single state. 'And how happy a state that would be were the German nation to be married to the French, and each to neutralise the other!' Oncken, *Historisch-politische Aufsätze* (1914), vol. 1, p. 265.

promulgating an improved copy for Bavarian use. It provided his subjects with an assembly elected on safe principles and endowed with very moderate powers; but this assembly was not convoked. Still, though a sham, like the Napoleonic constitutions in various parts of Europe which it resembled, it was not without influence in accustoming its recipients to the possession of a certain measure of political rights, and in commending to the subjects of other states, including Prussia herself, the expediency of political reforms. Exceptionally, meetings of the old Estates continued to be held in the kingdom of Saxony and in some of the Saxon duchies, which thus enjoyed a noticeable continuity in the tranquil conditions of their home politics.

The cup of humiliation might have seemed full when, at the meeting in Dresden in May 1812, Napoleon, before taking his departure for the Russian campaign, appeared almost literally as the head of all things. The Emperor and Empress of Austria seemed to fall into the second place below their son-in-law and daughter; the King of Prussia was anxiously avoided by his brother sovereigns in the brilliant assembly; the King of Saxony sat up all night, in order not to miss the farewell salutation of his august guest on the stairs. The causes were many which led to the extinction of all this glory by the catastrophe that swept away the Confederation of the Rhine and the Napoleonic system of which it was intended as a prop. But two among the causes in question should not be overlooked, apart from the unforeseen revulsion in Napoleon's fortunes which gave Germany her opportunity of recovery. The Napoleonic *régime* had been rendered intolerable by the constant strain upon the economical resources of the nation, and by the sacrifice of its very life's blood. These losses more than counterbalanced the advantages derived from many of the legal or administrative reforms which Napoleon's

rule or that of his vassals had introduced into various parts of Germany, and of the west in especial, and with which even the inner reorganisation of Prussia, and the infusion of democratic ideas into its monarchical organism, were not wholly unconnected. The economic privations to which German popular life at large had been subjected for the purposes of Napoleon's Continental System were becoming unbearable; and it was hardly within the limits of endurance that those who suffered from the hardships which this system imposed should patiently submit to them till the overthrow (continually postponed) of the power of Great Britain. To this was added, in Prussia, the oppressive burden of the war contributions, which, at one time, it had seemed as if nothing but the surrender of another province (Silesia) could shake off. But more cruel than all other taxes was that on human life. The sacrifices entailed by the Napoleonic levies rose to their height with the tremendous demands of this Russian expedition; and a continuance of the process must have entailed a permanent depletion of the manhood of the country[1].

Although, more particularly in the younger generation which had witnessed and, in some measure, taken part in, the great uprising against the Napoleonic rule, a considerable amount of misconception came to prevail as to the share which German national feeling had in the movement, there can be no doubt as to the fact of its cooperation. The Governments were not in the habit of taking this factor into account; we have seen how, in 1809, the Austrian Government had been unable to comprehend, more than in part, the general national significance of its own effort against Napoleon; and, when this was over, the Emperor,

[1] Thus, in the Russian campaign, nearly the whole of the Saxon, Bavarian, and Württemberg contingents—of about 20,000, 33,000 and 12,000 soldiers respectively—perished.

committing his affairs to the dexterous conduct of Metternich, had fallen back into his usual apathy—or assumption of it. Humboldt, who about this time was sent to Vienna as Prussian representative, found that, politically, there was little or nothing to do there but to look forward to better times. Austria and Prussia had each deserted the other at the critical moment, and, as in the instances of Hofer and Schill, each of the two Governments had abandoned its own subjects when these refused to despair.

But, in Prussia, a change, of which Metternich himself perceived indications, was gradually being brought about. The excessive caution of Frederick William III, nurtured by a secret self-distrust, made him extremely slow in allowing any exhibition of popular feeling to rouse him to action. But his nature was not perverse; persuasion was not wholly thrown away upon him; and, after he had once recognised what seemed to him the right course, he might be relied upon for a steady adherence to it. Thus, the feeling of readiness to rise, should opportunity occur, gradually matured itself in Prussia during the Russian war; it was shared by Hardenberg, who continuously kept in hand the threads of negotiation with the Tsar, and it found an open representative in Stein, to whom, at the decisive moment, Alexander committed the government of East and West Prussia, then occupied by Russian troops.

Stein was the earliest statesman to treat the German idea proper as a political motive and a political force; and it was only very gradually that it was under this aspect brought to the front. We should not forget, among other things, how little the curious blend of sentiment and reason, to which religion had mainly reduced itself in the Protestant, and to some extent also in the Catholic, population of eighteenth century Germany, was capable, without being quickened in some unusual way, of stimulating a national movement, such as priests and monks of the Roman Church

in Spain, and of the Greek in Russia, helped to bring about.

A well-known writer[1], whose touch on the beatings of the national pulse in the successive stages of German history is singularly sure, probably does not go too far in saying that, about the first decade of the nineteenth century, there was to be found in the greater part of Germany no other patriotism than that unextinguishable kind which has its origin in common characteristics of mental and moral disposition (*Gemüt*), and of language and literature. Even in the relatively limited circle of those who cherished and expressed a distinct belief in the future of the nation, the ideal was long cherished of a cosmopolitan culture, of which it was the mission of the German nation to be at once the leading formative agency and the most perfect actual representative. In literature, even when the earliest signs became apparent of the hold which the Romantic movement was to exercise over the German mind, this movement was tinged by some of the hues of the very cosmopolitanism against which it had declared war. So early as 1802, Ernst Moritz Arndt, in whom, in the days of the War of Liberation, the German public rightly recognised one of the most genuine, as he was one of the most outspoken, of national patriots, had printed a treatise setting forth his belief in the ideal of a united nation and state; but he had confessed that it was an ideal only. Fichte, who, after the Prussian collapse, had, almost (as has been said) within the sound of the French drums, dared to call upon the German nation to take counsel with itself, and to devote its best energies to its own regeneration, had not, by any means, lost sight of the earlier and more widespread ideas as to Germany's national destiny or mission. But, already when he spoke as a prophet (to use the word in its higher sense), he had reached the conclusion that the individual freedom

[1] Gustav Freytag, *Karl Mathy* (1870), p. 22.

upon the attainment of which philosophers and poets had formerly bid their countrymen concentrate their efforts was not enough, and that when secured it must still be regarded as but a step towards a fuller consummation. 'To realise this postulate of an imperial unity of all Germans—of a state, actually, organically and perfectly blended into one, is the mission of all Germans. With them, the establishment of the Empire must proceed from the full growth of personal, individual freedom—formed, first, in the individual citizen; next, in the several states to which they may at the time happen respectively to belong, and which, as mere means to a higher end, must themselves afterwards cease[1].' And, when the venture had been made, and the process of liberation begun, he saw still more clearly and spoke more plainly; and the lofty philosopher, who had compared the patriotic selfconsciousness of Austrians, Prussians or Saxons to the conceit of rustics whose eyes cannot see further than their own homesteads, bequeathed to the nation which he had helped to arouse to action the advice to aim at a national German state under Prussian headship.

Even, however, the teaching of Fichte, coupled with the new and legitimate interpretation given to Kant's categorical imperative, could not have sufficed to inspire the confidence with which Prussia, crushed and humiliated as she had been by the disasters of but a few years since and their consequences, set an example to the rest of Germany by taking up arms against the oppressor. It was to the great body of the middle classes—those classes whose feeling against military service had before 1806 been so marked—that the call to arms of 1813 must have seemed very specially to address itself, though not they alone had been affected by the great measures of reorganisation which had marked the last period of Prussian history. The educational reforms were already at work, helping to train

[1] Cf. Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (1908), pp. 111–5.

the intelligence and energy of the generation which must take its share in the struggle. Elementary education was being remodelled in accordance with the ideas of Pestalozzi; secondary was being reorganised, under the advice of such scholars as F. A. Wolf and J. W. Süvern, in the direction long followed by Prussian gymnasia; while university education entered into a new era of breadth and comprehensiveness by the foundation, in July 1809, of the University of Berlin —a foundation of which the national purpose was quite openly avowed. The moving genius in all these educational reforms was Wilhelm von Humboldt, who had in 1809 accepted the directorship of Public Worship and Education in the Ministry of the Interior at Berlin, and for a time, after Stein's dismissal, devoted himself to the administrative service of the state in the spirit of his revered friend. As to the great reforms of Stein himself, it should be remembered that they were conceived by one who was not a Prussian by birth, and whose loftiest political aspirations were concerned with the future of Germany as a whole, rather than with that of Prussia in particular. But what Stein did for Prussia was, in the first instance, to render her capable of taking the lead in the struggle for the liberation of Germany. He renovated the Prussian state by the abolition of serfdom and the establishment of municipal self-government, and by placing the system of land-tenure on a freer footing and making it no longer dependent on the privileges of a particular class. These reforms had been carried into execution before he was obliged to quit office and to leave it for Hardenberg, rather than for his own immediate successors, to take up, in happier times, the constitutional and financial parts of his work. But enough had been done to inspire the great body of the population with a confidence in the future of the state unknown in any previous period of its history; and this confidence had been increased by Scharnhorst's new system of military

service, which, half in secret, was preparing the people for a national war.

Under these and cognate influences, then, the great task of liberation was undertaken and carried through. A new generation was growing up that was being taught and teaching itself to throw aside the half-superstitious reverence for Napoleon and his irresistible star. Entering into alliance with Russia, Prussia as it were permitted herself to be forced into the struggle by a patriotic commander—the King consenting with great reluctance; even the statesmen at the head of affairs agreeing with very uncertain notions as to what, in the event of success, might be the issue of the venture; the masses following, partly by impulse, partly by compulsion, till in the end they, too, were carried away by the enthusiasm of the classes directly inspired by the ideas of the real leaders of the nation. Stein, it may be added, now held an international rather than a national position in the world of European politics; and it would therefore serve little purpose to attempt an analysis of his ideas concerning the relations between a new Germany and a reconstituted Europe; but, by his side, it was Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with Fichte and a select body of thinkers, teachers and poets, who really stood in the van[1]. The Treaty of Kalisch (February 28th, 1813), which gave the signal for joint action with Russia, was followed by a proclamation (the work of Karl Müller) from the Russian field-marshal 'to the Germans,' which promised the 'restoration of the German constitution in vigorous rejuvenation and unity, without foreign influences, solely by the German Princes and peoples and in accordance with the original spirit proper to the German nation.' The basis of the alliance was thus, as one might say, broadened with a will; and the same proclamation applied the principle thus announced by declaring the

[1] See a very notable article by H. Delbrück, *Neues über* 1813, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, July 1914.

Confederation of the Rhine dissolved. Of course, this declaration was absolutely unauthorised; but it sufficed without any formal repetition, inasmuch as the Confederation 'determined' of itself. On March 17th King Frederick William III issued the famous appeal 'To My People' (composed by Staatsrat T. G. von Hippel, the younger), which in few words sounded the true note of patriotic readiness for self-sacrifice. On the same day, the establishment of *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* was announced to the Prussian people. No sooner had the war begun than many hundreds of volunteers joined the Prussian armies from states which had not yet broken with France. But the Governments were far from being generally willing to fall in with the popular enthusiasm. It was not very long before the battle of Leipzig that Feuerbach's popular tracts brought down upon him the censure of the Bavarian Government; and in Württemberg an eminent privy-councillor (Jasmund) fell into similar disgrace because he had ventured to express to the King his pleasure at learning that his sovereign was about to take the patriotic side. During the earlier half of the year, the efforts of Napoleon to keep Austria to her neutrality continued; while, at Reichenbach and elsewhere, Prussian diplomacy was active in a contrary direction. In July, the abortive Congress of Prague was opened; and at last, on September 9th, after the Prussian campaigns had successfully proceeded, Austria was at Teplitz drawn more completely into the anti-Napoleonic Alliance. With much diplomatic skill, Metternich had contrived to come in late, but not too late. On October 8th, just before the critical conflict, the compact of Ried was finally concluded with Bavaria, where there was much hesitation on the part of the King, and much circumspection on the part of his minister Montgelas, but where popular feeling, represented by the Crown-prince Lewis, now prevailed. Wrede, in signing the treaty, was just in time; his gallant stand at

Hanau against the retreating Napoleon further cleared the situation; and Austria's judiciously conciliatory attitude towards Bavaria had at the same time saved her neighbour from being too late and put an end to the long-standing jealousy between the two monarchies. Not long afterwards, at Fulda, Württemberg came in; and treaties of adhesion were concluded with other Princes who had formerly been members of the Confederation of the Rhine[1]. Saxony alone (or virtually so), after a futile attempt to attach herself to Austria before the latter had abandoned her neutrality, was thrown back into the embraces of Napoleon; and was not able to emerge from them before the decisive conflict.

And now Leipzig had been fought, and Paris entered, and all Germany had shaken off the yoke of the foreigner; though, to be sure, Saxony was under the rule of a Russian governor-general, appointed by the Central Administration, which had been contemplated already at the conclusion of the Treaty of Kalisch, and which owed its name and the main lines of its scheme to Stein.

The original design of the Central Administration had been to place the lands which should be freed from French rule under a national authority representing Germany as a

[1] Klüpfel has justly pointed out that, by guaranteeing the sovereignty of Bavaria and Württemberg, Austria effectually closed the prospect of any controlling central authority being established for Germany at large. It may be well to note in this place that, although the collapse of the Confederation of the Rhine was complete, and although, in a considerable part of the territories which had accepted it, the symbol of the social sway of the great empire, the *Code Napoléon*, was swept away, it remained in force in the Prussian, Bavarian and Hessian Rhinelands. Even in those parts of Germany where the reaction against the French *régime* was most marked, certain reforms which owed their origin to it were not undone by its collapse—such as the abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction and some of the changes in the legal position of the Jews.

whole; but when, by the autumn, most of the states which had belonged to the Confederation of the Rhine had joined the Alliance against France, they were withdrawn from the control of this authority, which now only administered, besides Saxony, the grand-duchies of Frankfort and Berg, and a few petty principalities. Such had been the rapidity of the transformation of Germany that Stein's plan of pressing forward the unitarian principle, as it were by the way, had, almost of necessity, fallen through.

The great disturber of the peace of Europe lay, as his adversaries believed, safely interned in the iron island in the Mediterranean, and, as Stein said, 'it was now the day of small things and of mediocre men.' The Congress summoned to Vienna delayed its opening for a few months—till November 1st, 1814; but the diplomatists, who had now come uppermost, were busily at work during the earlier part of the autumn. Among them, no question was debated with more apparent determination to bring it to a settlement than that of the future of Germany and the conditions of her prospective constitution. The statesmen of Germany, as well as those of the Allied Powers with whose aid she had accomplished her liberation, were alike convinced that upon her security, more than upon any other factor in the political situation, depended the stability of the entire European system; and this conviction, which had already found expression in the writings of political thinkers, now became an axiom for practical application. Already at Chaumont, where the representatives of the four Allied Powers concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance of the highest importance for the future of European politics (March 1st, 1814; renewed March 25th, 1815, at Paris), a stipulation had been made that Germany should receive a federal constitution; and a further assurance was given in the First Peace of Paris (May 30th), which declared that the German states should be 'independent' (their sovereignty being thus in each

case assured) 'and united by a federal bond.' Popular feeling in Germany was already intent upon the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine; but, although this was advocated by the Hanoverian Count Münster (who might have been able to influence English opinion in its favour) and others, France was left with her frontiers as they had stood in 1792. On the other hand, the treaty of peace contained a provision that the states of Germany should be severally independent, and united by a federal bond. Thus, even before the Congress of Vienna began its deliberations, the European Powers had laid down conditions affecting the very essence of the political life of Germany; and it was only the prescience of Stein which preserved the question of the constitutional settlement of Germany from being treated, like other questions brought up for discussion by the Congress, simply as a matter concerning all the Great Powers alike. But this way of looking at the matter was never altogether waived; and, after the German Constitutional Act had been carried through its first stage, it was incorporated in the Final Act of the Congress. Metternich had been anxious (primarily, of course, in the interest of Austria) to secure what he regarded as a European guarantee and what was viewed in this light by the Great Powers. Attention has been directed[1] to the teaching on this subject of the eminent and patriotic historian Heeren, who deemed the preservation of German independence—the independence of a country weak in the offensive, but strong for defence—a European task, and therefore one which imposed upon Europe the duty of protecting a political creation necessary for her own protection! This reliance—in theory at all events—of a reconstituted Germany upon the goodwill of the European Powers, which no less a legal authority than the great Heidelberg civilist Thibaut wished to see extended to a joint guarantee by them of the code of laws

[1] By Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

which, as he hoped, would be promulgated by the new Germanic Confederation—was, as will be seen later, to prove in some respects the reverse of advantageous to Germany.

For the present, however,—even before the Congress of Vienna actually assembled—Stein had succeeded in inducing the Allied Powers to entrust the settlement of the future German Constitution to a Committee of five German states —Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hanover; and this Committee at once entered upon the deliberations which it regularly continued after the opening of the Congress. Austria and Prussia had, in the meantime, carried on separate discussions, and agreed upon a draft (really the reduction of the second draft proposed by Prussia), which, on October 16th, 1814, Metternich presented to the Committee of Five. No more need be said here about these earlier deliberations or the schemes propounded in them; of the changes through which, as they succeeded to one another, even Stein's strong will and lofty patriotism passed; of the devices for reconciling the official primacy of Austria with a reasonable recognition of the claims of Prussia to a leading share in the executive[1], or of futile notions of solving the difficulty by excluding both the Great Powers from the hegemony. The idea of restoring the Germanic Empire, which Stein had mooted and which Humboldt had opposed at Teplitz, was not encouraged by Austria, though, as we shall see, it found less responsible supporters; the present task was really how to formulate a fairly satisfactory treatment of the federal expedient[2]. Humboldt, whom

[1] The scheme prematurely propounded in a *mémoire* by Karl August's aide-de-camp at Vienna, Ottokar Thon, of uniting Germany under Prussian headship, was of course unofficial. At Vienna no statesman (unless perhaps Stein in one of his moods) ever entertained the idea of the exclusion of Austria from the Confederation.

[2] The secondary plan of the coronation of the Emperor of Austria as such, was approved by Metternich, but abandoned.

Talleyrand called *le sophisme incarné*, but who, for better or for worse, showed himself at Vienna the most practical of negotiators, concluded that 'federation alone is possible.' It should be pointed out that, during this earlier period of the Vienna discussions, the spirit of the Confederation of the Rhine was still alive in the Governments which had been its most important original members. Bavaria and Württemberg were anxious to restrict the character of the new Confederation to that of an alliance as against foreign states, precluded from interfering in the internal affairs of its members; while, at the same time, they objected to any preponderance being given in the composition of its proposed directing council or judicial tribunal to either Austria or Prussia. This had been the proposal embodied in the so-called Twelve Articles of October 16th, 1814, according to which, in a directory of five, Austria and Prussia were to have two seats each, and Austria the presidency. Württemberg was so obdurate in her opposition to the federal principle, for which the Austro-Prussian proposals were intended to supply a reasonable form, that the earlier series of sittings of the Committee of Five had to be suspended *sine die*. During the six months which followed the Committee ceased to meet.

It was about this time that the most important condition of an ultimate settlement of the German question—the maintenance of a substantial agreement between Austria and Prussia—was in imminent danger. This danger was perceived by a British statesman at Vienna, to whose insight insufficient justice has been done, and who, at this time, showed a full perception of the great importance of Prussia's leadership for Northern Germany. Castlereagh's endeavours at Vienna to secure the cooperation of Prussia and Austria against Russia in the matter of the Polish question, Austria consenting to the annexation by Prussia of the whole

of Saxony, broke down in the end[1]; and, under the influence of Talleyrand, Gentz and through him Metternich were gained over to bitter hostility against the Russo-Prussian designs with regard to Poland and Saxony. There was even a passing intention, on the part of Austria, of forming a Germanic Confederation from which Prussia should be excluded. Though this, also, came to nothing, the projects and protests as to the German question itself multiplied. Already soon after the first meeting of the Congress, the *Standesherren*—the Princes and Counts of the Empire who had forfeited their sovereign authority by the organic changes consequent upon the Peace of Lunéville, and who had seen their chance of recovering these rights vanish with the existence of the Empire itself—entreated the Emperor Francis to resume the German Imperial dignity; but their day was not to dawn again[2]. Of more significance was a protest, which had indeed helped to bring about the stoppage of the constitutional discussions, on the part of the still reigning Princes and Free Towns who had been excluded from these discussions by the very fact of the appointment of a Committee representing the Five States. These lesser sovereign personages and bodies, twenty-nine in number, had the good sense to resort to united action. They, very naturally, objected to any settlement of the political future of Germany without their concurrence, and went on to demand, as the surest guarantee of the federal constitution and the liberties to be included in it, the

[1] See C. K. Webster, 'England and the Polish-Saxon Problem at the Congress of Vienna' in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, vol. VII (1913). Had Castlereagh's policy been successful, 'Austria and Prussia' would have been 'joined together in a friendly alliance, and a united Germany' would have offered 'an impenetrable barrier to both French and Russian aggression.'

[2] In the Federal Act, the Mediatised Princes and Counts secured the right of *Ebenbürtigkeit*, together with certain lesser privileges.

restoration of the title and dignity of German Emperor, with such modifications as might seem to be expedient. When, in February 1815, after the Saxo-Polish difficulty had been brought to a conclusion, Austria and Prussia once more conferred on the constitutional question, they ignored this demand, but agreed to admit representatives of all the German states to the deliberations of the Committee, so soon as these should be resumed; and, when the time came, this concession was actually, though not at once completely, carried out.

On March the 4th the news of Napoleon's departure from Elba reached Vienna, and on the 8th he landed at Cannes. Waterloo was fought and won on June the 18th, and Paris was once more entered on July the 7th. Meanwhile, inasmuch as it was, of all things, desirable to avoid the appearance of an interrupted settlement, the deliberations of the Congress were judiciously continued. By May, the large majority of questions still outstanding had been brought to a conclusion; but that of the German Constitution still remained open. Shortly before the arrival of the news of Napoleon's return from Elba, Humboldt had, on the part of Prussia, produced, in succession, two fresh drafts—the noteworthy points in which consisted in their provisions for an effective supreme authority, for a federal judicial tribunal and for the establishment in the particular states of constitutions under the guarantee of the Confederation. Neither Metternich nor Hardenberg was possessed of the unflinching energy which would have been needed for the elaboration of these *desiderata* in the time which, after Napoleon's return, remained before the affairs of the Congress were finally wound up. Metternich, accordingly, now produced a draft, which he submitted, in the first instance to Hardenberg and to the Hanoverian plenipotentiary, Münster, and which was by far the feeblest and the most imperfect of the whole series. Hardenberg weakly allowed this draft, after it had

received certain modifications supposed to assimilate it to its more vigorous last Prussian predecessor, to be, in the name of the Prussian as well as of the Austrian Government, laid before the now enlarged German Committee of the Congress at its meeting on May the 23rd. Here, Metternich took occasion to stamp the proposals with the character of incompleteness by observing that they did not profess to contain anything beyond the fundamental principles of the Confederation about to be established, while the fuller development of them must be left to the Diet which it was intended to constitute. In a series of conferences lasting till June 10th—in none of which Württemberg took part, while Baden attended only the first six of the nine meetings held—the draft was worked into a shape in which, under the title of the Federal Act (*Bundesakte*), it was, as a whole, declared to be an integral part of the Act of the Congress of Vienna (*Kongressakte*), which had been signed on June 9th. It should be added that, on June 21st, Baden and, on September 1st, Württemberg, acceded to the Federal Act; the inclusion in it of Hesse-Homburg, whose separate existence had, apparently, been overlooked, was not effected till July 7th, 1817.

A minimum of results had, at last, been successfully achieved upon the narrowest of bases. The German Empire, as we have seen, had not been restored. The entire series of transactions which had been brought to a conclusion at Vienna, had been founded on the cooperation of Austria and Prussia—in other words on a friendly dualism which was to continue the relations that had found their most direct expression in the alliance of the two monarchies in arms. Accordingly, Francis I had, as has been seen, steadily refused to be a party to the restoration of the Empire. Metternich might, conceivably, have agreed to it, if it had been actually proposed at the Congress. But the Prussian plenipotentiaries, Hardenberg and Humboldt, were quite of

one mind on the subject, and were content with Prussia's attaining, in most though not in all respects, to a position of equality with Austria in the Confederation. On the other hand, the limitations of the sovereign powers of the rulers of the particular states had become an impossibility, after the Treaty of Ried had expressly guaranteed the sovereignty of the King of Bavaria and had served as an example to the treaties with other Princes. Stein's hopes had been frustrated, and he well knew why he visited Montgelas with unextinguishable wrath. Hardenberg's earlier constitutional drafts still included limitations, especially as to the declaration of war and peace; but Talleyrand had taken good care to keep the eyes of the smaller Princes open to their danger, and the time had passed for any serious attempt at unification. The individual members of the Confederation were debarred from waging war against one another on any pretext, and, in the case of war having been declared by the Confederation, from negotiating or concluding peace on their own account. In general, the Germanic Constitution, as it issued forth from the foundry after some fifteen weary months of casting and recasting, managing and manipulating, represented the best agreement that could be reached between Austria and Prussia, with the least unwilling assent of the other German states. As between the two Great Powers, it reflected the deliberate endeavour of Metternich and his master to maintain the direct formal, and the indirect informal, ascendancy of Austria; while, on the part of Prussia (in almost the very words of Hardenberg and Humboldt) it attested a desire to avoid what, in times of peace, might give rise to antagonism between the two Powers, and, in times of war, facilitate the falling-asunder of the Confederation. It was, as these statesmen (who were not always at one either as to their arguments or as to their conclusions) agreed to point out in the same document, in the interests of Europe as well

as of Germany, that such a conflict should be avoided, or that at least its conditions should be mitigated. Frederick the Great, then, had in vain impressed upon Prussia the expediency of ignoring such risks. Apart, however, from the formation of a bond likely to endure, what more substantial advantages had the settlement now brought to pass secured for Germany at large? Was the widespread disappointment caused by the publication of the Federal Act justified by something besides the extravagance—in existing circumstances—of the hopes which had attended the earlier stages of the discussions concerning it?

A generation later—in the year 1847—the epitaph of the Confederation which was soon to pass away (though it was revived for a second but briefer period of inglorious life) was thus written, in an official document issued by the Prussian Government: 'To the question, What has the Confederation accomplished, since its birth thirty-two years ago, during an almost unprecedented era of peace, for the strengthening and advancement of Germany, no answer can be given.' A strong federal union for common national ends—preeminently for military and judicial purposes (since the economic advantages to be gained from it had hardly yet dawned even upon farsighted minds)—among states individually reorganised on sound constitutional principles: such was the ideal of the new Confederation in the minds of all freeminded patriots in the nation, and to this they continued to look forward, even after, as the weary years passed by, the likelihood of its being realised seemed to dwindle more and more. The Prussian plans for the Vienna settlement had undergone so complete a transformation in the Austrian draft which had served as the groundwork of the plan actually adopted for the Confederation that it failed, from the first, to satisfy legitimate popular expectations, and that consequently, also from the first, its shortcomings provoked a hostility against it which not only

made it difficult to work, but perverted the very spirit of its operations.

The object of a federal union of states must be the establishment, for definite common purposes, of a central power strong enough to ensure the accomplishment of the purposes in question, and thus to bring about a sense of community of interests from which other benefits will, in due course, hardly fail to flow. But no central power can secure the common respect of the confederates, and thus prove strong enough to exercise real authority over them, unless the relative proportions of the members of the confederacy, in population and in consequent political significance, are fairly reproduced in their representation in that central authority. Now, in the ordinary assembly of the Diet, the representative body of the Confederation, Austria and Prussia were assigned one vote each—neither more nor less than was given to such states as Saxony or Electoral Hesse respectively: so that the total voting power of Austria and Prussia together amounted to two-seventeenths of the total number of votes. In the larger assembly of the Diet consisting of 70 members (the so-called *plenum*), for which it was reserved to decide on any alteration in the fundamental laws of the Confederation, Austria and Prussia had four votes each—neither more nor less than each one of the four smaller kingdoms; and the actual voting power of Austria and Prussia together, on such extraordinary and, it might be, critical occasions, accordingly amounted to less than one-eighth of that of the whole body of Confederate states. Thus, in the game of practical politics, where nothing is decisive except a real preponderance of material strength, the two Great Powers were left to depend upon a legitimate indirect exercise of their influence over the neighbouring and other lesser states, and, where this would not suffice, upon the employment of intrigue, which admitted of no control, or upon the direct use of force. In other words, the whole

scheme of the Confederation was in flat contradiction to practical experience, which had proved that the future of the nation was really under the control of the two Great Powers and of their relations to each other. It may be added that the intention, left open in the Federal Act[1], of allowing a certain voting power in the Diet to representatives of the Mediatised Princes was ultimately abandoned at the instance of Bavaria.

Again, in the matter of the federal army, an article of the military section of the Federal Constitution expressly provided that, in accordance with the principle of fundamental equality among all the members of the Confederation, even the semblance of the assumption by one state of authority over another was to be avoided. Various expedients had been suggested for the solution of this difficulty in the arrangement of a workable military system; but, in the end, it was settled that the Federal Commander-in-chief was on each occasion to be appointed by election—the electing body being, of course, the Diet, composed as aforesaid. The long period of peace which ensued after the adoption of the Federal Act allowed of no opportunity for the application of the elective principle. In cases of Federal execution the Diet committed this to one or more particular states.

A Federal judicial tribunal, which had formed part of the original Prussian scheme, was not set up, but sacrificed to the objections raised by Bavaria and Württemberg. In place of it the ancient system of *Austräge* (settlements effected by a judicial authority chosen by the parties and not bound by written law) was renewed in a more developed form than had hitherto obtained[2]; and disputes between particular states, if they could not be settled by a committee

[1] See art. VI.

[2] Art. XI. The *origines* and development of this most interesting system may be studied in Eichhorn.

of the Diet, were to be determined by 'a well-ordered *Austrägalinstanz*' (judgment by means of an *Austrag*). The important scheme of a German National Church, on which high hopes had been placed in some quarters, was likewise dropped, partly in deference to the wishes of Bavaria.

While, as has been seen, the vast superiority of the two Great Powers in population and strength had been ignored in the voting system established for the Diet as well as in other respects, Metternich had taken care that the presidency of the representative body, a privilege which could not possibly remain purely formal, should be secured to Austria. In point of fact, as will be shown in the sequel, this reservation of itself sufficed to enable Austria, with Prussia obediently following suit, to pursue, for a long time to come, a German policy not only alien from the original purposes of the Federal Constitution, but directly antagonistic to one of its provisions. For the rest, nothing was done by the authority of Confederation or Diet to advance German trade or navigation; with the negotiations of which the ultimate result was to be the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*) and of which some account will be given below, the Federal Diet had no concern. Finally, the drawing-up of a body of fundamental laws (*Grundrechte*), by which the personal freedom and individual public and private rights of every German should be ultimately assured to him, was, together with the further development of the Federal organisation in its relation to the military, foreign and domestic interests of the nation, including agreements as to the liberty of the Press and the regulation of commercial intercourse, hopefully left by the Federal Act to the Diets of the future.

On one particular head, however, the action of the Confederation and its organ the Diet was, as we shall see, not only to fall short of the original design of the Constitution,

but actually to pervert its purpose. Article XIII provided, in the form of a declaratory law, that, in each of the states forming part of the Confederation, a constitution with assemblies of Estates (*landesständische Verfassung*) should be established. The provision was entirely in accordance with the spirit of the age, and France had received her *Charte* from Louis XVIII already before the return of Napoleon (1814). Of the constitutions recently promulgated in Germany, whether in Napoleonic dependencies such as the kingdom of Westphalia, or in states belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine such as the kingdom of Bavaria, mention has already been made. On the other hand, Duke (now Grand-duke) Karl August of Weimar, who had granted a constitution to his duchy so early as 1809, was quick to renew and expand its provisions in 1816. And, on May 22nd, 1815, four days before he left Vienna in order to join his army, King Frederick William III of Prussia had been induced by Hardenberg (still accessible to advocates of progressive ideas) to sign a rescript in which he decreed the formation of a popular representative body chosen from the Provincial Estates; a commission was to meet on September 1st following to elaborate a written constitution. Thus, it would be preposterous to assume that the celebrated article XIII was included in the Federal Act without a *bonâ fide* intention of carrying it out in accordance with its plain meaning, or that its insertion was due to mere *incuria* on the part of Metternich. But, as we shall see, the times changed with great rapidity; and, although the King of Bavaria had followed the example of the Grand-duke of Weimar by granting a new constitution in 1817, and Baden and Württemberg, as well as Lippe-Detmold, had in their turn received constitutions later in the same year and in 1819, article LV of the Vienna Final Act (May 15th, 1820) supplemented article XIII of the Federal Act in such a way as not only to stultify

its intention, but to give the Confederation the right of interference against the very principle which the instrument of its foundation had laid down. This, however, is to anticipate. For the present, it must suffice to have indicated what the German settlement of 1815 had left undone, and how the perversion of its purposes which was to follow was directly caused by the inherent ineffectiveness of its provisions for the future, just as the futility of its safeguards unmistakably resulted from its neglect of the historical lessons of the past.

The Second Peace of Paris, which, within a few months, followed the signing of the Act of the Congress of Vienna, changed nothing in the political aspect of German affairs. Once again, but more conspicuously than in the First Peace, if the history of the Hundred Days and Prussia's share in bringing them to a conclusion be taken into account, Austria failed her German ally in the crucial question of the French frontier. Humboldt's memorable plea for the cession of more territory and more fortresses by France, as necessary for the future security of Germany, was resisted by the representatives of Russia and Great Britain, and left unsupported by Metternich. France retained her frontiers of 1790; and, though the most popular organ of German current opinion might deplore 'a peace which was no peace and which brought with it the prospect of a new war,' the German Governments and nation could now once more turn their attention to the problems which awaited them at home.

CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN STATES IN 1815

Before entering upon a brief consecutive narrative of German affairs during the century which followed upon the establishment of the Confederation, it may be well to recall the general conditions in which its principal states respectively entered upon the new chapter which was opening in the political history of all. In this rapid review we shall not go back once more upon the past history of these states except where this seems indispensable.

That Austria had issued forth from the great struggle with the adversary who had repeatedly smitten her to the ground, as the Power whose voice had on the whole been most authoritative in the European settlement effected in her capital, was due neither to the wisdom of the reigning head of the House of Habsburg, nor to the spirit in which the populations under his rule had entered into the decisive conflict. Francis I had some physical, and some mental, qualities which enabled him to stand erect while, time upon time, the edifice of his and his dynasty's fortunes seemed crumbling into ruins around him; and he even knew how to gain an unsurpassed personal popularity among his good Viennese by a simplicity of manner and bearing which there is no reason for supposing to have been altogether assumed. But he cared nothing for the idea of progress, or indeed for any ideas; his apathy (which was not merely one of manner) drove his minister Stadion into despair,

and caused even Gentz, at a critical moment, to discuss with Radetzky the possibility of bringing about a change of dynasty by way of a radical cure for the ills of the Empire. For the rest, though honestly unwilling to benefit any nationality among those under his sway to the disadvantage of another, he could not even conceive of an Austrian empire which should look eastward for the development of its destinies, or find the centre of its interests anywhere but at Vienna. At home, he could think of no way of preserving what was except that of preserving it as it was; and the immovability of the internal policy of his reign, which has constantly been laid at the door of his chief adviser in his later years is, much more fairly, to be charged against Metternich's master. Among the Archdukes who stood near to the throne of Francis I, his brothers Charles and John alone enjoyed any considerable share of popular regard. Archduke Charles, though not a general of the highest distinction, remained a great military and patriotic figure; but he had long been left standing apart from public affairs, while Archduke John was never called upon to play an important part in them till, when already on the threshold of old age, he was placed in a position as false as it was splendid, but in which he never lost sight of the interests of his House. Archdukes Joseph and Rainer respectively held the offices of Palatine of Hungary and Viceroy of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, but enjoyed little of the Emperor's confidence. His favourite brother, whom he afterwards called to a prominent place in his councils, was the youngest and least competent, Archduke Lewis.

The soul of Austrian policy, for nearly twoscore years after the day of her deepest downfall onwards, was, of course, the Chancellor of State, Prince Clement Metternich—though with regard to home affairs this cannot be asserted without certain qualifications. Few statesmen, indeed few historical personages of modern times, have been judged

with more passion, and, accordingly, with a larger admixture of injustice; but we must here confine ourselves to the earlier and most successful period of his political career, so far as it directly bore upon German affairs. Born and bred in the least patriotic atmosphere, perhaps, to be found in the length and breadth of the decaying Empire—the Courts of the Rhenish Spiritual Electors—Metternich had, notwithstanding, in his youth felt the impulse of antagonism against the national foe beyond the Rhine; but, when in the first year of the new century, he, like his father before him, entered the Austrian service as Minister at the Court of Dresden, his task there was to withstand the influence of Prussia. At Berlin, whither he was soon moved, he was unable to detach Prussia from her policy of neutrality, which led to an understanding with France. As ambassador at Paris (June 1806), while steadily keeping in view the probability of a conflict between Austria and France, he gained, in a very remarkable degree, the personal goodwill of the Emperor Napoleon. It was this combination of statesmanlike insight with diplomatic tact which in 1809, after Austria had been overtaken by the catastrophe of Wagram and a humiliating peace had been imposed on her by Napoleon, pointed out Metternich as the fittest Minister for the conduct of Austrian foreign affairs; notwithstanding the illwill of many members of the Austrian higher nobility, who resented the supersession by him of one of their own inner circle (Count Philip von Stadion). The period through which the empire must unavoidably pass required, in his own words to Francis, a policy of constant tacking, evasion and cajolery—one in which the transition from patient expectancy to the beginnings of recovery must depend upon the relations between France and Russia, always to him an object of vigilant attention. When Franco-Russian relations ended in open hostility, Austria could come forward

as the arbitress of war; and, when Napoleon—whom Metternich by no means desired to make impossible—had refused her conditions, her ultimate adhesion to the Alliance was the decisive step which led to the battle of Leipzig, and to the predominant position taken up by Austria and Metternich at the Congress of Vienna. This predominance, maintained partly by outward deference, partly by self-consistency, even against the Emperor Alexander I who strove hard to overthrow it, Metternich asserted with particular success, though with perfect coolness, in German affairs. Neither the claims of Prussia nor the anxious jealousy of Bavaria and the south-west prevailed against it; and, in 1815, he came forth from the Congress of Vienna as the foremost of German statesmen.

The protocolist's pen at that Congress was wielded by Friedrich von Gentz, who was, in the first instance, a man of letters and a publicist of the highest class, rather than a statesman, but whose influence upon Metternich's policy in the years 1812–18 was of more direct importance than the Minister would always have cared to acknowledge. Gentz, after sympathising, like most aspiring minds of his age, with the beginnings of the French Revolution, had, like the majority of them, changed his view of it in its later phases. But, though he had passed from the Prussian into the Austrian service, and, before he actually joined the latter, had become the continental mandatory of the ideas of Pitt, he was no turncoat and, at all events in his better days, adhered to the principle of taking money (which he received in large quantities) from those who agreed with him. He consistently advocated the cooperation of Austria and Prussia against Napoleon, and, while waving aside the illusions (dissipated even before the collapse of 1806) as to a Prussian headship of Germany, pressed the scheme of two confederations, each under one of the Great Powers, in perpetual alliance with one another. But,

though he reedited the Prussian manifesto of war, and, after the catastrophe, welcomed Stein to Vienna as the martyr-in-chief of an ill-fated age, he had little real confidence in the state of which he was a native. When Austria, in her turn, took up arms in 1809, it was in the words of Gentz that the famous challenge to the archfoe of Germany was delivered—the last and most brilliant proof of the high spirit maintained by this great writer in the darkest times, whatever distrust might lurk in his mind against the dynasty which he served. But, when the effort had been made, and made in vain, and when there seemed no policy left to pursue but that of patient and cautious observation, Gentz fell back into a cynical mood[1], which he was unable to shake off, even after Austria had at last openly thrown in her lot with the Allies and, having once more declared war against France in a manifesto composed by him, had shared in their triumph. In this frame of mind, largely due to the excesses and disillusionments of his personal life, he allowed himself, at the Congress of Vienna, to be won over by the legitimist arguments of Talleyrand, and, without much difficulty, persuaded Metternich to oppose the Russo-Prussian policy with regard to Saxony and Poland. The adoption by the Austrian Government of a line of action marking the height of the jealousy between Austria and Russia, which the Eastern policy of both the one and the other Power had long tended to foster, also marks the last stage of Gentz's actual influence upon the conduct of affairs. Though always disliked by the Emperor, he appears, henceforth, as a reactionary pure and simple, in the service of Metternich's system of preserving at any cost the political settlement concluded at Vienna, and of suppressing any movement, in or outside Germany, which might interfere with a rigorous adherence to this object. Though his pen continued busy

[1] *Blasé*, Häusser calls it, in his admirable summary of Metternich's later policy (*Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. III, 1860).

(as in his campaign, in the *Wiener Jahrbücher* and elsewhere, against the liberty of the press), the part which he played was now really secondary, and he had no leading share either in the successes of Metternich or in his failures. On the other hand, his political sagacity and critical acumen did not desert him to the last; he was by no means blind to Metternich's shortcomings in action and character, and perceived that his policy both abroad and at home was devoid of vitality because it followed no principle except that of an abhorrence of change; and, before he died (June 9th, 1832), he had brought himself to confess that concessions must be made to the moderate constitutionalism of which he had long been the bitter foe. Very obvious morals have been drawn from the long tragicomedy presented by the life of this great captain of the pen; but his refusal to despair of Germany, and his brilliant services to the cause of her liberation from the foreign yoke, should always be remembered in his honour.

Among Metternich's confidential agents should be noted Joseph Anton von Pilat, his private secretary in the dark Napoleonic days, who in 1811 had taken over from Friedrich Schlegel the editorship of the *Oesterreichische Beobachter*, the main organ of the Austrian Government till Metternich's fall and Pilat's withdrawal in 1848. The imaginative political theorist Adam Müller, who after the peace of 1815 was appointed consul-general at Leipzig and *chargé d'affaires* at several small Courts and made himself very useful in the promotion of Metternich's German policy, Friedrich Schlegel himself, and K. E. Jarcke, whose influential publicistic career was, like Gentz's, divided between Berlin and Vienna, all belonged to the reactionary, romantic and ultramontane circle from whose devotion the Austrian interest in Germany sucked great advantage.

As for Metternich himself, whose ascendancy in German affairs continued, even after, as we shall see, it had undergone

some depression in those of Europe at large, no supposition could be further from the truth than that he was a fanatic of order. He was, indeed, a fanatic of nothing. At home in Austria, he was, as has already been indicated, well aware of the defects that had long retarded the progress of the state-machine, in matters of finance, in the general administrative system, and in the excessive centralisation which still remained as an inheritance from the reign of Joseph II. But neither in 1817, when he actually suggested the plan of a *Reichsrat* composed of a representation of the several *Landtage* of the Austrian empire together with a proportion of high officials, nor at any other time, did he give proof of the energy requisite for the carrying-out of reforms distasteful to his sovereign; and, as a matter of fact, the chief influence in internal affairs was, during the greater part of the reign of Francis I, exercised, not by Metternich, but by Count Francis Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, who, from 1826, presided over the political and financial sections of the Council of State (*Staatsrat*). Popular belief, on the ground of Kolowrat's long-standing rivalry with Metternich, attributed to him liberal tendencies of which he was, probably, innocent; but, in matters that did not touch the fundamental principles to which the Emperor's government adhered—especially, it would seem, in matters of finance—he was no adversary of progress. After the death of the Emperor Francis I and the accession of Ferdinand I (1835), the old Conference of State (*Staatsconferenz*), in which two Archdukes sat by the side of the two leading ministers, was revived; but the rivalry between Metternich and Kolowrat continued. As time went on, the influence of the latter was considerably restricted, nor was it his fortune, after the fall of Metternich in 1848, to hold for more than a moment the power which had dropped from his more successful rival's hands.

In the affairs of Hungary, too, as was shown on the

occasion of the diet of 1825, Metternich showed himself willing to make concessions. His main attention, however, was devoted to the foreign relations of Austria and to those between the Confederation which he had succeeded in establishing as part of the European agreement and its several members. In foreign affairs, his ascendancy and that of Austria continued during the period marked by the successive meetings of the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau and Laibach (1819–21), and reached its height with the overthrow of the Neapolitan insurrection and the breakdown of the Piedmont-Milanese revolt. It was at this date (1821) that Metternich, who had been raised to the rank of Prince in October 1813, was appointed Chancellor of State, the era of his career being thus signalised which was fullest of external successes, and perhaps the most barren of any efforts for internal progress. Of his dealings with the several German states we shall have to treat in the following chapters; but, taken together, while they justify Häusser's saying that his policy, as a whole, was defensive rather than conservative, they certainly illustrate the power of his personality. The distinction and charm of manner which made him one of the most attractive cavaliers of his age would not, of themselves, suffice to account for the dominant authority which he wielded over the ministers of other German states, who flocked to Johannisberg to listen to the piping of their shepherd. Especially notable is the power which he acquired over the Prussian ministers of this period. The foremost among them, Hardenberg, may be held to have had certain affinities of disposition with his fellow-Chancellor; but at Teplitz, in 1819, Metternich gained over the stolid King Frederick William III by his enunciation of principles and perils which even the political jealousy and personal antipathy of the Emperor Alexander I had been unable to ignore.

Of the territorial recoveries and gains that had accrued

to Austria through the War of Liberation, one had come home to her before that war had passed through its final stage and the Congress had assembled at Vienna. On June 26th, 1814, faithful Tyrol (with Vorarlberg) was, in accordance with the Paris Convention of June 3rd, supplementing the Treaty of Ried of October 8th, 1813, reunited with the Austrian monarchy. Yet the Austrian Government had been slow in responding to the loyal sentiment of the Tyrolese, whose premature rising had, in December 1813, led to an armed Austrian intervention on behalf of the Bavarian Government, which, in return for this service, placed no obstacle in the way of the actual transfer. The whole affair was carried out after a fashion the reverse of gratifying to Tyrolese patriotism; nor was the hope fulfilled that it might at least be accompanied by the restoration of the old constitution, which the Emperor Francis, when he ceded Tyrol to Bavaria in 1805, had promised should remain intact. The constitution granted, in its place, in 1816 differed from it in several respects, more especially by making over to the Emperor the entire right of taxation. This, together with the proceedings whereby that right was exercised and the general oppressiveness of the Austrian administration, mitigated only by a willingness to indulge the religious traditions of the people, acted unfavourably upon Tyrolese opinion; and it began to be doubted whether, if the loyalty of the country were to be tried once more, the history of 1809–10 would repeat itself.

By the agreement of June 1814, the grand-duchy of Würzburg and the principality of Aschaffenburg were, in return, united to Bavaria. It was further stipulated that the duchy of Salzburg (as it was now called[1]), which, after

[1] It had previously been called 'electorate.' The former archbishopric of Salzburg had changed its government five times in fourteen years. The old archiepiscopal splendour was here long remembered with regret.

acquiring direct possession of it in 1805, Austria had ceded to Bavaria in 1810 (with Berchtesgaden), should be restored to Austria (without that place), together with certain parts of Upper Austria, the *Innviertel* and the western portion of the *Hausruckviertel*. The retrocession of these was long delayed by the tenacity of the Bavarian Government, inasmuch as the equivalent promised to it in 1814 could not be obtained. This equivalent, at first, included the cities of Frankfort and Mainz (which latter Prussia was ready to see made a Federal fortress, but would not allow to fall into Bavarian hands) and the principality of Hanau. Fresh arrangements were, accordingly, attempted at the Congress of Vienna, by means of two compacts successively prepared between Austria and Bavaria; but these, again, met with opposition, and nothing could be settled on the subject before the return of Napoleon. It almost seemed as if the old quarrel between the Houses of Wittelsbach and Habsburg (of which a further word will have to be said below) were to prove incapable of settlement in this final phase. The Bavarian Government appealed for support to Prussia, Russia and Great Britain, though Stein and others protested vehemently against consideration being shown to a state which had clung so long to Napoleon. Finally, after the Emperor Francis had gone so far as to order a frontier demonstration in arms, Metternich induced the Bavarian Government to accept a compromise (April 17th, 1816), by which, in exchange for the *Inn-* and the *Hausruckviertel*, and the greater part of Salzburg, Bavaria was to receive certain lesser territorial compensations on the Rhine, formerly belonging to the Duke of Nassau, the Prince-Abbot of Fulda and certain other lesser potentates. It was further provided that, on the extinction of the direct male line of the Grand-duke of Baden, Bavaria should enter into possession of the Palatine lands on the right bank of the Rhine, and that, during the interval, Austria should pay to her an

assured sum of 100,000 florins. As will be seen, Bavaria never acquired the lands in question, inasmuch as, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), the four Great Powers recognised the succession of the Hochberg line in the entire grand-duchy of Baden; and Austria thus had the ultimate advantage in a not very edifying game of *chicane*.

Neither in Salzburg nor in the recovered portions of Upper Austria did the restoration of the Austrian *régime*, any more than in Tyrol, bring with it contentment. As in many parts of Europe, where the harvest failed in both 1816 and 1817, so especially in the Austrian dominions this fact and its consequences disastrously affected the condition of the population; in Salzburg and Tyrol, its sufferings were abnormal, and aggravated by a pressure of taxation probably due in part to want of good financial management.

The same was the case in Illyria, which was reincorporated with the Austrian monarchy on June 23rd, 1814. The French *Provinces Illyriennes*, of which the organisation was in progress during the years 1809 to 1811, comprised Carniola (Krain), Istria with Trieste, Dalmatia, the territory of Ragusa, and the two divisions of Croatia. The bulk of these possessions, exclusive of the Dalmatian coast-line, but inclusive of Friuli (Friaul) and certain other additions, now became the kingdom of Illyria, and augmented the Emperor's style by another royal title. But those portions of the new kingdom which had of old belonged to the kingdom of Hungary (where, indeed, the conception of an Illyrian 'nation' had first formed itself among the Serb immigrants) vehemently resented the loss of an opportunity of reunion with Hungary, instead of which they found themselves included in an utterly artificial innovation. Within a few years, however, their wish was at least partially accomplished (1822); and, less than a generation later (1849), the name of the kingdom of Illyria itself vanished from the political map of Europe.

In Italy, Austria had sought her principal gains. Here she had recovered all that she had lost through the series of calamitous treaties which she had been forced to conclude. The whole of these territories were now, with the addition of the Valtelline, united under the name of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, proclaimed on June 22nd, 1814. It was to be governed direct from Vienna; for the Viceroy who held his court at Milan was a political nonentity. At the Second Peace of Paris, the Austrian possessions in Italy were in substance left unaltered. They now constituted a most important enlargement of the Austrian dominions, and, to all outward appearance at least, a great increase of strength. Metternich was, at this time, intent upon uniting all the territories of the House of Habsburg into a single state, governed on a highly centralised and purely absolutist system. He had no ear for proposals such as that attributed to Field-marshal von Bellegarde, of following the system of Maria Theresa, and abstaining from any attempt to assimilate to each other the condition of the Emperor's Italian and that of his German subjects. Practically, the Italian possessions were treated as a conquered territory; and, notwithstanding the protests which occasionally found their way to Vienna against the rigour of the administration and the pressure of the taxes in particular, the hand-to-mouth process of government continued without interruption, and, with the aid of a remarkably unintelligent police, accumulated a sullen discontent throughout the population.

It should be added that, by virtue of her Italian, Illyrian and Dalmatian coast-lines—for the new kingdom of Dalmatia included the territory of the former republic of Ragusa, the Venice of the Eastern Adriatic, and the Montenegrin seaport of Cattaro—Austria might now become a sea-power, in so far at least as the condition of her finances enabled her to meet her additional responsibilities.

The financial difficulties of Austria, though incapable

of depressing the temperament of Metternich, in truth constituted the gravest internal problem which Austria had to face in the period upon which we are entering. The demand for constitutional changes at home was by no means inaudible; but it occupied little time or thought in the chancery of state at Vienna. When the time came (as it did very soon) for a general agitation on the part of the Confederated Governments against demagogy and all its works, the Austrian was among the most active in its investigations and measures of repression. Genuine interest was taken in these proceedings by the Emperor Francis, under whom the Austrian police system had been steadily elaborated from 1793 onwards, till, in 1814–5, its secret operations were brought to bear upon the European Congress itself[1]. But serious projects of internal reform were not regarded as belonging to the sphere of practical politics; any attempt to prepare a federation of the great divisions of the Empire by conceding to them a fixed measure of independent rights was excluded by the centralising ideal; and, in the several provinces respectively, no use was made of the existing historical relations between Government and Estates. Where advantage could be taken of these or of any similar relations introduced into the newly-acquired provinces, for a better adjustment of taxation, this was designedly done in as ineffective a way as possible.

The period following upon the conclusion of peace witnessed one of those financial crises of which no Government had a larger experience than the Austrian. It had met its share of the cost of the last year of the Napoleonic War (1815) by a loan, which, in spite of the high interest ($8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.) carried by it, had not been fully taken up. When, on the final conclusion of peace, the reckoning had

[1] See A. Fournier, *Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress*. Vienna and Leipzig, 1913.

to be cast up, Austria found herself much behindhand. Her share in the indemnity imposed upon France in the Second Peace of Paris was considerable, and, within the five years ensuing, amounted to more than 43 millions of florins (£6,500,000 *c.*); on the other hand, Austria had to meet a British claim for repayment, with interest, of subsidies granted in 1796. In 1813, this claim was, in a friendly spirit, reduced to two millions and a half of British money, which Austria met by means of a fresh loan. But, apart from the pressure of these arrangements, the condition of the Austrian finances suffered permanently from a disorder which was never clearly explained; so that, instead of a remedial policy being carefully considered, resort was had to loan upon loan, skilfully manipulated by the great banking-houses which dominated the finance of the Empire. At the same time, the process of taxation was continuously hampered by the differences between the systems followed in the several provinces. These differences were but very gradually removed, while, of course, the entire monarchy was bound to the maintenance of prohibitive duties, as against the importation of goods from other countries. The commercial and industrial condition of the Austrian dominions remained in stagnation, at a time when the downfall of the Continental System was subjecting the European mainland to the inroads of British competition, to which Austria had nothing to oppose but an exclusion of foreign goods as complete as possible.

Thus, the economic condition of Austria at home was one of torpor, broken only by uneasy moments of discontent, while her foreign policy remained continuously successful, till, at the time of the Eastern crisis of 1828–9, it suddenly became an open secret that she was not equal to carrying on a serious war. It should be noted that, during the earlier part of this period, the Austrian Government had been untroubled by Hungarian jealousy, and that the

kingdom had shown no hesitation about furnishing the aid demanded from it in the War of Liberation. Austrian statesmen were well aware that the Hungarian constitution was not to be ignored with impunity; and Metternich was personally in favour of recognising, however late, the claims which it warranted, and which, after much delay, led to the summoning of the Diet of 1825. The proceedings at this Diet, though hardly such as to cause great alarm or discomfort to the Austrian Government, pointed to a continued insistence upon historic constitutional forms, and to what might, perhaps, in the end prove a more strenuous use of them. These transactions call for no further notice in this place. Enough has, probably, been said to show how imperfectly the condition and coherence of the Austrian monarchy at large corresponded to the commanding position which the self-confidence and political skill of its leading Minister enabled it for a long time to hold in the affairs of the Confederation.

Unlike Austria, Prussia had, by the settlement of 1815, incurred an actual diminution of territory, as compared with that under her rule before she entered into her solitary struggle with the overweening power of Napoleon. Yet she had made a large number of acquisitions, besides recovering part of her former possessions. Her grievance, however—for as such it deserves to be set down—lay not so much in the fact that her total area after the peace was less than that which she had owned in 1805[1]; or that, while she had recovered the Old Mark of Brandenburg, which had been absorbed in the Napoleonic kingdom of Westphalia, besides once more coming into possession of 'Swedish' Pomerania and expanding her dominions west of the Elbe, Bavaria had retained the Brandenburg margravates of Ansbach and Baireuth, first ceded to Prussia by the voluntary act of the

[1] Her area in 1815 amounted to 5086 square geographical miles (with about ten millions of inhabitants), as against 5655 early in 1807.

last of the Franconian margraves. Nor was there much more to be said even about the imperfect success of her chief demand at Vienna, the claim on Saxony, which, after having, in conjunction with the Polish question (or really in subordination to it), caused so dangerous a commotion at Vienna, she had to leave only half-satisfied. Prussia's real failure at the Congress, where the assiduity and skill of Hardenberg and the powerful advocacy of Humboldt had alike been unable to carry the day, had lain in her not having secured for herself a geographical cohesion such as was both indispensable to her safety and necessary for the continuous growth of her political power. Nor had she, in addition to her enlarged Baltic coast-line, secured a north-western seaboard, which her legitimate future development must, sooner or later, require. This double disappointment was mainly due to the restoration of Hanover to a place among the German states—which, in view more especially of its connexion with Great Britain, could not have been prevented (though the idea of an important Guelphic kingdom was abandoned). The principality of East-Friesland had at Vienna been formally ceded to Hanover by Prussia. The Prussian monarchy was now hopelessly bisected; nor could the military roads connecting its two divisions be accounted a remedy for this evil. The grievance was all the more palpable, since some time must pass before the whole of Prussia's western acquisitions could be fairly assimilated to the rest of the monarchy, comprising as they did, together with a large number of Spiritual and Temporal lands that had formed part of the old Westphalian Circle or of the recent Westphalian kingdom, some of the former possessions of the Elector of Cologne, and nearly the whole of those of the Elector of Treves. In these regions, separated from the main body of the Prussian population by their religious creed and still more by their openness to the ideas of the French Revolution, and to the institutional changes

introduced with the advance of the French arms, loyalty towards the new order of things could only be a plant of extremely slow growth; and, in the early years of the Prussian *régime*, so cool and experienced an observer as Hardenberg could not suppress his belief in the possibility of a revolt against it on the part of the western provinces. In the province of Saxony, which had been detached from the remainder of the kingdom, no lasting resistance to the new state of things had to be feared; but there was great bitterness on both sides of the new frontier. In spite of all these obstacles, Prussia now stood before Europe in a position with which that held by her in the period preceding the catastrophe of Jena could not be brought into comparison. As has been frequently pointed out by historians, the centre of gravity of the Prussian state had now definitively come to lie in Germany. Moreover, Warsaw had, as it were, been exchanged for Aix-la-Chapelle; and Prussia had thus become the recognised guardian of the German frontier on the west, and the representative proper of the German element in Western Europe at large.

Prussia, as soon became clear, had entered on the new stage of her political history resolved on a line of action which was to prove one of the bases of her ultimate rise to the German hegemony. The guiding spirits of her Government had agreed to postpone all other considerations or designs to the task of perfecting in all its component parts the administrative system of the state. It is true that, even before article XIII of the Federal Act had decreed that there should be assemblies of Estates in all the states belonging to the Confederation, Frederick William III had issued a declaration promising the summons of a representative assembly chosen out of the Estates of the several provinces of the monarchy. But we shall see how, notwithstanding the fact that the King of Prussia had thus deprived himself of his undoubted right of choosing his own time for

carrying into effect the general principle enunciated in the Federal instrument, a long period was to elapse before his undertaking was fulfilled in such a way as to call a constitutional system of government into life. The economic condition of the population, depressed by the bad harvests which, as has been already mentioned, afflicted Germany as well as other parts of Europe in the years 1816 and 1817, demanded immediate attention; and to this object the labours of the official machinery of Prussia, already beyond comparison conscientious and efficient, were from the first preeminently directed. Moreover, all processes of legislative or administrative reform moved slowly in Prussia, though this very fact might help to strengthen the foundations of ultimate success. The traditions of the Prussian bureaucracy—a hybrid term rarely more appropriately employed than in the present instance—have generally favoured amplitude in the preparation of their designs and elaboration in the execution of them; and they are fundamentally opposed to the precipitate rush from conception to execution characteristic of more arbitrary methods of government. Added to this, the personal influence of the occupant of the Prussian throne in the period which followed on the War of Liberation, was rarely on the side of promptitude of action.

Frederick William III, although far from being either one of the greatest or one of the most interesting of Prussian Kings, has, largely no doubt by reason of the extraordinary vicissitudes through which his monarchy passed during his occupancy of the throne, on the whole been sympathetically judged by historical writers. In saying this, we refer not so much to the fluent eulogy of his religious counsellor Bishop Eylert, who saw much of what was perhaps both the strongest and the most admirable side of the King's nature, as to the judgments passed on his motives and conduct by the political historians of his reign. He succeeded to

a King (Frederick William II) who ended as an enervated voluptuary, though he had been devoid neither of political ambition, nor—as was natural in the son of Prince Augustus William—of personal charm. He was, on the other hand, the predecessor of a sovereign of high intellectual ability and of eager aspirations in the domains of both Church and State. His own character was well summarised by a writer thoroughly acquainted with him and with his method of government, Field-marshal von Boyen, who, in the second volume of his interesting *Reminiscences*[1], devotes some striking pages to an analysis of the King's personality and of the effect exercised by it. This keen but loyal observer considers that the qualities which entitled Frederick William III to respect as a man outnumbered those appropriate to his position as a ruler, but rightly adds that, in judging the King, it should be remembered that his reign fell in fateful times. 'Whenever things went on as usual, his mild and just temperament made him a good ruler; it was only at seasons calling for courageous resolution, when he was required to subordinate the enjoyment of the present to foresight for the future, or (speaking more precisely) his own inclination to the commands of duty, that his irresoluteness became painfully perceptible and cast a shadow over the path of his royal actions. Happily, the subsequent course of events obliterated the traces of many such sins of omission'; while, as to the honesty of the King's intentions, no doubt existed, from first to last. Endowed with an excellent memory for both persons and facts, and indeed for everything of a concrete sort, he was, largely in consequence of an education altogether mismanaged under the influence of rationalistic notions, greatly wanting in imagination and, therefore, a stranger to the ideal sides of life and to the emotional forces acting

[1] *Erinnerungen a. d. Leben d. General-Feldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen.* Hrsgbn. von F. Nippold. 3 vols. (1889–90).

upon it. This had become very noticeable in the critical times preceding the declaration of war in 1806, when Frederick William III continued to pursue a policy of neutrality long after it had become impossible except as a perplexing and irritating synonym for delay, and when, in Hardenberg's words[1], the King proved inexhaustible in the invention of specious reasons for doing nothing—although, after all, he was, again and again, driven into action by events, instead of remaining master of his own will. It was likewise seen in 1809, when he bowed his head before the conqueror, and, practically at Napoleon's behest, stopped the reorganisation of the Prussian state. The King's hesitations had been a severe trial to Queen Louisa, who was gifted with a far livelier imagination and a far quicker will than her consort's; although it may be doubted whether, except where the will was necessary to the thought, she surpassed him in mental insight. For the rest, her direct influence upon him was never very important; he was extremely jealous of any interference, even on her part, in the affairs of government; nor was her own command of them such as to allow of her taking any real part in the inner working of the state. Frederick William III was a man of unimpeachable personal courage, but unenterprising to the last degree, and little accustomed to carry out an idea to its consequences, whether in action or in argument. This moral timorousness made it difficult to transact business with him in seasons of danger and difficulty; thus, the *mémoire* against Haugwitz and the cabinet councillors presented to him in 1806 by Stein and other leading personages excited in him nothing but anger. In ordinary intercourse, his mental shyness reflected itself in an abrupt manner of conversation—more especially (so Boyen thought) when he spoke German. He was a true Prussian king in

[1] *Denkwürdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fürsten von Hardenberg.* Hrsgbn. von Leopold von Ranke (1872–7), vol. II, p. 95.

his liking for soldiers and soldiering, but he was, by nature, a lover of peace; and, in the matter of military training, he occupied himself rather with the externals of the parade-ground than with the real concern of preparing for war. He had no strict conception of military discipline; and that relaxation of it to which many of the Prussian disasters of 1806 must be attributed has to be reckoned among the inevitable consequences of this shortcoming in the head of the army.

Finally, his straightforward and simple nature (for he was, almost constitutionally, averse from form and show, from compliments or any other kind of rhetoric) was in unison with a plain religious faith, which stood him in good stead in the days of adversity. He had no special interest in education; but, while adhering to the religious beliefs in which he had been brought up, and pious at heart (he was said to have himself composed several of the prayers in the new liturgy), he was, on the whole, true to the tolerant spirit characteristic of his House. Educated as a Calvinist, but personally rather inclined to Lutheran opinions, he was, not unnaturally, led to cherish those schemes of religious union to which, as will be seen, he afterwards sought to give fixed form and expression—by a process, in appearance at least, out of harmony with the principles of toleration to which he had hitherto adhered.

Although his capacity for work, his honesty of aim, and his rectitude of character, had enabled Frederick William III to weather the heaviest storm of his reign, until, after many tribulations, he saw Prussia once more a Great European Power and, even more distinctly than before, a main factor in the future of Germany—he cannot be said to have proved more than adequate to the demands made on him by fortune, either as his friend or as his foe. When the opportunity had at last come for throwing off the Napoleonic yoke, though he was no longer encouraged by the high spirit of the Queen

whom he had not long since lost, he had not been found wanting; he had made up his mind to the decision which Hardenberg's diplomatic skill had contrived to defer till the most seasonable moment; and, though his was not the most striking figure among the sovereigns at Paris and Vienna, none better deserved the respectful recognition accorded to him. That Prussia was prepared to assert, in the long run at all events, her right to the position in which she now stood, was proved, not only by the law of September 3rd, 1814, which placed upon a permanent footing her system of general compulsory service and the organisations of *Landwehr* and *Landsturm*, but also by the ordinance of April 30th, 1815, that promulgated the principles on which the whole of the reconstituted State was to be organised in Provinces and Governmental Districts (*Regierungsbezirke*). The broad lines were thus laid down, at the outset, for the military and civil life of the Prussia of the future; and the question now was whether the King and the statesmen by whom he was surrounded would guide the advance of the monarchy along these lines with clear consciousness of purpose and consistent energy of action.

As has been noted, Queen Louisa had passed away so early as July 19th, 1810, leaving behind her a name enduringly consecrate in patriotic hearts. It was not till 1824 that King Frederick William III found in his second (morganatic) marriage with Augusta von Harrach, created by him Princess of Liegnitz, the domestic content which, to his simple nature, was an indispensable condition of happiness. On an affection which, earlier after Queen Louisa's death, he had conceived for a French Catholic lady, he had with much good sense and right feeling abstained from setting the seal of marriage, thereby giving an example not to be forgotten in his family.

By the side of King Frederick William III, none of the royal Princes had exercised any sensible influence upon

the course of public affairs, except the King's second brother, the fourth son of Frederick William II, Prince William (who survived to 1851). Both he and his wife (born a Princess of Hesse-Homburg), to whom, after Queen Louisa's death, there descended, not unworthily, some of the admiring devotion enjoyed by her, were at first regarded as extremely reserved in bearing; but in 1806, after joining in Stein's movement against Haugwitz and the existing system of government, Prince William served at Auerstädt. Soon afterwards, he was chosen for a trying and unsuccessful mission to Paris, where he gained the admiration, though he could not influence the action, of Napoleon. In 1813, he was one of the first to counsel open war, and took an active part in the campaigns of that year. Notwithstanding rumours of important appointments, he returned to the seclusion which he preferred; but, in 1822–4, he held the governorship of the Federal fortress of Mainz, and, in 1830–2, that of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, where he left behind him an enduring remembrance. His friendship with Stein had helped to implant in him a love of progress; and both he and his wife were long among the most honoured members of the royal family, while he was loved wherever he cared to be known.

Prince Ferdinand, Grand-master of the Order of St John, the youngest brother of Frederick the Great, still survived; but he was the least important of the brotherhood, as even the piety of his daughter Princess Louise (Princess Anton Radziwill) is, in her pleasing memoirs, unable to conceal. On the other hand, the Crown-prince (Frederick William) and his next brother (Prince William), though they had done their duty, as became Prussian Princes, in the War of Liberation, still stood only on the threshold of their manhood. The former, however, as will be seen, whose alert mind and active imagination made him quick to interest himself in public affairs, was speedily to be called to take

part in them. A prominent figure at Berlin during the greater part of the reign of Frederick William III was Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the half-brother of Queen Louisa. As commander of the brigade (afterwards *corps*) of Guards he did much to develop the military efficiency of that body; but the fact that his political influence was uniformly exercised in favour of uncompromising reaction, combined with his personal arrogance, made him one of the most unpopular men of his day.

When, after the conclusion of peace, Prussia without delay addressed herself to the task of internal reorganisation, it was not only measures which she needed, but men. Stein's work for Prussia, though it remained uncompleted, had, like his work for Germany at large, so far as he was himself concerned, virtually been done. He never reentered official life, having declined both the presidency of the Frankfort Diet, offered him by Austria, and the Prussian legation there, and attending none of the sittings of the *Staatsrat*, though he regularly presided over those of the Westphalian Provincial Diet, from 1826 till his death in 1831. The inspiration of his personality, however, long remained active, and never sank into oblivion; nor will history ever cease to recall his name as that of the true founder of the later greatness and prosperity of Prussia. In close conjunction with it, however, and because of direct services to the welfare (as, at one time, the very existence) of the monarchy equalled by those of no other statesman either in length or in diversity, the name of Hardenberg deserves precedence in the present place. His liberal sympathies as well as his unrivalled experience designated him, the Minister actually at the head of affairs, as, beyond all question, the most suitable agent for the completion of the work of reorganisation. But it is equally clear that, during the years remaining to him, he lacked the requisite strength—moral as well as physical—for carrying through the entire system of reforms of which no politician

more clearly perceived or more fully appreciated the expediency, and which none could have regarded with a mind freer from reactionary prejudice or narrow adherence to tradition.

Hardenberg's career, which was now drawing to its unavoidable close (the year of his birth was 1750), had, after a fashion of its own, reflected many of the extraordinary changes of the Revolutionary age; but only those passages in it need be recalled here which have a direct bearing upon its concluding stages. Born a Hanoverian subject, he had passed out of a service to which he was sincerely attached into that of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, whose policy, always favourable to Prussia, found an effective agent in him at the time of the first formation of the *Fürstenbund*. It was not till 1790 that fate led him, for the rest of his life, into the Prussian service, or rather, in the first instance, into the hybrid office of Minister to the last Margrave of Ansbach, who was eager to anticipate the transfer to Prussia of the two Franconian margravates that would fall to her on his death. In the anomalous position, which he held from 1792, of Prussian Minister of State with full governmental powers in Ansbach and Baireuth, he already gave proof of his great administrative capacity, and first began to take a leading part in higher politics. Ranke says of Hardenberg[1] that his supreme merit as a politician must be sought in his having had the greatest share in confirming and restoring the self-dependence of Prussian policy—a praise which, unfortunately, his subservience, in the last stage of his public life, to Metternich contributed not a little to dim. Beyond a doubt, at its commencement, Hardenberg helped to bring about the change of Prussian policy which led up to the separate peace with France (1795); and he was so far in sympathy with the ideas of the French Revolution as to make it easy for him to

[1] *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. I, p. 142.

take part in the secularisation which, a few years afterwards, was carried out on so extensive a scale. Of both these much criticised transactions, the responsibility must, certainly, in a considerable measure, be attributed to him.

In the course of the territorial reorganisation of Germany which ensued, Hardenberg's scheme for assuring to Prussia a strong position in south-western Germany fell to the ground, and in the arrangements by which France secured the practical control of the north-west he had no leading share. In the ensuing period, whether Haugwitz or he directed foreign affairs, it was the former who still possessed the King's chief confidence, and who concluded the alliance with France in 1805, which, in return for the acquisition of Hanover, placed Prussia in humiliating dependence upon her ally; but Hardenberg, whose eminently political mind never went back upon what was impossible or impracticable, agreed to the ratification of the treaty, though in consequence of Napoleon's hatred of him, his name was not appended to the document. Curiously enough, he is found, at this highly critical time, drafting a new constitution for Germany; but it was stillborn, for Napoleon was already meditating the Confederation of the Rhine. Meanwhile, Hardenberg, with the King's knowledge, and with the connivance of the Queen, was continuing secret negotiations with Russia.

Undoubtedly, Hardenberg helped to encourage the resolution which, at the last, was rashly taken for war against Napoleon; and, though he was again formally charged with the direction of foreign affairs in April 1807, Napoleon's openly manifested displeasure made it necessary to drop him after Friedland. He, therefore, bore no part in the negotiations for the Peace of Tilsit. It was in the very town—indeed, in the very room—where the crushing compact had been signed, that Hardenberg set to work upon those long, diffuse and unwieldy, but still deeply interesting

memoirs which, as their eminent editor has pointed out, were primarily intended to show that the system of neutrality (a supposed 'independent' neutrality) long pursued by Prussia was a wrong system, and that it was not of Hardenberg's, but very largely of King Frederick William III's own devising.

During his temporary exile—for it was practically such—at Riga, Hardenberg, and Freiherr Karl von Stein zum Altenstein (who from 1799 had been a member of the Government, to which he had specially rendered service in the department of the finances), in the truest spirit of patriotic statesmanship, occupied themselves with drawing up, for the consideration of the King, opinions closely connected with each other and respectively purporting to discuss *The reorganisation of the Prussian State* and *The Conduct of the Government of the State after the Peace* (both dated September 12th, 1807). These documents plainly indicate the direction in which Hardenberg and his colleague looked for the regeneration of the ill-fated state to which, in or out of office, their loyal service was given. While they advocate a radical reform of the ministerial system of government, and at the same time insist that the government should be supported, in accordance with Stein's original demand, by a representative body, it was not from this but from the King and his Ministers, that they intend the direction of affairs to proceed. The democratic ideas contained in these 'opinions' may be held to be derived from Napoleonic precedents or influences, which ranged two noblemen of ancient descent among the opponents of the privileges of the nobility; but the monarchical spirit of Prussian tradition did not for a moment deny itself in the mouths of these reformers. Together with his 'opinion,' Hardenberg transmitted to the King a letter characterising the men who had served him under Stein, paying a splendid tribute to Stein, and concluding with a remarkable, and

indeed pathetic, appeal as to the action of the King himself at so tremendous a crisis.

It need not be repeated here that the most important of the steps recommended by Hardenberg—the recall of Stein—was, with some courage, taken by the King, and that the great Minister had made good progress with his reforms, and Scharnhorst with the military reorganisation supplementing them, when peremptory orders arrived and Stein had to retire. He left behind him a kind of political testament (really drafted by Schön) which pointed out the indispensable character of the measure which he had set on foot. Hardenberg was not himself again directly called into council till, in 1810, the state of the Prussian finances had, owing to Napoleon's vigorous insistence on the payment of the contributions imposed at Tilsit, become most alarming. Desperate measures, including a forced loan of some kind, had been suggested; but Hardenberg thought that they should be preceded by the summons of a national representative body and a reconstitution of the ministry. An assembly of notables was actually convoked; but, though Hardenberg was ready for very far-reaching methods, including a large secularisation of ecclesiastical property (especially in Silesia), he held to his belief that Napoleon had no present intention of annihilating Prussia. Hardenberg's policy in these years was marked by great caution; but he never lost sight of the end in view. The treaty of alliance with France (February 27th, 1812) was, on the whole, concluded against his judgment; and the initiative in the negotiations between Russia and Prussia after the French retreat proceeded from the Tsar. But before the Convention of Tauroggen (December 30th) hastened the march of events, Hardenberg had actively carried on negotiations with Austria; and, though Yorck was at first disavowed, the Russo-Prussian alliance was now a certainty, and Hardenberg could propose peace to Great Britain, offering

her not only the restoration of Hanover, but its enlargement into a great kingdom between Elbe and Scheldt, compensation being made to Prussia. In March 1813, the last French troops left Berlin, and the campaign began. After Lützen and Bautzen, Napoleon was ready to negotiate for peace, and the Prussian monarchy was no longer in danger. Upon the armistice followed the agreement of Reichenbach and the abortive meeting of the Congress at Prague, where Hardenberg's diplomacy achieved its greatest success in bringing Austria into the Alliance, through Napoleon's refusal to reply to the ultimatum offered him, and in thus founding the last Coalition. At the Congress of Vienna, however, Hardenberg failed to follow up his previous success. The combination which brought about the overthrow of Napoleon had largely been his work; the settlement after the victory was but slightly moulded by his influence. Though Prussia had nothing to gain from the increase of the power of Russia in Europe, she could not break with her ally; and this, again, made it necessary for her to insist on a compensation for herself in Saxony. On the other hand, so far as Germany was concerned, her liberation had been made possible by the cooperation of Austria and Prussia; and Hardenberg had no intention of impairing this by pressing on a reorganisation of Germany which would have been unacceptable to Austria. His instincts as a statesman had failed him in the arena of the Congress; for the Saxon acquisition was but a half-success, with which he had had very great difficulty in persuading his sovereign to content himself, and the Germanic Confederation was an edifice which any great European landslip might carry with it. He now turned back to the work of internal reform which Stein had left him to accomplish. Much still remained to be done that his openminded insight and constructive ability (he was, too, an excellent draftsman) marked him out as preeminently qualified to carry through. But his

powers had been impaired by time, and by a self-indulgence which had ended in making his private life something very like a public scandal. It may be that, as Varnhagen thought, he should have resigned office when at the height of his political fame; but at least it was no ignoble purpose which held him to his task.

Far different had been the personal life of the second statesman who had represented Prussia at the Congress of Vienna, and who might be expected to play a prominent part in the future history of the kingdom, unless the radical difference between him and Hardenberg, which was much more than a mere matter of temperament, should interfere in his disfavour. Wilhelm von Humboldt, born June 6th, 1767, and thus the elder by some two years of his brother Alexander, may be accounted the most finished type of the best cultivated minds of his age and nation. The brothers, descendants of a family which belonged to the old nobility and had served the Prussian Court in positions of distinction, had been brought up at the height of the literary and philosophical *Aufklärung* of the day. Joachim Campe was, for some time, their private tutor; and Engel, who by the side of Garve and Mendelssohn was the accepted representative of the philosophy, at once amiable and matter-of-fact, of the day (he was afterwards tutor to the future King Frederick William III), prepared them at Berlin for their university studies. Here, Wilhelm von Humboldt, at an early age, fell under the influence of the *Berliner Monatsschrift* (a journal which sought to preserve to Prussian men of letters their old privilege of leading the rational mind of Germany), and (since the *Aufklärung* had its romantic side also) was initiated into a secret society of which one of the presiding geniuses was Henriette Herz. After studying law at Frankfort-on-the-Oder and Göttingen, Humboldt enlarged his mind by making the acquaintance of Jacobi and forming a close friendship with George Forster, and visited Paris

with Campe. The intolerant tendencies of the Berlin Government, where Wöllner was then in the ascendant, were not to his liking; and thus it came to pass that, with every opportunity for an honourable public career before him, he withdrew from all share in affairs of state into a sort of intellectual quietism, waiting till the time came—if it should come—when he might be wanted. The best years of his manhood (1792 to 1802, or, it might almost be said, to 1808) he spent as a devotee of self-culture. Yet, after the manner of some hermits and most German professors, he never relinquished his outlook upon public affairs and public men; he kept up intimate relations, for instance, with Dalberg, and, partly in conjunction with him, composed, though he never published, a significant work on the philosophy of mankind, the state, religion and history[1]. But his main occupation was the assiduous study of Greek, under the inspiring influence of F. A. Wolf, and aesthetic speculation, which brought him into close intellectual intimacy with Schiller. His friendship with Goethe began rather later, and found expression in a criticism of unusual insight and breadth—the essay on *Hermann and Dorothea.* Humboldt had a genius for friendship, and was intimate not only with the greatest poets and scholars of the age, but, at Berlin, with Rahel and Gentz. In 1802, he accepted the appointment of Prussian minister-resident at Rome. But this was not yet, what it afterwards became, a political post of a certain importance; and the chief biographical interest of his residence consists, characteristically, in his having then acquired the conviction of the supreme significance of language for the moral and even the political development of nations. His German patriotism continued thoroughly idealistic and, as it were, independent of place

[1] *Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen* (1792). Published at Breslau in 1851, with an introduction by Cauer.

and time, till a sojourn at home in 1808 brought him into near contact with the condition of things there. In January 1809 (after the dismissal of Stein), the King invited Humboldt to become Director of the Department of Public Worship and Education in the Ministry of the Interior, over which Altenstein presided; and he accepted the offer without hesitation. During the brief period—about fifteen months—in which he held administrative office, Humboldt's spirit was as the spirit of Stein, not only in its grandeur of design and thoroughness of execution, but also in the democratic breadth of view with which he applied his educational reforms to all classes of the population alike. Of these reforms, and the foundation of the University of Berlin by which they were crowned, something has already been said[1]. Unfortunately, Humboldt, who was thus beginning, as it were, to realise his own ideals on behalf of the Prussian people, seems to have found it impossible to work longer in harmony with or under the second-rate men, as they seemed to him—Altenstein, Beyme, and the rest—who, to the best of their ability, were seeking to carry on the work of Stein; and, when Altenstein was succeeded by Hardenberg, he was personally too much out of sympathy with the new Minister to be willing to reconsider his decision. He was, hereupon, sent as ambassador to Vienna, where for the time there was little to do, and he plunged into the study of the Basque language; but with the crisis of 1812–3 there ensued a change, and he once more, but this time as a diplomatist, came promptly to the front. At Reichenbach and Prague, and again at Teplitz, he was occupied with the burning questions of contemporary European politics—invariably showing tact and temper in the conduct of affairs and, though always willing to listen to the counsels of Stein, careful to show himself conciliatory and even ready for concessions to Metternich. It was Humboldt who worked

[1] See p. 35, *ante*.

out Stein's idea of the Central Administration, which might have had far-reaching results, but of which, again largely owing to Metternich, little actually came; and who at Vienna, as has been seen, indefatigably exerted himself as one of the chief working members of the Congress, thus covering, so far as in him lay, the shortcomings in action of his senior colleague, Hardenberg. His extraordinary power of formulating (rather than initiating) political conclusions on disputed questions was of incomparable value for the progress of business; but it may be doubted whether some of the problems, such as that of the German constitution, were of a nature to admit of diplomatic solutions. In the Paris negotiations for the Second Peace, Humboldt argued, with even more than his usual comprehensiveness and force, against Capodistrias in favour of ampler and more solid cessions such as were in the true interests both of Germany and of Prussia in particular; but the great services which he here rendered proved in vain. He was deeply disappointed; but this was not the only occasion in his public life when he deserved the success which he could not command. The obstacle which stood most ominously in the way of the continuance of his services to Prussia and Germany lay in the mutual antipathy which separated Humboldt, the man of many friendships, from Hardenberg.

The military and political services of Gneisenau – incomparable at all events in their combination—had met with acknowledgment already before his memorable participation in the campaign of 1815. In the remaining sixteen years of his life he, too, had to undergo many disappointments; and, after his return to Berlin in 1818, as governor and member of the *Staatsrat*, his activity was much hampered by the want of sympathy which his Liberal ideas had to encounter. He remains one of the noblest examples of the highly-trained soldier, indefatigable in

service, full of patriotic aspirations and true to the highest of ideals—a type more than any other identified with the great days of the War of Liberation.

Among the statesmen by whose counsels the Prussian monarchy had benefited in the days of stress, and who survived to render service to it in the ensuing period, Theodor von Schön should, also, find a place, though perhaps not so prominent a one as he might have thought his due. As a member of the Immediate Commission of 1807, he had a share in preparing the famous Emancipation Edict, of which, indeed, he claimed for himself the chief credit. For a short time, he was the actual administrative successor of Stein; but, in 1810, he did not enter Hardenberg's Government, largely perhaps because of the King's want of confidence in him, and from 1809 his public work was essentially confined to provincial administration; first as chief of the *Regierungsbezirk* Gumbinnen, and then as Chief-president of the newly-formed province of West Prussia. His services to the material and intellectual interests of the province were most conspicuous; and the Marienburg, of which he was in a sense the second founder, remains their most imposing memorial. Down to his final retirement in 1842, and afterwards to his death in 1856, he remained a fearless champion of the constitutional freedom which in his younger days he had learnt to appreciate in England. But the exorbitant vanity, combined with rankling jealousy and resentment, characteristic of his memoirs and other papers, posthumously published by his family, has done much to injure his reputation: he was one of those who are unable to detach from their own personality any great achievement in which they have been concerned.

A less eccentric type of official was Karl Friedrich Beyme, the son of an army surgeon, who early entered the career of a legal state official, and took part in the elaboration of the

Prussian code. He gained the confidence of Frederick William III while the latter was still Crown-prince, and increased it by his sympathy with the charitable tendencies of both King and Queen. In 1798, he was appointed a Cabinet Councillor, and began to exercise the influence upon affairs which it was his constant endeavour to preserve and extend. His zeal for reform was not of a kind to overcome the dislike with which he was regarded by Stein, and which is apparent in several passages of Hardenberg's memoirs. But his fidelity and tenacity prevailed; when Prussian affairs were at their worst, the government at times centred in him, and he was one of the few statesmen in high office who as such survived the catastrophe of 1806. In the subsequent internal reorganisation of Prussia, Beyme had a prominent share. Though a chief representative of the decried Cabinet system of government, and regarded by Stein and those who thought with him as having, through his intervention between the King and his Ministers, paralysed their action, Beyme's sincere self-devotion maintained him in his position; and, in November 1808, he was, with Stein's approval, named Minister of State and Grand-chancellor. In June 1810, however, Hardenberg's return to power led to Beyme's withdrawal, which was accompanied by conspicuous marks of the royal favour; nor did he again hold office till 1816, when his activity was chiefly directed to the reorganisation of the system of justice in the monarchy at large, and more especially in the Rhenish provinces. Nothing but the steady goodwill of the King could have upheld him against the impatience of Hardenberg, who regarded his measures of reform as inadequate. We shall, accordingly, find Beyme entering into close relations with Humboldt and accompanying him out of office in December 1819. This was the end of Beyme's official life, though he survived in honoured old age till 1838.

Another statesman of mark who went out of office in

1819, but who, after a long period of retirement devoted by him to literary labours of high value to students of later Prussian history, was summoned back to the ministry of war so late as 1841, was Leopold Hermann Ludwig von Boyen. He was one of those 'learned' officers who laboured to turn to good account the bitter experiences of 1806, and he was closely associated with the great reforms of Scharnhorst. We shall see how, together with General K. W. G. von Grolmann, a soldier-statesman of the same type, he quitted office when the future of the *Landwehr* seemed in jeopardy. Boyen, whose services were again in demand under Frederick William IV, was a largeminded man, who signally helped to give enduring vitality to the great impulses which mainly determined the action of Prussia in the struggle of 1813. He died, as a field-marshal, in 1848, on the eve of humiliations happily shrouded from the foreknowledge of this patriotic soldier and statesman.

Among other servants of the state under Frederick William III, mention should be made of Friedrich von Bülow, a typical representative of the spirit of Prussian officialism. Like his relative Hardenberg, he passed out of the Hanoverian into the Prussian service, which in the days of severe trial (1808) he gallantly defended with his pen against the powerful attacks of A. W. Rehberg. After the peace, he was appointed head of the Government of the new Prussian province of Saxony, and in 1817 became member of the *Staatsrat*. In the following year, he renewed his publicistic activity by a remarkable denunciation of the supposed hierarchical tendencies of the Evangelical clergy. His public services were ended by physical collapse in 1821, when he was supposed to be on the eve of becoming Minister of Justice.

Of Altenstein's association with Hardenberg both as an official and as a political writer mention has already been made; he was one of the most faithful servants of Frederick

William III (with whom he was coeval in the years of both birth and death) and bore probably the heaviest of the burdens of his Government in the years 1808–10, until he resigned in the latter year, on the rejection of his advice that a further territorial cession (Silesia) should be made to Napoleon. Of the honesty of his advice there can be no doubt. He did not return to office till 1817 when, as will be seen, he assumed the direction of the department of Education and Public Worship.

The services of Burggraf Alexander zu Dohna-Schlobitten, though the active part of his life did not end till 1831, are more especially connected with the earlier years of Frederick William III's reign. This descendant of a Prussian noble house renowned for its loyalty gave signal proof of his quality when, as a young man, he voluntarily became a hostage in the hands of Napoleon for the pacific conduct of West Prussia, and showed great firmness under pressure exercised by the Emperor in person. On his return in 1807, he was at once entrusted with high office by the King, and very soon, on Stein's withdrawal, was named Minister of Home Affairs. He quitted the public employment in 1812, on Hardenberg's becoming Chancellor of State, but in the following year took a leading part in the movement of liberation, and as Civil Governor of the province of Prussia, in the organisation of the *Landwehr*.

J. A. F. Eichhorn, who was to play an important part in the development of the relations between Prussia and the other German states, as well as in her purely internal affairs, did not become conspicuous before the years 1814 and 1815, when he shared the administrative labours of Stein and vigorously advocated the annexation of Saxony. He became a member of the *Staatsrat* after his second return from Paris, and soon addressed himself to tasks of constructive statesmanship.

Finally, Barthold Georg Niebuhr, whose name it is

impossible to pass by, must at least be mentioned here as an eminent man of singularly versatile ambitions, who, born half Holsteiner half Dane, had not entered the Prussian service till a few days before Jena and Auerstädt, but, even before he had to take flight for Königsberg, had become Director of the Chief Bank and *Seehandlung* at Berlin, the funds of which he afterwards saved by carrying them to Riga. Prevailed upon by Hardenberg and the King to remain in the Prussian service even after Tilsit, he rendered much aid to the finances of the state in connexion with the proposed Dutch loan and with the general management of the national debt, but in 1810 exchanged these duties for the post of historiographer-royal, and in the next few years laid the foundations of the enduring part of his fame by his lectures in the new University on Roman history. In 1813, however, he once more returned to politics, negotiating for British subsidies, besides, in a famous pamphlet (1814)[1], justifying the proposed annexation to Prussia of the Saxon kingdom. In 1814, we find him giving instruction to the Crown-prince, by whose high intelligence he was much attracted; and, in 1816, happily for the great work of his life, he obtained the appointment of envoy-extraordinary and minister-plenipotentiary at Rome.

If Frederick William III's judgment in the choice of the statesmen called by him to the control of the chief administrative departments of the state cannot be described as invariably fortunate, neither was he always happily inspired in the bestowal of his personal intimacy and favour. Among those thus honoured, Charles Leopold von Köckeritz seems to have been imperfectly qualified for any but the most perfunctory performance of the duties of a go-between in the daily intercourse between the King and his Ministers.

[1] *Preussen's Recht gegen den Sächsischen Hof.* In the previous year he had founded the *Preussische Korrespondent*, through which, with Arndt, he strongly influenced national feeling.

Yet, from the date of his appointment as Adjutant-general to the King, in 1797, to that of his death, in 1821, he was a constant companion of Frederick William III, and one after that sovereign's own heart—flawless in the details of his uniform, but without any marked capacity, or, except at particular seasons (more especially when the size of the Court had dwindled with the power of the state), displaying no strong desire to express an opinion on matters of moment.

On the other hand, General Job von Witzleben, who in 1817 became Chief of the Military Cabinet and in 1818 Adjutant-general to the King, was a man of character and ability. The intimacy which sprang up between him and his royal master showed itself in an openness of discussion soon extending from the affairs of the army to those of the state, the Church and the royal family. In 1834, Witzleben became Minister of War, and he continued his unselfish though well-rewarded services, till illhealth obliged him in 1837 to retire. He died in the same year. He was a man of versatile ability (while an accomplished soldier, he was able to enter into the King's theological interests, and Rossini once told him that he ought to have given himself up to music) as well as of extraordinary powers of work, and his great sincerity of speech was accompanied by self-restraint and tact; while he was entirely free from self-seeking and from any subservience to party or faction. Thus, it is not surprising that he should have exercised an unparalleled influence over Frederick William III in his later life, and should have been described as 'for twenty years the most powerful man in the state.' He faithfully upheld the bases of the new order of things—the reorganisation of the army, and the internal reforms of Stein and Hardenberg —and, undeniably, had a share in building up new conditions of life for the country which he loved.

A hybrid influence—partly of courtier and partly

of Minister—was that of Prince William Lewis George Wittgenstein, who was born in 1770 and lived till 1851. He had originally passed out of the rather lax service of the Elector Palatine Charles Theodore—in the course of which he had raised a regiment for the emigrant French princes—into that of the Prussian Court, where he had acted in succession as the supreme official of the Courts of the two Queen Louisas (the consorts, respectively, of Frederick William II and of his son). By Frederick William III and his Queen, Wittgenstein was very fully trusted; and, from 1806 onwards, he influenced the course of public affairs, though, from no fault of his own, he was unsuccessful in two diplomatic missions—one to England and the other to the Elector of Hesse. In the course of the latter mission, he was arrested by the French authorities, in circumstances which involved him in a quarrel with Stein, with whom he was on terms the reverse of friendly. After, in 1810, the King and Queen had come back to Berlin, Wittgenstein was appointed First Grand-chamberlain at the royal Court, and in this position actively promoted the appointment (which proved permanent) of Hardenberg as Chancellor of State. The result was that Wittgenstein (who, about this time, had revived a very drastic proposal of Hardenberg's for putting an end to the deadlock in the public finances) won the complete confidence of the Chancellor, although they did not see eye to eye in all political matters. After he had been placed at the head of the Police Department in 1812, his vigorous dealing with the adherents of the *Tugendbund*, as impairing Prussian relations with France, excited much animosity. He continued his activity as Police minister long after the French alliance, of which he had approved, had come to an end, and in the period to be treated in our next chapter cooperated zealously with Metternich, with whom he had, for some years, kept up an understanding. His endeavours for the maintenance of 'public order' were,

for the most part, carried on in secret; but he was a member of most of the commissions to which, as we shall see, the examination of Hardenberg's reforming proposals was entrusted, and by which the majority of these proposals were wrecked. He belonged, in a word, to the reactionary Opposition, of which his personal influence with the King made him perhaps the most formidable member. Under Frederick William IV, though he retained his offices, his political importance was at an end. Stein judged him hardly; but his subservience to Metternich, and generally retrograde influence upon Prussian politics, should not altogether obscure his earlier services to the state.

Oldwig von Natzmer, who, educated as a page at Potsdam, from an early age enjoyed the intimacy of the royal family, after an honourable service in arms, distinguished himself highly in diplomatic military missions. After accompanying the King to Paris in 1814, he was named a general, at the age of 33, in the following year. To an exceptional knowledge of military affairs (the Emperor William liked to regard him as his tutor in them) he added a general business faculty which, but for the King's death, might have actually placed him at the head of the administration. He survived, full of honours, to 1861.

The name of Friedrich Ancillon (who lived till 1837) is more enduringly associated with Frederick William's than with those of his predecessors. Though a theologian by training and at one time preacher to the French Huguenot congregation at Berlin as well as professor of history, he had at an early date become associated with the Court. In 1806 he became tutor to the royal princes, and in 1810—in no happy hour for the future of Prussia and Germany—was specially appointed to the tutorial charge of the Crown-prince, on whose character his own exercised an influence the reverse of tonic. Thus it came about that, in 1814, Hardenberg took him into the Government, and, three

years later, he was appointed member of the *Staatsrat* and Director of the political section of the ministry for Foreign Affairs. He had shown himself inclined to reforms in the direction of municipal and provincial self-government; but he gradually fell back into purely feudalist and generally reactionary lines of both thought and action. The public, however, thought him both more Liberal and more original than he probably was; even of the mind of Frederick William IV, who was deeply attached to him to the last, he seems to have rather followed than directed the workings.

From the state which had accepted the second place in the Confederation, we turn to Bavaria, whose political ambition was not henceforth—unless in occasional moments of self-delusion—to make her look higher than the third. To say nothing of earlier designs and aspirations of the House of Wittelsbach, a long time had passed since the Elector Charles Albert had grasped the Imperial crown, and, on the next day, had most aptly compared himself to Job, the man of sorrows. He had not gained the Austrian hereditary lands which he had coveted, and he had, for many a year, forfeited his own. The self-restraint and good sense of his successor, Maximilian III Joseph (1746–77) had not sufficed to revive the prosperity of his dominions, while the Bavarian relations with Austria were still strained; but Charles Theodore, who followed (1777–99), had, at least, not succeeded either in setting back the clock of intellectual progress, as in the latter part of his reign he seems to have desired to do, or in effecting a territorial bargain with Austria against the will of his subjects. In Maximilian IV Joseph (1799–1825), the Bavarians had, at last, a ruler after their own heart; and if, while innocent of all German patriotism, he was, so long as he could be, a friend of France, he certainly did not herein run counter to the sentiments of his people. The large additions of

territory which, in consequence, he had in turn acquired at the close of each of Austria's successive disastrous conflicts with France had, as has been seen, suffered some diminution by the incomplete settlement with Austria in 1814–6; but he retained a kingdom of wide dimensions though (in spite of the Treaty of Ried) without a wholly continuous frontier-line, together with the autonomous independent sovereignty which had been at once the primary object of his political ambition and the main cause of his administrative success. The Bavaria of Maximilian IV Joseph and Montgelas—'the least autocratic of princes and the most autocratic of ministers[1],' to the latter of whom its political regeneration was primarily due—represents more than any other *Rheinbund* state the application of so much of the principles of the French Revolution and the administrative system of the French empire as admitted of assimilation to German conditions. Metternich's testimony to this fact may be accepted without suspicion[2], and Count Montgelas's own summary of his achievements without substantial cavil. 'It must be confessed,' wrote the former, under Montgelas, 'that Bavaria has experienced and successfully passed through a religious, political, civil and military revolution. The Bavarian is the only nation that has shown courage and power of stay; and it deserves universal respect and imitation[3].' Montgelas's own memoirs on the administration of Bavarian home affairs in the years 1799 to 1817, which take the form of a report to the King and begin, in a rather unusual way, with an apology against the charges brought against the Minister, of having

[1] C. T. Heigel, *Ludwig I, König von Bayern* (1872), p. 70.

[2] Hardenberg called Montgelas a revolutionary; but the charge as a whole was unjust, especially from its author.

[3] *Denkwürdigkeiten d. Gr. Maximilian Joseph von Montgelas über die innere Staatsverwaltung Baierns* (1908), M. Doeberl's Introd., p. LXXVII.

sought to enrich himself; of having introduced a new system of arbitrary ministerial government; of having been rendered incapable of work by illhealth; of having concealed the actual condition of the finances, and of having neglected the maintenance of the army on a proper footing—continue in the following strain:

'After absolving this task, it only remains for me to quote the facts and furnish the explanations required for an account of the period of 18 years which covers the most active and the fullest reign known to our history....The state driven thrice to the brink of the precipice, but on each occasion rising up again stronger than ever before; the extent of the kingdom doubled; religious tolerance and the reasonable freedom of the press proclaimed in an epoch when there was still some merit in these measures; ecclesiastical jurisdiction reduced to fixed and just limits; the abolition of the Regular clergy effected in a way useful alike to the revenue, the population and its industrial life; the revocation of the equally odious and unjust law of confiscations; the abolition of judicial torture; the ending of personal serfdom; the restoration to owners of the right of alienating their rural estates; the work on the register of lands (*cadastre*); the reform of criminal legislation; the obligation upon all of a participation in public burdens; the open promulgation of equality before the law; the establishment by law and by constant application of the principle of the irremoveability and independence of the judges; the safeguarding of the lot of faithful servants and of their families after them, by means of a system subjected only to modifications indispensable and demanded by public opinion; the adoption of legislative and administrative measures for mitigating the sufferings of the unhappy victims of the revolutions of the age; the introduction of a plan for assuring by means of a competition (*concours*), excluding the interference of intrigue or importunity, the enjoyment of ecclesiastical benefices by the worthiest; the perfecting of the system of popular instruction; the multiplication of rural schools; the encouragement of the fine arts; the enrichment of all public collections; a large number of useful establishments called into life in the midst of war; the preservation of the profoundest internal tranquillity in the very centre of general agitation—all these things, taken together, offer a picture sufficiently interesting to efface a few blots such as are inseparable from the work of man.'

This list of achievements was, most certainly, no empty boast; but we must not omit to add that, while the complete transformation of Bavaria from a feudal and patrimonial into a modern state found direct expression in the grant of the constitution in 1808, this instrument differed essentially from the constitution of 1817, to which we shall have to return. The Bavarian constitution of 1808 was not a political *charte*; and the time did not seem to Montgelas to have come for convoking the representative assembly which it had in view. But it secured to the individual Bavarian subject a full measure of civil, though not of political, rights; and the Administration that hereupon held sway, besides assuring to the kingdom an unprecedented military efficiency and industrial conditions which approached nearer to free trade than those of any other contemporary state, opened to the people the prospect of continuous intellectual and social progress. In this administration, a system of centralisation, rooted in conceptions of royal sovereignty such as could not have been realised without difficulty in a larger state, and a consolidated Ministerial organism such as it would have been impossible to establish there, were carried out to extreme limits; and measures like the secularisation of monastic property were executed with a rigour suited to the middle of the sixteenth century, rather than to the beginning of the nineteenth. In point of fact, the processes of this particular reform were brutally inconsiderate, and go a long way towards accounting for the inevitable reaction. On the other hand, the establishment of relations of real parity between the confessions, of which a religious edict issued in 1809 elaborated the principles declared in the constitution of the previous year, redounds to the enduring credit of Montgelas's *régime*; and, in 1818, this edict could be added, with but slight modifications, to the ampler constitution promulgated after his fall. The negotiations with Rome which were carried on in the hope

of establishing a national Bavarian Church broke down, in 1814, on this head of parity as well as on that of Church patronage. The whole system of public instruction was by Montgelas placed under state control and freed from any denominational character. While elementary education was made compulsory for children, from their sixth to their twelfth year, great attention was paid to the modernisation of its secondary branch, and the higher underwent a radical change. The Universities of Dillingen, Altdorf, Innsbruck and Salzburg came to an end as such; while that of Würzburg was secularised and otherwise reformed so as to continue by the side of Munich, Landshut and Erlangen. The large proportion of non-Bavarian professors introduced at Landshut and elsewhere aroused much patriotic or particularist jealousy, which undoubtedly contributed to the unpopularity of Montgelas in the last period of his Ministry. It is not a pleasant thought that Stein, who justly took umbrage at the ominous recognition of Bavarian sovereignty in the Treaty of Ried, should have countenanced the publication of a most unjust libel launched against the Minister[1]. His principles and traditions stood very far apart from those of Stein and his school; but, both in his protracted adherence to the French alliance and in his resistance to a progressive German policy at the Congress of Vienna, Montgelas was guided by a singleminded desire to further the interests of Bavaria which, unlike the chief adversary of his policy, the Crown-prince Lewis, he thought incompatible with the abandonment of any part of the sovereign rights of the King. The fall of Montgelas became inevitable when he could neither keep pace with the new developments of Liberalism, nor satisfy the reactionary demands of Aretin and the *Alemannia*; but the substance of the services which he had rendered to Bavaria remained assured to her.

[1] *Bayern unter der Regierung des Ministers Montgelas* (1814).

Saxony, which it had been part of Napoleon's policy to use against Prussia, something in the way in which he used Bavaria against Austria, had, in consequence, run the most serious risk of being crushed out of political existence. A rapid recapitulation of these transactions will best serve to explain the position of Saxony and her normal relations towards the German Great Powers in the period which ensued. The ultimate cause of her political downfall, of the tension between her and Prussia, and of her persistent reliance on the goodwill of Austria, had been, not so much the Peace of Posen (December 1806), which made her Elector a King and the grateful and devoted vassal of Napoleon, as the Peace of Tilsit (1807), which bestowed on him the unexpected gift of the duchy of Warsaw. Saxony's connexion with Poland seemed to have ended in 1763, the year of the peace which concluded the Seven Years' War, and the first year of the long reign of King Frederick Augustus (1763–1827), an excellent prince of mediocre abilities, but hardworking and, as his fatal adherence to Napoleon was to show, singularly faithful. The revival of that connexion through Napoleon's calculated munificence brought to Saxony nothing but sacrifice upon sacrifice, and with it a bitter feeling of jealousy on the part of Prussia, at whose cost the donative had been granted. The thought now took hold of some Saxon minds, notably of that of Count Senfft von Pilsach, who had succeeded Count Bose (a mere puppet of Napoleon) in the direction of the affairs of the kingdom[1], that Saxony was destined to occupy the place of Prussia not only as the leading state of modern Germany, but also as an important European Power; and he could not shake off his jealous fears of the recapture by

[1] The Cabinet-Minister Count Marcolini, the King's personal favourite, was politically a nonentity. He remained by the King's side till his brief sojourn in 1813 at Prague, where Marcolini afterwards died.

the neighbour kingdom of its former position. But neither Frederick Augustus nor his Ministers, nearly all of whom were members of the faithful Saxon nobility, were made of the stuff needed for the pursuit of a great ambition, though ready to accept what territorial gains might fall into their lap. Thus, when Saxony entered into the Russian campaign, in which her gallant troops were to undergo terrible sufferings, she did so with the full knowledge that, whatever might be its result, the duchy of Warsaw would be lost to her, and that her sovereign's 'compensations,' if there were to be any for him, must lie elsewhere. The acquisition had never given satisfaction in the kingdom, or been regarded as a makeweight against the manifold burdens of the Napoleonic friendship.

After the Russian catastrophe, though it had failed to shake in the least degree the devotion of Frederick Augustus to Napoleon, the position, not of his duchy but of his kingdom, had at once become critical. In the kingdom, there was little immediate desire to join any warlike combination against Napoleon; but the French 'protection' had few friends, and such incidents as the blasting of the bridge at Dresden soon created a bitter feeling against the 'Protector' and even against Frederick Augustus himself, whom the French ambassador insolently advised to cast about for an exchange, since he was so unpopular at home. What there was to be found of statesmanship among the royal officials—and there was not much forthcoming among the excellent Friesens and Zezschwitzes and Globigs and the rest, who conducted the government while the King marked time at Ratisbon—favoured adhesion to Austria; but to whom was Austria herself intending to adhere? Meanwhile, his most capable Ministers, Senfft and Langenau, feared Russia quite as much as France. Thus, the King declined to join the Russo-Prussian alliance; his Government let things drift; and the Russian and Prussian troops entered

his kingdom. But for the hesitation of Frederick Augustus, the question of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia could not have arisen.

The unfortunate King's second blunder was more fatal still. He had refused to enter into a compact of common action with Bavaria in support of the Austrian project of mediation; but he now accepted Esterházy's proposal that, in return for an Austrian guarantee of the integrity of his kingdom, he should support the Austrian mediation, and promise to abstain from any further armed assistance to France. But, unfortunately for his own interests, Frederick Augustus consented to observe secrecy with regard to the agreement, and, when he suddenly took refuge at Prague, neither Napoleon nor the Saxon people could understand his proceedings. He was waiting for a decisive step on the part of Austria, when Napoleon's victory at Lützen once more brought his trembling ally to his feet.

Senfft had to make way for Count Detlev von Einsiedel, a worthy official of the most conservative type, whose political horizon was the range of his sovereign's will. Napoleon accepted the King's submission, and imposed on him terms which rendered it absolute. During the armistice concluded after Bautzen, the sufferings of the country, which had been flooded first by the Allies and then by the French troops, had become almost unbearable; yet the Saxon Cabinet still hoped for peace and even began to calculate possible gains to be secured at the Prague Congress.

But Napoleon's obstinacy cut the ground from under the feet of his shortsighted follower; Austria, at last, joined the Alliance, and Leipzig was fought and won. The passing of 5,000 Saxon troops to the Allies, of course, came too late, even had it been made with the approval of the King. He saved his personal honour; but he had no ally left; and when, on October 19th, in the hours of final suspense, Einsiedel drew up a memorandum on the more

than pressing question as to the quarter in which his master should seek support, the arguments in favour of the Emperor of Austria could not be called more than colourable. As a matter of fact, Frederick Augustus was taken as a prisoner of war to Berlin.

The condition of the country, which was now by the Central Administration placed under the Governor-generalship of the Russian Prince Repnin, was deplorable; Leipzig was one great hospital, with 34,000 sick and wounded; nearly the whole of the country, from Lusatia to the borders of Thuringia, had for the better part of a year been uninterruptedly the scene of warfare or the station of large armies; in many parts there was indescribable desolation and devastation. Thus, before thought could be taken of anything else, a special commission had to provide, so far as it could with public and private help (the latter contributed in part by British sympathy), for the relief of the sufferers. The general finances were in hopeless disorder, public credit was for the time destroyed, and, for the maintenance of his Court and the payment of dismissed officials, the King had to accept a loan—from the King of France! Moreover, the army, the greater part of which had dispersed after Leipzig, had to be reorganised, so as to make it possible to furnish a Saxon contingent to the Allies[1]. Finally, the future of the kingdom itself had to be settled. Popular feeling in Saxony had, in the midst of all this trouble and distress, once more returned into its old accustomed courses; and, in the agitation (literary and other) which ensued, the desire of all classes was for the preservation of the Saxon throne and the return of the King. So vehement were the expressions of this sentiment that Repnin threatened the introduction of a garrison of 60,000 Russians. The unfortunate kingdom was, however, not to be given over to

[1] The mutiny of the Saxon troops at Liége and its suppression by Blücher (May 1815) added to the existing bitterness of feeling.

the Cossacks; but (in November 1815) it was placed under Prussian administration, as a foretaste of the future awaiting it. There was some talk about Prince William of Prussia being appointed Governor-general, when Metternich at last suggested the expedient of a partition. It was, at first, unanimously rejected by all parties in Saxony as an arrangement that could not last (the Emperor Francis thought this the best reason for accepting it); while King Frederick Augustus placed on record a solemn refusal to make any cession or accept any equivalent. (Hardenberg had, most recently, suggested Westphalia.) But the decision lay elsewhere. In the end, after an imminent collision among the Great Powers had been averted, Metternich's renewed and revised proposal of a partition of Saxony was, after long discussion, adopted by the Four Powers, and, after much pressure, accepted by King Frederick Augustus. It left him ruler of considerably less than half his former kingdom, but of more than four-sevenths of his former subjects[1]; and, though not all the important towns of the kingdom remained to it as in the first draft of the revised proposal, Leipzig, the chief object of contention, had been saved. The provisions for the execution of the settlement with regard to debt, taxes, and the like, were, so far as it is possible to judge, not unfair, and were conscientiously carried out; but the bitterness which the enforced cession left behind it was enduring, and, as a sentiment, outlasted the generation on which the partition had been imposed. With the feeling of exasperation against Prussia, there survived, in the Government and in the upper classes of the population of the reduced kingdom, a rooted conviction that Saxony's only safety for the future lay in reliance upon Austria. On the occasion of the signature of the Federal Act—for Saxony had joined the Confederation on June 1st, 1814—

[1] He gave up 367 square geographical miles with 864,404 inhabitants, retaining 271 with 1,182,744.

Metternich informed Globig that the cause of the King of Saxony would never be alien to the Emperor of Austria. This promise was, for better or for worse, cherished by King Frederick Augustus and his successors.

He was, as we shall see, to sit on the throne which he had nearly forfeited till his death, in his seventy-seventh year, on May 5th, 1827, when he was succeeded, without any immediate change of system, by his brother Anton, his junior by only six years and originally intended for the Church. The third brother, Prince Maximilian, was three years younger than the second; and he afterwards fulfilled Napoleon's expectation that both his brother and he would make way for his eldest son, afterwards King Frederick Augustus II. The simplicity and sincerity of character distinctive of the Saxon royal House was in Prince Maximilian's family accompanied by intellectual activity of various kinds. King Frederick Augustus I, who had to pass through many vicissitudes of fate, abhorred change, and maintained, so far as he could, the elaborate ceremonial and etiquette which marked his absurdly numerous Court. The entire official system of the monarchy, where public service meant implicit obedience to the orders of immediate superiors, harmonised with these notions, and impressed upon the Saxon Administration an ultra-conservative character. At Pressburg, before the return of Frederick Augustus to Dresden (June 1815), Ministerial consultations were held as to the exigencies of the situation; and it was agreed that 'the breaking-up of the kingdom furnished no reason for making any change in the previous form of the Administration or for granting a new constitution, which could only increase the confusion already occasioned by the changes introduced by the foreign Government [i.e., the Central Administration] but still needing examination and approval by the royal authority.'

In this spirit, Einsiedel and his colleagues carried on the government of the kingdom during the remainder of the reign of Frederick Augustus and the beginning of his successor's. Little was altered except the national colours, which became green-and-white, in order to be in more decided contrast to the Prussian than the old black-and-gold of the House of Wettin. Einsiedel's policy was uniform, and few personal changes were made, though foreign affairs gradually came into the hands of Johann von Minckwitz (another member of the old Saxon nobility). An endeavour was made to supersede the old *Geheime Consilium* by a *Geheimerat*, with no particular result except that of rendering the *Geheime Cabinet* omnipotent in the management of affairs. The projected codification of the law was delayed, and the army kept down to something like 14,000 men. The old constitution, which called for thorough reforms, was left substantially untouched; the union of all the Estates in a single *Landtag* in 1817 was not effectively carried out; and neither the example, near at hand, of Saxe-Weimar nor the complaints made at home could induce the Government to appoint a commission for a reform of the representative system, with a view to giving their due place in it to the towns and the peasantry. While thus, for the present, the political life of Saxony made little progress, and the privileges of the nobility remained unimpaired, although only a fraction of the landed property in the country was in their hands, something was done to advance the economic and social condition of the country—by the encouragement of forestry, mining, and other industries—but not enough to counteract the general depression of manufactures and trade, to which the maintenance of a system of almost prohibitive frontier-duties contributed. Saxony was one of those states where the condition of industry and commerce called most loudly for the introduction of freer communication between the several German states, without

which there could be no return of prosperity. Intellectually, Saxony had long ceased to be a chief centre of the national life; but in this respect, too, better days were in store for one of the most intelligent as it was one of the most industrious of German populations. It was not long before Dresden was once more to become an artistic centre of high importance, especially through the dramatic and operatic stage; and the University of Leipzig, which had lost most of her medieval privileges, was on the way to becoming a great modern centre of higher learning[1].

It may be convenient to note in this place that the relations between Albertine Saxony and the petty Ernestine states of Thuringia had, in the Napoleonic times, varied considerably. Among these states, Saxe-Weimar, thanks to the patriotism and insight of Karl August, had in every respect taken the lead. He carried on the government of his territories (Weimar, Eisenach and Jena) on his own account from 1775, in which year Charles of Saxe-Meiningen, who, with his brother and coregent George, shared the literary tastes of their Weimar kinsman, likewise entered upon his princely duties. It was not only these literary tastes, of which the most significant expression was the lifelong intimacy with Goethe, that have made the name of Karl August memorable, but also the important part played by him in the political history of Germany.

We need not go back here to the days of the *Fürstenbund*, or to those of the expedition into Champagne (1792–3), in both of which he had a part, or dwell on the reorganising activity displayed by him, with the aid of Goethe and others, in almost every branch of the life of his own state

[1] Gottfried Hermann was already at this time her most distinguished scholar; but her most widely known professor was the philosopher W. T. Krug, who had in the worst times upheld the cause of the liberation of Germany, and advanced it by numerous publications.

(inclusive of the University of Jena, which belonged to the Ernestine duchies in common). After he had held a prominent command in the disastrous campaign of 1806, his own and the other Thuringian states were forced to enter the Confederation of the Rhine, while Erfurt remained under direct French administration. It has already been seen how, in 1809, he promulgated a constitution for his Weimar, Jena and Eisenach territories; so that, in 1816, he could, without searching for less recent foundations, promptly respond to article XIII of the Federal Act by granting a revised constitution, which called upon the Confederation itself to 'guarantee' its provisions. Thuringian troops had fought in the Napoleonic armies in Tyrol, Spain and Russia; but, notwithstanding the dangers and difficulties to which, by reason of its geographical situation, this part of Germany was specially exposed, the Thuringian Governments had early joined the Russo-Prussian alliance, and both Karl August and Duke Ernest I of Coburg-Saalfeld (afterwards of Coburg-Gotha) were appointed to important commands. In the troubled earlier months of 1813, the King of Saxony's Government had entertained some fears of cabals at Weimar; on the other hand, it had soon afterwards, in the course of its negotiations with Bavaria, expressed the opinion that, should it prove impossible to preserve the Ernestine sovereignties, their interests must be regarded as closely connected with those of the Saxon Crown; and, even when at the Congress of Prague it had flattered itself with empty hopes of 'compensations,' it had thought of Altenburg as well as of Erfurt, and of a sort of military hegemony for Saxony in Thuringia! At the Congress of Vienna, where the King of Saxony was in danger of losing his whole monarchy, Karl August ultimately declined to join a collective effort of the Ernestine Dukes in favour of their Albertine kinsman; but, though the Russian marriage of his heir obtained for him the grand-ducal title, his daughter-in-law refused to plead

for an increase of his territory with the Tsar[1]. Erfurt and certain other pieces of Thuringia were incorporated in the new Prussian province of Saxony. Both at Vienna, and in the drawing-up of the Constitution of 1816, Karl August was admirably served by Ernst Christian August von Gersdorff, a statesman who was firmly convinced that the future of Weimar lay in a loyal adherence to Prussia, on which the future of all Germany mainly depended. Gersdorff was an able and liberal financier, as well as a man of solid culture.

As to the remaining German states, it is impossible within our limits to find room for more than a few notes. Württemberg had been a kingdom since 1805, when, after entering into a definite alliance with Napoleon, its wary Duke—now Elector—was rewarded by the royal title and part of the Austrian spoils. King Frederick I, whose daughter was married to King Jerome of Westphalia, took the second place among the members of the Confederation of the Rhine, and his subjects had to pay a heavy tribute to the Napoleonic protectorate in military service; the Russian campaign of 1812 destroyed one per cent. of the entire Württemberg population, and, in the next year, the country had, for the third time, to place in the field what was virtually a new army. Yet in lesser matters, King Frederick, on the whole, held his own well against Napoleon, as he also did against the influences adverse to the full exercise at home of the sovereign authority which he held to have accrued to him with the royal crown. The frontiers of his kingdom had been finally determined by the treaties of 1809 and 1810, which had more than doubled its area as compared with that which it had covered at the beginning of the century, while the population had risen to about a million and a quarter. The consolidation of Old- and

[1] Cf. Fournier, *op. cit.*, p. 65. The part played by Karl August at Vienna was not altogether consistent.

New-Württemberg (as the divisions of the country before and after the late accretions were called) into a compact monarchy, with a suitable constitution and an efficient army in common, was an object which might well commend itself to the attention of the King. New-Württemberg was a collection of fragments alien to the population of the original duchy in political traditions and largely, also, in religious beliefs; in Lutheran Old-Württemberg, on the other hand, the venerated constitutional machinery to which Fox paid his celebrated tribute was beginning to rust, and the Standing Committee of the Diet (*Landtagsausschuss*) guarded its Exchequer (*Landschaftskasse*) so jealously as to hamper the public administration wherever it could. The nobility had no political influence, their place being in a measure taken by the superior clergy of the Lutheran Church. Out of these elements, Frederick I succeeded in creating the modern kingdom of Württemberg, the whole country being subjected to a government conducted on modern principles, by means of a state Ministry divided into six Departments. Württemberg came into the Alliance, after the door might have seemed shut, by concluding on October 23rd, 1813, a military convention with Austria, followed on November 2nd by the Treaty of Fulda, of which Russia and Prussia approved. But, owing to the skill and self-possession of Frederick I, and in some measure, no doubt, also to his imminent Russian and actual British relationships[1], he preserved his kingdom undiminished by the arrangements of the Vienna Congress. Meanwhile, his Government had, of all the German states, played the most obstructive part in the deliberations which led to the passing of the Federal Act, of which he, in the first instance, delayed the signature. His conception of his sovereignty, on the other hand, and

[1] His second wife was Charlotte, daughter of King George III; and his son and heir, in January 1816 married, as his second wife, Catharine (Paulowna), daughter of Tsar Paul I.

his desire for the completion of the political unification of his kingdom, had led him, in pursuance of a manifesto issued by him so early as January 11, 1815, to lay before a diet summoned for the following March, a draft constitution providing for a composite representative body of fifty members. The diet, however, which claimed to be sitting as a constituent body, rejected the royal draft; and the Old-Württemberg spirit, with its insistence on '*das gute alte Recht*' of the existing constitution, was not subdued during the reign of Frederick I. He died on October 30th, 1816, and it was reserved for his son, King William I, to bring the conflict to a close. In this endeavour, as will be seen, he at first asked the aid of Freiherr K. A. von Wangenheim, who under Frederick I, after holding high judicial and administrative offices and the curatorship of the University of Tübingen, had, at the King's request, in vain attempted to bring about a settlement by means of a draft of his own. This politician, whose genius was, in Stein's phrase, 'lacking only in what may be called self-control,' was to play a conspicuous part in German politics, during the first seven years of the long reign of King William I of Württemberg.

To this mention of Württemberg may be naturally subjoined one of its western neighbour, Baden—the state which in its multiplicitous composition formed the most striking monument of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic age, while the progressive tendencies to which its immediate vicinity to France materially contributed were to mark it out for a political destiny peculiar to itself among the states of the German south-west. Margrave Charles Frederick of Baden-Durlach, who, on the extinction of the Baden-Baden line in 1771, had added its dominions to his inheritance, had conducted the affairs of his state with a wisdom and liberality that, but for its geographical position, might have enabled him to regard with tranquillity the progress of the

Revolution in France. In 1793 he had felt obliged to follow in the wake of the German Great Powers; but three years later he was forcibly constrained to conclude a separate peace with France and attach his fortunes to hers. The result was that to no German Prince were the territorial changes of 1803 relatively more advantageous than to him; so that his electorate of Pfalz-Baden, as it was now called, became one of the more important of the German secondary states. By the Peace of Pressburg, in 1805, he secured the greater part of the Breisgau, with the city of Constance, and, when he entered the *Rheinbund* and acquired still further gains, which raised the number of his subjects to 930,000, he was disappointed in not being granted a royal crown, though he was speedily proclaimed Grand-duke. Like King Frederick I of Württemberg, Margrave Charles Frederick, and, after his physical collapse, the Ministers—especially J. N. F. Brauer—who carried on his policy, were intent upon the unification of his heterogeneous dominions. It was to this end that so-called 'Edicts of Constitution' were issued, the *Code Napoléon* introduced in a careful adaptation, and Church affairs regulated. A constitution proper of the Westphalian type, drafted by Brauer for publication in 1809, was never actually promulgated. Grand-duke Charles Frederick was, in 1811, succeeded by his grandson Charles, who had been his coregent since 1808. Though Baden's tribute to the Russian campaign had been very heavy, it was not till November 1813 that it could shake off the French alliance. At the Vienna Congress the Grand-duke (an effete prince who had no part in the enthusiastic Germanism which the University of Heidelberg had for many years signally helped to foster) only reluctantly acceded to the Germanic Confederation. But it was borne in upon him that the cohesion of his grand-duchy was in serious danger, for Bavaria and Austria in their territorial bargains were alike taking thought of

compensations at Baden's expense. Moreover, owing to the exactions of the war, which had pressed upon it with exceptional heaviness, the finances of the grand-duchy were in great disorder; and as Grand-duke Charles had no surviving son, the succession to his dominions rested upon the descendants from his grandfather's second marriage (the Counts of Hochberg), whose *Ebenbürtigkeit* had been recognised by their father, but not, as yet, by the Powers. These considerations could not but induce the Grand-duke Charles at Vienna to listen to the advice of Stein and of the Emperor Alexander, and to appoint a commission charged with preparing a constitution for his state; but, though not less than four drafts were presented in this and the following year, it was not till shortly before his death in 1818 that the labours of those entrusted with the task—and in particular of K. F. Nebenius, who had already distinguished himself by reorganising the financial system of the grand-duchy—reached a definite result. Meanwhile, ecclesiastical as well as dynastic troubles beset the concluding years of the enfeebled Grand-duke's life.

Baden's northern neighbour, Hesse-Darmstadt, had likewise, on the establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, become a grand-duchy, having considerably extended its area after Landgrave Lewis X had become one of the vassal princes of Napoleon. At the same time, the old estates of the landgravate, whose existence had long since become merely formal, were actually abolished. Grand-duke Lewis joined the Allies so late as November 2nd, 1813; but, in the arrangements made at the Congress of Vienna, or immediately afterwards, he gained a slight further extension of territory. Though he became a member of the Holy Alliance, his internal policy was by no means retrograde, and, while he had consistently promoted the economic and social advance of his state, he was prepared for approving its political progress. Hesse-Darmstadt was the last of the

South-German states to receive a constitution, which the skill of the Grand-duke's Minister, K. W. G. von Grolmann, had succeeded in adapting to the popular demands.

So much could, it seemed at first, be also said of the contemporary representative of the eldest—since 1803 the Electoral—line of the House of Hesse. The Elector William I of Hesse-Cassel had, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1806, played unsuccessfully the dangerous game of armed neutrality, and had been driven out of the lands where King Jerome lorded it among the Wilhelmshöhe fountains. At the close of 1813 the sturdy but long-suffering race, which he returned to rule, received back into its midst a sovereign whose despotic ways had not been softened by exile. He refused to acknowledge as binding upon him any transactions—more especially any sales of 'Westphalian' domains—which had taken place during his seven years' absence, and laid a heavy hand upon all who had accepted service under King Jerome. But, though he, too, had joined the Holy Alliance, he, at first, showed himself disposed to take into consideration the grant of a Liberal constitution, including the principle of representation. The design, however, remained unaccomplished during his reign; the *Landtag* of 1815–6 was dissolved in hopeless disagreement with the Elector as to the relations between the income of the state and that personal to the sovereign; and, though his rule was not without signs of respect for the principles of law and justice, it was in essence arbitrary and, on occasion, tyrannous.

The first Duke of Nassau, Frederick Augustus, of the Usingen line, had followed the same general course of political action as that pursued by most of the other south-western Confederates of the Rhine. He had received an increase of territory, and (though not till January 1812) had introduced the *Code Napoléon* into his duchy. Indeed, in 1814 he, too, promulgated a Liberal constitution drafted

by Marschall von Biberstein; but it did not come into force till 1818, when it met with much resistance from the 'Mediatised' whose territories he had absorbed. The duchy of Nassau reached its greatest extent when, in 1816, on the death of Frederick Augustus, the new Duke William, of the Weilburg line, united all the lands of the German branch of the House under his sway. The importance of the duchy was enhanced by the fact, that the Congress of Vienna had recognised the claim of the branch now ruling at Wiesbaden to the inheritance of the grand-duchy of Luxemburg—exclusively of the city of Luxemburg, which was made a fortress of the Confederation—in the event of the extinction of the branch now ruling in the Netherlands in the person of King William I.

The part played by Hanover in the discussions on the conditions of European peace and the proposed Germanic Confederation had differed as widely from the action and bearing of the south-western states as had her general experience in the course of the Napoleonic age from theirs. The Brunswick-Lüneburg electorate, after passing through the troubles, very grave more especially at the outset, of the French occupation (1803–5), followed, with an interval of Prussian tenure (1806), by a renewed subjection to Westphalian and then partly Westphalian, partly direct French rule, had at the close of 1813 been placed by the Allies under British administration. As to its restoration to Guelfic sway, there could of course be no doubt. But with the resurrection of Prussia an end had come to the daydreams in which, in the period after her downfall, Count Ernst von Münster, the Hanoverian Minister in London and confidant of the Prince-regent, had together with his friend Gneisenau (likewise a Hanoverian by birth) indulged, and which had in view the creation of a great north-German state destined, under a younger Prince of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, to renew the Guelfic glories of a remote past. At

Reichenbach, in June 1813, both the Brunswick lines had been promised the recovery of their possessions before the wars, the Hanoverian being increased by the Hildesheim episcopal lands. At the Congress of Vienna, where the interests of Hanover were in the hands of Münster and Count Ernst von Hardenberg, they were naturally regarded as identical with those of Great Britain; as a matter of fact, however, Münster, whose ability and devotion have met with very grudging treatment by historians unable to forgive his jealousy of Prussian ambition, was intent upon ends largely those of the dynasty served by him, but not necessarily always those of the British nation and its Government. At Vienna, the Reichenbach undertakings were fully carried out, and, while ceding Lauenburg to Prussia (which made it over to Denmark), Hanover acquired, with Hildesheim and Goslar, the coastland of East-Frisia, so often the object of contention between Prussia and herself, and avoided a cession which would have formed a link between the two moieties of the renovated Prussian monarchy. In August, 1914, the Prince-regent announced to his German subjects the elevation of Hanover to the rank of a kingdom. The recognition of it was delayed for several months by Russia, for Alexander was suspected of having intended to bring about the transfer of Hanover to his Oldenburg kinsman.

Münster's share in the construction of the new German Constitution cannot be described here[1]; but it shows a spirit of loyalty to the idea of national unity, however disappointing was the result of his labours. After 1815, he continued to act as head of the German Chancery in London and Hanoverian minister at the Court of St James's, his activity being now administrative rather than diplomatic. The advance of Hanoverian political life and institutions was

[1] Its activity was enhanced by the fact that G. F. von Martens, one of Münster's subordinates at Vienna, acted as secretary to the German Committee of the Congress.

in a measure procured by the choice as Viceroy (October 1816) of the Duke of Cambridge in lieu of his self-willed elder brother the Duke of Cumberland, a prospective successor to the Hanoverian throne; but Münster's hope that for the amiable rule of the Duke might be substituted Gneisenau's firmer grasp of affairs was frustrated.

After all the changes through which the territories and population of Hanover had passed the landed nobility here waged a not unsuccessful contest for the maintenance or recovery of its privileges, and turned to its own account the desire of the Government to grant 'parliamentary' institutions to Great Britain's sister-kingdom. So early as August 1814, the draft of a Hanoverian constitution including the proposal of a single Chamber, which should represent the kingdom as a whole, was made public, but excited strong opposition on the part of the nobility, led by a nephew of Münster, Freiherr Georg von Schele. A. W. Rehberg, the ablest of Münster's subordinates and a political writer of high repute, who had been the leading spirit of the movement for reform, was driven from office; and on December 7th, 1819, another constitutional scheme was finally promulgated, which by its adoption of the two-Chamber system favoured the interests of the nobility and of Government officialism. The full proceedings of the *Landtag* remained unpublished, and a growing apathy towards affairs of state became characteristic of Hanoverian life during the remaining period of Münster's controlling influence, which had formerly seemed so favourable to political progress.

The government of the duchy of Brunswick (Wolfenbüttel) was, after Duke Frederick William had died a hero's death at Quatrebras, carried on in the name of his infant son Charles by his guardian the Prince-regent of Great Britain, who left the chief control of it in the hands of Münster, between whom and Justus von Schmidt-Phiseldeck, the leading member of the Brunswick privy council,

an excellent understanding prevailed. The *Landschafts-ordnung* (Estates ordinance) promulgated on April 25th, 1820, represents an improvement upon the Hanoverian constitutional scheme of the preceding year; nor did the affairs of the duchy become a source of trouble until the premature transfer of its actual government to Duke Charles, at the end of his nineteenth year (October 1823).

The close relations between the reigning families of Oldenburg and Russia (as representing respectively the younger and the older branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp) had made Napoleon's expulsion of Duke Peter and his nephew in 1810 one of the contributory causes of the great war of 1812, and, on the Duke's return, had secured him considerate treatment at Vienna. A slight addition was here made to his territory, and he was granted the title of Grand-duke, which however was not assumed till the accession of Grand-duke Paul in 1829. In Oldenburg, there was a considerable free peasantry, and the complaints against the disregard of ancient liberties was confined to a particular district (Jever). The time had not yet arrived for either Oldenburg or the duchy of Holstein, whose fortunes, though directly bound up with those of Denmark, had not ceased to interest both branches of the House of Gottorp, to attract attention in connexion with the general course of German history.

Both the duchies (from 1815 grand-duchies) of Mecklenburg had long stood back from the general political and social advance of the neighbouring states. This was largely attributable to causes which had been in operation for the better part of two centuries. No part of Germany had suffered more terribly from the Thirty Years' War than Mecklenburg, whose population is reckoned to have been then reduced to about one-sixth of its previous total (50,000 out of 300,000). The long-standing quarrel between the Dukes and their nobles, which reached its height in the earlier half of the

eighteenth century, had its roots in the calamitous proceedings of the seventeenth, when the ravages of war enabled the land-holding nobility to put an end on all their estates to free peasant holdings and to make themselves absolute masters of a great part of the soil and of the dwellers thereon. The Dukes in their turn excluded the inhabitants of the domains, which in the Schwerin duchy comprised about one-half and in the Strelitz more than two-thirds, of the land, from all political rights, and arbitrarily determined their burdens. Fortunately, although fresh wars brought more suffering, the duchies in the latter half of the eighteenth century were under intelligent and beneficent rulers; but, after many generations of oppression, stagnation and hebetude, the peasantry remained in a condition of complete serfdom, while only in Rostock and a few other of the larger seaports was there any advance of trade and industry. In 1803, Mecklenburg-Schwerin acquired, in the way of pledge, the hitherto Swedish port of Wismar (which was not formally incorporated in the duchy till 1903). In 1806, however, the duchy was subjected to much suffering by the French occupation, which was carried out with extreme rigour, as that of a hostile country. Duke Frederick Francis I, who had fled early in 1807, was permitted to return after Tilsit; but, like his Strelitz kinsman Charles (the father of Queen Louisa), he had to join the Confederation of the Rhine, which they were afterwards among the earliest to abandon. At the Congress of Vienna the Mecklenburg Dukes, who had been allowed a share in the war contribution paid by France, were raised to the rank of Grand-dukes. Their relations with their nobility, and the legal condition of the peasantry of the land, however, remained unaltered. A law of November 1817 proclaimed that disputes between the Dukes and their nobles should be referred to arbitration by a tribunal to be approved by the Frankfort Diet; and the emancipation of

the peasantry was not resolved upon till 1819, or proclaimed till the following year. But even then, as will be seen, the process thus declared was, especially on the lands of the nobility as contrasted with the ducal domains, gradual and slow, and accompanied by fresh drawbacks. Thus, though the War of Liberation had not passed over Mecklenburg without exercising ultimately important effects, the country remained to some extent isolated in the continuous flow of German political and social life, and its nobility the type of an unprogressive squirearchy.

It is not possible to extend this survey further, and any notice that it may be possible to give of the territories of the Anhalt lines, or the House of Waldeck, or of other petty principalities, must be incidental only. Nor may we speak of the House of Lippe, where, in the Detmold moorlands, consecrated by the most ancient remembrances of German patriotic endeavour, the wise regency of the Princess-mother Pauline prepared the population for a constitution of her own pattern, which, in September 1819 she imposed on the Estates; while, in the neighbouring Court of Bückeburg, another high-souled lady (Caroline, the sister of the reigning Prince) upheld the scientific and literary traditions of the Schaumburg-Lippe line.

In conclusion, a remnant of medieval nomenclature, rather than of medieval political life, had been preserved within the Germanic Confederation, when it was decided to keep alive the autonomy of the 'Free and Hanse' towns of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. Together with these formerly Free Imperial Cities (for this *status*, though frequently contested in the case of Hamburg, had undoubtedly been recognised, in her case too, by the highest authority), a fourth, Frankfort-on-the-Main, had, as the seat of the new Confederation, recovered her sovereign independence, which she had lost when mediatised in 1806, to be, four years later, incorporated in the grand-duchy

called after her name. If Frankfort, the ancient place of election of the Emperors, was now an Imperial city without an Empire, the three Hanseatic towns were such without a Hansa. They had, all of them, seen their trade ruined by the Continental System, whose author had for some time appeared uncertain as to the use to which they were severally to be put. In the end, they had, in 1810, been incorporated in the French empire, Hamburg being made the capital, and Lübeck one of the towns of the Department of the Mouths of the Elbe, while Bremen had become the capital of that of the Mouths of the Weser.

Hamburg's hour of liberation had come late, for, after admitting Russian troops in March 1813, it had been made a French place of arms, whither Davoût had betaken himself after Leipzig, and whence resistance was offered during the winter and spring of 1813–4. In May of the latter year, the city saw the last of the French, and the period of its very rapid and remarkable recovery set in. Bremen, which in 1815 numbered not more than 34,000 inhabitants, had a not dissimilar experience. The Bremeners were fortunate enough to number among the members of their Senate a statesman of great ability, both political and literary, Dr Johann Smidt; and to the energy and ability displayed by him as representative of the city at the Congress of Vienna the three towns largely owed the preservation of their autonomy. Lübeck, as to which there seems to have been some thought of concluding a bargain with Denmark, was particularly lucky in reaching so honourable a consummation; for the ancient head of the Hansa and mistress of the Baltic had sunk low in material prosperity; nor can she be said to have at all recovered in this respect till the third decade of the nineteenth century. All three towns—and Frankfort also—were, at the time of the restoration of their independence, still oligarchies; and, though Frankfort in 1816 adopted a new constitution, by which a

legislative assembly representing the Christian part of the civic community was associated with the ruling Senate, while in the same year the Bremen *Bürgerschaft* acquired an influence upon the election of the governing body, this body itself was composed of representatives of financial competence and professional learning. In Hamburg, things remained unchanged. The great importance of the Hanse Towns for the development of Germany lay in their commercial importance as free ports and as, accordingly, the great North Sea (and Baltic) inlets into Germany, more especially for British and transatlantic trade. What relation they would hold to her general commercial and industrial policy, when the needs of the populations should have at last begun to shape it, was, therefore, certain to be one of the questions of vital importance for the national future.

CHAPTER III

A DECADE OF REACTION

Germany's new era began—or should have begun—with the opening of the Federal Diet at Frankfort, which, after delays due, in the first instance, to the Paris peace negotiations, took place on November 5th, 1816, a year and two months after the date fixed in the Federal Act. The representative body of the Confederation, whose inherent defects, whether it were regarded from a national point of view or merely as a working organism, have been already indicated[1], met, when it met at last, in circumstances of widespread disappointment, irritation and distrust; and only a persistent optimism, like that of Hans von Gagern, the largeminded Netherlands plenipotentiary for the grand-duchy of Luxemburg at the Diet, could hold out against the prevalent despondency.

Most patent among the causes accounting for the breakdown of the hopes which, in the times of the War of Liberation and in those following upon its victorious conclusion, had animated a large part of the nation, was the material pressure of dearth and famine. An incessant rainfall, a long sequence of floods, and the hopeless failure of the crops throughout a great part of Europe, made the first year of peace a calamitous one in her annals; nor was it till the autumn of 1817 that the economic prospect began in some measure to clear. There was great suffering in

[1] See pp. 47 sqq., *ante*.

various parts of Germany—in Saxony and in East and West Prussia, which had not yet recovered from the ravages of the war; in central Germany (notably in Hesse-Cassel) and on the Rhine; in the south-west, whence, already in this period, there was much emigration; in Silesia among the half-starved weavers, and in the adjoining provinces of the Austrian empire. The imperial Government at once prohibited the exportation of corn; the states of the south-west followed suit; and business communications between the several parts of Germany came to an almost absolute standstill. Instead of the relations between north and south, hitherto never intimate, being speedily drawn closer by the peace, the political advance made, under Napoleonic auspices, by the south-west contributed to render it more or less indifferent to the sufferings entailed upon the north, and the old Prussian provinces in particular, by war and foreign occupation. It must be remembered that the south-western states had only at the last begun to take an active interest in the struggle, while in the Austrian provinces popular enthusiasm had not again risen to the glow of 1809. In the north, on the other hand, the lassitude had set in which inevitably overcomes peoples, as it does individuals, after an era of extraordinary exertion; and from this apathy the younger generation only, which had actually taken part in the campaigns and battles of the War, was exempt.

Nor were there any intellectual impulses at work, in the domain of literature in particular, strong or clear enough to help to carry the nation rapidly forward from the accomplishment of its liberation to an effective use of the new condition of things. Although Goethe still sat securely enthroned at Weimar, his attitude towards the conflict with invincible genius had not been one likely to give commanding authority to his voice in the present stage of national affairs, and he had scant sympathy with modern forms of constitutional

government. The popular favourites of the day were the Romantics, who had rarely been in close touch with the political aspirations of the party of movement, and to whom very specially applied Stein's censure that 'the generation of today is ill adapted to the great task of construction.' The German Romantic writers who reached the height of their reputation in the second decade of the nineteenth century included the few singers to whose verse the national uprising against an alien yoke had communicated some of its own patriotic fire. Heinrich von Kleist had put an end to his existence before the outbreak of the war which he had urged his fellow-countrymen to wage; but Theodor Körner, the poet of *Lyre and Sword*, before his share in the conflict brought him glory and a grave, had been a follower of the dominant school[1]. To it belonged the other German poet of the age whose lyrics largely helped to stir patriotic feeling, Max von Schenkendorf; and one of its leaders was Friedrich Rückert, whose *Sonnets in Armour*[2] hold a place of their own among the multiform productions of this master of verse. In politics, his openminded Liberalism was at issue with the immovable adherence to ancient right displayed by his friend Ludwig Uhland, whose romances and ballads admirably reproduced the spirit of the past. But the romanticism of the age on which had been bestowed the heritage of the War of Liberation, was of a less vigorous type. The melting sentimentalism of Jean Paul and the insatiable intellectual curiosity of the brothers Schlegel—the inventors, as they have been called, of literary history proper—had been succeeded by new growths; and among these none found wider favour than the romances of Fouqué, in whom there was, no doubt, a patriotic vein, but whose imagination was chiefly occupied with an artificially revived past. More or less contemporary with him were

[1] Cf. O. Baumgarten, *Die Jugend von* 1813. (Kiel, 1913.)
[2] *Geharnischte Sonette* (1814).

Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano, who continued to enchant their generation by the revival of medieval lyric; Chamisso, a true *Penseroso*; Wilhelm Hauff, whose gentler fancy found strength enough for fiction breathing something of the spirit of Scott; and E. T. A. Hoffmann, famous through the grotesque creations of his humorous fancy and, though shortly before his death his conscience as well as his satirical pen brought him into conflict with the Prussian authorities, in truth an unpolitical genius[1]. Most of these looked back with longing to the age of chivalry, while few took much interest in the realistic needs of the present. In the drama, the tendencies of the most fertile playwrights were not dissimilar; at the one end of the scale stood Tieck, all tone and colour, at the other the Viennese Raimund, all fairies and fun; while not least notable by his hold over the public was Zacharias Werner, prophet and fatalist, upon whose productions Goethe himself was fain to bestow a measure of approval. From its early association with the tragedy of fate (*Schicksalstragödie*) the genius of Grillparzer was soon able to free itself, and, by the close of the period treated in this chapter, he had made an important contribution to the literature of the national historical drama. He was among the few eminent men of letters who redeemed the intellectual life of Austria in this period from the stagnation to which it was reduced by reactionary influences in high places.

It was not from a literature pursuing tendencies such as those just noted that a nation concerned with its own remaking could draw the sober hopefulness and the assured self-confidence which spring from conscious strength. Yet it would be a mistake to ignore certain more or less isolated attempts made before the first meeting of the Germanic Diet, and designed to bring about, in the end, real national unity.

[1] See an admirable article by E. Daniels on Börne and Hoffmann in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, CLIII, 2 (August 1913).

It must be remembered that in the latter part of the eighteenth century German society was permeated by secret leagues, associations and orders of all kinds, and that in the days of humiliation, in 1807, no method of recovering political independence from the stranger's yoke had seemed more likely to lead to the desired result than the semi-clandestine association known as the *Tugendbund*. From 1814 onwards, 'German societies' for patriotic purposes were formed in different parts of the country; and, indeed, their formation, in connexion with the universities, seems to have been contemplated even before this date under the influence of J. F. Fries and F. L. Jahn. In the summer of 1814, at the instigation of E. M. Arndt, such societies were formed about the Main and Middle Rhine; and one of these, the *Wetterauerverein*, which fantastically upheld the principle of the equality of men, and which was dissolved at Frankfort in October 1815, influenced a group of students at Giessen, of which something will have to be said below. In 1815, these societies were superseded by a directly political league which was called by the name of Karl Hoffmann, a high legal official of patriotic yearnings at Rödelheim in Upper Hesse, but of whose members Justus Gruner was by far the most important. This remarkable man, a native of Osnabrück like his more widely celebrated godfather, the political historian Justus Möser, by his arduous secret labours, more especially at the head of the Berlin and then of the entire Prussian police in the years 1810–2, substantially contributed to the success of the great liberating movement, in the course of which he was entrusted by Stein with the government of the grand-duchy of Berg after its occupation by the Allies. The 'Hoffmann League,' which was known to Gneisenau and 'sanctioned' by Hardenberg[1], aimed at the accomplishment of the unity of

[1] This was about the time of the too well remembered promise of a Prussian constitution by Frederick William III. See Meinecke, 'Zur

Germany under the leadership of Prussia; it came, however, to a speedy end in October 1815, in consequence of internal dissensions which led to the resignation of the founder[1]. The intermediary between him and Gruner had been S. P. Martin, who, in the single number of the journal *Teutschland* (published at Cassel), advocated the union of Germany as far as the Main under Prussia.

One of the foremost of Gruner's associates in the long struggle against the domination of Napoleon had not yet passed from this phase of his extraordinary literary career into another in which he figured as a leading spirit of the Roman Catholic propaganda. Joseph Görres's organ, the *Rheinische Merkur*, published by him at Coblenz from 1814 onwards, was described by a friendly critic[2] as marking a new epoch in German political literature, and, it was said, by the archfoe himself as a 'fifth Great Power.' But, already in his denunciations, on the occasion of Napoleon's return from Elba, of the once more imperilled European fabric, the passionate prophet seemed to Hardenberg to stand in need of a warning; and when, from Europe in general, Görres turned to Prussia in particular, and began to censure the reaction perceptible in her government, the arm of power descended upon his journal, of which the last number appeared on January 10th, 1816. It was, however,

Geschichte des Hoffmann'schen Bundes' in vol. I of H. Haupt, *Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte der Burschenschaft u. der Deutschen Einheitsbewegung* (Heidelberg, 3 vols., 1910–2); and cf. ib. vol. II, E. Müsebeck, 'Siegmund Peter Martin,' etc., and vol. III, H. Haupt, 'H. Hofmann' (to be distinguished from the K. Hoffmann of the league).

[1] Gruner's activity during the last few years of his short life was diverted to diplomacy; but the project of appointing him Prussian Minister at the Saxon Court, to counterbalance Fouché, who had been designated for the French legation there, came to nothing, as in the end Fouché was not sent to Dresden.

[2] Ebel of Zürich, in Joseph von Görres's *Gesammelte Briefe* (1858–74), vol. II, pp. 456–7.

very far from being the eloquent publicist's last word. In the same year came out his *Germany's Future Constitution*, which preached the union of Germany under a German emperor, with a national army, free-trade within the empire, and an imperial judicial tribunal. The book was translated into several European tongues. We shall see how, early in 1818, its author made an attempt to intervene in practical politics, which, together with the publication, in 1819, of another widely read book, *Germany and the Revolution*[1], led to his being driven into exile, where a change came over him as a thinker and writer. It was not really surprising; for he was at heart a romantic, and soon came to delight in his amphibious, half-progressive, half-ultramontane position.

The voice of Görres was not the only voice, or the *Rheinische Merkur* the solitary journal, which at this time summoned the nation to grasp its unprecedented opportunity. The eminent criminalist Anselm Feuerbach, who in the great days of 1813 had held up, not only to Bavaria and Germany but to Europe, the contrast between servitude and emancipation[2], had three years later concentrated his energies upon the work of legislation for which, in his celebrated contention with Savigny, he disputed the unfitness of the age. On the other hand, H. Luden, who for many years had worked at Jena as professor of history, and who in 1813 had resolved to devote his energies to the direct service of the national cause, in the following year assumed the editorship of *Nemesis*, a historico-political journal of note in the struggle against the reaction, to which, notwithstanding the Liberal spirit of the Weimar Government, it had, in 1818, at last to succumb. An occasional contributor to *Nemesis* was the distinguished classical

[1] It was followed, in 1821, by the cognate *Europe and the Revolution*, written in Switzerland.

[2] *Über die Unterdrückung und Befreiung Europa's.*

scholar and archaeologist (the real discoverer of the Attic trilogy) F. G. Welcker, upon whom with his younger brother K. T. Welcker—editor, from 1815 to 1817, of the patriotic *Kieler Blätter* and, afterwards, a leading Baden parliamentarian—the reaction was before long to take its revenge. For the *Kieler Blätter*, another aspiring young politician, F. C. Dahlmann—destined to exercise a powerful influence upon the political life of the nation—wrote, in 1815, an essay in favour of really representative institutions. Other political writers of progressive views and aims were Ludwig Wieland, son of the poet and formerly friend of Heinrich von Kleist, and K. E. Schmid (of Jena); but all were surpassed in the qualities which make a national leader, and in well-deserved and long-lived popularity, by Ernst Moritz Arndt. Of Swedish descent and a native of Swedish Pomerania, Arndt had been led by reflexion and travel to become a single-minded German patriot: and the first volume of his *Geist der Zeit*[1], published so early as 1805, marked him out as one of the most resolute antagonists of Napoleon and Napoleonism. For many years after this, his life was that of an exile and a wanderer; but, as the final conflict approached and ran its course, his stirring prose and inspiring lyrics made him, more than any other man, the literary champion of the national movement. During the two years following on the conclusion of the War, he seemed to have laid aside his pen in weariness or disgust; but, in 1818, the fourth volume of his *Geist der Zeit* left no doubt as to his views concerning the 'stupidity, cowardice and indolence' of the reaction, and, as will be seen, brought down upon his loyal head the wrath of the misguided Prussian Government. Arndt's influence upon German patriotic sentiment proved enduring This can no longer be asserted of the writings of his contemporary Karl von Rotteck; but, during the years following upon the conclusion of peace, and for many a

[1] *The Spirit of the Age*.

subsequent year, the ascendancy of his *Universal History*[1] over the ordinary German reader and his political tenets was practically undisputed. The direct effects of such a popularity are not to be measured; the book and its successors from the same hand were, however, not only attractive in style, but the work of a writer at once indefatigable and aware of the limits of his learning, who was never unfaithful to the ideals of his youth and manhood, and who thus, like Arndt, by his character as well as by his literary gifts, impressed these ideals upon his countrymen during the period extending from the War of Liberation to the second French Revolution.

Finally it was essentially patriotic enthusiasm which, after enrolling among Lützow's volunteers Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the author of *Deutsches Volksthum*, published at a time (1810) when Fichte, as rector of the University of Berlin, showed much political timidity, induced him, from 1816 onwards, to take up a new movement on behalf of the rising generation. This was the development of the practice of gymnastics (*Turnen*), in the first instance at Berlin, and then throughout the fatherland. Though Jahn was intellectually of a type far inferior to Arndt's, his masculine and resolute personality, and his gift of idiomatic speech, rapidly advanced the movement to which, with many fantastic adjuncts of manners and costume, he had given a vast popularity, and to which, as we shall see, the blundering shortsightedness of the Prussian and other Governments soon attached a perverted significance[2].

The patriotic complaints of the shortcomings of the organisation by which the Federal Act proposed to meet

[1] *Allgemeine Geschichte*, 9 vols. (1812–27).

[2] The rudiments of this form of athleticism seem to have been first systematised in 1795, by a teacher named F. Guts-Muths in C. G. Salzmann's already celebrated seminary of youth at Schnepfenthal near Gotha. Jahn and E. Eiselen's *Die deutsche Turnkunst* was published in 1816.

the national needs were, as has been seen, more or less isolated in character, and consequently without much visible effect. But they could hardly fail to call forth recriminatory comment, especially in a state like Prussia, where it had long been the custom for officialdom to think for the people. One of these effusions was the work of T. A. Schmalz, whose name thereby attained to a notoriety out of accord both with his personal antecedents and his literary endowments[1]. Schmalz (who was brother-in-law to Scharnhorst) held a high juridical position at Berlin, where he was also professor of law in the University, of which the Crown appointed him the first rector. He had persuaded himself, and a pamphlet published by him in 1815 sought to persuade an astonished public, that the prevalence of revolutionary sentiment in Germany was due to the underground operations of secret leagues formed in imitation of the *Tugendbund*. The charge provoked numerous remonstrances, including protests from Niebuhr and Schleiermacher. When, therefore, an order was issued prohibiting all secret societies, and Schmalz was decorated not only with a Württemberg but also with a Prussian order, the public, naturally thinking that it discerned cause and effect, was vehemently excited. The entire episode was not to remain without significance as a precedent for later denunciations leading to more important consequences.

Meanwhile, so far as the future of the Confederation would be affected by the relations between the two German Great Powers, these seemed to have been at last permanently settled, and the era of Austria's acknowledged primacy to have definitively begun. In the first place, the Prussian Government had given way about Mainz, the city being now made over to Hesse-Darmstadt, while the fortress became Federal, with a mixed Austro-Prussian garrison, under

[1] *Schmalzgesellen* became a term of abuse for reactionary officials and politicians.

alternating command. In the second place, Hardenberg's attempt to establish at Frankfort something in the nature of a dual control of the Diet had broken down. The Austrian representative who had arrived at the imperial legation in the Eschenheimer Gasse (henceforth the seat of the Diet) was Count J. R. von Buol-Schauenstein, a diplomatist of experience, who took an imposing *à priori* view of the functions of the Diet, while paying scrupulous regard to the obligations imposed upon the Confederation by the Federal Act, and who thus exercised a commanding personal influence over his colleagues. Later, he showed himself unwilling to take his cue from the reactionary policy of Metternich, rarely disposed to insist very strongly on the authority of the Diet, and was, in 1823, recalled[1]. Prussia was less fortunately represented. Stein, probably because of his rooted distrust of Hardenberg, refused to think of the post. It was then accepted by Hänlein, at the time Prussian minister at Cassel, who was full of dualistic ideas, culminating in the pleasing notion of the Austrian Emperor reassuming the title of German Emperor, while the King of Prussia should take that of German King. The draft scheme for a division of administrative power, drawn up by Hardenberg for Hänlein's use at Frankfort, did not go so far as this; but it reserved for Prussia important functions formerly attached to the arch-chancellorship of the Empire, and it gave to the two Great Powers the command of the military contingents of the petty states in the north and south of the Confederation respectively. Metternich refused to listen to any of these proposals: and, before the Diet actually met,

[1] Some curious information as to the early days of the Confederation will be found in the letters of Friedrich von Schlegel dating from 1815–8, and printed in J. Bleyer, *Friedrich Schlegel am Bundestage* (1913). His letters did not suit his employer Metternich, and in 1818 he returned to Vienna, to devote himself to the more congenial task of elucidating 'scientific Catholicism.'

Hardenberg had to cover his discreditable fiasco by recalling Hänlein. His place was taken, but provisionally only, by Humboldt, who showed little confidence in the Diet's capacity to readjust the system which confined the control of its machinery to Austrian hands. After the first meeting of the Diet, when the President delivered a solemn address in which, however, a sarcastic allusion to the aggrandisement of Prussia within the limits of the Confederation was thought discoverable, Count A. F. F. von der Goltz took his seat as Prussian envoy. He had managed foreign affairs without much ability, from 1807 to the time of the national uprising in 1813, and his reputation was not enhanced by his Frankfort career[1]. None of the envoys of the other German states as yet played a prominent part at the Diet, unless it were the genial Hans von Gagern, of whom mention has already been made.

But before the Diet had reached the date of its first adjournment, towards the end of July 1817, it had met with a fall in its earliest conflict with particularism—or state sovereignty—in the redoubtable person of the Elector William I of Hesse. He had repudiated the pretension of the Diet to intervene (eventually) in his quarrel with one of his subjects concerning certain lands formerly the property of the German Order, which the Elector would not allow to remain in private hands. He had reason enough for resisting Federal intervention, since he was engaged in a long campaign against the owners of former electoral domains purchased by them in the days of the kingdom of Westphalia. In June 1817 (about a month before the adjournment of the Diet), Austria and Prussia had come to an understanding as to the (provisional) competence of the Diet for securing justice when refused by a territorial sovereign. But the buyers of Hessian domains reaped no advantage

[1] Varnhagen, who had previously regarded von der Goltz as a dead failure, was, apparently, a little softened by the 'scapegoat's' wish that his place might be filled by the diarist himself.

from this understanding[1]; the Frankfort Jews, to whom the government of the free city had denied the exercise of civic rights not long since purchased by them for hard cash from their Grand-duke (Dalberg), had to wait six years for a partial restoration of these; and the establishment of an *Austrägalinstanz* for the settlement of disputes between members of the Confederation[2] proved a slight, if not a broken, reed on which to place reliance. The fundamental security for the very existence of the Confederation—its military system—remained in an only half-settled condition, even after conferences had been held, in the summer of 1817, between Austrian and Prussian military delegates at Carlsbad. Frederick William III had, indeed, been persuaded to drop his desire of effecting the inclusion in the Confederation of his provinces of East and West Prussia and Posen, his contingent in the armed force of the Confederation being proportionately increased; Metternich, aware of the impracticability of the pursuit of a similar line of action by Austria, having pointed out other ways of guarding against Russian encroachments, the fear of which was in the King's mind. But, in the end, the two Great Powers found it so difficult to reach any final conclusions concerning the numbers and system of division to be adopted for the Federal army, that they contented themselves with drawing up a purely provisional *matricula* (for five years) based on a numerical estimate of the populations of the several states.

So tired of war, however, was the Germany of this period that it refused to dwell on belligerent preparations; and so intent was a large element in the nation upon the

[1] In 1823, the Diet, notwithstanding the efforts of Wangenheim, declared itself incompetent to interfere with the Elector's exercise of his sovereign rights.

[2] Cf. pp. 49–50, *ante*. When, in May 1817, Austria moved for a permanent *Austrägalinstanz*, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg and Baden resisted the proposal as prejudicial to their sovereign rights.

assurance of political freedom that no state seemed any longer to deserve that name which remained without a constitution. Thus, the article of the Federal Act which busied the public mind beyond all the rest was the thirteenth, whose oracular announcement that 'in all the states of the Confederation a constitution with territorial estates shall take place' has already been cited on a previous page[1]. It was there also noted how curious a readiness several German sovereigns displayed to respond to this provision. In the main, these were south-western Princes, intent, above all, on maintaining the territorial expansion which they had gained as members of the Confederation of the Rhine, and which, with certain modifications here and there, remained to them as members of the new Germanic body. They were, therefore, desirous of meeting the wishes of their subjects, naturally more sensitive than the populations of northern and eastern Germany to the political ideas at work on the other side of the Rhine, and consequently eager to secure charters of their own. The case of Württemberg, where King Frederick I proposed a constitution to his Estates so early as March 1815, was, as has been seen, peculiar; and the repugnance of the Old-Württembergers to accept a king-made constitution, even after the King had followed his Minister Wangenheim's advice in granting as many concessions as possible, continued to the close of his reign (October 30th, 1816) and under his popular successor, William I. The new King, accordingly, resolved to bide his time, but pursued, in general, a policy of progress which heightened his popularity. Serfdom was, at least partially, abolished; emigration was permitted, while, at the same time, agriculture was encouraged by judicious measures; and so early as January 1817, freedom of the press was granted. Wangenheim's resignation of his ministerial office in the following November, when he was appointed envoy

[1] p 51, *ante*.

at Frankfort, and speedily became the *bête noire* of Metternich and his followers, did not impede the progress of friendly relations between the King and his Estates; and, on September 27th, 1819, a constitution was proclaimed, to which the Estates had agreed in conferences held at Ludwigsburg, and which assured the financial rights of the *Landtag*. It is noticeable that, in the previous year, Wangenheim at Frankfort, and Count Wintzingerode, a statesman much trusted by King William, at Vienna, had sought to obtain an authentic interpretation of article XIII on the part of the Federal Diet perhaps with a view to safeguarding the King in his Liberal policy; but the proposal fell through, although it was not forgotten by Metternich[1].

More than a year before Württemberg, Bavaria had received a constitution, in accordance with the provision of the Federal Act. Here, the control exercised by Montgelas over the policy of the easy-tempered Maximilian Joseph was no longer absolute, as it had been before the Treaty of Ried, and before the active intervention in public business of the ambitious Field-marshal Wrede and of the Crown-prince Lewis. The mind of this gifted prince, notwithstanding its romantic tendencies, was open to the influence of Liberal ideas, and above all, was full of an enthusiastic German patriotism[1]. Thus Montgelas, who had treated the Bavarian constitution of 1808 with deserved contempt, could not refuse his consent to its revision; but the draft prepared by a packed commission and forwarded to Maximilian Joseph at Vienna in February 1815 was so palpably inadequate that the Crown-prince induced the King to reject it, and, for the next two years (1815–7), Montgelas was able to fall back upon the previous system of government. But, as time went on, the opposition to him increased and the hostile clerical influence in particular, favoured by the

[1] Cf. Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. II, pp. 167–8.

[2] See C. T. Heigel, *Ludwig I, König von Bayern* (1879).

new Empress of Austria, Caroline Augusta, who thus at the same time added to the illwill entertained against him at Vienna, was eager for his fall. For, until this could be brought about, there was no hope of the acceptance by the Bavarian Government of the draft concordat transmitted from Rome by its octogenarian commissioner Bishop Häffele. The dismissal of Montgelas actually came to pass, with extraordinary suddenness, on February 2nd, 1817, by means of a personal appeal on the part of the Crown-prince in a letter laid before the King by Wrede. But the consequences of the event were less drastic than the *coup* itself. The clerical party did not come into power with the overthrow of their chief adversary. The government of the country was henceforth distributed among five Ministers, between whom there was no connecting link save such as was supplied by the *Staatsrat*; while, of the two most prominent among them, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Aloys Rechberg, was distinctly favourable to Austria and to the clerical party at Rome, but the Finance Minister, Freiherr M. E. von Lerchenfeld, was Liberal in his sympathies and desirous of establishing constitutional government. The ablest member of the new Administration was, no doubt, G. F. (afterwards Freiherr von) Zentner, Director-general of the Ministry of the Interior, whose skill and tact conciliated even so bitter an opponent of the Bavarian constitution as Gentz[1], and contrived to reconcile the administrative traditions of Montgelas with the claims of later Liberalism.

The treatment of the religious question exemplified the character of the new *régime*. Though on October 24th, the King approved a concordat with Rome which had been

[1] In August 1820 Gentz reports Zentner and his colleague Count Thürheim as decidedly on the side of the *boni*: but Metternich regarded Zentner as too much of an idealist. *Briefe von u. an F. von Gentz*, vol. II, part II (pp. 17, 30).

substituted for that signed, without warrant, by Bishop Häffele, but which conceded the same papal claims, destructive to the principle of religious parity, the effect of the agreement was nullified by a religious edict maintaining the principle as incorporated in the constitution of 1818. For, in February of that year, the revision of the constitution, which Montgelas had dropped, was resumed; and, on May 26th, 1818, a constitution, drafted mainly through Zentner's exertions, was proclaimed at Munich. Together with a reasonable liberty of the press, it granted tolerable conditions of representation, while at the same time making some provision for communal self-control. Thus, the Bavarian Government had gained a clear advantage over the other Governments of the south-west by meeting the popular demands of the age, which not long since Anselm Feuerbach had been persecuted for advocating. Nor, though, beyond a doubt, the constitutional ardour of Maximilian Joseph and his Ministers had been increased by the desire of outbidding Baden, and thus perhaps furthering the consummation of the perennial dream of Bavarian policy—the acquisition of the Rhenish Palatinate[1]—had this been the main motive of their action. The Crown-prince, who had pulled down Montgelas, returned from one of his Italian journeys to sign the new constitution, under which the first *Landtag* met on February 4th, 1819. For a time—though the time was not to be long—it seemed as if, of all German states, Bavaria was to be the leader of the cause of Liberalism and progress.

In Baden, necessity rather than choice had induced

[1] This acquisition, and the establishment, by means of it, of the continuity of the northern frontier of the Bavarian state, was a cherished object of Bavarian statesmen from the conclusion of the Ried treaty onwards, and had not ceased to be such in 1870. See K. A. von Müller, *Bismarck und Ludwig II*, in *Histor. Zeitschrift*, vol. CXI (1913).

the moribund Grand-duke Charles to announce his desire to become a constitutional monarch; but the execution of this enterprise had been delayed by various difficulties. The question of the succession had here, as at times it has in greater monarchies, come to dominate all others. In April 1817 the Grand-duke was left without an heir of his line except an unmarried uncle; and, with the Bavarian Court lying in wait for his inheritance, it behoved him to take every step in his power for securing it to the descendants of the second (morganatic) marriage of his predecessor (the Hochberg line). On October 1st following, he therefore promulgated a family statute (*Hausgesetz*) which confirmed the recognition, already pronounced, of the succession rights of the Counts of Hochberg, and, at the same time, countered the Bavarian craving for the Palatinate by declaring the indivisibility of the grand-ducal dominions. It was not, however, till the meeting of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in the ensuing year, that the Great Powers recognised the order of succession thus proclaimed; and, even after this, King Lewis kept up territorial claims against his neighbour which caused endless trouble[1]. Of more far-reaching importance for the future of Germany were the ecclesiastical troubles of the grand-duchy. The Vicar-general of the bishopric of Constance, Henry von Wessenberg, was a prelate in whom broad patriotic sympathies were united to a truly evangelical spirit. At the Congress of Vienna, he had incurred the profound displeasure of the Curia by his efforts to give practical shape to his ideal of a

[1] The King could never reconcile himself to the loss of the coveted Rhenish Palatinate; and a lesser question, concerning the unreasonable compensation demanded by Bavaria for her cession of part of the ancient countship of Sponheim (on the left bank of the Rhine), became a byword of diplomacy, and could, at last, only be settled by both sides resigning their pretensions. But the desire for the Palatinate was bequeathed by the King to his successors.

national German Church, and by his hostility to the Jesuits, whose Order had been restored by Pope Pius VII in 1814. When, therefore, in this year, Dalberg, as Bishop of Constance, named Wessenberg his coadjutor, with the right of succession, the choice was twice annulled at Rome. The Grand-duke Charles was roused to a protest, and Wessenberg repaired in person to Rome, in order, as he hoped, to set things right at the Vatican by his powers of persuasion. But he was not allowed to see the Pope, and Cardinal Consalvi coldly called upon him for submission in a carefully-worded formula. The Baden Government appealed to the Diet, but without venturing to make a definite proposal on a subject manifestly beyond the sphere of action of that body. Bavaria, as has been seen, had recently been anything but successful in her dealings with Rome; and the attempts now made by Baden, Württemberg and Nassau (Wangenheim taking the lead in the Frankfort Conferences on the subject) with a view to a satisfactory joint concordat with the Papacy, accomplished nothing for the present, although they were to become significant for the later ecclesiastical history of the Upper Rhine. Henry von Wessenberg was afterwards nominated for the vacant archbishopric of Freiburg; but he was left without effective support by the new Grand-duke Lewis, who had succeeded in December 1818; and herewith the public career of this highminded and farsighted divine virtually came to a close.

Meanwhile, the reign of Grand-duke Charles had not ended before the outbreak of the quarrel with Bavaria, which the courageous *Hausgesetz* of October 1817 had rendered all but inevitable. Munich having broken off diplomatic intercourse with Carlsruhe, the Grand-duke was induced by his new Minister, Freiherr von Reitzenstein, to address a vehement letter of remonstrance to his brother-in-law, King Maximilian Joseph; and, this missive having been surreptitiously communicated to a Hamburg newspaper

by the Prussian Minister at Carlsruhe, Varnhagen von Ense (whose own pen was destined to gain a unique celebrity for the perpetuation of scandals), public opinion in Germany was widely stirred in favour of the Baden case. This was the time when Tsar Alexander, with Capodistrias (a name odious to Metternich and Gentz) by his side, was posing before Europe as the patron of constitutions and of liberal ideas in general; and as, since the fall of Montgelas, the Bavarian Government had shown itself ready to follow in the same direction, no time was to be lost unless the Grand-duke was to forfeit the vaunted goodwill of his brother-in-law the Tsar, and also that of German Liberalism. Hence, the Baden constitution was definitively signed by Grand-duke Charles, on August 22nd, 1818. Like the Bavarian, which it had succeeded in anticipating, the Baden constitution contained sufficient provisions as to the parliamentary control of the public expenditure, while, unlike the Bavarian, its system of representation was very favourable to the towns. Before very long, the *Landtag* at Carlsruhe and its spirited debates became the hope and pride of German Liberalism of the most recent type.

Curiously enough, the distinction of being the earliest constitutional state in the Germanic Confederation had nearly been taken from Saxe-Weimar by Nassau. Even before the final union, under the rule of a single line, of the heterogeneous territories of the duchy, a constitution had been promised it from Vienna (September 1814). This promise was in accordance with the insight distinguishing the administration of Freiherr Marschall von Biberstein and his coadjutor C. von Ibell, to which the duchy owed a series of important reforms. But it was not till four years later (March 1818) that, after a long controversy as to the revenues of the ducal domains between Duke William and his subjects, the first Nassau *Landtag* actually met; and it was far longer before any substantial change occurred in the

methods of governing the congeries of petty territories now known collectively by the great name of Nassau.

Hesse-Darmstadt, a state of a historical growth even more complicated than that of Nassau, did not attain to a constitution till December 1820, when Grand-duke Lewis, who, albeit a member of the Holy Alliance, adhered more consistently than did its founder to ideas of political progress, fulfilled a promise made at an earlier date.

But, though it was in the south-west that the constitutional movement was alike most widespread and most successful, the earliest constitutional state in Germany as a whole was the little Thuringian principality which had consistently taken up its position in the van of political progress. Among all the princes of Germany, Grand-duke Karl August of Saxe-Weimar had, once more, by his quick and decisive action, shown his confidence in a movement springing from genuine patriotic sentiment. The revised constitution which, as already noted, he signed on May 5th, 1816, although it failed to edify Goethe, became, partly, no doubt, on account of the halo still hovering round his Weimar, a shining exemplar to the efforts of German Liberalism. The Weimar constitution, the work of statesmen among whom E. C. A. von Gersdorff should be specially mentioned, was submitted to the Diet of the Confederation for its guarantee. Karl August's purpose, as stated at Frankfort, was that, in case either the Grand-duke or the Estates should fall short of the obligations imposed on them by the constitution, the Diet should use all the means in its power to enforce them. Count Buol having diplomatically pointed out that a guarantee of state constitutions was unobjectionable, so long as it did not contravene the conditions of the Federal Act, the Weimar constitution was, on March 13th, 1817, not without reluctance, guaranteed by the Federal Diet.

Karl August had taken the important step of seeking

for a Federal guarantee of the constitution of his state on his own account. Least of all could he have derived encouragement from the patriarchal rule of his Albertine kinsman in the diminished kingdom of Saxony, where all essays at reform met with the same immovable resistance. But at no time in his thoroughly self-consistent political course had he looked in any direction but one for the leadership without which the future of the national life must remain hopelessly uncertain. Was there any prospect of that life passing successfully through the new stage on which it had now entered under any other leadership than that of Prussia, or could the constitutional movement, from which Austria held altogether aloof, be carried on without Prussia taking part in it?

We have seen how, already on May 22nd, 1815, before leaving Vienna, King Frederick William III had decreed the formation of a representative body chosen from the provincial Estates, and how the intention of losing no time in carrying this royal resolution into effect had been shown, in the first instance, by the speedy appointment of a Commission on the subject. It is needless to discuss the motives of Hardenberg in persuading his master to take a step which was at the time hailed as a frank acceptance by the Prussian Government of the cardinal political demand of the age, but which has since, by the foremost among historians devoted to the principle of Prussian hegemony[1], been declared a lamentable blunder. For Hardenberg was a consistent believer in constitutional freedom, and needed no incentive towards bringing about its establishment in Prussia. There can, however, be little doubt that, not less characteristically, he at the same time believed that he was playing a card which might prove of direct assistance in advancing the German hegemony of Prussia. Reference has already been made to the movement in this direction, which should not be overlooked, although it proved abortive

[1] Treitschke.

in consequence of Prussia's ultimate refusal to take advantage of it. The movement was, of course, specially active at Berlin, where the well-known bookseller G. Reimer published the *Tagesblatt der Geschichte* and was the centre of a circle of supporters of the ideas which it promulgated. He was connected with the still better known publisher F. Perthes of Hamburg; and in other parts of Germany, too, the ideas of Arndt had begun to take root, and the schemes of Gruner and his friends were devised[1]. But hopes and schemes were alike in vain. The most farsighted of Prussian statesmen, Wilhelm von Humboldt, when, before leaving Frankfort in the autumn of 1816, he laid down the principles on which the Federal policy of the Prussian Government should for the present be based[2], held that the time had not yet arrived for a system of action antagonistic to Austria and provocative to the Governments of the smaller states, or for doing more than setting those states the example of liberal advance at home (where he was a strong advocate of constitutional reform), and drawing them nearer to Prussia by means of separate negotiations—the policy which was to achieve its first memorable success in the early history of the *Zollverein*. In any case, had there been any present question of the Prussia of Frederick William III immediately and openly claiming the national hegemony, she would have needed other guidance than that of the keen-witted and liberal-minded, but unimpassioned and worn-out statesman at the helm of affairs. Although, notwithstanding his advancing years, still in full possession of his high intellectual faculties and his extraordinary power of work, Hardenberg was hampered not only by deafness, but by the disrespect in which he was involved by his personal surroundings, which he had not moral vigour

[1] Cf. pp. 126–7, *ante*.

[2] See for this remarkable memorandum, B. Gebhardt, *Wilhelm von Humboldt als Staatsmann*, vol. II (1894), pp. 205 sqq.

enough to cast off. Among his Ministerial colleagues, Boyen alone was in full sympathy with his Liberal ideas, while the Finance Minister, Count L. F. V. H. von Bülow, was his cousin. Of the other Ministers, those of Police and of the Interior—Wittgenstein, the most effective supporter at Court of the reaction and the intimate of Metternich, and Schuckmann, the most energetic representative of unbending officialism ('the Philistine of the old era,' as Humboldt called him)—were steadily opposed to political reform. Thus the early agitation in favour of Prussian hegemony was consciously allowed to flicker out unused; and it was a cruel requital that, in the end, some of its promoters were included among the victims of the political persecutions in which the state of their choice played a conspicuous part.

Prussian statesmanship, while shutting its eyes to such political opportunities as the moment offered, was actively engaged upon numerous and pressing problems of internal reorganisation. Over these, and over the opposition which the endeavours to solve them encountered from local interests of the most diverse kinds, we are obliged to pass very summarily. In the new province of Saxony there was a long-lived attachment to the ancient *régime*, and in Posen there were treasonable intrigues. In the face of a host of difficulties more or less of historical origin, the royal ordinance of April 30th, 1815 dividing the monarchy into ten provinces and twenty-five governmental districts (*Regierungsbezirke*) was carried out; and, on March 20th, 1817, the supreme consultative authority of the state, the *Staatsrat*, was reconstituted on the wider basis on which it was to have been summoned in 1810. At its first meeting, two cabinet orders were read appointing a commission on the constitution, and another on taxation. The former met on July 7th, 1817, when, in accordance with a provision of the cabinet order, Altenstein, Klewiz (afterwards Minister of Finance) and Beyme were appointed roving commissioners

to ascertain the views held in the several provinces concerning the future constitution. Considering the highly composite character of the Prussian monarchy, which the reception given to the recent administrative changes had made more manifest than ever, this enquiry cannot fairly be held to have been appointed for the purpose of delay; it, however, actually put off further deliberations on the subject at headquarters for a couple of years.

On the other hand, the commission on taxation at once proceeded to business; over this Humboldt presided, and it included among other experts the Chief-presidents (*Oberpräsidenten*) of the several provinces—Schön being conspicuous among them for the incisiveness of his criticisms. The difficulties of this commission's task were great; for nine years of war and foreign occupation had inflicted heavy damage upon every kind of trade and industry, and the existing system of internal custom-duties of all kinds impeded all efforts towards recovery. The report of the Finance Minister Bülow neither ignored this state of things nor shrank from a move in the direction of free-trade; but his main proposed innovation in the system of taxation, a general bread-tax (*Malsteuer*), was all but unanimously condemned by the commission. His attempt to shift the responsibility for the existing deficit on the army requirements under the new *Landwehr* system broke down; and a large majority of notables assembled in the several provinces declared against his proposals. Hardenberg, with whom Bülow had contrived to quarrel, was at first inclined to make terms with Humboldt, the chief critic of the scheme; but the Chancellor would not agree, nor would the King, to a complete reorganisation of the Ministerial system, which would have established a departmental responsibility under that of the head of the Government. Humboldt and Schön, who had demanded this change as indispensable to the restoration of public confidence, were therefore sent about

their business (Humboldt to his post in London); and, in December 1817, the Ministry was reconstituted without being radically changed. Finance was handed over to Klewiz, who upheld the great reform of taxation which he had to administer for nearly eight years (when he was succeeded by Motz), being much hampered by the establishment of a general comptrollership in coordination with his Ministry; and Bülow was put at the head of the newly-formed Ministry of Commerce and Industry, while a section of Schuckmann's department—Worship and Education—was transferred to Altenstein, who, together with Beyme, reentered the Ministry. On May 26th, 1818, it signalised itself by a tariff law which was mainly the work of the eminent economist K. G. Maassen. This law, as will be seen[1], was in truth an important step forward in the direction of free-trade, and, above all, in that of a German customs union of which Prussia would be the nucleus. Yet it is not wonderful that, with the existing feeling against Prussia and the illiberal character of her policy, it should have been widely and angrily denounced as selfishly Prussian in its purpose. While it permitted the importation into Prussia of all foreign wares[2] under frontier duties far more moderate than those obtaining in Austria and in other great European states, it secured economic unity to the Prussian monarchy by applying to it in its entirety the new facilities of importation, consumption and transit (this last under heavy duties). The moderation of the tariff was a boon which soon came to be looked upon by the advocates of free-trade as an example set by Prussia to the rest of Europe; though it was not as yet seen that what strengthened the unity of Prussia and tended to attract the adhesion of other German states would in the end help to advance the German unity of the future.

[1] See chapter IV *post*.

[2] With the exception of the *regalia* salt and playing-cards.

Meanwhile, the King's constitutional promise continued unfulfilled. The travelling commissioners had very various replies to their enquiries to report. Provincial Estates were demanded on all sides; but, as to their nature and as to what development was to accompany them, there was much difference of opinion. In the west, as was to be expected, Altenstein had found a general desire for a representation of the nation at large, by means of Estates of the realm (*Reichsstände*) meeting as a single assembly. In the centre of the monarchy (Saxony, Silesia, Posen and Brandenburg), and again in the north-east (Pomerania and the two provinces of Prussia), Klewiz and Beyme had found considerable doubts as to the population being ripe for a complete representative system, and among the nobility a strong desire for the restoration of the old Estates, in which the preponderance belonged to the landed proprietors. But there were many voices to the contrary; East Prussia was probably not the only province where the superiority of intellectual culture lay with the middle-class rather than with the landowners; and the emancipation of the peasantry had already borne fruit in the creation of a class rapidly becoming fit to participate on its own account in the life of the state. By those who wished for the establishment of Estates of the realm as well as of provincial Estates, very diverse views were put forward as to the relations of origin and functions between the two bodies; and it is not surprising that Beyme, from whom only a comprehensive report accompanied by recommendations remains, should on the whole have been in favour of going no further at present than the convocation of provincial Estates; though even these he thought should be summoned 'less for the purpose of consultation, than for that of assistance in administration.'

The tenor of these reports as a whole was not such as to embolden the King to take immediate steps towards the

fulfilment of his promise. Still less was he likely to be moved to action by more or less isolated admonitions addressed to him in some of the chief towns of the Rhine province, on his visit to that part of his dominions in the summer of 1817. In December, a similar appeal was addressed to his Ministers by the town-councillors of Berlin. On January 12th, 1818, an address from the town to the King was laid before Hardenberg at Coblenz by a large deputation including Görres, who, though the *Rheinische Merkur* had been silenced, still retained his belief in the destiny of Prussia. It had been reedited by him from an original first intended for presentation to the Federal Diet, and had received many signatures. It asked for a constitution and numerous further reforms, including liberty of the press for the well-informed, and the endowment of both the Catholic and the Protestant clergy. Hardenberg received this manifesto politely, and spoke of the summoning of provincial Estates as the practical preliminary step; but the King, rendered more suspicious than ever by the progress of the constitutional movement in south-western Germany, angrily let it be known that he would choose his own time. Görres, after publishing a narrative of the whole transaction, proceeded to pour out his soul in the tract *Germany and the Revolution* already mentioned; whereupon Hardenberg broke off all further communications with him. Thus the incident had an effect contrary to what had been designed. The reconstituted Prussian Government carried on its work, Hardenberg still seeming indispensable and Humboldt more than ever out of the question. In 1818, Count Christian Günther von Bernstorff was induced to exchange the Danish for the Prussian service and, after having by Hardenberg's side taken part in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, assumed the duties of Minister of Foreign Affairs at Berlin. Beyond a doubt, this addition to the Government (which does not seem to have been suggested

by Hardenberg) implied the strengthening in it of the conservative element; though Bernstorff was to show independence of judgment as well as insight. But, as for the question of the constitution, it had, even before the crisis in German affairs which ended in the victory of the reaction, been shelved for many a long and weary year.

At Frankfort, the general subject of art. XIII of the Federal Act was once more raised, in December 1817, by a motion of the Mecklenburg envoy L. von Plessen, which called upon the Diet to make an explicit declaration concerning the much-vext article. The motion, made with no progressive purpose, was eagerly supported in a different spirit by Wangenheim, but was coldly received by Buol; and, in the end, the Prussian view was adopted, which interpreted the article as a mere general promise, and characteristically recommended an adjournment of the discussion. A proposal made by Weimar, in April 1818, to formulate a general agreement on the subject of the liberty of the press was similarly put off, and each Government was left to make its own provisions with regard to the censorship. How could the proceedings of a body, decrepit from the day of its birth, which thus shrank from even attempting to remedy the defects of the existing Federal system, satisfy the aspirations of the younger generation, justly anxious to say its word in the determination of the national future?

Before we pass from the subject of the constitutional movement among the German states, of its partial progress and of the obstacles in its path, mention should be made of an effort made, within the period treated in this chapter, to engage the support of the Diet in the struggle which the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had already for some time been carrying on in defence of their constitutional rights against the Danish Crown. Reserving, for the moment, any attempt to summarise the origin and growth of what was, for many weary years, to be called the

Schleswig-Holstein question, we need only note here that, inasmuch as King Frederick VI of Denmark had become a member of the Germanic Confederation for the duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, their claim for a constitution was rendered incontestable by art. XIII of the Federal Act. But, inasmuch as the indivisibility of Schleswig and Holstein had been assured to these duchies when (in 1460) they had elected Christian I of Denmark as their sovereign, the rights of Schleswig, which had not entered the Confederation, would be jeopardised if Holstein received a constitution without the sister duchy. This expedient was precisely that on which the Danish Government had begun to calculate. While the contention that Schleswig formed an integral part of the Danish monarchy was becoming more and more an axiom of Danish policy, a strong agitation had arisen in the two duchies for the maintenance of the union between them; and it was with the same object that, about this time, the two most prominent champions of the Schleswig-Holstein cause, F. C. Dahlmann, a Mecklenburger, and N. Falck, a north-Schleswiger, by birth, both professors in the University of Kiel, founded the celebrated though short-lived journal, the *Kieler Blätter*. King Frederick VI now announced his intention of granting a constitution to Holstein and, in reply to supplications to the contrary, proceeded to have it drafted. But nothing further followed; and, in order to end the long-protracted suspense, the Knights (*Ritterschaft*) of Schleswig-Holstein (who, although they had not been summoned with the Towns to the old diet since 1712, had remained united by a so-called *nexus socialis* and thus carried on their private concerns) in 1822, together with the Prelates, presented to the Frankfort Diet an address, composed by Dahlmann, complaining of the peril to which the rights of the duchies were exposed, and requesting the Diet's mediation. In spite, however, of the endeavours of Wangenheim, which were resisted by the Great Powers,

the Diet shelved the address and thus, beyond all question, helped to sow the seed of the conflict of which the moral cause was the conviction of the Danes that the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein could place no dependence on the support of Germany[1].

Of all the national institutions of Germany, the universities were least likely to have remained without a share in the great changes due to the War of Liberation and its achievements. And, by what may justly be called a tragic turn of events, it was precisely in this sphere of the national life, pervaded by its loftiest longings and ever environed by its fondest affections, that the crisis to which we have referred was to have its immediate beginning. The history of the German universities, though closely interwoven with that of the nation at large, had in some respects pursued a course of its own[2]. The traditions of absolute academic independence and the tendency to close corporate association, which were partly the inheritance of the Middle Ages and the following period, partly connected with the addiction, already noticed, of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to secret leagues and orders of all sorts[3], were, in the

[1] For these transactions, see J. H. Gebauer, *Christian August, Herzog von Schleswig-Holstein* (1910), pp. 52 sqq.

[2] See for the most complete extant account of this subject F. Schulze and Paul Ssymanck, *Das deutsche Studententum von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart* (1910); for what follows especially part II. Of biographical sources for the early history of the *Burschenschaft*, the best known is H. Leo's *Meine Jugendzeit* (1880), candid, although more or less coloured by the conservative opinions of his later years; but a great deal of additional matter is to be found in H. Haupt's valuable collective work already cited.

[3] The last resolution passed by the old Ratisbon Diet (June 14th, 1793) prohibited all students' associations (*Verbindungen*). The previous year (1792) had witnessed the famous Nöhra secession, when 500 (out of a total of 800) students had seceded from Jena, and returned with flying colours, all their demands having been granted.

Napoleonic age and that which succeeded it, dying out but not yet quite dead. A blatant coarseness, diversified by occasional touches of later eighteenth century sentimentality, had, though not without exceptions (such as Göttingen and Leipzig), continued to disfigure the student life of Germany; and to the obtrusive remains of the *Pennalismus* of earlier times had been added the narrow formalism of the *Landsmannschaften*, associations based on the territorial origin of the students belonging to them. These customs had to some extent been broken up by the cosmopolitan ideas of the Revolutionary period; but the patriotic enthusiasm and the masculine discipline of the War of Liberation were far more effective in leavening the lump. At a later date, the close superintendence exercised in Prussia over the relations between university examinations and professional careers—a system gradually adopted in other states—materially helped to put an end to the old sense of irresponsibility and independence among students as well as professors. But, for the present, it was the infusion, in a period of national effort, of a deeper and more serious spirit into the individual and corporate life of the students which did most to bring about a change moral rather than political in its origin, and steadying rather than agitating in its effects. It was as if the flower of the German youth had become too manly to be able any longer to care for childish forms, or to descend to brutal pleasures.

Of all the German universities, Jena may be said to have been the chosen seat of the old conceptions of student life, where the two great businesses of that life, drinking and duelling, were subject to the sovereign rule of the *comment*; and here, too, was the actual starting-point of the new movement of regeneration. For what lay at its root was the national patriotic element. On September 6th, 1812, a gathering of the Jena students' association (*Verbindung*) called the *Vandals* (Wends) took place on the Kunitzburg,

where those present swore an oath of fidelity to the fatherland. The immediate result of this was seen when, after the King's historic appeal to his people, the Jena *Wehrschaft* (body of defence) was formed, and when the numerous students from various universities who entered Lützow's famous corps (others joined other parts of the forces) included nearly all the members of the *Vandalia*.

Before the Jena *Burschenschaft* (among whose eleven founders nine were Lützowers) was actually called into life, there were movements in much the same direction in other universities. At Halle (1813–4) and at Giessen (1814) associations were founded under the significant names of *Teutonia* and *Teutsche Gesellschaft*; among the promoters of the latter—the earliest direct attempt to nationalise the students' associations—were Adolf and Karl Follen, the elder two of three brothers who were to play a notable part in the movement now beginning. A third *Teutonia* was founded at Heidelberg in 1815. But the cradle of the *Urburschenschaft*[1] could hardly find its place elsewhere than in the dominions of the most patriotic of German princes, and in the University of Jena. From Weimar and Jena, with the cooperation of such academical luminaries as Luden, the eminent natural philosopher Oken, J. F. Fries[2] and the distinguished pathologist D. G. Kieser, the German academical and general public was for the first time familiarised by the press with the aspirations for unity which lived in the nation. Thus, when, on June 12th, 1815, the earliest German *Burschenschaft*, which for a time called itself by the name of the *General* (*Allgemeine*) *German*

[1] Primary or original *Burschenschaft*.

[2] In 1814 Fries's political pamphlets, especially *Bekehrt Euch* (Repent ye), gave a great impulse to public feeling in favour of national unity and personal purity. In 1816 he dedicated to the youth of Germany his daring treatise *On the German Confederation and the German State-constitution*.

Burschenschaft, was founded by the formal adoption of its constitution, there could be no doubt as to the spirit which moved its promoters. Their end and aim was national unity, and their ideal the restoration of the Empire, without any prejudice to the continuance of existing Governments. No doubt, the conception of the medieval Empire, as it suggested itself to the romantic sympathies of the age, was largely accountable for the militant Christian element from the first to be found in the movement; but its patriotic purpose was paramount, though Jews were excluded from the new academical fraternity[1] as well as Frenchmen and Italians. Arndt's famous *Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?* found a place in the institutional instrument of what was to signify the absorption rather than the extinction of the *Landsmannschaften* of the past. For the rest, the constitution of the *Burschenschaft* was based on that of the *Vandalia*, and, though undoubtedly a higher and more serious spirit was intended to animate the life of its members, there was as yet no idea of renouncing the practice of the duel or the customary convivialities of student life. As the example of Jena was rapidly followed and *Burschenschaften* were founded in other universities of the Jena type, where the students had been accustomed to be a law to themselves —at Giessen, Marburg and Erlangen—and also in the state-favoured University of Berlin and elsewhere, no essential change seems, at all events in the first year or two, to have taken place in the general nature of the movement. Much patriotic enthusiasm was manifested by the *Burschen*, together with a spirit of exalted Christian faith; but there was little or no airing of definite political designs. On the other hand, the moral effect of the new ideas soon became perceptible, and was in course of time attested by various witnesses besides Karl August. Duels were not abolished, but diminished in number; and there were other signs of

[1] At Jena in 1818, and at Heidelberg in 1819.

a decrease of licence. Of course there were numerous conflicts between *Burschenschafter* and *Landsmannschafter*; and there were many internal differences in the associations of the new model themselves between the progressives and the moderates, called respectively at Jena *Altdeutsche*, from the Old-German costume which they affected, and *Lichtenhainer*, from the chosen local tavern where they kept up their cheerful rites. But it would, unmistakably, be an error to identify the sins of the *Burschen* at large with such extreme developments as that of the *Schwarzen* at Giessen (so named from their antique dress), whose principles were proclaimed by K. Follen in the *Ehrenspiegel* (mirror of honour) published by him in 1816. They had religious as well as patriotic ends in view; upheld chastity of life, set their face against gambling, condemned duels, except as a last resort, together with the remnants of pennalism. These high ideals were already in the air; but at Jena at least they were not the common property of the *Burschenschaft*, and it was only later, at Freiburg in 1818 and elsewhere, that the movement was, in some of its phases, dominated by them.

In 1817, the Jena *Burschenschaft*—for the Halle *Teutonia*, which had first entertained the scheme, had been dissolved by the authorities early in the year—summoned the general body of German *Burschen* to hold high festival in the Wartburg near Eisenach on the eighteenth day of October. The proposal was intended to signalise—or, as it were, to consecrate—this gathering by the twofold celebration of the tercentenary of the German Reformation and of the fourth anniversary of the battle of Leipzig; and the preparations were carried on with full publicity and with the open approval of the Weimar Government. The number of students attending the festival amounted in all to not more than 500, or thereabouts, of whom the majority came from the smaller German states; of the Prussian universities Berlin, which sent 30 students, was alone

represented; the same number marched in from Kiel, singing *Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott*. The Catholic universities (including the Austrian) had not been invited at all: the whole spirit of the gathering was Protestant, but not one of intolerance. On the other hand, there was no general wish to give it a distinctly political character. Undertaken with the purpose of bringing about the supersession of the *Landsmannschaften* by the *Burschenschaften* in the German universities at large, the gathering grew into a demonstration in favour of academical, as both symbolising and promoting national, union. The main part of the demonstration went off in good humour and order, with patriotic speeches, a religious service and a general display of healthy enthusiasm. Unluckily, H. F. Massmann—inspired, it is said, by Jahn, of whom he was an early disciple—had devised a concluding sensation, which was eagerly carried into effect by a hot-headed section of the gathering, but was in no sense an organic part of the festival. This was the burning, chiefly *in effigie*, of a number of books of supposed anti-patriotic tendencies, including, in odd juxtaposition, writings by Schmalz, Ancillon, Kamptz (Prussian Director of Police and a sworn foe to all Liberal, national, and academic aspirations), Immermann (afterwards celebrated as the author of *Münchhausen* and the *Epigonen*, who had at Halle courageously espoused the cause of a student ill-used by the *Teutonia*, and had carried the grievance into the presence of the King), the romantic-reactionary political philosopher Haller and Kotzebue (who was in evil odour especially as having in his capacity of Russian Councillor of State become the literary correspondent at Weimar of the Tsar's Government).

The whole festival, which had been brought to a dignified conclusion on the day after that of this *auto-da-fé*, at first made a good impression on the public; but Kamptz addressed a violent remonstrance to the Weimar Government, which was answered with much zeal by Kieser, one of the

Jena professors who had been present on the Wartburg. It should be noted that, at the beginning of 1818, one of Kotzebue's reports to the Tsar, reflecting on Luden, having been surreptitiously published, an interchange of bitter invectives followed, in consequence of which Kotzebue, who had openly jeered at the Wartburg festival, the *Burschen* and the constitution-mongers, ultimately withdrew to Mannheim. Meanwhile, though Karl August continued to smile upon his beloved students, an attention the reverse of benevolent began to be bestowed elsewhere upon the remarkable progress of the *Burschenschaft* movement. In the course of the year the Jena association nearly doubled its numbers, and, from October 10th to 18th, there was held here the first general assembly of the *Allgemeine deutsche Burschenschaft*. The extreme developments of the movement were likewise in active operation. In the spring of 1818 A. Follen visited Jena, and in the autumn his brother Karl moved thither as a *docent*, and began to gather round him a small circle of *Schwarzen*, of whom a yet smaller minority, known by the name of the *Unbedingten* (the Unconditional), entered into discussions on the application of the principle that the end justifies the means.

It was at this time, when the attention of the diplomatic world of Europe was concentrated upon the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, where the attitude of Tsar Alexander was highly reassuring to those whom, like Metternich, his recent displays of Liberal sympathies had disquieted, that out of his immediate surroundings a blast was sounded demanding the attention of all Germans. In November 1818, Alexander Stourdza, a young Moldavian in the Russian service as councillor of state, put forth, entirely with the Tsar's cognisance and perhaps by his orders[1], a very

[1] When, after the publication of his pamphlet, two students called out Stourdza, he disdained personal responsibility by declaring that, though written by him, it had been 'by command.'

notable pamphlet which was communicated to several Courts and first published by *The Times*[1]. Opening with a high-strung recognition of the part played by Germany in history, this production paid a very deferential tribute to the Holy Alliance, and, while insisting on the religious needs of Germany, declared that a federal government would never take root in her soil instead of an absolute monarchy. Enumerating among the signs of the prevailing unrest 'the vociferations of the Wartburg' and, above all others, the 'striking phenomenon of emigration,' the pamphlet proceeded to insist, among the causes of these troubles, more especially upon the present condition of the German universities. Here, in contrast with the discipline which, in the most democratic states of antiquity, was thought desirable for youth, everything was allowed to it under the seductive name of 'academic liberty.' The teachers thought of nothing but popularity and pay; theology had become antagonistic to religion, and its commentaries were but a profanation of Holy Writ; medicine thrust its scalpel into the sanctuary of the soul; law proclaimed the right of the strongest. The sound part of the nation entertained no doubts as to the remedies called for by such a condition of things. These included, among others, the suppression of all academical privileges suitable only to the Middle Ages, the irrevocable 'fixation' of courses of study preparing for professions, the demand of certificates of character as part of the testimonials granted to candidates for Holy Orders, and the settlement of professorial elections by the decisive vote of the Governments. We must pass by the curious proposal to establish a national academic institution under the protection of the Confederation, in order to show the

[1] The *Mémoire sur l'état actuel de L'Allemagne* was published at Paris, in November 1818. A copy of this pamphlet is in the Acton library at Cambridge.

existing universities the way they should go[1]. The pamphlet then went on to demand, until education should have gradually extirpated the abuses due to the liberty of the press, suitable securities for the control of newspapers, as a corollary to the educational reforms indispensable for assuring the cohesion and national welfare of Germany.

Even at the time, it was felt by cool-headed judges that there remained 'medieval' features in the German universities to which the time had come for putting an end; but, though the invective of the pamphlet must have contributed to stimulate the illwill of the Governments against the movement among the students[2], its exaggerated or unjust character could hardly be mistaken by unprejudiced minds. Suddenly, however, an event occurred which seemed to set a seal upon these officious denunciations. This was the assassination, on March 23rd, 1819, of A. von Kotzebue by Karl Sand. This unhappy young man, who as a student of theology at Erlangen had taken part in the Wartburg gathering and had since passed on to Jena, had conceived the thought of wreaking mortal revenge upon 'the traitor' before at Jena he fell under the influence of K. Follen, and became one of the *Unbedingten*, though, it is said, not one of the nearest intimates of that leader. That there was not very much harm, and certainly no corruption, properly so-called, in Kotzebue, was a view which the academic Brutuses of the day could hardly be expected to take. That Sand's was a glorious deed—in which light it was regarded even by not a few enthusiasts of maturer years—was perhaps far from strange; and that he was himself a

[1] There seems to have been some thought of utilising for this purpose the newly-founded university of Bonn, to which an entirely undemocratic character was to be given.

[2] The Halle *Burschenschaft* was dissolved by authority on February 14th, 1819; that of Leipzig had been in danger already in the previous summer.

misguided fanatic of the nobler sort is quite obvious. But the most perverse blindness was theirs who believed that the attempt would scare the adversaries of the party of movement into acceptance of its principles. On the contrary, both Gentz and Metternich perceived at once that Sand's deed had delivered into the hands of the Governments the supporters of the cause for which Sand had intended to open the way. Sand himself, after recovering from a self-inflicted wound which he had meant to be mortal, and after undergoing the agony of a long enquiry, was put to death, more than a year after the murder. The proceedings, as was formally stated by the president of the commission which carried them on, brought to light absolutely nothing that could be regarded as evidence of a combination—still less of a conspiracy—against Sand's victim, though it is not improbable that K. Follen was aware of his acolyte's design. Certainly, the *Burschenschaft* as such had no part in the deed; though at Jena, where the *Burschen* had hoped to acquire corporate rights and were elaborating a new and complete constitution (adopted in June 1819), it put a stop to the progress of their schemes. And, many months before Sand's death, his crime had been made the occasion for a long and shameful series of further proceedings, not only against supposed accomplices of his design and sympathisers with his ideas, but against the Liberal and national movement as a whole and the press which supported it.

Before the close of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in November 1818, Metternich had managed to make representations to King Frederick William III on the evils noticeable in the educational system of Germany (including the 'excesses' of the *Turners*) or due to the existing liberty of the press, and, in an elaborate memorandum, had delivered himself against the convocation of general Estates (*Reichsstände*) in Prussia. The King, already very sensitive to the dangers of the movement to which his fellow sovereigns in

the south-west had yielded or were yielding, was at this time much under the influence of his brother-in-law, Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the commander of his Guards, and seems to have been painfully impressed by the fact that progressive ideas were finding their way into the army[1]. Immediately moved, perhaps, by a rather tepid memorandum *On the Spirit of the Times and its Degeneracy*, drawn up by Altenstein (November 1818), the King, on January 11th, 1819, issued a cabinet ordinance calling upon his Government to take vigorous measures against the evils indicated. It was received without warmth by most of the ministers; but there could be little doubt that Hardenberg would not care to hold out against the apprehensions of his sovereign and the eagerness of his reactionary subordinates. Meanwhile, to Metternich, impelled both by a fear of academic and other conspiracies and an enduring horror of journalistic licence, and eager to seize the opportunity of putting an end to the constitutional movement, the necessity for action seemed imperative. But he showed his usual circumspection before he took the decisive step. The Bavarian diet, which met in February 1819 under the new constitution (towards which the Catholic clergy took up an attitude of uncompromising antagonism) had given great umbrage to King Maximilian Joseph and his Government, more especially by the proposal (which was shelved) that the army should take the oath to the Constitution; and some talk even arose as to a royal *coup d'état* abolishing it. When Rechberg conveyed this suggestion to the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, they prudently abstained from advising any such action; but their antipathy to south-western constitutionalism was deepened by the affair, as well as by the proceedings of the Second Chamber

[1] See as to H. R. von Plehwe, an officer in the Guards, whose papers were seized by Kamptz and examined by the Mainz Commission, H. Haupt, *u.s.*, vol. II. Plehwe had been a friend of Sand.

of the Baden diet, which met in April and carried on a violent dispute concerning the rights of the nobility. There was likewise agitation in Hesse-Darmstadt and in Nassau, where, on July 1st, 1819, a fanatical apothecary named Löning made an unsuccessful attack upon the life of the Minister Ibell, whom he supposed to be a reactionary.

Jena was avowedly the centre of the *Burschenschaft* system, and its patron at Weimar had identified himself with the constitutional movement in Germany. Karl August, well aware of the offence he had given from both points of view, had, from the first, sought to dissociate himself from the extravagances of which some of his protegees had been guilty, and had safeguarded himself by ascertaining through a confidential agent that the rumours as to a conspiracy at Frankfort, Stuttgart and Carlsruhe, of which Sand's deed had been the direct result, were wholly groundless. He now (April 1819) caused an enquiry into the subject of university discipline to be proposed at the Diet. But the declaration made in his behalf on the occasion adhered with spirited frankness to the principle of freedom of opinion and teaching at the universities, and explicitly approved of the purposes of the *Burschenschaft*. About the same time, Oken, on refusing to give up the editorship of *Isis*, was relieved of his professorial functions at Jena. But the suspicions of the Great Powers were not allayed, and all Prussian students at Jena were recalled under the threat of severe penalties. Meanwhile, Metternich prepared for carrying out the general plan of action which he had for some time had in mind. This plan was, in a word, to checkmate the endeavours of Weimar and the other supporters of the movement for constitutional government and the liberty of the press by carrying through the Diet repressive measures settled beforehand at Vienna, after consultation with the Prussian and a selection of certain other Governments. So early as April 1819, Metternich

stated to Gentz, the real originator of the scheme, that the action which he proposed to take in common with the leading German Governments was based, not upon Sand's deed, but upon the Weimar motions at the Diet. Hardenberg, though he entered into the plan with fatal readiness, was so far from an understanding with Metternich as to art. XIII of the Federal Act and the relations of the Diet to constitutions present or future in the particular states, that in May of this very year 1819 he completed his draft of a Prussian constitution (to be mentioned below), which clearly laid down the principle, abhorred by Metternich above all things, of a representative assembly for the whole kingdom. But he could not withstand the panic in high places as to the supposed machinations of the demagogues. In July the first important proceedings dictated by these fears were taken in Prussia. At Berlin, Jahn was suddenly arrested and clapped into prison, first at Spandau and then at Küstrin; and the papers of Reimer and others were sealed up or taken away. At Bonn, Arndt and the brothers Welcker were confined to their houses, where their papers were ransacked; and other suspects were placed under arrest elsewhere. Among lesser precautionary acts must not be omitted the employment of detectives to watch the sermons of Schleiermacher[1]. By way of general justification of these doings, the *Staatszeitung* published an article declaring that the existence of a republican plot had been discovered: and Bernstorff issued a circular to the diplomatic agents of Prussia abroad, informing them of the

[1] Though he long remained suspect, that eloquent orator was not one to be silenced. It is curious to find Bluntschli recording how in his younger days—c. 1827—he heard in the Prussian Academy a speech by Schleiermacher in memory of Frederick the Great which illustrated the remarkable intellectual freedom then common at Berlin. See J. Ziehen's useful source-book *Aus der Studienzeit* (1912), p. 194.

discovery and of the cheering fact that the mass of the nation remained pure and loyal.

The ground being thus well prepared, the cordial co-operation of the Prussian Government in Metternich's scheme was fully assured by the interviews which took place between him and Frederick William III at Teplitz at the end of the month, and in which the arguments and warnings of the Austrian Chancellor secured a complete ascendancy over the mind of the Prussian sovereign. At a conference held on August the 1st between Metternich and Hardenberg, at which Bernstorff and Wittgenstein, with Count Zichy, were also present, a 'punctation' was accordingly drawn up which laid down in solemn secrecy the principles of action agreed upon between Austria and Prussia, and provided for a conference to take place at Carlsbad between their representatives and the invited ministers of other German Governments, and to be followed by a second conference, which Metternich wished to be held at Vienna. At Carlsbad, only matters of the greatest urgency were to be discussed, including the management of the press, the expurgation of the University teaching bodies (Karl August's commission on this subject, then sitting at Frankfort, was ignored), and the rectification of ideas as to art. XIII of the Federal Act. With regard to this last, Hardenberg had communicated to Metternich, as expressing his 'private ideas,' a version of the draft of the Prussian constitution prepared by him in the previous May, which reduced the proposed general *Landtag* to as small a number as possible[1] of deputies of the provincial Estates; and even this quasi-constitutional scheme was not to be taken in hand till after the financial and other internal affairs of Prussia had been put in thorough order.

With this assurance in hand, Metternich, at the beginning

[1] This qualification is absent from the original draft, reprinted as Appendix IX to A. Stern, *Geschichte Europa's* 1815 *bis* 1874, vol. I.

of August 1819, reached Carlsbad, where the invited representatives of several German Governments had assembled. Besides the Austrian, nine Courts had unconditionally consented to be represented there, viz. the five kingdoms, Baden, the two Mecklenburgs and Nassau; and Gentz was most appropriately charged with the protocol of the sittings[1]. Bernstorff was the first plenipotentiary of Prussia, Rechberg of Bavaria, and Münster of Hanover. A diplomatic agent of Hesse-Cassel 'accidentally' appeared at the conference, while Karl August had sent Freiherr von Fritsch to Carlsbad uninvited. He was admitted to one only (the fourth) of the 23 meetings held during the conference, when he spoke in favour of the appointment of a Government curator at Jena, but was otherwise duly mystified, until, on his making known his intention of taking his departure from Carlsbad, some measure of enlightenment was accorded him. At the second sitting it was agreed, on the proposal of Marschall (Nassau), that a Central Commission should be set on foot at Mainz to deal with the treasonable agitation which had been discovered in Germany, and that it should consist of seven members learned in the law, to be named by the Governments represented at the conference, with an additional member for Hesse-Darmstadt. Prussia would have preferred a judicial tribunal: but the Emperor Francis held that this might impair the sovereign authority of the particular states, and Metternich cynically pointed out that a great tribunal with small results would not satisfactorily impress public opinion.

[1] These sittings were nominally kept secret, except as to certain fragments of the discussions, till, in 1845, the documents collected by A. Klüber were published by K. Welcker. On these is based A. F. H. Schaumann's account of the Conferences in Raumer's *Historisches Taschenbuch*, III, 2 (1850), which is supplemented by L. K. Aegidi's *Aus dem Jahre* 1819 (1861).

In the remaining sittings of the conference the two questions of the condition of the universities and schools, and of state constitutions and their relations to art. XIII were discussed. On the latter head, Metternich submitted certain proposals, by way of preface to which a pamphlet by Gentz was circulated, which declared it indispensable for the endurance of the Confederation to draw a definite distinction between territorial Estates (*Landstände*) and a direct representative system, with which the Confederation could not coexist. Unanimity on the subject proved, however, unattainable; for, while Prussia, with Saxony and Hanover, assented to Metternich's views, Bavaria and Baden vacillated, Mecklenburg deprecated interference with the autonomy of well-intentioned states, and Württemberg, through Wintzingerode, adhered to the view that, as constitutions with representative assemblies had been already established in some quarters, the proposed declaration came too late. It was agreed to resume the discussion of this and other topics (including the establishment of a permanent judicial instance and the completion of the system of Federal fortresses) at a conference to be speedily held at Vienna. Here, also, it was resolved to treat the whole subject of trade and communications between the several states, after an attempt by Baden to have it dealt with at Baden, with the aid of a report drawn up by Nebenius, had come to little or nothing. Meanwhile, it was agreed that the decrees of the Carlsbad Conference should be promulgated by the Federal Diet, in conformity with a presidential order, to be approved by each of the several states.

Inasmuch as the repression of demagogy was, after all, an administrative question which, for better or for worse, would have to be settled *ambulando*, it was the question of the constitutions which Metternich was primarily anxious to push to an issue at Carlsbad. The standing menace, so to speak, of art. XIII, in the natural sense of its clumsy

phraseology, must be got rid of now or never. Metternich, having made up his mind that in the Austrian empire the grant of a constitution was out of the question, aimed at doing away with representative assemblies, or the thought of them, throughout the Confederation. Prussia, which like the Austrian empire contained a non-German element, though a much smaller one, seemed more and more likely to take up a position similar to the Austrian; and the Governments of Hanover, Saxony and the Mecklenburgs were perfectly content to follow suit. But in the south-west, notwithstanding the fears of the Court and the illwill of the clerical party in Bavaria, the friends of constitutional liberties now stood in a strong position; and any attempt to tamper with the newly-granted constitution remained too hazardous for present execution. For the moment, it was enough to assent to the Carlsbad decrees. The conference had broken up on the last day of August; so soon as September 20th, the decrees were passed with unanimity by the Frankfort Diet. But the sitting was secret; and several of the ambassadors, while declaring themselves without special instructions, only appended their signatures for the sake of unanimity; and Saxony, as well as Württemberg, declared itself desirous of additions which would give more equity to the proceedings of the Central Commission, or safeguard the rights of the particular states.

Outside the closed doors of the Diet, the indignation created by the decrees was loud and deep, and found its most powerful expression in the saying of Stein, that the best way of restoring peace to Germany was to destroy the arbitrary rule of selfwill. In Austria, indeed, there was no doubt as to the ratification of the decrees; but in Prussia it was not accomplished without a notable attempt, which its consequences rendered still more serious, to expose and condemn what could not be prevented. Hardenberg, indeed, in this the least honourable period of his chequered

career, showed himself wholly obsequious to the policy of Metternich, his unwillingness to incur the King's displeasure combining with his jealousy of Humboldt. For, partly in consequence of fresh Ministerial changes which had become necessary early in the year, Humboldt had been recalled from London and invited to enter the Ministry with the special charge of the concerns of Estates (*Stände*) and communes. He regarded this as a commission to prepare a constitution; but the draft which he brought with him to Berlin and which provided for a directly elected representative assembly, Hardenberg, whose own draft (further reduced at Teplitz) was much less far-reaching, would not allow to be laid before the King. Thus, Humboldt actually became Minister without a satisfactory understanding with the Chancellor, whose own functions, as he was well aware, his new colleague was anxious to see reformed. Humboldt's ascendancy in the Ministry was, inevitably, increased by the constant absence of Hardenberg from its sittings, because of deafness; and, in August, he actually laid before the King, in the name of his colleagues as well as his own, a protest against existing conditions of the Chancellor's authority. The conflict between the two statesmen was therefore now declared; and it was when affairs were in this extraordinary position that the question of the confirmation of the Carlsbad decrees came before the Prussian Government. At a sitting of the *Staatsrat* on October 5th, an elaborate memorandum[1] was laid before his colleagues by Humboldt, which denounced the decrees as a direct interference, not only legislative, but administrative, in the internal concerns of the particular states. It recommended that, if still possible, the decrees should be regarded as an extraordinary measure, and be discussed anew after two years; for the rest, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be authorised

[1] An abstract of it is given by Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 400–7.

to deliberate with his colleagues on matters referring to the internal affairs of Prussia before instructions concerning them were despatched to the envoy at the Diet. This memorandum, although it very much resembled an indictment of the statesmen at the head of affairs, could, as Humboldt knew, have no practical effect upon the matter immediately at issue. Indeed, while the discussion in the *Staatsrat* was in progress, the decrees were promulgated in Prussia; and, on the same day—it happened to be October the 18th—an edict was issued which subjected *all* printed matter to censorial supervision (a supreme censorial board was shortly afterwards constituted) and threatened all newspapers and other periodicals with suppression, if they made a 'harmful use' of the authorisation granted them by the state. Meanwhile, the discussion in the *Staatsrat* ran its course, Beyme and Boyen alone supporting Humboldt. Boyen, as Minister of War, was at issue with the King as to the relations between the *Landwehr* and the line, the King being desirous of blending them together, while the Minister desired to preserve the *Landwehr* under conditions which would facilitate its mobilisation as a popular levy in time of war. The question having been solved in accordance with the royal wishes, and the army thus placed on a basis which remained unaltered till the reorganisation of 1860, Boyen thought it incumbent upon him to resign, and a few days later he was followed by Grolmann, his Chief of the Staff. The moment seemed to have arrived for Hardenberg to rid himself of the man whom he had come to look upon as his rival; and, on December 1st, Humboldt and Beyme were dismissed from both Ministry and *Staatsrat*, the former withdrawing with placid contentment into the privacy which he sincerely loved. Gneisenau, who was known to be in general agreement with his political views, and who, in 1818, had been made Governor of Berlin, and member of the *Staatsrat*, did not follow him into retirement, but

remained in office, an almost solitary representative of earlier and greater days.

Nothing now stood in the way of the execution of the Carlsbad decrees. During the eight years, or thereabouts, of its operations (1819–27) the Mainz Commission accused 161 persons, of whom it acquitted 44. In Prussia, the persecutions continued; the eminent theologian de Wette, who had written a consolatory letter to Sand's mother, was driven out of Berlin; there was much visitation of former members of the *Burschenschaft* at Breslau; at Bonn, Arndt was deprived of the right of lecturing—a prohibition which remained in force for twenty years (1820–40). The practice of *Turnen* was absolutely prohibited. On the other hand, the censorship of the press was managed with discretion by the new board, though there was little chance of remonstrance against the *Staatszeitung*, where the redoubtable Kamptz, the soul of this petty Terror, had it all his own way.

In most of the lesser states the decrees were carried out without much difficulty, though with a good deal of dislike. In Bavaria, where the Crown-prince Lewis frankly protested against them in a letter to the King, the Liberal Minister Lerchenfeld contrived a compromise by which on their promulgation a proviso was added safeguarding the sovereign rights of the King and the constitution and laws of the monarchy (October). It is, however, noticeable that, at Mainz, the Bavarian Hörmann proved the most active member of the commission; and that, at home in Bavaria, the universities and the press found scant protection in Lerchenfeld's saving clause, which, on the renewal of the decrees five years later, was silently abandoned by the Government. In Württemberg, the constitution had been finally accepted by the King a few days after the passing of the decrees by the Frankfort Diet (September the 25th); and the King now paid a visit to his brother-in-law Tsar

Alexander at Warsaw, apparently with the view of securing his protection against any interference on the part of the German Great Powers. How little the Russian Government was impressed by the necessity of the repressive policy of the decrees is shown by a curious circular note sent on November 30th from Petersburg to the Russian legations, in which the general repugnance to the decrees is insisted on and the question is ironically asked whether, at the conferences about to be opened at Vienna, they would be revoked or developed[1]. In Hesse-Darmstadt, the most conspicuous victim of the persecution was Ludwig Börne, a very clever, but paradoxical writer, whose satirical prose was at one time ranked with that of Heine. (His *Zeitschwingen*, published at Offenbach, was one of the most widespread political journals of the day; but he had now to take refuge at Paris, whence he wrote a popular series of *Letters*.) In Weimar, the blow descended upon the supposed *focus* of meditated rebellion; and, on November 26th, 1819, the Jena *Burschenschaft* was dissolved. In Freiburg, official proceedings were instituted in 1819 against the *Burschenschaft*, of which Karl Bader was the moving spirit; and in 1820 he was arrested at Berlin, and detained in prison by the Prussian Government for seven years. The associations bearing this name (besides being, in 1821, partly revived under that of a quasi-*Landsmannschaft*, the *Germania*) were secretly continued at Jena and elsewhere; but the open movement with which they were identified stood still from 1820. They held secret meetings at Dresden in 1820, and elsewhere in subsequent years; and from 1825 the old *Burschenschaften* began to reappear, especially in the south-west, and that of Jena came into life again. The secret, as well as the revived, associations bearing this name remained

[1] See L. K. Aegidi, *Der erste Eindruck der Carlsbader Conferenzen auf das Cabinet von St Petersburg*, in Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. XIV (1865), pp. 139–50.

a receptacle for ideas regarded as revolutionary by paternal Governments; and they played a part in the agitations of the years 1821–4, as well as in those of later years. But their endeavour, fired by patriotic enthusiasm, to bring about a national unity of which the general association of university students should be but the initial stage lay buried, with the generous ideas of Arndt and Jahn, in misrepresentation and despondency.

On November 25th, 1819, the conferences opened at Vienna which were intended to supplement the Carlsbad decrees, and to produce the *Vienna Schlussakte* as the coping-stone of the Federal Act. Metternich had become aware of the necessity of proceeding with caution and moderation, while he remained as convinced as ever of the expediency of taking out of the hands of the Frankfort Diet the settlement of problems it had proved unable to decide. The result, embodied in 65 articles, that had been discussed in 34 sittings, of which the protocols were the work of Gentz, was thus by no means so triumphant a success as he pretended for Metternich's policy. But it certainly weakened the central power of the Confederation, which was now defined as an international union of mutually independent states with equal treaty rights and obligations, while it was to the state Governments that their representatives at the Federal Diet were solely responsible. No change was, however, made as to the distribution of voting powers at the Diet, and no permanent tribunal for the settlement of disputes between the several states was established. As to the momentous art. XIII, it was resolved that the Diet should see to its not remaining unfulfilled in any Federal state, and should have the right, if requested, to guarantee any particular constitution providing territorial Estates (*landständisch*), while no alteration of existing constitutions was to be permissible 'except in a constitutional way.' No sovereign state authority was to be constitutionally made

dependent on the cooperation of its Estates unless in the exercise of particular rights; but no definite obligation was imposed upon the Estates to grant to the Government the sums which it required. The publicity of debate in the Chambers of constitutional states was only limited by a resolution dwelling on 'the lawful limits of free expression of opinion.'

Thus the article and its bearing upon constitutions already granted had been left very much as they were; and Gentz, who professed to regard the 'victory' as more important than that of Leipzig, only proved how small are the mercies for which self-conceit can persuade itself to be thankful. In other respects, the Vienna conferences were more absolutely barren. Metternich, it is only fair to state, would have been prepared to favour free-trade in articles of food between the states of the Confederation; but the Emperor's consent was not to be obtained, and the commercial exclusiveness of the Austrian empire precluded the hope of a general system of duties common to the whole Confederation. Thus, it only remained to indulge in futile invective against the customs-law recently adopted by Prussia, which was regarded as itself exclusive in purpose; while the project suggested itself of a commercial union of their own among the states of the south-west[1]. In matters military no progress was made, save in the adoption of the principle (which was to become of considerable significance when the relations between the two Great Powers had altered) that a formal declaration of war by the Confederation required the approval of a two-thirds' majority. On another point, as to which Prussia's wider proposal was countered by Bavaria, Metternich carried the compromise that no part of either the Austrian or the Prussian monarchy not included in the Confederation should be defended by it except after the vote of a majority declaring the safety of some part of the Federal territory to be in danger.

[1] As to these notions see the following chapter.

The Vienna Conferences, though they had achieved very little, were nearly at an end when a last difficulty arose out of Metternich's proposal (March 4th, 1820) that the resolutions passed should be merely communicated to the Diet as supplementing the Federal Act. The Württemberg representative (Mandelsloh) moved as an amendment that they should be voted on at the Diet in the usual way; but he found no support; and, on May 24th, the Diet unanimously adopted the *Schlussakte*, passing over a final futile *chicane* on the part of Wangenheim. The work done at Carlsbad had, in Metternich's judgment, been brought to an adequate, though not a brilliant, finish; and the Carlsbad decrees had been maintained. The authority of the Diet had, at the same time, been subordinated to that of an agreement between the two Great Powers; and, as has been truly said, the scheme of the Confederation itself had been stultified[1].

For a time, the good understanding established between Austria and Prussia seemed destined to dominate the general course of German affairs. In the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach, whose principal concern was with the revolutionary movements of 1820 in the south of Europe, Prussia, though her interests were not involved, consistently acted with Austria. The constitutional states of the south-west, whose number was, in December 1829, increased by Hesse-Darmstadt, showed themselves less disposed than at first to give trouble to their Governments by the proceedings of their diets[2]. But, at heart, neither Governments nor populations

[1] Cf. Schaumann, *op. cit.* It may be added that, owing to the very different opinions expressed at Vienna concerning the ends and aims of the Confederation, it was thought well to keep the principal evidence secret; nor was much known of the proceedings before Aegidi's publication on the subject in 1860.

[2] The Württemberg Second Chamber, in February 1821, even assented to the expulsion from it of one of its members who had conspicuously given offence to authority—Friedrich List, later of

looked with satisfaction upon the overbearing action of the two Great Powers, and this feeling was carried furthest in Württemberg, where the remembrance of the Vienna conferences rankled in the breast of King William, who was still influenced by the ambitious ideas of Wangenheim and found an obedient minister in Count Wintzingerode. An argumentative pamphlet, which appeared in 1820 under the title of *Manuscript from South-Germany*, attracted much attention. It professed to be edited by 'Georg Erichsen,' but was actually written by F. L. Lindner, a Courlander and a Liberal journalist and publicist of much ability[1]. After being mixed up in the feud with Kotzebue, he had, at Stuttgart, entered into relations with the King, under whose direct inspiration he, without Wintzingerode's knowledge, composed this tractate. Hostile to Austria and Prussia, and still more so to the existing Confederation, it advanced the idea of a 'purely German' confederation which should embrace the states of the south-west to the exclusion of the two Great Powers, and be founded on the principle of state sovereignty and imbued with the traditions of the *Rheinbund*. But, though at Frankfort the Bavarian envoy, with those of Saxony, the Hessian Courts and Oldenburg, had for some time acted with Wangenheim, King Maximilian Joseph declined to listen to these schemes, which aimed at the setting-up of a *Kleindeutschland* of lesser states. Many an arrow was yet to be shot from the quiver to which King William's able scribe had had resort; but they were all doomed to miss the mark. In Stuttgart, however, the attacks on the Carlsbad decrees and the ascendancy of the two Great Powers continued; and, in January 1823, the King went so far as to approve the issue of a circular despatch protesting against

economic fame, who was imprisoned and finally took refuge in America.

[1] The authorship of the pamphlet was long a subject of speculation; the eccentric K. von Lang and Hörmann were in turn suspected.

their Napoleonic policy and the menace it implied to the independence of the other German states. Ancillon and Gentz were at hand to rebut the charge, on which even Tsar Alexander thought it well to frown. An interview which he granted to his brother-in-law, the King of Württemberg, at the close of the previous year had led to no satisfactory result.

Thus when, at this very time, representatives of the German states were once more in conference at Vienna, in order to agree on any revision or expansion requisite in the Carlsbad decrees previously to their renewal, they were at the same time invited to consult with one another as to the 'purification' of the Diet. It was significant that, about this date, the Austrian Government substituted as President for Buol the younger and 'firmer' Count Joachim von Münch-Bellinghausen. Wangenheim's recall was demanded by both Austria and Prussia, for he had become more and more troublesome at the Diet, where several of the lesser Governments were in sympathy with his efforts to break the domination of the two Great Powers, whom, after all, the other states could easily outvote. Though he succeeded neither in inducing that body to interfere on behalf of the purchasers of Westphalian domains, nor in obtaining a hearing for the grievances of the Schleswig-Holstein *Ritterschaft*[1], his personal following among the envoys was considerable, and included in turn those of all the secondary states When the King of Württemberg upheld his representative, the two Great Powers recalled their envoys, Prussia instructing hers (who happened to be absent from Stuttgart) not to return; while, at the request of the Mainz Central Commission, the Diet ordered the suppression of a leading Stuttgart journal favoured by the King. In the end, however, Wangenheim, who to the last had held his head high at Frankfort as a champion of the supreme rights of the Diet,

[1] See above, pp. 151–2.

had to be recalled, and Wintzingerode's dismissal followed (1823). The struggle ended with the Württemberg Government's assent to the renewal of the Carlsbad decrees, approved by the Diet in January of the following year (1824); and, the King having, according to Metternich's expression, got out of his infamous (*verruchl*) attitude, which had carried him so far as a protest against the decrees of the Congress of Vienna, Wangenheim's singular political career was at an end[1]. The reason of its failure was, of course, that lack of material strength in the state he served which the ambition of able Ministers in his position is too apt to ignore.

Not long before Wangenheim's fall, the life of a German statesman of wider fame had closed in disappointment and in what to any other Minister—and with any other sovereign but his irresolute master—would have meant disgrace. Hardenberg had continued to hope for a constitutional development in Prussia of which the summoning of a general body of Estates (*Reichsstände*) should be the crown; and for the sake of this, it is hardly too much to say, he had not scrupled to give way to the fears of demagogic machinations which Metternich had implanted in Frederick William III's breast. About this very time (January 17th, 1820) a very notable edict was issued on the occasion of a final statement being made as to the Prussian national debt (which had reached a total of over 180 million dollars (£25,500,000) and was declared closed for the present), to the effect that no state loans should be contracted unless with the joint assent and guarantee of the *Reichsstände*. Their future existence was thus implied as a definite part of the constitutional plans of Hardenberg. They were detested *in toto* by Metternich, who was resolved upon thwarting them; and the irregularities of the Chancellor's private life added greatly to the King's distrust of his policy. While the Liberals derided his efforts

[1] He was elected for the *Landtag* of 1833; but the Württemberg Government refused to allow him, as an alien, to take his seat.

to parade his antipathy to revolutionary agitation, the reactionary *ultras* hated him and calculated upon his speedy demise[1]. The unlucky attempt made in 1820 by an admirer, Benzenberg, to rehabilitate him in public opinion by publishing a general *apologia* of his career, of which Benjamin Constant produced a French version under the provocative title *Du triomphe inévitable et prochain des principes constitutionnels en Prusse*, only did Hardenberg harm, since the French writer ascribed it to the Chancellor's physician and henchman Koreff, who had sent him a copy. It is needless to enumerate the constitutional reports which in Hardenberg's last years flowed from his indefatigable pen, or even the commissions before which they were laid. From that of October 1821, over which the Crown-prince presided and which included Hardenberg's old adversary O. K. F. von Voss, a consistent adversary of reform, the Chancellor was left out. After another gathering of notables, in which of course the landed interest predominated, had been summoned, the commission came to a decision wholly in favour of provincial as against general Estates; and, in September 1822, Voss was appointed Vice-president of the Ministry and the *Staatsrat*. Before starting for the Congress of Verona, Hardenberg gave directions for a last protest. But, on his journey, death overtook him (November 26th, 1822). Voss succeeded Hardenberg as President of the Ministry; but, he, too, having died a few weeks later (January 30th, 1823), the presidency was abolished altogether, and each department left separately responsible. The death of Hardenberg marks the close of the constitutional struggle of Frederick William III's reign; for during the remainder of it no attempt was made to renew the movement for general Estates. On June 5th, 1823, a law laid down the conditions under which the provincial Estates

[1] Varnhagen and Gentz sufficiently attest these currents of opinion.

were to be summoned; and, in the following year, special provisions were issued for the several provinces of the kingdom. So matters remained till the summons of the United *Landtag* under Frederick William IV in 1847. The spirit of Metternich had triumphed over that of Hardenberg, the last and not the least memorable effort of whose statesmanship had collapsed in face of the resolute diplomacy of his fellow-Chancellor. The scandals of Hardenberg's private life count for something in this melancholy failure; but in truth they only attest the infirmity of will—not instability of purpose—which was the curse of his later years.

Metternich's ascendancy, which marks this dreary period of German history, depended, in no small measure, upon the continued fears of the sovereigns of Germany for the safety of their thrones—fears with which Tsar Alexander was showing himself more and more ready to sympathise. The revolutionary movements of 1820 and the following years in southern Europe suggested the continued existence, in spite of the Carlsbad decrees, of a widespread secret conspiracy. The activity of the Mainz Commission, which had begun to slumber, and which in 1822 Wangenheim urged the Diet to dissolve outright, was revived, in order to trace this conspiracy to its roots. But it was not till 1824 that the arrest by the Bavarian authorities of a treacherous adventurer named Wit von Döring led to 'disclosures' which were held to prove that the centre of the international plot was at Paris, whence its emissaries had gone forth into Germany as well as into Italy and Switzerland. There is no doubt that the fanatical Karl Follen and certain other revolutionaries had, early in 1821, met in Paris and afterwards in Switzerland, where already in the previous year a demagogic club was reported to exist at Chur. These agitators had conceived, as adjutory to the movement contemplated by them in Germany which was designed to revolutionise

the political world, a double league consisting of a *Männerbund* (league of men) to be supplemented by a *Jünglingsbund* (league of youths); and of the latter the universities, with their remains of the *Burschenschaften*, were to be the nuclei. The *Männerbund*, upon which K. Follen was specially intent, and of which Erfurt and Darmstadt were to be chief local centres, came practically to nothing; while the *Jünglingsbund*, largely through the activity of a young Mecklenburg enthusiast, A. von Sprewitz, in the course of the year 1821 rose to a hundred members, with Jena as its centre. Its chief object still seems to have been to bring about the establishment of constitutional monarchy throughout Germany; but there was in it a considerable element of republicanism (as in the case of the Pomeranian Arnold Ruge) and, no doubt, of varied extravagance[1]. It was dissolved in October 1822, rather more than a year before the series of arrests began in which some of its members were involved. This repressive action was due to information concerning a widespread revolutionary conspiracy for the establishment of a German republic, of which evidence was held to have been discovered at Erlangen. Early in 1824, the news was conveyed by the Bavarian Government to the Mainz Commission and, through it, to the other Governments. The extradition of K. Follen was demanded from the Swiss Confederation; but he was successfully spirited away to America, where he became a law-abiding citizen. Prussian subjects were prohibited from carrying on their studies at Basel, which Gentz (in 1823) described as a nest of Jacobin professors. At home, arrests were made in large numbers; and, in Prussia, the persecution was extremely searching and severe. A special board of enquiry was established at Köpenick, and Kamptz's activity surpassed itself[2]

[1] See as to these leagues H. Fraenkel's essay *ap.* Haupt, *op. cit.*, vol. III. They are ridiculed in Immermann's *Epigonen*.

[2] E. T. A. Hoffmann's attack upon him as 'Privy Councillor

Many non-Prussians were drawn into the net of these enquiries, among them the French philosopher and historian Victor Cousin, who was brought up from Dresden. At Breslau, too, severe sentences of imprisonment were passed on not less than 26 members of the *Jünglingsbund*.

After this final effort, the Mainz Commission gradually came to the inglorious end of its long-drawn-out labours. They had brought little to light; but it cannot be said that they had fallen harmless. Its dissolution took place silently in 1828. The main report of the Commission, though drawn up by Hörmann, was never made public, as had been promised when the Commission was created, though a summary of it was laid before the Diet in 1831 by Blittersdorff, who had been charged with the task on the report being found unsuitable for publication in its entirety. It had not much to say concerning recent discoveries, and traced the whole movement back to the rising against Napoleon.

The reaction which, about the second decade of the nineteenth century, had settled down upon the internal affairs of Germany might seem complete. Yet, at the very time when the Mainz Commission was still in full activity, when the Carlsbad decrees were in process of renewal, and when patriotic aspirations seemed almost doomed to sink into subterraneous sentiment, the historical developments of the future were not wholly obscure to far-seeing minds. To the year 1823, or some proximate date, belongs the remarkable memorandum known as *Eichhorn's Denkschrift*, so called because its authorship was attributed to an eminent statesman of whom more will be said below, which after

Knarrpanti' in his story of *Meister Floh*, long suppressed, seems to be of rather earlier date. See as to this curious episode and its consequences E. Daniels's essay on Börne and Hoffmann in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. CLIII. Kamptz was in 1824 appointed director in the ministry of education.

strange vicissitudes became public in 1836[1]. Its purport was that Prussia should 'remain always on the best of terms with Austria, but at the same time continue steadily to aim at securing the moral hegemony of Germany and, by such organisations as the *Zollverein*, driving Austria out of the national *nexus*.' The following chapter may serve as a commentary on both clauses of this political programme.

[1] Cf. O. Klopp, *Politische Geschichte Europas*, vol. II (1912), pp. 275 sqq.

CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE *ZOLLVEREIN*

The closing years of the first quarter of the nineteenth century exhibit the influence of Austria and Metternich at its height in the councils of Europe (as they may in this period still be called); while, as is almost invariably the case in political affairs, they, also, offer the first indications of an impending change. That change finds definitive expression in 1830, the year of the French 'July' Revolution. In the latter part of this period and in the ensuing years, while Austria was gradually losing the predominant position in European politics to which she had attained through the use, at once adroit and bold, made by Metternich of the crisis ending in the fall of Napoleon, Prussia had, both abroad and within the Confederation, seemed to be playing a merely secondary part. She had, to all appearance, forfeited the claim to the leadership of Germany which, in the third and fourth decades of the century, but few political thinkers continued to keep in view; and even these differed widely as to the conditions under which it could be asserted with any prospect of success[1]. Yet she was, in these years,

[1] See F. Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (1908), pp. 328 sqq. Pfizer, who in 1830 maintained that a constitutional Prussia would render the union of that state with the rest of Germany more difficult than before, in 1835 held that Prussia could not secure a true basis of leadership until she should have furnished guarantees

very slowly and with only partial consciousness, evolving a commercial policy which laid the first solid foundations of the future political union under her headship of much the greater part of Germany. It was not till 1834 that the German *Zollverein* entered upon an assured continuity of existence; and it is up to this date that its preliminary history will be here briefly traced, after the foreign policy of Austria and Prussia has been sketched, even more summarily, to 1830.

A review, however condensed, of the successive efforts and vicissitudes of Metternich's foreign policy would take us too far into the domain of general European diplomatic history. But it may be well to point out that the system of intervention with which his policy is usually, and in the main justly, identified, and which was primarily directed towards the preservation of the existing state of Europe as settled by the Congress of Vienna, was accommodated by him to the interests of the Austrian empire, of which he was the devoted servant. Hence, for instance, his attitude towards the affairs of Spain was not the same as that towards the affairs of Italy; and his foreign policy lacked the steadiness which characterised his management of home affairs and his treatment of questions concerning the Germanic Confederation. Not that he was a devotee of consistency, even as to the internal government of the Austrian empire, in which his interest was, after all, relatively faint ('I have often,' he told Guizot in the days of their exile, 'governed Europe, but never Austria'). He

of a liberal system of government at home. F. von Gagern, who with K. T. Welcker (afterwards for a time opposed to Prussian hegemony) is numbered among the early champions of the idea of a federal state, in 1823 thought that it would be possible to unite Germany under Prussian government as a single state; ten years later, he held that the head of the German confederation of states should not be at the same time sovereign of any particular state.

could not, indeed, reconcile the establishment of a ministry collectively responsible to the Emperor with the maintenance of his own supreme ministerial authority, especially after this had been explicitly recognised by his appointment, in 1821, to the comprehensive office of *Haus- Hof- und Staatskanzler* (Chancellor of the Imperial House, Court and State). But he succeeded, in 1817, in inducing the Emperor, who hated all change, to appoint a Minister of the Interior, and it was not till the end of the period treated in the present chapter that the system of Ministerial conferences was regularised. The purely consultative body, the *Staatsrat*, was hampered in its usefulness by the indefiniteness of its functions, which, though subdivided, did not include any control of the management of foreign affairs. In the matter of government, Metternich perceived the impossibility of a thorough centralisation and of a fusion of parts so separated from one another by race, language and history—by nationality, in a word—as were the several dominions of the House of Habsburg. Least of all did he think such a result obtainable by means of a general representative assembly. The scheme of a *Reichsrat* (a name which at a later date was to have a genuine parliamentary ring in the Habsburg empire), brought forward by him in 1817, did not go beyond the institution of a consultative assembly consisting of deputies from the Estates of the several provinces; and, even of this plan, the execution was deferred by Francis I till 1833, the year before his death, and finally frustrated by that event. The provincial diets restored or established in most of the Cisleithanian provinces of the empire had but a shadowy existence; their principal duty was to assent to the taxes demanded ('postulated') by the sovereign—hence the term *Postulatlandtage*. In Hungary, notwithstanding the sincere desire of the Palatine, Archduke Joseph, to maintain the constitutional rights of the kingdom, everything was done

to repress the endeavours of the county assemblies (*Comitate*) to delay illegal ordinances till the Diet of the Realm (*Reichstag*) should have pronounced upon them. In Italy, the attempted organisation, on lines of its own, of the newly-formed Lombardo-Venetian kingdom failed to prevent the growth of a vehement feeling of illwill towards the Austrian rule. Among the main grievances were the introduction of large numbers of German (especially Tyrolese) officials, the espionage practised (in the opening of letters and in other ways) by the Austrian police, and the oppressive action of the censorship, odious to a people proud of its literary past and always prolific of political writers of every sort. According to Italian usage, the national feeling showed itself in the formation, despite strict laws and regulations to the contrary, of numerous secret associations, among which the *Carbonari* were the most widespread and indefatigable. When, after a visit to Italy in 1817, Metternich drew up a memorandum advocating a 'national' administration of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom on lines calculated to satisfy Italian self-esteem, nothing came of the recommendation. Thus, when the period of revolutions began in southern Europe, Austria could not meet it with the consciousness that in her own Italian possessions things were tranquil and in order.

The Austrian Government had, together with the other signatory Powers, made itself responsible for maintaining the European settlement which, by its initiation and under its direction, had been concluded at Vienna. It was not so much in the Austrian empire itself, or even in the Germanic Confederation, where gaps remained to be filled up in the provisions of the Federal Act, as in the general European system at large, that of all European Powers, Austria felt herself most especially called upon to adhere to the principle of finality. On the common consciousness of this fact, as well as on the personal confidence which

Metternich's statesmanship had come to inspire even in the Tsar Alexander I, who had so long held himself justified by his divine mission as the saviour of society in pursuing a course of his own, was based the central position which Metternich now held in the European political system. Austria's relations to Russia were amicable, though (as was to be shown in the attitude of the Tsar's Government towards German affairs after the Carlsbad decrees) they had not become intimate; and the friendship of Great Britain, though at first cordial, might at any time be affected by a change in her foreign policy consequent upon a shifting of the balance of parties. Prussian statesmanship, during the greater part of the period now under review, was disposed to follow in the wake of Austrian, though at times more desirous of maintaining an unbroken cooperation between all three Eastern Powers, and towards its close, inclining to Russian rather than Austrian policy and thus augmenting the importance of Prussia's own. These relations may be illustrated by a cursory glance at the history of Austrian, which is largely that of German, foreign policy in the period usually and appropriately called the era of Congresses, and in the period immediately following.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which Metternich was desirous of summoning so early as 1817, actually met in 1818, and admitted France, the evacuation of whose territory by the troops of the Allies was the chief business treated there, into the concert of the Great Powers; though the other four Powers 'secretly' renewed the alliance into which they had entered at Chaumont and which, after the return of Napoleon from Elba, they had renewed at Vienna. Prussia, at this Congress, showed some anxiety about the security of her eastern frontier, but, in the main, fell in with the general policy of the Congress, both on the principal subject of its discussions and with regard to the settlement of the long-standing difficulty, to which reference has already

been made[1], between Bavaria and Baden. The course of the Congress seemed to heighten the prestige of Tsar Alexander in Germany; but, as a matter of fact, it strengthened the influence of Metternich by establishing it with unprecedented completeness over the minds of both the Russian and the Prussian sovereigns.

On New Year's day 1820, the Spanish revolution broke out, of which Riego was the hero and the reestablishment of the Cortes constitution of 'the year Twelve' the object. Alexander I speedily manifested his desire to intervene against it; but Metternich was opposed to any such action, and in May expounded this view in a long and (perhaps inevitably) paradoxical memorandum. Prussia followed suit. To his great chagrin, the Tsar had to abandon his intention; and, since legitimist France did not as yet feel strong enough to intervene on her own account, the Spanish revolution for the present took its course and kept the King, Ferdinand VII, in its hands. The insurrection, in the same year, of the constitutionalists at Naples, followed by a rebellion in Sicily, came home very much more closely to the Austrian Government. The Emperor Francis I ordered the prohibition of freemasonry, which already obtained in other parts of the monarchy, to be extended to the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom; and Metternich lost no time in announcing the imperial intention to restore and preserve tranquillity throughout the peninsula, though without claiming the support of the other German Governments, should military operations become necessary. The apprehensions of the Papal Government, together with the popular excitement both in Lombardy and in neighbouring Piedmont, suggested immediate Austrian intervention—the King of Prussia's indignation seeming to warrant the expectation that he would undertake the guardianship of the Federal interests of the two Great Powers at home.

[1] Cf. *ante*, pp. 62 111.

But, both at Petersburg and at Paris, it was wished that for a military intervention on the part of one of the Great Powers their united sanction should be secured; and the outbreak, at this very time (August), of a revolution on similar lines in Portugal furnished an additional reason for such a meeting.

At the Congress of Troppau (in Austrian Silesia), held in October and November 1820, which was attended by the sovereigns of Austria, Russia and Prussia, accompanied by their leading Ministers, the Western Powers played only a secondary part, since they assumed a merely expectant attitude. Everything depended on the assent of the Tsar being secured to the Austrian proposal, which amounted to a simple approval by the Great Powers of an Austrian military intervention. After some resistance on the part of Russia, due to the Tsar's desire to secure the establishment in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies of a durable constitutional government, the three Eastern Powers were induced, by Metternich's personal influence, to adopt a preliminary protocol, declaring the right of the Great Powers to intervene, if necessary by force, in the affairs of states belonging to the European alliance whose forms of government had been changed by revolutionary processes. They then went on to apply this principle by approving the occupation of the Two Sicilies by an Austrian force, King Ferdinand I having been previously, on Metternich's astute suggestion, invited to attend in person at a congress of the Powers. The Congress of Troppau was dissolved before the King had had time to put in an appearance there; but its action had served Metternich's purpose by making manifest to the world the intimate relations between the three Eastern Powers (*les puissances délibérantes*, as they called themselves), from whose declarations the Western Powers held aloof. The hopes cherished in Italy that the action of Austria would provoke resistance from at least the

Württemberg Government proved vain; but neither this nor any other of the constitutional states in the Confederation was for the present prepared to make an effort to secure to southern Italy the liberties which they enjoyed themselves. Before the Congress separated, Metternich submitted to the Tsar, as a sort of 'declaration of faith,' a memorandum emphasising the necessity of the maintenance of a close agreement between the three Eastern Powers. But nothing came of the notion, originally mooted by Alexander himself, that legitimate sovereignty in Europe should be placed under a guarantee of all the Powers, so as to ensure their joint intervention in the case of the use of force against any monarch, without warranting it in the case of political changes in his state approved by himself, unless they constituted a danger to other states.

At the Congress which hereupon assembled, in January 1821, at Laibach—a place, like Troppau, situate on Austrian soil, but in closer vicinity to Italy—King Ferdinand I duly made his appearance, and, being now quite free to break his oaths, readily consented to a reconstruction of the government of his kingdom, on lines drawn up by Metternich and Gentz. The Two Sicilies, as Treitschke picturesquely expresses it, had now become an Austrian satrapy. The plenipotentiaries of the Western Powers abstained from attendance at the later sittings of the Congress; and, in these circumstances, the Tsar was obliged once more to desist from pressing for intervention in Spain.

A new development of the situation in Italy had been threatened, in March 1821, by an insurrectionary outbreak in Piedmont; but this, before long, was ended by a treaty with the new King, Charles Felix, providing for the temporary occupation of the country by Austrian troops on behalf of the Eastern Powers (July 24th). Prussia's promise of armed aid in the case of necessity appears not to have been explicitly given; but she had joined in the

Declaration of May 12th, in which the three Powers boasted of having preserved Europe from a general overthrow of the existing state of things and having thus protected the liberty of its peoples; while Kamptz had published an exposition of international law, demonstrating how intervention was as necessary for the family of nations as the police was for particular states. The lesser states of the Confederations, from Bavaria downwards, responded to the May Declaration with servile assent; and the Federal Diet unanimously expressed its respectful gratitude to the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns.

Meanwhile a cloud was darkening the horizon of the new Triple Alliance. The beginning of the Greek insurrection dates from Ypsilanti's crossing of the Pruth and entry into Jassy on March 7th, 1821. It was not to be expected that the ascendancy of Austrian over Russian policy maintained by Metternich at Laibach, would continue in the next Congress, of which thought had been already taken there; for Russia's Eastern ambitions were irreconcilable with Austria's interest in the preservation of the Ottoman empire within its existing limits—one of the axioms of Metternich's European policy, with which the traditions of British statesmanship were in general agreement. Prussia went with Austria, with whom her diplomatic relations were rendered specially intimate by the appointment of the reactionary Prince Hatzfeldt as ambassador at Vienna; but, from the first, Bernstorff could not make up his mind that the Greek insurrection was a hopeless enterprise. Moreover, in Berlin as elsewhere in Germany, the Philhellenic movement soon gained a multitude of adherents, among scholars and poets and the large number of ardent spirits influenced by them or moved by the old enthusiasm for the Cross against the Crescent, or by sympathy with a people struggling for its freedom against fearful odds. The Crown-prince of Bavaria and the King of Württemberg were among

the most eager of the Philhellenes, and the free spirit of Stein was on this subject at one with the obsequious pliancy of Ancillon; while money was poured out in support of the insurrection, and volunteers offered themselves for service under the flag, till, at Metternich's suggestion, a stop was put to this extreme mode of showing goodwill to a revolutionary movement.

The Congress of Verona actually assembled in October 1823, preliminary conferences having been held at Vienna. Metternich's difficulties had been greatly increased (in August 1822) by the death of Londonderry (Castlereagh), in whose support he had long been accustomed to confide, and whose place was taken by Canning, whom he soon came to detest with concentrated bitterness. On the other hand, shortly before this event, Capodistrias, who, among the counsellors of the Tsar, was by far the most obnoxious to Metternich, had been virtually dismissed. Alexander I was at this time in a fervently reactionary mood, and declared that every other consideration must give way to the overthrow of the Revolution and the preservation of the Holy Alliance. He was, therefore, intent upon the intervention of the Great Powers in Spain, and when this was opposed by the German Powers, inasmuch as France would not allow the transit of their armies, was eager to thrust upon France the duty of intervening on behalf of the European Concert. Austria and Prussia could not but regard such a course as most hazardous, though prepared to give it their moral support. The British Government, however, in which the spirit of Canning was now dominant, through Wellington strongly deprecated it. Thus, while France, whose Government hesitated to give way to the demand for intervention urged by the *ultras*, still hesitated, her enquiries were very differently met by the other Great Powers. Russia was all for war, Austria and Prussia, the latter in particular, following, cautiously and conditionally,

in the same direction; while Great Britain was more and more determined to refuse her cooperation. Metternich's position thus became very difficult, more especially since his main object in giving way to the Tsar's desire for intervention in Spain was to divert him from hostile proceedings against the Porte. The French Government delayed action for the time, and the Great Powers agreed in rejecting the appeal of the Greeks; so that Metternich, chiefly through the exertion of his personal influence over Alexander, had succeeded in averting dissension between the Eastern Powers. Inasmuch, however, as neither the Spanish troubles nor the Greek insurrection were at an end, the great satisfaction expressed by the circular despatch, composed by Gentz and sent forth by Metternich at the close of the Congress, was either pretence or self-delusion. On the other hand, the admonition which followed, calling upon the lesser Governments to support the Eastern Powers in their efforts for maintaining both the letter and the spirit of the European treaties, was not without sufficient reason. The opposition to the policy of the Holy Alliance (as, by a loose usage, those Governments long continued to be collectively called) was not confined to the Stuttgart press and to Lindner's pamphleteering pen[1]. King William of Württemberg, who had openly quarrelled with the Austrian and Prussian Governments and could no longer expect the countenance of his Russian brother-in-law, at the beginning of 1823 issued a circular attacking the Great Powers as 'heirs of the influence which Napoleon had arrogated to himself in Europe,' and censuring them for excluding from their Congresses not only the Governments of the second rank, but also the Germanic Confederation, which must assuredly be a Greater Power than any states

[1] Treitschke unhesitatingly attributes the authorship of the 'diplomatic report,' published in 1822 by Kollmanner, *On the present situation of Europe*, to Lindner.

forming part of it. In Bernstorff's absence, Ancillon replied with becoming wrath to this foolish manifesto; and it has been seen how Metternich at the Conference, summoned by him in January at Vienna, of representatives of German Governments on whom he could depend (including the Prussian and the Bavarian) sought further to reduce the authority of the Diet[1]. The only point however on which they could agree was the desirability of getting rid of Wangenheim; and, this having been achieved, King William recognised the fact that his own part was played out, and accepted the principles which had actuated the Great Powers at the Congresses of Laíbach and Verona.

The years 1823 and 1824 saw the triumph of the reaction in Spain, after the French armed intervention had been accomplished with unexpected ease. Metternich had wished that the French army should be accompanied by plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers and that the political control of the war should be in the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris; but Bernstorff prevented this. Meanwhile, the legitimist victory in Spain and the accession to the French throne (September 1824) of Charles X, the head of the *ultras* as he had formerly been the chief of the *émigrés*—though by him, too, Metternich's hopes were to be disappointed—were counterbalanced by Canning's declaration of Great Britain's intention to recognise the independence of some of the chief Spanish-American colonies (January 1st, 1825); and, a year later, the despatch of a British expedition to Lisbon secured the establishment of constitutional government in Portugal under the Infanta Donna Maria. The attempt to settle Portuguese affairs had led to something like a duel between Metternich and Canning, who in April 1827 became head of the British Ministry, and who, before his death three months later, cooperated in the beginning of the end of the Greek Revolution.

[1] Cf. p. 175, *ante*.

After Verona, Metternich had still indulged a faint hope that Alexander would still come to terms with Turkey, and, at the interview held between the Emperors of Austria and Russia at Czernowitz in October 1823, the Tsar had given expression to peaceable intentions. Early in the following year, he made certain proposals for the pacification of Greece which commended themselves to neither side, while Metternich indignantly noted the tendency of the British Foreign Office to give favourable consideration to the claims of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and of the Greeks in particular. Thus the Conferences held at Petersburg in June and July 1824 failed to advance matters, the British refusal to treat the Greek insurgents as rebellious subjects clashing with Metternich's continued disbelief in the ultimate success of their efforts. Hence, there was no longer any prospect of the British Government joining in any intervention by the Powers, although it was ready to take part in an endeavour at mediation. Metternich's position was one of peculiar difficulty, inasmuch as his twofold object was that Austria should give her moral support to the Ottoman Government, while doing what she could to prevent Russia from making war upon Turkey, more especially since Prussia (as Bernstorff's balancing instructions of July 27th indicate) was not unlikely, at the last moment, to fall in with Russia's action. The enthusiasm of the Philhellenes had not come to an end with the death of Byron (April 19th, 1824), who was widely mourned in Germany as well as in England. In 1825, although the prospects of the Greek insurrection seemed to be passing from bad to worse, the isolation of Austria with regard to this question became more and more apparent; and the death, towards the end of this year (December 1st), of Tsar Alexander I could not but leave Metternich still more uncertain of the future. The new Tsar, Nicholas, while expressing his unwillingness to further the purposes

of the Greek insurrection, let it be known that he was prepared to make short work with the Turks, to whose Government he, on April 5th, 1826, sent an imperious ultimatum, which, by Austria's advice, was accepted. On the other hand, the Petersburg secret protocol upon which, about the same date (April 4th), Russia and Great Britain agreed, and which implied an understanding between two Great Powers hitherto directly opposed to one another, both as to the Turkish question in general and as to the Greek insurrection in particular, at the same time made manifest a fundamental difference of opinion between the Russian and Austrian Governments, which had been veiled by the recent amicable relations between Alexander and Metternich.

This agreement, which contemplated a pacification between Greece and Turkey on the basis of the former becoming a vassal state of the Porte, was treated by Metternich as futile; and in truth it contradicted his diagnosis and stultified his policy. But the Turkish Government (weakened for the moment by the massacre of the Janissaries) showed itself in a yielding mood; and, after the Treaty of Akkerman (October 6th, 1826) had granted to the Balkan provinces the concessions demanded by Russia, it seemed as if the pressure exercised by her jointly with Great Britain and France might lead to the acceptance by the Porte of the stipulations on which, following the lines of the Petersburg secret protocol, they had agreed in the Treaty of London (July 6th, 1827) and by which Greece would have become a tributary state. The Austrian Government, however, between which and the Tsar the tension was at this time severe, declined to agree to the terms of this treaty; and Prussia, notwithstanding the urgency of the Tsar, on this occasion also, adhered to her German ally (Metternich had, once more, been received by King Frederick William III at Teplitz). But the opposition to

Metternich's policy continued to increase at Berlin; and there was a growing feeling in military circles in favour of a Russian alliance. Thus, the moral support of Prussia was, to his indignation, given to the policy of the three Powers. Though left without any support but that of Austria, the Turks remained obstinate and provoked the catastrophe which followed. Canning, who died on August 8th, 1827, had lived long enough to see the rupture in the counsels of the Great Powers. The Turks having declined the cessation of arms which was accepted by the Greeks, Russia and the Western Powers put their policy into execution by the battle of Navarino (October 20th). Great was the wrath of Metternich, who to the last had sought to mediate between the Sultan and the three Powers. On the other hand, the spirit of the Turks, according to their wont, blazed up, and was met by an outburst of warlike enthusiasm in Russia and the Principalities. The Russo-Turkish war, which Metternich had so long laboured to avert, was at last at hand. Russia prepared for an invasion of the Turkish dominions, which was not to stop till the Porte had accepted the whole of the provisions of the Treaty of London, and deeply resented Metternich's continued attempts at mediation. His hopes of Wellington, now at the head of the British Government, were vain; and, though a French effort to induce Prussia to join the Western Powers and Russia fell through, Metternich no longer had any prospect of withstanding the policy of the latter, while his futile counter-proposal of an independent Greece limited to the Morea and the Aegean islands was scouted alike at London and at Petersburg. After a final appeal to the Tsar from the Emperor Francis on the ground of the terrors of a general European war, the Ottoman Government had to be left to its fate. Notwithstanding Metternich's boasts, neither the political nor, especially, the financial condition of the Austrian empire warranted her drawing the sword against Russia; indeed, there was

already some talk of the tables being turned against her by that Power. Prussia well understood the condition of things, and, while there was no fear of her King and Government uniting her arms to those of Russia[1], they were resolved to maintain a strict neutrality in the impending conflict. On May 7th, 1828, the Russian army crossed the Pruth.

The unexpected power of resistance displayed by the Turks (at both Varna and Silistria) and the necessity, which gradually became clear, of a second campaign had excited in Metternich, whose elasticity of mind had not yet deserted him, the hope of bringing about against Russia a quadruple alliance of the other Great Powers, or, failing this expedient—and there could be no doubt as to the strenuous resistance which Prussia, at all events, would have offered to its adoption—a pacification by means of another European congress. His endeavours again failed; but the Tsar, upon whose Government the war had already imposed great financial efforts, showed himself not unwilling to accept conditions of peace negotiated on the basis of the proposals formulated by the London Conference on March 22nd, 1829, which included the establishment of a Christian prince as hereditary ruler of Greece. When, in the following June, the Tsar, with his Prussian consort, paid a visit to Berlin, where he was enthusiastically received as the best friend of the Hellenes, he showed himself ready for the peace urged upon him by the King, if the Porte would pay the costs of the war. To make the situation clear to the Sultan, the Chief of the Prussian Staff, General von Müffling, was sent to Constantinople. This was a notable step, especially in conjunction with the fact that Diebitsch-Sabalkansky, Chief of the Russian Staff and commander of the Russian expeditionary force, was a Prussian by birth. As implying

[1] According to Stern, vol. III, p. 157, Prince (afterwards Emperor) William was refused permission by the King to take part in the Russian campaign against the Turks.

the emancipation of Prussian diplomacy from Austrian control, it made a great impression in Germany, and though approved by France, created considerable uneasiness in Vienna and London. The capture of Adrianople by Diebitsch, who entered that city on August 20th, followed by other Turkish disasters, at last disposed Sultan Mahmud to lend ear to Müffling, and negotiations began at Adrianople. Diebitsch, whose army was reduced by pestilence and who could not look for speedy reinforcements, had good reason for hastening the conclusion of peace. Thus the Peace of Adrianople was concluded on March 2nd, 1829, on terms which, by the acceptance of the Treaty of London, imported the weakening rather than the ruin of the Turkish empire, and showed the Porte some consideration even in the matter of the costs of the war.

With the Peace of Adrianople, we may appropriately conclude this rapid summary of the relations of Austria and Prussia to the general progress of European affairs in the period preceding the French Revolution of July 1830. To Europe at large, this strange pacification, into which the victor was, as a matter of fact, forced hardly less plainly than the vanquished, and in which the most prominent diplomatic part had been played by Prussia, the Power least concerned in its conditions, was welcome as postponing indefinitely the complications and conflicts that must have followed on the annihilation of the Turkish Power in Europe. The 'grand design' of the French Minister Polignac for a radical revision of the political map, which would have involved a transformation in the Napoleonic style—not to the disadvantage of Prussia—was now a burst bubble. The Prussian Government, it need hardly be said, had explicitly declined to have aught to say to proposals including its abandonment of its present possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and interfering with the process of the internal consolidation of the monarchy. Austria and her leading statesman, on the

other hand, made scant pretence of being satisfied with the present settlement of the affairs of the Near East. Though, in a letter written in June 1830[1], Gentz is found imperturbably extolling Metternich as having cured the ambition of Russia, while preserving, at all events for a number of years, the remains of the Turkish empire, which the two Western Powers had delivered up to ruin, Metternich privately confessed to his master that the result would have been less disastrous, had the financial and military resources of his empire been in a better condition. Although he believed that Russia would never relinquish her prey, he began to speculate afresh on the revival of the Alliance of the Five Great Powers, which Russia, Great Britain and France had so rudely broken up, while commending the British notion of a guarantee by the former of the inviolability of the Ottoman empire. But Russia would not listen to such a plan; and the Porte in April 1830 accepted the resolutions passed in the previous February by the London Conference[2], which acknowledged, though within reduced limits, the independence of the Greek state. The Quadruple Treaty of 1832 finally established the new kingdom on an enduring basis.

Metternich's system was not wholly a thing of the past; for Russia began before long to look favourably upon a renewal of the alliance between the Eastern Powers, and, as we shall see, the outbreak of the July Revolution led to a new series of efforts on his part for a European league against a disturbance of the peace of Europe. But the period during which his voice had possessed a prerogative if not a paramount influence in European politics had

[1] See *Briefe von und an Gentz*, vol. III, part II, pp. 342 sqq.

[2] The Greek crown, accepted by Prince Leopold of Coburg in February 1830, was declined by him three months later, and was, in May 1832, finally bestowed by the three Powers on Prince Otto, a younger son of King Lewis of Bavaria.

passed away with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war and the conclusion of the Peace of Adrianople; and his inability to carry the Prussian Government with him in the gradual development of his anti-Russian policy had notably contributed to the disappointment of his hopes. This fact should not be overlooked in any survey of the relations between the German Great Powers in this period of their history. For the rest, the policy of reaction had been successful in Italy; it had (though not in the way which he would have proposed) triumphed in Spain and, for the time, reasserted itself in Portugal; and the most reactionary of all the Bourbons sat on the throne of France. Metternich's day had not altogether departed, nor had the renewed cooperation of the Eastern Powers become impossible, when they were once more confronted by a revolutionary France.

Before that change arrived, a great advance had already been made on the way towards the completion of a great design by which ultimately the whole of Germany, except the Austrian dominions and certain small states in the north, was to be bound together in more intimate commercial union. This union was established on the principle that all commercial intercourse within it should be free, while no alien state should become one of its members; it was, at the same time, wholly independent of the Germanic Confederation, and stood under the actual, though not formally acknowledged, hegemony of Prussia[1].

The commercial condition of the Holy Roman Empire had been the most striking consequence of its political

[1] I have slightly expanded Sybel's definition, vol. I, p. 59 (ed. 1901). Treitschke's account, in his third volume, of the beginnings of the *Zollverein*, is mainly based on his three powerful essays, *Die Anfänge des deutschen Zollvereins*, in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. XXX (1872). See also Aegidi, L. K., *Aus der Vorgeschichte des deutschen Zollvereins* (Hamburg, 1865).

disunion. The complications and contradictions, in its innumerable temporal and spiritual territories, of customs and excise dues at and within the frontiers, and of prohibitions and privileges of all sorts, as well as the multiform and corrupt state of the coinage, lay heavy upon internal trade, while no Imperial customs frontier existed for dealing with foreign imports. The dissolution of the Empire improved matters in some respects, but led to an intensified desire on the part of each of the two score absolute sovereigns now established to resort to a customs system of his own as exclusive as possible, and this tendency reached its height in the days of the *Rheinbund*.

We have seen how the consciousness of the necessity of change, in this respect also, was present to the generation which took part in or witnessed the War of Liberation; and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna included a clause (the much-vext art. XIX), which expressed the intention of the members of the Confederation to enter into consultation at the first meeting of the Frankfort Diet on the subject of trade and intercourse between the several Federal states and on that of navigation, in accordance with the principles adopted at the Congress of Vienna. When, however, on May 19th, 1817, the Diet discussed a proposal of Württemberg (occasioned by the agricultural distress of this and the preceding year) to put an end, within the Confederation, to any prohibition of the exportation of corn and cattle, although the Prussian headed a majority of Governments in favouring the motion, it was resisted or impeded by the Bavarian, the Hanoverian and other Governments, and finally, at the suggestion of the Austrian, laid on the shelf. Free-trade principles were by no means a novelty in Germany, where, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Adam Smith had several distinguished disciples; of Bülow's financial proposals to the Prussian *Staatsrat* in 1817, only that establishing the principle of free

imports received immediate royal approval[1]. But the enormous proportions reached by British imports into Germany in the first years after the peace could not but lead to a demand for protection of German industry, which seemed in danger of being crushed before it had had time to revive. In the Ministerial Conferences held at Vienna in the winter of 1819–20 the enthusiastic deliverances of List and others, who appeared there as deputies of an association of German merchants and manufacturers (*Deutscher Handelsverein*) founded by him, insisted on the commercial union of the nation as an object of paramount importance; but Metternich and others declared it irreconcilable with the sovereign authority of the particular states. The lucid and powerful memorandum prepared for this meeting by the Baden statesman K. F. Nebenius, which advocated a united system of Federal customs, contained many proposals resembling those afterwards carried out; but the method of action recommended in it was essentially different from that actually adopted, and, inasmuch as, till its publication by its author fourteen years later, it seems to have remained unknown to the Prussian officials chiefly responsible for the policy pursued, he can hardly be credited with the 'invention of the *Zollverein*[2].' At the same time, a widespread feeling of indignation against the Prussian law of September 1st, 1818, which had come into operation at New Year 1819, found all but unanimous expression at the Vienna conferences. To the promulgation of this law, which was the work of the free-trader K. G. Maassen, at the time an official at Cleves, reference has already been made[3]. It was

[1] Cf. p. 146, *ante*.

[2] See the appendix *Nebenius und der Zollverein* (in opposition to Roscher) in Treitschke, vol. II. Nebenius was a councillor in the Ministry of Finance, and had drafted the Baden constitution. Cf. p. 112, *ante*.

[3] Cf. p. 147, *ante*.

not regarded by its opponents—and probably by very few of those concerned with its introduction—as laying the foundations of a general German Customs Union, in so far, at all events, as it united more than half of non-Austrian Germany as a single market; but it was widely decried as a measure selfishly adopted by Prussia for her own purposes, to the detriment of any prospect of a commercial union among all the German states. In Prussia, it worked well from the first, though difficult of execution, inasmuch as a frontier-line of not less than 1073 (German) miles had to be guarded; this made a simple tariff necessary, since a complex one would have required too many officers, and, for the same reason, goods had to be taxed by weight, not *pro valore*. The transit duties were of great importance, as fully half of the goods entering Prussia passed through it. Trade and public comfort increased at once in Prussia, though perhaps not as rapidly as has sometimes been supposed, while navigation remained unprotected by a fleet, and commerce with Great Britain was discouraged by the Navigation Act. Already at the first revision of the tariff, in 1821, a further advance was made in the direction of free-trade; the tariff was simplified and several duties were lowered.

It was in these circumstances that the Prussian Government, deliberately, though without any announcement of programme or platform, entered upon the policy which, by sixteen years of unremitting endeavour, was to lead to the establishment of the German *Zollverein*. The Prussian Government recognised the impossibility, so far as could be seen at present, of the formation of a customs system common to the whole Confederation; for even the attempt, made in 1817 under the pressure of famine, to bring about national free-trade in corn, had broken down[1], and Bernstorff repeatedly declared at Vienna that it was impossible to

[1] Cf. p. 203, *ante*.

bring about a union of German customs except by a gradual advance and by the most careful mutual reconciliation of conflicting interests. It was, therefore, resolved by the directors of the commercial policy of Prussia to apply, in this particular field, the general maxim of Humboldt that Prussia must proceed by implicating the German neighbour states so far as possible in her own system of government. The process must be slow, but it was indispensable, if only because Prussia, split into two halves, could, from a commercial point of view, in no other way become internally one, and avoid being isolated as against foreign countries. Thus, the Prussian customs system was devised from the first with the intention of drawing neighbouring states in the first instance, and then other members of the Confederation, into its *nexus* by means of separate treaties. Meanwhile, all attempts at giving effect to art. VI of the Final Act must be left to take care of themselves and to end in ignominious failure.

These views were enunciated in 1828 by the statesman to whom, with Maassen, and after him at a rather later date, F. C. A. von Motz, was due the execution of the great design. J. A. F. Eichhorn, whose rigorous ecclesiastical policy in the reign of Frederick William IV drew down upon him an obloquy which has obscured the remembrance of his great political services, had, after assisting Stein in the Central Administration established by the Allies, written in defence of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia in 1815, and rendered great assistance to Hardenberg in the Paris peace negotiations of the same year. He then entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, of which he became one of the principal officials, and the *Staatsrat*. An indefatigable worker, distinguished by breadth as well as penetration of view, he was not much better liked by the Liberals, who misunderstood his policy, than by Metternich, who, more or less instinctively, suspected it. His was the diplomatic branch

of the *Zollverein* negotiations; while to Maassen and Motz (who became Minister of Finance in 1825) fell the financial. The party in the Prussian Ministry and at Court which favoured Austria was unfriendly to the development of Eichhorn's policy; and he had to contend against the criticism both of the Liberals who thought it hopelessly narrow, and of certain finance officials who shrank from it as venturesome and hazardous. But he never faltered in its pursuit. He and those associated with him in his plans were admirably served by their subordinates; and the King was loyal.

Of the difficulties accompanying the extension of Prussia's customs system the most pressing was the unavoidable necessity of dealing with the *enclaves*—pieces of territory belonging to other states but surrounded by Prussia. By a procedure which, whether 'wholesome' or not, was beyond question arbitrary, the Prussian customs line was at once advanced so as to include not only parts of the small Thuringian dominions, but the whole of the Anhalt duchies. All goods imported into these were subjected to Prussian import-dues. It is true that, so soon as the necessary administrative arrangements had been carried out, the states concerned were invited to negotiate on the basis of an understanding that the Governments to which the *enclaves* owed allegiance should receive from Prussia the income derived from the customs levied in them; and that she further promised to assent to a similar treatment of Prussian *enclaves* in lands which might have joined another customs union. But, even if legally defensible, the measure was one of force, and by no means an auspicious beginning.

The next step followed speedily, but it was not at once carried beyond its first beginning. On October 25th, 1819, Prussia concluded the first of the treaties admitting other states into her customs system, that with the principality of

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen. The concession which made possible both this in itself insignificant treaty and the *Zollverein* was that the customs receipts were to be divided among the states of the union in proportion to the numbers of the subjects of each. The example of Sondershausen was not followed for nearly three years. A customs union with southern Germany seemed out of the question, so long as the states by which the Prussian monarchy was bisected remained outside its customs system; for the commercial interests of the south, with its comparatively slight demand for colonial goods and the relative smallness of its trade with Great Britain and Holland, differed from those of the north, while southern manufacturing industry of the more modern or larger kind lagged far behind northern. But the expectation that an understanding would without very much delay be effected with Saxony, Thuringia and Electoral Hesse proved vain; Austrian influence and a deep-seated jealous suspicion of Prussia's intentions alike contributing to this result—motive causes to which the south-western kingdoms were less subject. In the north, in different ways, Hanover was affected by the pressure of British, and Holstein by that of Danish, interests. The Hanse Towns would not hear of a general German commercial policy. Elsewhere, political or dynastic antipathies, for a time, proved stronger than economic interests. Thus, the bitter attacks made upon Prussia at the Vienna Conferences by Anhalt-Köthen, which, in common with Anhalt-Dessau, had determined to resist the application to itself of the new customs law, at first met with a ready audience, and developed into a protracted quarrel between two very illmatched antagonists. Köthen received for a time the sympathetic support of the Liberals of the south-west under the leadership of Wangenheim; and, from Leipzig, Adam Müller fanned the flame of the dispute. It lasted ten years (during which Anhalt was the centre of a brisk smuggling trade), being

complicated by the Elbe navigation question and the compensation demanded by Köthen after coming into the Act of 1821, and embittered by the tension between the Prussian and Köthen Courts in consequence of the conversion to the Church of Rome of the Duchess Julia, half-sister to Frederick William III, followed afterwards by that of her consort. In 1827 Prussia closed the Elbe above and below Anhalt, and the Duke of Köthen in return indulged in the luxury of sending an ultimatum to Berlin by a lieutenant in his army. When however the affair came before the Diet, Austrian influence induced Prussia's antagonist to give way; and on July 17th, 1828, Köthen and Dessau, much to their own advantage, joined the Prussian customs system.

Before this, a series of other petty states, whose territories were more or less broken up by Prussian *enclaves*, had followed the example of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, after having at first refused the accession of their own enclaved lands. Thus, in 1822 Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, in 1823 Saxe-Weimar and Anhalt-Bernburg, in 1826 Lippe-Detmold and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, acceded; in 1829 and 1830 Coburg-Gotha, Hesse-Homburg, Oldenburg (for Birkenfeld) and in 1831 Waldeck, followed. The sovereigns of these territories alike received a share of income from the Prussian customs, calculated on the proportionate numbers of their populations, but without a voice in commercial treaties or in modifications of the Prussian customs tariff. By these *Zollanschlüsse* (adhesions to her customs system), which were all made on the proposition of the petty states concerned, Prussia acquired a considerable extension of frontier subject to her customs, and thereby a vantage-ground for her subsequent negotiations for a customs union (*Zollverein*) with states of superior importance. At the same time, the rule had been established of negotiating with single states only—or (as afterwards became necessary) with an actually

existent commercial union of several states among themselves. The patience exhibited by Prussia in the first period of the execution of her great commercial design was to have its reward in the second, but only after a series of complicated negotiations which were systematically conducted on lines laid down on the Prussian side in 1824, but which cannot here be pursued in detail.

In 1827, after it had become clear that nothing was to be done with the Elector of Hesse, the Prussian Government entered into negotiations with that of Hesse-Darmstadt, although the territory of this state nowhere adjoined Prussia's own. These negotiations were all the more important, inasmuch as seven years earlier the intelligent Conservative Darmstadt Minister Du Thil had originated a long succession of deliberations with Baden and other states of the south-west, for which Nebenius, in the first instance, prepared a draft, but of which the ultimate result was very different from that originally intended—namely, the conclusion, in 1828, of the Bavaro-Württemberg Customs Union. The larger scheme of a South-German *Zollverein* was openly or secretly opposed on all sides, and Austrian as well as Prussian influence was used against it; but it really broke down because of the impossibility of satisfying divergent commercial and industrial interests within so narrow a territorial area as that which it had in view. Each of the states of the south-west concluded to go its own way; and a renewed attempt at a general agreement between them made in the Stuttgart Conferences, which began in 1825, again broke down. In the end, however, owing mainly to the determination of King Lewis I of Bavaria—a man of genius, but frequently wrongheaded—Bavaria and Württemberg in 1826 arrived at a separate commercial agreement, which was followed, on January 1st, 1828, by the conclusion of a *Zollverein* between them. The other states of the south-west were afraid of the ascendancy

of Bavaria, the Elector of Hesse-Cassel obstinately clung to his sovereign rights, and Hesse-Darmstadt was already engaged in direct negotiations with Berlin.

Here lay the key to the whole situation. Hesse-Darmstadt, situate as it was on both sides of the boundary-line between north and south, was now unwilling to trust for her commercial future to a league with the two chief states of the south-west. On the other hand, there was hesitation at Berlin as to admitting into the Prussian Customs Union a state whose frontiers barely touched those of Prussia, and connexion with which had no special economic advantages to offer. The difficulty was increased by the *intransigeant* attitude maintained by Hesse-Cassel. It was owing to the farsighted energy of Motz, with whom Eichhorn fell into line, that the admission of Hesse-Darmstadt was pressed, and actually accomplished. On February 14th, 1828, Darmstadt entered the Union on terms of perfect equality, the distribution of customs revenues to follow population; and the settlement proved as advantageous financially to the lesser as it did politically to the more important partner. While, in fact, the Bavaro-Württemberg and the Prusso-Darmstadt treaties, after much consideration in both cases, were concluded about the same time (so that all discussion as to priority of idea is really idle), the latter was a fatal blow to the former; and the wrath of King Lewis of Bavaria knew no bounds. It had been already excited by the assent of the Frankfort Diet to the declaration of the Great Powers concerning Baden, and by Prussia's clear intimation to him that she would oppose any attempt at forcible resistance to it on the part of Bavaria. Some whisperings with France followed; but these, with so good a German patriot as King Lewis, could only be momentary.

Meanwhile, even the Prusso-Darmstadt treaty had not been able to force the hand of the Elector William II of

Hesse-Cassel, whose resistance was due to low intrigues at his Court, whence the jealousy of his mistress, Countess Reichenbach-Lessowitz, for a time drove his Prussian consort and his son into a kind of exile at Bonn. The Bavaro-Württemberg *Zollverein* had cherished the hope of his adhesion, but Austria disapproved of a customs union of the south-west, or indeed between any German states. On the other hand, he rudely refused to enter upon any negotiations with the Prussian Union. Together with Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, Hanover and Nassau continued to avert their countenances from it. Saxony—actuated partly by the continued illwill of Court and population against Prussia, partly by the desire to find some sort of market for her manufacturing industry, on which the revival of her prosperity largely depended, partly by a long-cherished desire to assert a control over the Ernestine duchies in Thuringia—hereupon originated a third German Customs Union. This unhappy scheme of driving in a wedge between the two existing Unions, and thus preventing the extension of the Prussian, was devised by the two brothers Carlowitz, Ministers of Saxony and Gotha, who, so early as March 1828 signed, with the Weimar Minister Schweitzer, a preliminary agreement called the Punctation of Oberschönau (an estate of the Carlowitz family). Hanover and Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Homburg, Nassau, Oldenburg, Bremen and Frankfort, together with Weimar, Gotha and Meiningen (whose Duke believed that his capital was destined to become the *nodus* of the trade-routes of Europe) joined this 'league of neutrality' which was finally concluded on September 24th under the name of the *Mid-German Commercial Union*[1]. It covered an area with six million inhabitants and had command over nearly all the North Sea coast, and parts of the Rhine, Elbe, Main and Weser. Public, and even Liberal, opinion both in

[1] *Mitteldeutscher Handelsverein.*

central and in south-western Germany supported the new union, which was to last till the termination of the Prussian *Zollverein* in 1834. Its manifest object was a customs war against Prussia, by diverting the main stream of the German transit trade from the area of her union. There can be no doubt that Great Britain and France, as well as Austria, welcomed this new *Zollverein*, and that the Prussian Union was threatened by a most serious danger, and, for at least six years to come, prevented from proceeding to any further extension of its own boundaries.

The statesmanship of Berlin—the stedfast adherence of Eichhorn and Motz to a plan of action clearly conceived from the first, though, more especially in this critical period, disclosed to but few—was equal to the peril. Though the Austrian Government encouraged the schemes of the Mid-German Union, as it had encouraged the pertinacity of the Duke of Anhalt-Köthen, the Prussian Government remained on good terms with it, even through the contemporary complications of the Eastern question. Meanwhile, the construction of highroads in the area of the Northern Union was actively carried on, and the setting-on-foot of the 'Central' denounced in Ministerial despatches and with the aid of journalism. In the struggle to which her *Zollverein* was very distinctly challenged, Prussia had, above all, the advantage of the fact that the highroads by means of which the European transit trade was to be diverted from the Northern Union to the 'Mid-German,' had yet to be built. Soon it became clear that the interests within the third Union itself were divergent, and that Electoral Hesse, more especially, was an utterly unaccommodating element in its midst. There was no commanding spirit to direct the policy of the Union, and there was no customs administration common to all its members, who were held together merely by their agreement to lower tariffs and provide improved routes of communication. Gradually, the rashly

tied bond began to loosen here and there. Sondershausen, which had joined the new league for part of her dominions, proffered an apology, as did Gotha. Then an ally in the open campaign which Motz was urging against the third Union presented himself in the person of King Lewis of Bavaria, who, with his usual rapidity of decision, made up his mind against its intervention; and the King of Württemberg, partly no doubt from hatred of Metternich, followed suit. Soon King Lewis and his Finance Minister, Count Armansperg, a high-spirited young statesman after the King's own heart, advanced to the thought of joining the Prussian league; and a notable series of negotiations began between Bavaria-Württemberg and Prussia-Darmstadt, in which the chief agent of the former was the eminent publisher Freiherr J. F. Cotta. On May 27th, 1829, a treaty was signed which provided for free-trade between these states in all but a certain number of articles, as to which a reduction of 25 per cent. was to be allowed. Commercial treaties with adjacent states (such as Baden) were only to be concluded by common consent. King Lewis was now full of ardour for a complete understanding with Prussia; but, though her Government were fully conscious of the political significance of the step which they had taken[1], they still continued to advance with caution.

In contrast to the jealous delays in the rival Union, a great highroad was constructed, from Langensalza in Prussian Saxony viâ Gotha and Meiningen to Würzburg and Bamberg in Lower and Upper Franconia. The desertion of the Mid-German Union by the two little Ernestine

[1] A memorandum elaborated by Motz, which appeared at the close of the year 1829, explicitly states that the present combination will imply a Germany composed of true allies, strong and free within and without, under the protection and shield of Prussia. All that is needed is to complete what has been begun.

duchies had sounded its doom. Pride prevented the Governments represented at its initial meeting from breaking it up immediately; but, as the Prussian Government, in particular, declined to enter into any negotiations with the Union corporately, it began to fall asunder into its chief constituent elements. By the Eimbeck treaty of March 27th, 1830, Hanover, Oldenburg, Brunswick and Electoral Hesse formed themselves into a closer customs association with a low tariff of their own; and Saxony agreed upon special conditions of customs with several of the Thuringian states. In February 1831 Saxe-Weimar fell away from the Mid-German Union and joined the Northern, and in August of the same year Electoral Hesse broke loose from the Eimbeck league and, for the bulk of her dominions, joined the Prusso-Darmstadt Union on the terms which had been granted to Darmstadt three years earlier. A few days after this act of tardy wisdom, the Elector William II named his son Frederick William coregent and practically resigned the government—or misgovernment—of the electorate into his hands. The long-desired unbroken connexion between east and west had at last been established. In Saxony, where, as in Electoral Hesse, the French Revolution of July 1830 had exercised very direct political effects, the necessity for approaching the Prusso-Darmstadt Union likewise became irresistible; but the negotiations were not completed till March 30th, 1833, when a union of customs was established by treaty. On May 10th, 1833, a similar treaty followed with Weimar, Gotha and most of the remaining Thuringian states. Throughout these negotiations the Prussian Government had steadily refused to swerve from the mode of procedure which it had from the first adopted, asserting that a general German Union of Customs and Commerce could only be brought about if the political system of the Confederation itself were reorganised. But, in addition to the successes enumerated, Prussia, about

the same time, dealt a heavy blow at the Mid-German Union by means of the Rhine Navigation Convention, which, after a long-protracted struggle, secured Holland's acknowledgment of the freedom of the Rhine '*jusque dans la mer*,' and thereby, at the same time, materially altered the commercial relations between Great Britain and the two Unions.

Shortly before Prussian statesmanship had accomplished, in 1833, the disruption of the Mid-German *Handelsverein*, which Metternich himself afterwards described as having been 'tentatively called into life against the Prussian system of customs,' its real *raison d'être* had been taken away by that union between the northern and southern leagues which it was to have rendered impossible. Many influences —ultramontane as well as particularist—had exerted themselves against the commercial treaty of May 1829. But it had become evident to the Bavarian and Württemberg Governments that, with Electoral Hesse admitted into the Prussian Union, while Baden remained unreconciled to Bavaria, the South-German *Zollverein* could not permanently be maintained; and in December 1831 negotiations for a complete Union were opened at Berlin. There were many difficulties still to overcome—one of them that of securing at least an approximate measure of agreement between the rates of internal taxation in the several states belonging to the Union. Bavaria must cling to her malt-tax, which was here at least three times as productive as the same tax in Prussia; and in Württemberg public opinion could not free itself from a bundle of fine old prejudices, as maintained by Uhland and other authorities. At last King Lewis of Bavaria definitively asserted himself, and in January 1833 his friend and Finance Minister von Mieg repaired to Berlin on behalf of both the southern kingdoms. On March 22nd, the treaty was concluded—mainly on the same terms as the Hessian treaties, though the full right of

concluding separate commercial treaties conceded to Bavaria and Württemberg was really as little hurtful to Prussian interests as had been the formal concession to Darmstadt that her 'consent' should be obtained for such agreements. In the absence of mutual confidence and community of interests, the maintenance of the Union was in any case impossible; and to this conclusion Prussia, wisely as the event proved, trusted, while leaving to all the associated states the right of exercising a *liberum veto* at the periodical general assemblies, and the other right, which proved the chief safeguard of her own interests—of giving warning at the end of the period for which the *Zollverein* treaties had been concluded. This was eight years from the date at which the Prusso-Darmstadt treaty would end if denounced (otherwise, it was to run for six further years), and at which the treaties concluded in 1833 came into force—January 1st, 1834, the birthday of the German *Zoll- und Handelsverein*.

Metternich's resistance to the final achievement of the great result had come too late. In 1832, Austria had been charged by the Frankfort Diet with an *Austrag* between Hanover and Electoral Hesse, which Hanover had indicted for violation of the agreement of the Mid-German Union; but the manœuvre, to which the close relations between Hanover and Great Britain gave special importance, had fallen to the ground. In the same year, Metternich had sent an agent to Munich to offer an Austrian commercial treaty, and to propose the construction of a Danube-Main canal (which it took ten years to accomplish). In June 1833, in view of a courteous clause in the Prussian treaty with Bavaria and Württemberg, agreeing to dissolve the *Zollverein*, if the Diet should carry out art. XIX of the Federal Act, Metternich published a memorandum in which he recommended the execution of this article as a sovereign remedy; and at the Ministerial Conference held at Vienna in the winter of 1833–4 Hanover once more brought up the

question of this article. Though a memorandum in favour of carrying it out was presented by the wise and patriotic representative of Bremen (Smidt) the only states which supported Hanover were Austria and Mecklenburg; and, in 1834, the Austrian Government decided that reductions in the Austrian tariff could only take place as equivalents for concessions by the Prussian *Zollverein*. Against any pressure from without that Union was now safe, and its relations with Austria could not be settled except on a footing entirely different from that adopted in the case of other German states. But, of these, there still remained some to gather into the system. Baden's long-stretched-out frontier called for special concessions, and on these lines a treaty admitting her into the *Zollverein* was concluded on May 12th, 1835, and, thanks to the efforts of Nebenius[1] and others, notwithstanding the vehement declamation of Rotteck, approved by small majorities in the Chambers. In Nassau, Marschall had thought to save the situation by a commercial treaty with France, largely reducing the duty on mineral waters (September 1833). But Eichhorn succeeded in convincing the Duke, when on a visit to Berlin, of the futility of such a course; and after the French treaty had been annulled, on the pretext of a formal defect, Nassau was, on the usual terms, admitted to the *Zollverein* in December 1835. Finally, Frankfort, which had recently concluded a commercial treaty with Great Britain to the annulment of which that Power consented, joined the *Zollverein* in January 1836, the fairs of the free city being granted the same exemptions as those which had been allowed to the Leipzig fairs in the Saxon treaty.

In May 1841, the treaties on which the *Zollverein* rested were renewed without important modifications. Though

[1] To the effective treatise published by him on this occasion he appended his old memorandum of 1819.

the Union thus entered on a new lease of life, its great defect, more especially so far as its foreign relations were concerned, remained the absence of a coast-line, except in the Baltic, which in the main was an inland sea, and which the Sound dues effectively helped to keep closed. The *Zollverein* states' navigation included few ocean-going vessels, and the German oversea trade was mainly in the hands of Hanover, and more especially of the two larger Hanse Towns. So long as these remained outside the *Zollverein*, and while the Rhine navigation was bound up at its outlet by Holland, the Union continued truncate and essentially incomplete. The inclusion of Luxemburg, in 1842, had no political or commercial results of consequence; but the virtual break-up of the separate associations founded in 1830, of which Hanover was the leading member, seemed to hold out the prospect of its accession, together with the more important additions of Bremen and Hamburg, which had—the latter more especially—held resolutely aloof. Brunswick, which had quarrelled with Hanover, joined the *Zollverein* for part of its dominions in 1841, and as a whole in 1844. In the former year, Waldeck and Lippe-Detmold also came in. Hanover, however, still held out; nor was it till September 1851, three years after the National Assembly at Frankfort had, in the constitution adopted by it for Germany, declared it a single area as to customs and commerce, that Hanover, followed by Schaumburg-Lippe in the same year, and by Oldenburg in the following, became members of the *Zollverein*. In 1836, a population of twenty-five, and, in 1852, one of thirty, millions dwelt within its boundaries. The adhesion of the Hanse Towns to the German Customs system belongs to a far later period; it began in 1872 and was completed in 1885. More than half a century earlier, Motz had declared that the Hanse Towns must form the completion, as they would the cornerstone, of the edifice of German commercial unity.

The movement of 1841 and the following years had the advantage of making the national character and aims of the *Zollverein* clearer than before to the country at large; and, in the next period, the chief difficulty of the Union was the internal one of reconciling the protectionist demands of the south, of which List, to whom the *Zollverein* owed a deep debt, was the most influential exponent, with the moderate free-trade policy of Prussia. On the whole, the preponderating vote favoured a reduction of tariffs, though the iron duties and others were kept up with a special view to Great Britain. Commercial treaties were negotiated by Prussia with several foreign states; but she gained small credit by those actually concluded—a treaty of navigation with Great Britain, which was very unjustly denounced as subservient to British interests; another with Belgium, of which the real purpose was to defeat the scheme of a Franco-Belgian customs union, and a third with Russia, which slightly improved commercial relations on the eastern frontier. In 1846, the struggle between protectionist and free-trade tendencies reached an acute point at the Carlsruhe meeting of the *Zollverein*; and there was once more a clamour for a commercial association with Austria—a baseless vision, which came to nothing, as did the project of an Austro-Italian counterbalance to the German union. The great victory achieved by Free-trade in England by the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) could not but exercise a peaceful influence, and the period which followed was one generally favourable to the advance of commercial intercourse between nations. Although the efforts had failed which the eminent Bremen Burgomaster Smidt had set on foot, so early as 1841, to supplement the work of the *Zollverein* by securing united action in all matters affecting navigation by means of a league of states formed for that purpose, the repeal of the British Navigation Act, promised in 1847 and accomplished in 1849, was of very great advantage to the German

shipping trade. Towards the grave economic crisis of 1846 and 1847 on the other hand, to which reference will be made below, no common action was, or perhaps in the circumstances could be, adopted by the states belonging to the *Zollverein*.

Prussia, to whose statesmanship the foundation and development of the *Zollverein* was substantially due, loyally fulfilled the conditions by which it had, in its successive stages, been secured. The equality of rights on which it rested was at no time impugned or impaired; even the locality of its successive general conferences alternated; and but one of them was held in Berlin. Of the financial benefits which accrued to the whole body of its members, and to some of the lesser states which had most actively opposed it in particular, there can be no doubt. But, apart from these direct gains, the industrial activity of the states belonging to the Union rapidly increased, more especially in the south-west, to which a northern market was now all at once opened, and which, in due course, became largely protectionist as towards foreign countries and for many years prevented the reduction of import-duties. In Prussia, on the other hand, where the revenue derived from customs had at first diminished, many complaints were made, even in Ministerial circles, of the financial results of the *Zollverein*; but by 1838 there was little doubt left as to their satisfactoriness, and, happily, the Crown-prince, not always in sympathy with progressive ideas, was a staunch upholder of the *Zollverein* policy. Moreover, the period had already set in when the effects of the new system of railway communication more than supplemented those of the *Zollverein* by bringing about a thorough change from the backward and feeble conditions of German economic life. In 1835, Bavaria had the honour of constructing the earliest German railway (from Nürnberg to Fürth); and, two years later, the Dresden-Leipzig line was in part opened, and List's

'Saxon railway-system as the foundation of one comprehending Germany at large[1]' began to be carried into execution. Prussia followed, adopting in 1838 its great railway law which, while securing to the state the right of suppressing all private railways, kept open the prospect of the adoption of a state railway system; and, not long afterwards, Baden moved in the same direction. Here, again, was a contribution of the greatest practical value towards the ultimate union of Germany[2]. The political results of the establishment of the great Customs Union will be left for illustration in later chapters of this book. The German *Zollverein* remained consistently German; and it survived all the political chances and changes undergone by the nation till the establishment of the North German Federation, of which it was at once the precedent and the exemplar.

[1] The title of his work published in 1833. Austria was not included in this system.

[2] Of only less significance was the use of steamboats, in the first instance in river accommodation and then in transmarine and transatlantic trade, of which Germany was rapidly to acquire an important share.

CHAPTER V

BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS

About the beginning of the fateful year 1830, a general calm, though not the calm of settled contentment, might seem to have overspread the public life of Germany. The material prosperity of the country at large had not yet advanced beyond the first stages of its revival after the great war; and the national Customs Union, under which it was to develop with signal speed, was still only on the eve of the completion of its permanent organisation. The large majority of the Governments had ruthlessly repressed demagogy and all its works, including those which a perverse self-deception had either distorted or monstrously magnified, and had driven the public press into what was at least a semblance of general submission. Meanwhile, what may be called the Liberal Opposition, and those who thought with it, after some early parliamentary demonstrations in the south-west of its sincerity and fervour, remained quite out of touch with the internal political growth of Prussia. Yet this was the one state without whose aid and countenance there was no possibility of resisting the pressure exercised on all sides and on all occasions by the reaction and its main agencies—dynastic particularism and the political 'system' of Austria.

Into this calm, there fell suddenly, like a thunderbolt from a placid though not cloudless sky, the news of the

French 'July' Revolution of 1830, followed, more or less swiftly, by that of the breakdown of the Dutch rule in Belgium, the beginning of the Polish insurrection against the Russian government, and a fresh outbreak of the struggle for independence in central Italy. It was hardly possible that Germany, either in its western parts or elsewhere, should remain unaffected by a political movement so widespread and so intense.

The Revolution in France, which first lit the flame, though inevitable, had been little foreseen by other Governments—as appears, for instance, from the brief memorandum drawn up, shortly before its outbreak, by Metternich and Nesselrode at Carlsbad (the so-called *chiffon de Carlsbad*)[1]. It was with the view of diverting public attention from home to foreign affairs that Charles X's reactionary Minister Polignac had at first proposed to his sovereign plans for a reconstruction of the political map of Europe, which the Peace of Adrianople had compelled him to lay aside without making them known to any of the other Great Powers. None of these were in the confidence of the King of France and his Minister, and thus most of the ambassadors at Paris were only vaguely apprehensive of the catastrophe which was brought on by the signing of the fatal Ordinances of July 25th, and which ended with the proclamation, on August 7th, of Louis-Philippe as King of the French. The spectacle of a Government reduced to collapse by the expedient of filling its capital with barricades electrified Europe; and some time passed before it was seen that the fruit of the heroism of the Paris populace had fallen into the lap of a class intent upon its own interests, including the preservation of peace, as was the sagacious prince now in possession of the French throne. In Germany, the influence of France, after being largely shaken off in literature and social life, though not so completely as in

[1] As to this, cf. O. Klopp, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 91.

politics, once more began to assert its ascendancy over the younger generation. The patriotic enthusiasm of the War of Liberation, and its reflexion in the romantic phases of literature and art, had already largely given way to a cosmopolitan sympathy with all aspirations for freedom, and this tendency was greatly strengthened when France seemed once more to proclaim herself their natural champion. Thus, the general political influence of the French July Revolution on German opinion and sentiment was, undoubtedly, in favour of Liberalism; and it was intensified by the readiness with which the other chief Western Power, Great Britain, herself then in the midst of the struggle, soon to prove successful, for parliamentary reform, accepted the immediate results of the revolution in France, and its sequel in the Low Countries.

It may be well, before going further, to note that at this critical time the German Governments in general showed no delay or hesitation in taking the steps necessary for warding off whatever national danger might arise out of the political changes in France and Belgium. None of the secondary states showed any desire to derive advantage of their own from the existing condition of things. General Sebastiani, on instituting some discreet enquiries in the French interest at the chief Courts of the German south-west, found that the days of the *Rheinbund* had passed away, together with the *Trias* schemes of more recent date; and King Lewis of Bavaria, who was well content with the results of the *Zollverein* negotiations, and about this time sent his son and heir to Berlin as a university student, was warm in his declarations of friendship for Prussia. He had, at first, demurred to the proposal made by Austria and Prussia at the Diet in September 1830, to mass a considerable body of troops in the immediate neighbourhood of Frankfort and, if necessary, to march some flying detachments through central Germany, where the newspapers had provoked much

agitation; but he had no objections to make in principle, and consented to the restraint of journalism in his own kingdom, where the censorship had hitherto not been severe. The Diet passed some resolutions appealing to the several Governments to maintain a firm but conciliatory attitude towards their own subjects, among whom there was, inevitably, much excitement; and the proposal of Prussia was accepted which united the contingents of the smallest states as a reserve force, to be employed in garrisoning the Federal fortresses. As the political horizon at first continued to darken, Bernstorff put forth a circumspect memorandum (January 1831), explaining that a war with France, were it to become necessary, must be carried on, not as an offensive war on behalf of the principle of legitimacy, but as a national defensive war. He added that the time for Federal reform seemed to him to have not yet arrived. An attempt was, at once, made to substitute, at least on the present occasion, for the existing system of national defence (which dated from 1821 and bound the secondary states to furnish a force more numerous, on paper, than that demanded from Austria and Prussia respectively) a simplified and improved scheme, in which the heaviest burden would lie upon Prussia. Three armies were to be formed on the western frontier—a Prussian, supplemented by contingents of the lesser northern states, on the Moselle; a south-German, supplemented by Prussian troops, on the Upper and Middle Rhine; and an Austrian in Suabia. The commander-in-chief of the whole armada was to be named by the Diet—i.e., to be an Austrian. Austria hesitated; but the south-German Governments were ready to do their part, and King William of Württemberg magnanimously proposed the Bavarian Wrede as commander of the south-German troops. Unluckily, the years of peace and the principles of economy in vogue in the constitutional south-west had tended to reduce considerably the numbers

of some of the regiments furnished by its Governments. Austria, the main part of whose own military strength was needed in Italy, having at last woke up to the needs of the situation in Germany, came forward with a counter-scheme; but, in the meantime, the immediate menace of a general European war had subsided. In September 1831, deliberations took place between the two Great Powers; but, in May of the following year, the secondary states, both northern and southern, pronounced in favour of the Prussian proposals. Ultimately, it was settled that Prussia should furnish 231,000 men (exclusive of the garrisons of the fortresses), the lesser states 160,000, and Austria 172,000, for the three several armies contemplated in the Prussian scheme; and, the plan having been communicated to the Tsar, he undertook to cover Poland with 100,000 men, besides furnishing an active reserve of double that number. These transactions were all kept carefully secret, and, as it came to pass, were not subjected to any practical test of their sufficiency; but they brought home very directly to those concerned the twofold problem of the security of the western frontier, and of the future military hegemony of Germany. Austria had been compelled by the difficulties confronting her, and the lesser states by consideration for their own safety, to concede to Prussia for the critical moment (which was not actually to present itself) a preponderance which, in quiet times, nothing could have induced them to acknowledge.

Though awake, or aroused, to the necessity of taking thought of possible defensive war, Austria and Prussia—the latter, more distinctly, as being more immediately imperilled—showed themselves prepared, from the first, to recognise the new *régime* in France, as maintaining the monarchical, even at the sacrifice of the legitimist, principle. They would, no doubt, have preferred that joint action should be taken on this head by the four Great Powers; and Prussia had hoped that the opportunity might be used for

obtaining from Louis-Philippe a formal guarantee for the maintenance of existing treaties. Austria, anxious, for the best of reasons, to avoid becoming involved in a second Revolutionary War, recommended a congress of the four Powers, or, failing this, the establishment at Berlin of a *centre d'attente*, by means of which they might jointly watch the progress of events in France. It does not, however, seem as if Metternich could be justly accused of having played with the idea of bringing the Duke of Reichstadt on the scene; and, from May 1832 onwards, the ill-fated young prince was, in truth, a dying man[1]. But, at Petersburg, the Prusso-Austrian proposal of a joint conditional recognition of Louis-Philippe met with determined resistance, while Great Britain recognised him on her own account. In the course of September, the Prussian and Austrian Governments took the same course, and most of the lesser states, together with the Germanic Confederation, followed suit.

About the same time, the Belgian revolution was carried to a successful issue. A strong current of public opinion in France—by which, however, the new King of the French was not carried away—had hailed it as an obvious occasion for incorporating the insurgent provinces in the French monarchy, or, at least, subjecting them to its permanent control. Both for dynastic reasons[2] and from the point of

[1] Cf. c. IX of E. Wertheimer, *Der Herzog von Reichstadt* (1902). In February 1831 Metternich seems to have threatened the French Government with support of the Duke, in case it countenanced the revolutionary movement in Italy. Gneisenau was for supporting the Duke of Bordeaux in the south of France, and the Duke of Reichstadt in the north.

[2] The intimate relations between the Houses of Hohenzollern and Orange, and the claims of the Brandenburg dynasty upon the Orange inheritance, dated back to the marriage of Prince Frederick Henry's daughter Louisa Henrietta with the Great Elector. King William of Holland was married to Wilhelmina, sister of Frederick

view of her commerce and navigation, Prussia was far more closely interested in the struggle between Belgium and Holland than in the fortunes of the Orleans throne; and there was a strong feeling in Berlin society that the treaty rights of the House of Orange ought to be maintained by arms, as if such a course had been specifically guaranteed in the Act of the Congress of Vienna. But, in the present instance also, discretion prevailed on both sides of the Rhine. King Frederick William III, whose caution was at this season of great value to the peace of Europe as well as to the interests of his own kingdom, was deaf to the arguments of Field-marshal Diebitsch, who appeared at Berlin on an extraordinary mission from the bellicose Tsar Nicholas. Thus, when, on November 4th, 1830, the Conference brought about by Great Britain assembled in London, a substantial agreement had already been reached as to a separation between Holland and Belgium having become unavoidable, though the form in which it was to be accomplished remained open to discussion. The Germanic Confederation, which, in October 1830, had been asked for aid by the Dutch Government, in view of the fact that the entire open country of the grand-duchy of Luxemburg was occupied by Belgian insurgents, waited six months before resolving to send an army of execution thither, and, after the whole question had been taken up by the London Conference, deferred the despatch of this army *sine die*. Yet, what with the insistency of the Tsar's despotic will, the desire of the King of Prussia to maintain, at any cost, the alliance between the Eastern Powers, and the agitation kept up by the pressure of French public opinion upon a Government conscious of its own weakness, the political atmosphere of Europe continued charged with elements of danger. On January 20th, 1831, the London Conference, on the motion

William III, whose youngest son, Albert, was about this very time married to King William I's daughter Marianne.

of the able Prussian plenipotentiary, H. von Bülow, adopted the principle of the neutrality of Belgium; but the hesitation of France, who required some territorial compensation for herself, caused much apprehension in Germany, and in Prussia (whose military preparations at this time were noticed above) more especially. These fears were increased when the Belgian crown was, by the National Congress sitting at Brussels, offered to Louis-Philippe's second son, the Duc de Nemours. Happily, Frederick William III would not allow himself to be driven into any action against France, whose Government, in its turn, yielded to moderate counsels. In June, the Belgian crown, which Louis-Philippe had declined for his son, was accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha—a prince whose own political sagacity, as well as the dynastic fortunes of his House, which he had a principal share in advancing, were destined to exercise a remarkable influence upon the course of European politics. German affairs came only in a secondary way under his ken; but, with regard to these, no advice, at a later date, was of more solid value than King Leopold's, and afterwards that of his younger kinsman Prince Albert's faithful counsellor, Baron Stockmar. The King's consistent loyalty to the cause of German national unity should suffice to rebut in his own case, and go some way to invalidate in that of the House to which he belonged, pettish complaints against the influence of 'Coburg intrigue' upon later German politics.

The Prussian Government did nothing to assist the bold attempt made by the Dutch, in the autumn of 1831, to recover the lost Belgian provinces; on the other hand, it declined to listen to Talleyrand's suggestion of a partition of them, by which the Prussian dominions would have been considerably aggrandised. Thus, the London Conference was enabled to lay down the conditions on which the Belgian kingdom and its constitution were formally acknowledged by the Powers (November 15th, 1831), and which affected

the Germanic Confederation only in the matter of the readjustment of its territorial relations with Luxemburg and Limburg. After the pacific representations of Frederick William III had prevailed, with great difficulty, over the pertinacity of the Tsar, the treaty signed at London was ratified by all three Eastern Powers (April and May 1832), though the Tsar was followed by several German Princes in delaying diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Brussels. The King of the Netherlands still held out; but in the armed intervention of the autumn of 1832, which brought about the surrender of Antwerp by the Dutch in December, neither the German Powers nor Russia took any part; so that the close of the Belgian troubles left the relations between the Eastern and Western Powers in a far from harmonious condition. In the peace between Belgium and Holland, which was not actually signed till 1839, part of the duchy of Limburg was, in compensation for the part of Luxemburg yielded by Holland to Belgium, ceded by the newer to the older kingdom and, with the exception of the fortresses of Maestricht and Venloo, incorporated in the Germanic Confederation. The Federal fortress of Luxemburg, which was held by the Prussian garrison under General Dumoulin, had not passed out of the hands of the Confederation, when the latter permitted the bisection of the grand-duchy.

The events of the wonderful year 1830 crowded upon, and in some measure neutralised, one another. In November, the Polish insurrection, the immediate outcome of the popular agitation which had followed on the outbreak of cholera in Moscow, and which in parts of the Russian empire had shaken the foundations of social order, had overwhelmed Warsaw and, soon afterwards, the whole of Russian Poland. In February and March 1831, Diebitsch was in full retreat from before Warsaw; and the King of Prussia, having decisively rejected the overtures of the

insurgents, ordered nearly half his army to be drawn up along the frontier dividing his own eastern provinces from the kingless kingdom. Russian or Russo-Prussian action against France had become impossible; but Prussia, rejecting all suggestions of neutrality, furnished material assistance to her eastern ally by enabling the Russian troops to cross the Vistula and by agreeing to a treaty which bound her to disarm Polish insurgents after they had crossed the frontier. She thus contributed directly to the recovery of Warsaw by the Russians, and to the final overthrow of the Polish insurrection (September—October 1831). The action of the Prussian Government had, on the whole, been at once prudent and dignified; when, in July, a Polish army-corps of 7000 men, after crossing the Prussian border, had laid down their arms, they had been 'interned' till most of them had been pardoned and returned home. On at least one occasion, the Prussian officials incurred the charge of cruel treatment of fugitive Polish soldiers; but the Prussian Government steadily refused the extradition even of ringleaders. On the other hand, any participation in the rebellion by Prussian subjects was prohibited as high-treason, though, after the close of the struggle, those who returned home by a fixed date were amnestied. The transgressors were very numerous, but their treatment was lenient. Inasmuch as the insurrection ended with the passing of an army of 21,000 across the Prussian frontier, it could not but leave very visible traces behind it in both this and other parts of Germany. More especially in the south-west, its outbreak and earlier course had been eagerly welcomed, and helped to stimulate the revolutionary spirit which, under influences largely derived from Paris, was fast rising there. As the Polish fugitives streamed westward, their presence and declamations could not fail to deepen the existing antagonism to Prussia as Russia's assumed associate in the overthrow of 'constitutional Poland.'

In the Prussian province of Posen, there was continued illwill between the native Polish nobility and the Government, represented by the Chief-president of the province, von Flottwell, an administrator of notable vigour, and the commanding general, K. W. G. von Grolmann; and Polish feeling was greatly incensed by a series of drastic reforms introduced into the province in 1833, among them the secularisation of the convents, and the purchase, from Government funds, of encumbered estates in order to transfer them to German owners. The German immigration, although not inconsiderable, for a long time failed to produce any change in these relations; and, with the Prussian officials on the one side and the Polish clergy on the other, there was little prospect of their improvement.

Austria's Polish dominions, on the other hand, were not much troubled by the insurrection in Russian Poland; at one time, there was actually some talk about offering the vacant throne of Poland to Archduke Charles. In October 1833, however, Austria joined with Prussia in signing at Münchengrätz a treaty in which the three Eastern Powers (no longer divided because of the Turkish policy of Russia, materially modified since the Treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi) once more entered into a mutual guarantee of their Polish possessions. In 1835, the three Powers followed up the Münchengrätz agreement by a secret treaty declaring it expedient to consider how to bring about the voluntary transfer of Cracow to Austria; and, three years later, their troops entered the territory of the republic, and speedily suppressed all disorder there. A cry of indignation went up through Western Europe and the world of Liberalism in general; nor was it till 1846 that the three Powers could venture to put their secret treaty into actual execution. By that date, the extreme revolutionary elements in the Polish emigration had completely gained the upper hand, and had been reinforced by the communistic

agitation which, as will be seen, was then overspreading a large part of Europe. The leader of the new movement was L. de Mieroslawski, soldier, author and man of fashion, who had taken part in the rebellion of 1830 and then withdrawn to France. In 1845 he organised a rising, which was to begin in Posen and Galicia, and thence to extend over Russian Poland; but when, in February 1846, it broke out in Posen, it was easily suppressed there. Hereupon, Austrian troops occupied Cracow. They evacuated it again in face of the insurrection, but speedily returned in larger numbers and put down the movement in both town and country, after some savage excesses had been committed by the peasantry against the property of their own nobles. Metternich delayed carrying out the secret treaty of 1835, till he could do so without granting concessions to Prussian (especially Silesian) trade, which apprehended great losses from the incorporation of Cracow (hitherto a place of free trade) in the Austrian dominions. This difficulty having been surmounted, the incorporation was formally declared; and the Western Powers were left to protest against the palpable violation, which sophistry alone could defend, of the Treaty of Vienna. The indignation excited in Western Europe by this transaction was very great, and, in many of the lesser German states, it produced at the same time a feeling of insecurity which led the Federal Diet to return a colourless answer to the assurances of Austria and Prussia, confirmed by Russia. In Prussia, sympathy with the Poles was heightened by the trial at Berlin of the 254 insurgents taken prisoners in Posen, among them Mieroslawski, who had been captured at Gnesen. The trial was conducted in public—in accordance with a law as to judicial procedure only recently approved by the King—and resulted in a series of sentences of which eight, including Mieroslawski's, were capital. But the extreme penalty was not, in any case, exacted, and Mieroslawski's career was not yet at an end.

In another quarter, Austria was to experience, on her own account, the effects of the July Revolution. During the winter of 1830–1, successful risings, followed by the establishment of provisional Governments, took place in the Romagna and other parts of the Papal States, as well as in Modena and Parma. Here, Austria, without hesitation, intervened to restore the old order of things, and occupied the Romagna (March 1831). A French protest induced Metternich to consent to a Ministerial conference at Rome, held in 1832, in which the Prussian envoy Bunsen took the lead, and by which the new Pope, Gregory XVI, was, in his turn, unwillingly persuaded to promise part of the reforms demanded, having by a secret treaty been assured of the return to his dominions, in case of need, of an Austrian protective force[1]. The real difficulty lay in the mutual suspicions of Austria and France; nor was it till after the plenipotentiaries at the Conference had unanimously declared their adherence to the principle of maintaining the Pope's temporal power that the last Austrian troops took their departure from Bologna. When, after Papal troops had returned to the Romagna, troubles broke out there afresh (January 1832), the appearance of an Austrian force under Radetzky speedily restored order. The French Government, by way of gratifying national susceptibility, sent a small force to occupy Ancona, where it remained till 1838, when the Austrian troops, also, finally quitted the Papal States. The moral victory had remained with Austria, which entered into a satisfactory understanding with the new King of Sardinia, Charles Albert, on whom high hopes had been placed by the party of movement in

[1] It afterwards appeared that the Austrian Government was not desirous of the Papal concessions going further than they did. As to the memorandum of reforms recommended to the Pope by the Powers, on May 21st, 1832, drawn up by Bunsen in 1831, see *Life and Letters of Bunsen* (1868), vol. II, pp. 534–7.

Italy. A surface tranquillity prevailed throughout the peninsula for several years; but the Austrian dominion in the north of Italy, notwithstanding, remained in a precarious condition. The hatred of it proved unextinguishable, above all in the educated classes; and, as time went on, the national cause found its most eloquent prophets in writers of the north. In 1846, however, fantastic dreams of a free and regenerate Italy, federally united under the headship of a patriotic Papacy, took their rise on the election of Cardinal Mastai-Ferretti as Pope Pius IX. When he prepared to meet the popular excitement by the offer of certain reforms, and confidentially consulted the Great Powers on the subject, Metternich had no scruple about warning him against concessions, and employed all the diplomatic means at his command to protest against any liberal measures or any policy of union on the part of the Italian governments. The Prussian Government (now under Frederick William IV) showed a much less rigid disposition, favouring a fair measure of reforms, such as had been urged upon the Papacy in 1831, and seeking to mediate in the face of Austria's high-handed line of action. A feeble beginning was made, in the autumn of 1847, towards carrying out the federal plans on which in October 1847 the Pope had agreed with the Courts of Florence and Turin; but it was countered on the part of Austria by treaties allowing her, in the case of danger, to occupy Modena and Parma. Charles Albert of Sardinia now virtually declared himself on the side of reform (October), and granted a constitution on the French model to his kingdom in January 1848, while in the same month Sicily proclaimed her revolt against the House of Bourbon.

In Switzerland, French and Austrian influences were traditionally opposed to one another, and this opposition was deepened by the encouragement given by the French Revolution of July to the democratic party in some of the cantons, where the 'patrician' governments had to give

way before popular agitation, and by the fresh impulse imparted to the unitarian movement against the maintenance of cantonal sovereignty. Prussia's relations to Switzerland, through the principality of Neufchâtel, were of a very special kind, and will be noticed below, in connexion with the course of Prussian affairs in this period. The Great Powers, as such, had in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna guaranteed the integrity of the confederated cantons, and had also acknowledged it as the basis of the Helvetic political system. On this latter recognition certain of the Powers, towards the close of the period treated in the present chapter, founded a claim to intervene against any attempted diminution of the self-governing power of the cantons, thus opposing the inevitable gravitation of Switzerland towards the political condition of a democracy with representative institutions. When, in 1846, the conflict, intensified by religious grievances, was about to be waged between the twelve cantons under the leadership of Berne, as the *Vorort* of the Confederation, and the seven Catholic cantons who had formed themselves into a Separate Confederation (*Sonderbund*), the sympathy with the seceders was so strong at Vienna that both arms and money were secretly sent to their assistance; arms also arrived from France. The war had actually broken out when Guizot, by means of a despatch of which he sought the acceptance by the other Great Powers, attempted to induce both sides to disarm. But, in the course of November 1847, General Dufour completely established the authority of the Confederation, which at once expelled the Jesuits, whose admission by the canton of Lucerne had been the primary occasion of armed conflict. When a note of mediation, signed by all the Great Powers except Great Britain, was presented in the following month, it could be declined by the Swiss diet as superfluous. On January 18th, 1848, France, Austria and Prussia despatched a further note calling upon

the Confederation to remove its troops from the *Sonderbund* cantons and to acknowledge their independence, allowing no changes to be made in the federal constitution except by a unanimous vote; and in this note Russia, a month later, signified her concurrence. The Swiss Confederation, in reply, claimed the right of dealing with its affairs in its own way (indeed part of the demands made had already been satisfied), and, before the Four Powers could do anything to give effect to their recommendations, or any notice could be taken of the Prussian suggestion of a congress at Neufchâtel, the Revolution was in progress.

In Spanish Carlism, which, together with the parallel movement of Miguelism in Portugal, much occupied the attention of the European Governments from 1833 onwards, the Eastern Powers had comparatively little interest; and, though the sympathies of their sovereigns were with the pretenders, the support given to them had to be limited to pecuniary contributions. Germany had no concern in these matters, and the German Powers no desire to intervene in their settlement. Austria, in particular, had every reason for holding her hand; and Metternich, who still remained her leading statesman, showed himself fully conscious of this. As his public career lengthened, he not only exhibited a more and more transparent desire to use in favour of peace his political influence, which the fears inspired by the consequences of the Revolution of 1830 had, for a time, once more augmented, but also made his wish clear to abstain from active interference outside the more immediate sphere of Austrian policy. The years following on the July Revolution were the time at which he, and his faithful Gentz perhaps even more distinctly, showed a willingness to enter into the question of constitutional reforms at home; but the Emperor Francis I maintained his attitude of uncompromising resistance. His death (March 2nd, 1835) and the accession of the Emperor Ferdinand I, who was

both physically and intellectually unequal to the demands of any position involving personal responsibility, made no change in the Austrian system of government. The relations with Prussia were drawn closer by two interviews between Metternich and Frederick William III at Teplitz in 1837 and 1838; nor did they undergo any important change on the accession of Frederick William IV, who, while there were many things which he admired and prized in England, disliked France as the representative of revolutionary ideas which her Government sought to keep, more or less, in bounds, and who was throughout staunch to his loyal friendship to the House of Austria, and to the principle of cooperation with Austria in matters of foreign policy. It has been seen how the two German Great Powers held together in the matter of Cracow; less complete though really unbroken was the solidarity of their joint action in the crisis through which European politics passed in 1840—the very year of the accession of a new king in Prussia. The *entente cordiale* between Great Britain and France, which seemed to have put an end to the general European concert, had by this time become a thing of the past; and, when, in February, the representatives of the Great Powers met in London to confer formally on the best way of settling the Turco-Syrian quarrel, France dissented openly from the policy of preserving the Ottoman empire by forcing the victorious Mehemet Ali to return to the Porte the greater part of his conquests. Hereupon, the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers signed the agreement with Turkey known as the Quadruple Alliance of July 1840, which, while ignoring the objections of France, summarily settled the Eastern difficulty. Austria was, by means of her fleet, to take an immediate part in the execution of the treaty; but Prussia, who through her envoy, Bülow, had been foremost in urging its prompt conclusion, reserved to herself a neutral position in the event of war. Yet, if a

European conflict actually ensued, it was she who was most likely to suffer from its incidence. For in France, where Mehemet Ali had been the hero of the day and where Thiers, a statesman far more warlike than his sovereign, was minister, the spirit of the people was up, the press was raging, and everywhere the cry was heard: 'To the Rhine!' Inasmuch as neither Russia nor Great Britain at present cared to advise considerate treatment of Mehemet Ali, messages to Louis-Philippe from the German Governments could not avail to calm the national excitement, which the King did not share; and the danger of a European war, and of a French invasion of the German west, seemed for a time imminent. In Germany, the menace was met in a spirit of unanimous patriotic readiness, although the states of the south-west were really no better prepared for effective military resistance than they had been ten years earlier[1]. In Prussia, whose military strength had not suffered from the excessive economy which had been practised, on this head, in Bavaria and elsewhere, the same patriotic feeling prevailed; but the new King, Frederick William IV, though an ardent patriot, had no desire for the experience of another national war[2]. After negotiations in which the Austrian Government had shown itself by no means eager to meet the Prussian overtures halfway, General von Grolmann and Colonel von Radowitz were sent from Berlin to Vienna, where they at last succeeded in persuading the Austrian Government to adopt and extend the scheme of federal military organisation formed in 1831. Radowitz, hereupon, continued his journey of enquiry to the chief

[1] Cf. p. 226, *ante*.

[2] Nor, most certainly, would he have sought to force it on in the interests of Germany and the Prussian hegemony, in accordance with the advice which Radowitz afterwards confessed he would have been glad to tender, had access to the royal ear been open to him soon enough. Cf. F. Meinecke, *Radowitz und die Deutsche Politik* (1913), pp. 44–5.

states of the south-west, which he found in a very unsatisfactory condition of military preparation. The chief practical result of his tour was the introduction, in the same year, of a system of Federal inspection, which, after many difficulties and hindrances, produced, two years later, a report to the effect that the majority of the army-corps were in a condition perfectly corresponding to the requirements of the military constitution[1]. Meanwhile, the fear of a French invasion had long passed, and, with it, the anxiety of most of the German states to furbish up their military system for the day of national peril. Mehemet Ali had been made to submit, and the warlike Thiers had been succeeded as chief Minister in France by the prudent Guizot. The German Powers, and Prussia in particular, had returned to a pacific policy, and the new Eastern question which engaged the attention of King Frederick William IV was of a very different sort from that which had terminated with the treaty of July 1841 closing both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles[2].

The Austrian Government, which in matters of foreign policy had thus, while acting in conjunction with the Prussian, come to play what could no longer be described as a leading part in the great affairs of Europe, was in truth, as the new reign continued and Metternich grew from year to year more timid and talkative, growing weaker and weaker at home. It can only be indicated here how the difficulties confronting it were in truth enormous, while the machinery with the aid of which it had to meet them was very much out of gear. The 'State Conference' which exercised supreme authority on behalf of the imbecile

[1] The federal fortresses of the south-west at this time still awaited construction; nor was it till 1844 that, at Ulm and Rastatt, the foundations were laid on which the fortifications were gradually completed.

[2] See *post* as to the bishopric of Jerusalem.

Emperor was, in fact, almost as devoid of energy as he was himself. It had been first instituted in order to obviate the consequences of the long-enduring rivalry between Metternich and Count von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky (Minister of State since 1825), who, notwithstanding certain slight reforms introduced by the Chancellor (including some desirable changes, especially of a personal sort, in the military administration), was supposed to be the more Liberal of the pair. With them Archdukes Lewis (representing the Emperor) and Francis Charles were associated in this 'Conference.' The latter was a well-meaning nonentity; the former, who had some ability, resisted all innovations. Metternich, whose own powers—his power of will in particular—were on the wane, now held his own at Court with much difficulty, particularly as he had at one time to beware of both female and clerical influences, which alike found a centre in the two Bavarian sisters, the Dowager Empress Caroline Augusta and Sophia, the consort of Archduke Francis Charles, a lady of much ambition and energy. Thus, the Jesuits were, in 1836, allowed to find their way back into the Austrian dominions, where they established themselves in Innsbruck and other places. The state of the Austrian finances remained as unsatisfactory as ever; throughout the long period of peace the public debt continued to accumulate, and a proportionate growth of influence necessarily accrued to the great banking-houses of Rothschild and others, which had long been an appreciable factor in the politics of the Viennese Government. The general oppressiveness of the political atmosphere made it impossible that manifestations of liberal and opposition feeling should not occasionally occur even among the German subjects of the Emperor—in the provincial diet of Lower Austria, in the universities, and elsewhere. But the German nationality—which amounted scarcely to one-quarter of the entire population of the empire—was in truth

the only one among the various Austrian nationalities really loyal to the Habsburg rule. The Italians, as has been seen, followed a course of their own, dominated by a grievance to which there could be no end but one. The Poles of Galicia, both before and after the annexation of Cracow, formed an element of constant, though not violent, discontent. In Bohemia and the adjoining provinces, the Čech nationality was beginning once more to assert its claims; the great historic remembrances of the days which had preceded the establishment of the Habsburg rule and of Bohemia's important share in the history of both Renascence and religious Reform, were assiduously fostered, with the aid of the writings of the historiographer of Bohemia, Francis Palacký, and others; and to the revived pride of the Čech nationality, stimulated by the great families introduced into the country after the initial catastrophe of the Thirty Years' War and by the Catholic clergy, was added resentment of German ascendancy, and, among the rural population, angry jealousy of Jewish, which was more or less identified with German, trade and industry. But stronger than anywhere else, was as has been already noticed, the feeling of nationality, appealing at the same time to chartered historical right, cherished in Hungary. Here, the inherited pride and the political experience of the Magyars persistently asserted its predominance over all other nationalities; and the Protestant Saxons of Transylvania, with the settlers in the Banat, alone remained faithful to the German sway. Except for a suggestion, made in passing at the Hungarian diet of 1833, of an assembly of notables from Hungary and the German and Bohemian lands of the Crown, Hungary went her own way unhindered. Under the leadership of such men as Count Stephen Széchenyi, Count Eötvös and Francis Deák, in conjunction with whom Lewis Kossuth raised his voice of irresistible popular power, the national demand grew into one for an

independent Magyar kingdom provided with representative institutions. In the diet of 1843, the Magyar tongue was substituted as the official language for Latin, with the inevitable result of immediately calling forth a demand for the similar use of the vernacular on the part of the diet of 'the united Croatian, Slavonian and Dalmatian Kingdoms' at Agram. In 1847 the aged Palatine, Archduke Joseph, who had presided over the government of Hungary with tact and enjoyed much popular goodwill, died and was succeeded by his son Archduke Stephen, a prince of some ability, if rather deficient in steadiness; and, in the diet of that year, opened in the Magyar tongue by the *fainéant* Emperor-King, where the Government had to face a hostile majority, Kossuth brought forward a democratic motion for the abolition of the exemption of the nobility from taxation.

From this brief reference to the affairs of the Austrian empire in the period between the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, we pass on to notice the effect of the earlier of these movements upon the lesser German states. The first of these to feel it was Brunswick; but, although there is, in some respects, a curious parallelism between the occurrences in the little Guelf duchy and the stirring rush of events on the vast Paris stage, the movements in the great state and in the small differed not less in their origin than in the spirit which animated them. In Brunswick, Duke Charles II had, during the eight years following on his accession to the petty throne left vacant in 1815 by the death of his father at Quatrebras, stood under the guardianship of the Prince-regent of Great Britain, afterwards King George IV, whose death preceded the outbreak of the July Revolution by a few weeks only. With the guardianship was combined the regency of the duchy, which was carried on, together with the government of Hanover, by Count Münster. This eminent statesman was by no means

inattentive to his supplementary task, the execution of which was mainly in the hands of Justus von Schmidt-Phiseldeck, who had represented Brunswick at the Congress of Vienna. Not content with restoring the old order of things in the duchy—there was even some talk of reestablishing the University of Helmstedt, for ever associated with the great memory of Calixtus—the Brunswick Government also entered upon administrative reforms in cooperation with the *Landschaft* (Estates) of the duchy. This body had met in its two Chambers since the constitutional reorganisation in 1820, retaining the right of assembling for deliberative purposes, after due notice given, on its own initiative. In October 1823, Duke Charles, although then only in his twentieth year, was declared of age and assumed the government of the duchy—Brunswick-Oels being placed under the separate rule of his younger brother, Duke William. During the following two years, Duke Charles, it is said on Metternich's advice, took no part in public affairs; but, at the close of this period, he gave vent to the ire accumulated by him against Münster and Schmidt-Phiseldeck for having passed over his claim to be declared of age at the close of his eighteenth year. He drove the lesser of the pair to seek safety in Hanover (where the Government refused his extradition and bestowed high office upon him), and, after carrying on with his incontinent pen a long and unseemly attack upon Münster, challenged him to a duel. At the same time, the Duke surrounded himself with a Ministry composed of corrupt adventurers and servile place-holders, and plunged into a reckless course of tyranny, which threw the whole administration of his duchy into utter confusion. While he refused to have his own ordinances countersigned, he declared all the acts of the Government during the final year of his minority null and void, and left the *Landschaft* unconvoked, important offices of state unfilled, and the salaries of officials to whom he objected unpaid. The

decisions of judicial tribunals were arbitrarily annulled, public works discontinued, state-domains put up to sale, and endless administrative changes introduced and *chicanes* practised with a view to immediate pecuniary profit. The money obtained was squandered on the Duke's theatres and mistresses and other amusements and self-indulgences, until his Court became deserted and his presence was shunned by honourable men. This shameful misrule continued till, on May 21st, 1829, the *Landschaft* assembled on its own motion and resolved to enquire of the Federal Diet, whether or not it was incumbent upon the Duke to acknowledge the constitutional revision of 1820. With quite unusual speed, the Diet decided in July that the Duke ought to revoke his complaints of those who had exercised authority over him as guardians and apologise to King George IV. This decision having been ignored by the Duke, the Brunswick Estates in February 1830 laid before the Diet a formal complaint against the abolition of the constitution of the duchy; and, though doubts were expressed at the Diet as to the validity of a constitution granted under a regency, a report was drawn up in favour of the contention of the Estates. In Brunswick, popular illwill, intensified by material distress caused by the Duke's stoppage of expenditure on public works, continued to increase, and even the officers of the Duke's army had their grievances to urge against him.

In the meantime, leaving the government of his duchy in the hands of his Minister Bitter (afterwards created by him Freiherr von Andlau), Charles II was taking his pleasure at Paris, when he was surprised by the outbreak of the July Revolution. On his speedy return to Brunswick, a deputation, headed by the Burgomaster, waited upon him to warn him as to the state of public feeling and to urge the convocation of the *Landschaft*. The Duke's reply was to mount cannon in front of the palace. On the evening of

September 6th, the city of Brunswick set about a revolution in the true Paris style. The Duke and his mistress, on coming from the theatre, were received with stone-throwing and cries of 'Bread or work'; on the following day, the cannon were taken away, and the citizens were allowed to arm themselves with pikes. In the evening, a mob attacked the palace and set fire to it, while the Duke, guarded by hussars, took flight across the frontier. The failure of the troops to suppress a not very formidable revolt was, no doubt correctly, attributed to their opinion of their prince. On the 9th, the Grand Committee of the Estates, which had assembled of its own accord, resolved to seek advice at Hanover and Berlin, and in the meantime invited Duke William of Brunswick-Oels to assume as speedily as possible the government of the entire reunited duchy.

Inasmuch as 'order' had never been seriously threatened at Brunswick, the question now to be settled was how to deal with the succession to the throne, which, it was agreed on all sides, could never again be filled by Duke Charles II. His diary had been discovered in his burning palace, so that none of his ways remained unknown to his former subjects. Duke William promptly appeared, on September 10th, in the near vicinity of Brunswick, where he met with a warm welcome and, in accordance with advice from Berlin, awaited the course of events. Duke Charles, who, in the interim, had paid a visit to the new King of Great Britain and Hanover in London, but could obtain no promise of support there or elsewhere, was persuaded by British advice to issue to his brother a revocable commission for carrying on the government in his name; but Duke William, having a few days later been invited by the Estates to assume the government *simpliciter*, at once issued a patent to this effect, in which nothing was said as to the revocability of the assumption. The onus of further action had thus been placed upon Duke Charles. The British and the Prussian

Court alike sought to induce him either to resign the throne, or to invest his brother with irrevocable authority as regent; but, after making mien of being ready to assent to the latter alternative, he insisted on a personal revenue of quite exorbitant amount, and the negotiations broke down. The Diet, on November 4th, at last proceeded to inform Duke Charles that the constitutional settlement of 1820 could not be altered by any but a constitutional process; whereupon, after withdrawing the revocable commission granted to his brother, Charles, on the last day of the month, made a futile attempt at a forcible reentry. But the Black Brunswickers quartered on the frontier easily dispersed his band of adventurers and mercenaries; and, taking advantage of this foolish escapade, the Frankfort Diet declared him incapable of carrying on the government and requested his brother to assume it for the present. The discussions which ensued chiefly turned on the question whether after Duke William, whose tenure of the throne it was intended to make permanent, his own or his elder brother's line should succeed; but, as both brothers were unmarried, Prussia's advice of leaving the difficulty open for the present was adopted by the *agnati*; and, on April 20th, Duke William, in a patent drafted by the Prussian Minister Eichhorn, announced his assumption of the government, proclaiming at the same time the restoration of the constitution. Much perturbation followed among the upholders of the principle of legitimate right at Frankfort, where the recognition of Duke William was not put to the vote till May 11th, 1831, and then, the votes being equal, was left to the separate decision of the several Governments. Since, however, none of these were prepared to break off official relations with Duke William and treat his brother as the legitimate sovereign, the position was untenable and called for one of Metternich's diplomatic *coups*. Duke William having supplied his envoy at the Diet with fresh

powers, these were accepted by that body 'inasmuch as the Duke was to be regarded as a member of the Confederation possessed of the right of voting.' Before this, a family law had been signed by the members of the House of Brunswick by which, though the succession difficulty remained unsettled, it was laid down that no member of the House might marry without the approval of its head. The one signature wanting to the compact was that of Duke Charles.

His later career cannot be pursued here. He haunted various European capitals, more especially Paris and London, and conspired actively against his brother's rule. His attempt at another raid was prevented by the Government of Louis-Philippe; and he was not more successful after his friend Louis-Napoleon had become Emperor of the French. But his private property was protected by the French courts of law; and he died a wealthy man, at Geneva, in 1873.

In the duchy of Brunswick, the constitution of 1832, by which an increased representation was granted to burghers and peasantry, gave general satisfaction; and the Brunswick revolution had thus proved the reverse of futile. For a long time, Brunswick enjoyed the reputation of being one of the best governed of German states. And the blow which the political change in Brunswick had dealt to the principle of legitimism was, in its way, as severe as that which had been dealt in France; for it had thwarted the resistance, not only of a contemptible petty despot, but of half the Confederation over which Austria presided.

In Hesse-Cassel, as in Brunswick, the troubles which the tidings of the July Revolution helped to bring to a climax had been of gradual growth. To the narrow-minded rapacity and arbitrary violence with which, since his accession in 1821, the Elector William II had oppressed the loyal-minded population of his dominions, had been added

family scandals which, while making the Court of Cassel a byword, had deeply incensed Frederick William III of Prussia, the brother of the Electress Augusta. Together with the Electoral Prince Frederick William, she was obliged to reside out of the country for several years; and, when at last she set up a court of her own at Fulda, the prince remained behind at Bonn, where he led a life not very different from his father's. At Cassel, popular indignation concentrated itself on the Elector's mistress (of long standing) Countess Reichenbach, who, or whose friends, were suspected of an attempt to poison the Electoral Prince. William II was despotic and prodigal; but it was the shamelessness of his private life which rendered him odious to his subjects. It was rumoured that he wished to marry his mistress as a second wife, following herein the example of his famous ancestor Philip the Magnanimous; and, in July 1830, he travelled to Vienna from Carlsbad, where both he and the Countess were sojourning, in order to contrive her elevation to the rank of a princess of the Empire. But Metternich kept out of the way, and the Elector came back to Carlsbad, where he fell seriously ill. On his sickbed, he was reconciled to his son, and, on September 12th, leaving the Countess behind them, they returned together to Cassel. There some rioting had taken place which had been suppressed by the citizens; but the electoral corn magazines had been opened for free sale. On the 15th, the Elector was constrained to receive a civic deputation and to avert a graver outbreak by promising to summon the Estates. Public tranquillity, however, was not restored; and, in October, the Estates met and proceeded to redistribute the public revenue between state and sovereign on terms, apparently, not unfair to him. Thus, the ground was cleared for a settlement of the constitutional question; and the *Landtag* was hereupon invited by the Elector to agree on a constitution to be substituted for that of which

it formed part. The leading part in these debates was played by one of the most singleminded as he was one of the best-equipped reformers of this period of German history, Sylvester Jordan, professor in the university of Marburg, whose name afterwards came to be remembered as that of a sufferer in the cause of popular rights. The new constitution was signed by the Elector on January 5th, 1831. It was, beyond a doubt, the most liberal of all the constitutions as yet promulgated in Germany, though the principles on which it was founded were in no sense revolutionary. It secured to the Estates, assembled in a single Chamber, the right of granting the taxes, and that of initiating laws; and it assured the fixity of the judicial system of the country, which was to prove its chief bulwark against governmental aggression. Jordan can hardly be blamed for having been unable, in regard to particular provisions of the constitution, such as those concerning the impeachment of Ministers by the Estates (which were to give much trouble later), to avoid compromise and consequent indefinitiveness. On being laid before the Frankfort Diet for its guarantee, the Hesse-Cassel constitution, notwithstanding Metternich's efforts to bring about its rejection, was received without open demur, and thus remained in force.

Dynastic matters had, meanwhile, likewise passed into a new stage at Cassel. The exultation of the inhabitants, when, on the day after the signing of the new constitution, the Electress appeared in public by the side of her consort, was speedily quenched by the arrival, on the morrow, of Countess Reichenbach at Wilhelmshöhe. Tumultuous demonstrations obliged her, within a few days, to take her departure; and, in March, the Elector joined her at one of his country-seats near Hanau. He never returned to his capital, but spent the remaining sixteen years of his life at or near Hanau and Frankfort, or in Bohemia, married, after the Electress's death, to his former mistress. On

September 4th, 1831, the Hesse-Cassel diet had approved the appointment of the Electoral Prince Frederick William as coregent, pending the Elector's return to Cassel. In this capacity, the Prince held sway till his father's death in 1847, without giving the faithful Hessians cause for rejoicing over the change in the person of their ruler. He began by creating his morganatic wife and former mistress Countess of Schaumburg, thereby, since his mother the Electress would not acknowledge her, provoking fresh disturbances. Public affairs went more smoothly till the death, in February 1832, of the leading Minister, Wiederhold (the elder), who was respected by both Court and Estates, brought into office Hans Daniel Hassenpflug—a personage destined to an obloquy unsurpassed in the annals of unpopular Ministers ancient or modern. He had attained to a high judicial position at Cassel, and was an extremely clever lawyer, besides possessing a character of extraordinary determination. His hatred of Liberalism (of which he was taunted with having been an ardent disciple in his student days) and detestation of what he regarded as the revolutionary constitution of 1831 commended him to the confidence of the coregent, and his power grew apace. The jealous obstinacy of the Prince and the unflinching audacity and endless chicanery of the Minister came to give to Hesse-Cassel its unhappy prominence among German states in the history of their struggle for constitutional rights and liberties. Before Hassenpflug was called to the headship of the Government, Hesse-Cassel had, as was seen above[1], joined the Prussian *Zollverein*; but with his advent to power the reaction set in. The maintenance of the censorship, coupled with the publication of the resolutions passed by the Federal Diet, on July 5th, 1832, against the freedom of the press and of public assembly, involved Hassenpflug in a quarrel with the Cassel diet; and when, making use of the right

[1] Cf. p. 215, *ante*.

accorded to it, though without sufficient clearness, by the constitution, the diet resolved to impeach the Minister of War for an administrative offence, and was understood to intend to apply the same process to Hassenpflug himself, it was dissolved (July 26th). He now resorted to a series of delays and dodges, prohibiting the celebration of the anniversary of the grant of the constitution and (a frequent Government device in this age of German constitutional history) obstructing the entrance into the new diet of several officials opposed to him, including Jordan. The new diet having charged the permanent committee of the Estates with the task of impeaching him for violations of the constitution, this committee was in its turn dissolved (March 1833); whereupon the diet itself took up the process against the obnoxious Minister. He was acquitted by the supreme judicial tribunal (before which he was defended by Robert von Mohl), and hereupon, holding the offices of Minister of Justice and of the Interior, carried on the government amidst constant quarrels, repeated adjournments and further unsuccessful attempts at impeachment, until his withdrawal from office, and the close of his first reactionary campaign, in 1837. His most intimate associate in the ecclesiastical branch of his policy was August Vilmar, a schoolman self-made both as a theologian and as a Germanist and historian of literature, but gifted with intellectual vigour and ability, and in his way almost as well hated in Hesse-Cassel as Hassenpflug himself. In conjunction, they strove, in 1837, to frustrate the design, formed at a meeting held at Schmalkalden, and supported by the influence of the Electress (the King of Prussia's sister), for compassing the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions in the electorate[1]. This proposal had found great favour throughout Hesse, and seemed an appropriate way of commemorating the recent tercentenary

[1] As to the Union in Prussia, see *post*.

of the League of Schmalkalden; but Hassenpflug denounced the historic league itself as a revolt against the Imperial authority and a stain upon the records of the country where it was set on foot. By this and other high-handed proceedings, Hassenpflug gave so much offence to the electoral Court that he was, in the same year, deprived of the Ministry of the Interior. Refusing to retain the Ministry of Justice, he withdrew in dudgeon to Göttingen, where his brothers-in-law Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm resided as professors, and thence passed into the service of other governments, ultimately (in 1841) accepting a high judicial post at Berlin. His return to the service of the Elector of Hesse in 1849 opens a later, and yet darker, chapter of his ministerial career in his native land.

Hassenpflug's removal in 1837 had not put an end to the perennial conflict between the electoral Government and the Cassel diet, which was vigorously carried on by younger officials of his training. The controversies on matters of finance were endless, turning, more especially, on the question of the appropriation by the Elector of the income which had accrued to his line by the reversion of certain domains formerly belonging to Hesse-Rotenburg (the so-called *Rotenburger Quart*), which the Cassel Estates claimed as part of the revenues of the state. These and other long-lived controversies—including, in the years 1845–7, the treatment of the new sect calling themselves *Deutschkatholiken* (German Catholics)—led to a new series of adjournments and dissolutions, and occupied the entire extent of Frederick William's coregency. His tyranny showed itself in many ways; but it came most closely home to the great body of his subjects in the treatment of Jordan, to whom the constitution of the electorate was deeply indebted. In 1839, he was imprisoned in the castle at Marburg on a charge of high treason dating back seven years; and, though, after a time, he was allowed to live in

the town under strict watch and ward, sentence was not passed on him till 1843; whereupon, he appealed and, two years later, was acquitted by the highest judicial tribunal of the land. Shortly before the close of the coregency, however, in 1847, the Government had at last come to command a majority in the diet at Cassel, which, after it had granted supplies to the end of the year, was forthwith adjourned. On the death of William II and the accession of his son Frederick William I (November 20th, 1847), the new Elector, finding that the officers of his army held by their oath to the old constitution, regretfully came to the conclusion, after taking counsel with Metternich, that it must be left intact; but civil strife speedily broke out again and, on February 22nd, 1848, the diet was adjourned anew. The political troubles in Hesse-Cassel, which, after bridging the entire interval between 1830 and 1848, now entered into new and graver stages, had throughout testified alike to the tenacity of the Hessian race and to the ineradicable perversity of the Cassel dynasty.

The movement of 1830–1 in Hesse-Cassel could hardly fail to affect the population of the neighbouring grand-duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, though the government of this agglomeration of territories round a small old-Hessian nucleus had been established by Lewis I on a sound constitutional basis, and was carried on by capable officials, intent upon the material interests of the land. But the new Grand-duke Lewis II, had, in conjunction with his consort Wilhelmina, a Baden princess, accumulated a large burden of debt. Of this he was anxious to be, in one way or another, relieved by his diet; and his able Minister Du Thil accordingly insisted upon economy at Court. On the other hand, Du Thil showed great firmness in dealing with an attempt at insurrection to which further causes of discontent —including the pressure of the new customs system, which had been felt in Hesse-Cassel, also—had contributed; it

had ended with a rather reckless charge of troops under Prince Emil (whose military reputation dated from days when his services had been recognised by Napoleon), extravagantly described as 'the massacre of Södel.' After this, the government of the grand-duchy was carried on for several years by Du Thil with firmness, though irritation was kept up in Mainz and Rhenish Hesse, by a diversity of interests as well as of institutions. But, although Hesse-Darmstadt was in near contact with the popular gatherings and disturbances which, at this time, marked the regions of the Main and the Upper and Middle Rhine, and although measures for the repression of 'demagogy' were carried on here till so late as 1838, the Government was in general successful in gaining gradually the confidence of the diets. In 1838, Heinrich von Gagern, who had led the opposition and of whom more will be said below, gave up his seat and remained out of public life till 1846, when, though more deeply interested in German than in Hessian politics, he resumed his former position in the Chamber. About the end of 1847, partly in consequence of the famine of that year, disaffection gained ground in Hesse-Darmstadt and, in conjunction with the agitation beyond its borders, led to the outbreak which here, as in other parts of Germany, occurred early in the following year.

In the south-western states, generally, the French revolution of July 1830 inevitably made its effects felt more deeply than in the north, although it was in the latter that, as it happened, they took shape with greater rapidity. In Baden, Grand-duke Leopold had, as has been seen, succeeded to the throne as the first sovereign of the Hochberg line[1]. Acting on the advice of L. G. Winter,

[1] From this period dates the publication of a great mass of scandals and commentaries on scandals concerning Kaspar Hauser, whom an eagerly credited conjecture declared to be the eldest son of Grand-duke Charles of Baden. The Hereditary Grand-duke,

whose political ideas may be described as liberal-conservative, and for whom Berstett, Metternich's faithful ally at Carlsbad and on other occasions, had, before long, to make room, the Baden Government steered its arduous course. It strove to preserve the goodwill of Prussia, without forfeiting that of Austria, and at the same time to restrain the ardent Liberalism of a large proportion of its subjects, urged on by the French republican propaganda established at Strassburg. The Baden Second Chamber, which met in March 1831, was composed almost entirely of Liberals. The most conspicuous of these were Rotteck and K. T. Welcker, the latter of whom, by his petition for the absolute freedom of the press—a purpose indefatigably pursued by him during many years of his life—had, in 1830, widely stirred the public mind. Within the brief period during which the desired freedom obtained in Baden, their journal, *Der Freisinnige*, held high the banner of liberal progress[1]; but it was suppressed, in the year of its foundation (1832), by a decree of the Frankfort Diet, whose proceedings it had condemned. The actual leader of the Liberal party in Baden was, for many years, Adam von Itzstein, whom Metternich called 'the first practical radical,' and whose courageous denunciation of the reaction, both in and outside Baden, raised his popularity high before the critical times of 1848, when he passed over

who was born and died in 1812, was supposed to have been made away with, in order to facilitate the Hochberg succession.

[1] Before this, in 1831, Welcker had, for the first time in German public life, openly demanded a German parliament, and Winter and his colleagues had only avoided a vote in favour of the proposal by withdrawing from the Chamber. After his suspension from his Freiburg professorship, noted below, Welcker, though judicially acquitted, was not restored till 1840, soon after which he transferred himself to Heidelberg. A full biography of Welcker by K. Wild has recently been published (1913). As to Rotteck, cf. *ante*, pp. 129–30. His last work, in which Welcker also took part, was the once celebrated *Staatslexicon* (1834–49).

into the extreme, or radical, camp. Under these influences, the Baden constitution was purged of certain objectionable clauses introduced into it in 1825; and, among other Liberal measures passed, although not without difficulty, a law bestowing temporary freedom upon the press was carried in defiance of the demands recently made by the Federal Diet upon the particular states (December 21st, 1831). When, by Metternich's behest, the Federal Diet called for the revocation of this law, the Baden Government, in July 1832, declared it out of force, thus provoking a series of conflicts which led, not only to the suspension of Rotteck and Welcker, but to the temporary closing of the University of Freiburg.

The activity of the Baden Chambers was afterwards directed both to protests against the Six Articles of the Federal Diet, to be noted below, and to agrarian reforms beginning with the abolition, on Rotteck's motion, of divers feudal services imposed upon the peasantry[1]. The long-continued opposition carried on against the Government may have in some measure wearied the country, and facilitated the change in the chief control of affairs which supervened on the death of Winter, in March 1839, when Freiherr F. K. L. von Blittersdorff, who had entered the Ministry three years earlier, became its head, Nebenius taking over the department of the Interior. Blittersdorff had, since 1820, represented Baden at Frankfort, where he generally followed the policy of Metternich, but took his own line in consistently supporting both the authority and the reform of the

[1] Concurrently, protracted debates were held on the question of the entrance of Baden into the *Zollverein*, which, as has been seen, was not actually accomplished till 1835. It had, to the last, been vehemently opposed by the Liberals, with the exception of Mathy; but even he had to adopt a much colder tone in advocating the entrance into it of Baden. Cf. G. Freytag, *Karl Mathy* (1870), pp. 78–9.

Confederation. In 1831, he brought about, not only the rejection by the Federal Diet of addresses sent up in favour of the Poles, but the prohibition of any further addresses to it on political subjects. Although he maintained himself in the confidence of the Grand-duke till November 1843 (when he returned to his post at Frankfort), the antagonism between him and the Liberals steadily grew; but they did not wholly lose their influence in the Government till the withdrawal from it, to the great satisfaction of the ultramontanes, of Nebenius in 1839. In 1841, Blittersdorff entered upon a set campaign against the Government officials in the Chamber, whose presence there in Baden, as elsewhere, formed a standing Ministerial difficulty. A long-continued conflict followed, during which the Baden Chamber once more witnessed a brilliant display of fearless Liberalism by Itzstein, Welcker, F. D. Bassermann, and others; and, though Blittersdorff ultimately succeeded in reducing the number of opposition officials, he could not prevail against a party which had the constitution at its back, while he was imperfectly supported by the Grand-duke and his Ministerial colleagues[1]. After his resignation, a series of reforms were passed; but the old relations of confidence which had existed between Government and Chambers in Winter's day had been broken; and, even after the appointment of the capable Finance Minister C. F. von Boeckh, in 1844, to the presidency of the Ministry, of which Nebenius was again a member, the more rigorous system of administration, with the censorship and the close supervision of state officials, introduced by Blittersdorff, remained in force. Baden thus became more and more the chosen camping-ground of an advanced Liberalism, or radicalism, which took its cue from the clamorous malcontents of France and Switzerland, and which was, in the end, to evolve an aggressive republicanism ambitious

[1] He published some reminiscences 'from his portfolio' in 1849.

of directing the destinies of Germany at large. And the violence of the recriminations between Government and Opposition rose still higher, when to political were added religious difficulties. Karl Zittel, pastor in Bahlingen, who in 1843 had come forward with a plea for the self-government of the Church and had acquired a widespread popularity by his writings, so that he was elected into the Chamber, was in 1845 led by the German-Catholic movement to propose a motion there for the grant of religious liberty and equal religious rights to the members of all Christian sects. The demand was, of course, resisted by those Catholics who had long insisted on religious grievances of their Church, and the ultramontane party actively pressed its claims. In the same year 1845, the new Archbishop (Vicari) of Freiburg ventured to insist on the education of all children of mixed marriages as Catholics. Already in this period, the national German question, mooted some years earlier by Welcker, was frequently brought forward by Baden politicians, especially Bassermann and his friend K. Mathy; but these beginnings hardly entered into an active stage before 1847. The result of the elections of the previous year had induced Grand-duke Leopold to include in the Ministry, and then to appoint head of the department of the Interior, J. B. Bekk, whose moderate but firm conduct of affairs had a conciliatory effect; but, in the Chamber elected in the latter part of 1846 and in 1847, the constitutional Liberals were confronted by a determined radical group, whose foremost member, Friedrich Hecker, the future leader of the Baden insurrection, had sat in the Chamber since 1843. While he was eloquently dilating on socialist grievances, the Liberal leaders in October 1847 met Heinrich von Gagern and other politicians of the same way of thinking at Heppenheim. Earlier in the year, the foundation of the *Deutsche Zeitung*, published at Mannheim and edited by G. Gervinus —a weighty organ of leading patriotic opinion, but never

widely popular—had further marked the advance of the national idea[1]. At the beginning of 1848, while Hecker and a financial crisis at Carlsruhe was giving a handle to the invectives of the socialists against capitalism, the Liberals were intent upon national German affairs, and, on February 8th, the very eve of the revolution which was to find one of its centres in Baden, Bassermann proposed in the Chamber his celebrated motion in favour of the convocation of a German national parliament.

A word must suffice as to the course of events in Nassau, which was in marked contrast to the political progress of Baden. An effort made in the diet of the duchy, in 1831, to settle the long-standing dispute as to the ducal domains, was frustrated by an unconstitutional *coup*, whereby the Minister, Marschall von Biberstein, secured a majority for the Government in the Upper Chamber; and the diet of 1832, in whose Second Chamber the majority had in vain resorted to the weak expedient of secession, was, after the budget had been passed by a house of five members, sent about its business. In 1834, Marschall died, and in the following year, as has been seen, Nassau joined the *Zollverein*; but the system of internal government which he had considered appropriate to a purely agricultural and largely forest country, continued. The accession, in August 1839, of Duke Adolf told altogether in favour of the reaction; nor was it till the meeting of the diet of 1847 that Liberal tendencies once more became prominent. But those who saw deeper were aware that there was much reason for anxiety in the economic needs of the peasantry.

Neither in Bavaria nor in Württemberg was the excitement produced by the July Revolution followed by any corresponding political changes. In the lesser of the two monarchies, King William, no longer under the stimulating influence of Wangenheim, exhibited his present conservative

[1] Cf. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, pp. 237–9.

inclinations by leaving the diet unconvoked for three years. In the protests provoked by this unpopular but not unconstitutional course, Wangenheim, who had, with doubtful legality, been offered a seat in the next diet, took part; but the King was immovable. Suabian Liberalism, as we have already seen, was of a different type from that which looked for its chief model to France, though in Württemberg, too, a sympathetic reception was given to the Polish refugees on their way further west. On the other hand, when, in 1833, the diet at last assembled at Stuttgart, it entered a strong protest against the recent proceedings (of which more immediately) of the Federal Diet at Frankfort. The mover on this occasion was Paul Pfizer, the publication of whose *Briefwechsel zweier Deutschen* (*Correspondence between two Germans*), in 1831[1], had led to his withdrawal from the Württemberg public service. His proposal was supported by the member for Stuttgart, the famous poet Ludwig Uhland, who, in 1833, likewise held himself bound to resign his professorial chair at Tübingen. The King, embittered by the share taken by some of his subjects in the Frankfort escapade of this year[2], refused to give way to the opposition; and a parliamentary conflict followed in which the popular party had the worst. Yet, among the Württemberg parliaments, the *Vergebliche Landtag*—the futile diet—of 1833 merits honourable remembrance, although its historic *sobriquet* was originally prefixed to a pamphlet written on the side of the Court and the reaction. The diet was dissolved in the year of its meeting; but the

[1] This book was founded on a philosophical correspondence between Pfizer and the poet K. Notter; but the celebrated second part, which, hypothetically, both predicted and advocated the future hegemony of Prussia in Germany, was the work of Pfizer. As to the book itself and its significance, see F. Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (1908), pp. 327 sqq.

[2] See p. 270, *post*.

endeavours of the opposition continued for several years, till, in 1838, all the Liberal leaders, including Pfizer, Uhland and F. von Römer, declined to offer themselves for reelection. Hereupon, the Government had everything their own way; and, though officialism was stronger than ever and the progress of reform slow, especially in agrarian matters, while the press was subjected to a rigorous censorship, the general, and, above all, the agricultural interests of the country were diligently advanced by a competent Administration. Its leading member had, since 1832, been the Minister of the Interior, Schlayer, while the King's most confidential adviser was the President of his Privy Council, Freiherr von Maucler, who held office for a quarter of a century. In the latter part of this period, the economic condition of the country grew worse, while the burdens on the land and its produce remained unremoved, and there was a heavy military expenditure which the Chambers could not control, till at last the rise of prices in consequence of the famine of 1847 and a monetary crisis led to distress, followed by outbreaks foreboding further trouble[1].

In Bavaria, the July Revolution necessarily gave great offence, not only to King Lewis I, who, however manysided and receptive of mind, always deemed the maintenance of the monarchical principle a paramount duty, but also to the powerful clerical and reactionary party, by whose influence the Minister of the Interior, Eduard von Schenk, a man of high intellectual attainments, grew more and more disposed to be swayed[2]. In consequence of a students' tumult in

[1] For an account of Württemberg affairs up to March 1848, see an art. so entitled in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. IV (1850).

[2] Schenk (to whom as a poet King Lewis assigned a place in his Valhalla) zealously cooperated in his sovereign's great architectural undertakings. An instance of his clericalism is the permission granted by him to the Oberammergau peasants for the revival of their passion-play.

the streets of Munich, the University was closed, and the functions of the censorship were enlarged. Five officials elected for the new diet, who were Liberals, were prevented from taking their seats there; and it was even attempted to exclude one of them after he had resigned his employment. Public dissatisfaction, stimulated by the recklessness of some journals, rose so high that Schenk was transferred to a provincial appointment and a more moderate press ordinance was introduced; but the opposition was not appeased and even laid hands upon the civil-list, on which the King had magnanimously drawn for the adornment of his capital and kingdom[1]. Schenk's place was taken, in December 1831, by Prince L. von Wallerstein-Oettingen. The rights of this nobleman as head of his (mediatised) house had, in consequence of his having contracted an unequal marriage, been forfeited to his brother; but, by the King's favour, he continued to hold a position of the highest dignity at the royal Court[2]. He was, in addition, personally very popular —his Bavarian patriotism was as fervent as the King's own; but, after his accession to office, the tendencies of both monarch and Ministry remained anti-Liberal, and numerous prosecutions took place for insults to the one or the other, ending with sentences of imprisonment or the enforcement of an apology, to be delivered kneeling before the portrait of the sovereign. Demonstrations of popular discontent continued, more especially in the Bavarian Palatinate, where there was little sense of cohesion with the main body of the monarchy, and where the proximity of France had long exercised a potent counter-attraction.

[1] The sacrifices made by King Lewis's personal generosity were by no means confined to works of art. The debt left unpaid by the Hellenic Government for advances made by the Bavarian was chivalrously settled by the King out of his own pocket in 1849, after his abdication.

[2] That of *Kronobersthofmeister*.

The agitation carried on here by radical journalists such as P. J. Siebenpfeiffer and J. G. A. Wirth was defiantly revolutionary, and, in this part of Germany also, heightened by the visit of Polish fugitives. In the spring of the following year (1832), the Federal Diet intervened by prohibiting several of the most provocative popular newspapers; but its orders were incompletely carried out by the Bavarian Government. The agitation was already passing beyond ordinary bounds, and the demagogues of the south-west, and of Bavaria in particular, were already intent, in the first instance, upon the organisation of large popular gatherings, in which the voice of the multitude should have a chance of making itself unmistakably heard. This was the origin of the Hambach festival, which may be regarded as the highwater-mark of popular excitement in this period, barren on the whole of notable efforts in the cause of progress[1].

The Hambach festival of May 27th, 1832[2], under the pretext of celebrating the anniversary of the promulgation of the Bavarian constitution in 1818, was designed as a popular meeting in support of the project of a united German republic, to which, and to the principle of popular sovereignty involved in it, the constitutions of the several states were to be adapted. Under the national banner—represented by the black-red-and-gold tricolour of the *Burschenschaft*—all sorts and conditions of men, academic and artisan, were to take part in this modern Mayfield. The Bavarian Government made a feeble attempt at putting

[1] Pfizer's work has been mentioned above; Friedrich von Gagern's treatise *On the German Federal State*, which developed Pfizer's ideas logically and practically, was not published till 1834. As to the activity of conservative thought and writing in this decade, see the remarks on Prussian affairs, *post*.

[2] Hambach is in the Bavarian Palatinate, to the west of Speyer.

a stop on the assembly; but it was held, notwithstanding, and was attended by some 25,000 enthusiasts (including an infusion of Frenchmen and Poles), who, with the aid of speeches and songs, testified to their belief in the liberty and fraternity of the peoples. From the governmental point of view, no doubt, much of this talk savoured of treason; but no action was taken against those who had been present at the festival; and, for the moment, it was allowed to exercise its 'moral' effect. Divers popular gatherings on a smaller scale followed in other places in the same region.

Shortly before the Hambach festival, a serious outbreak had occurred, of which the scene, strangely enough, was at Göttingen, whose University had long been more subject to aristocratic influences than any other German seat of academic learning. Here, however, the supposed reactionary views of Count Münster, who still controlled the Hanoverian Administration, provoked the opposition of a knot of radical politicians, chiefly younger teachers of the *Georgia Augusta* and advocates, headed by a *privatdocent* in law named Rauschenplat. On January 8th, 1831, they, with the aid of a body of students, seized the Göttingen *Rathaus*, and named a Provisional Government, consisting of graduates and students, and malcontent citizens. For a week, they remained masters of the town, without knowing very well what to do with their 'revolution.' When a large body of troops arrived and took possession of the town, Rauschenplat and most of the university ringleaders had vanished; the citizens who had taken part in the rising had to pay the penalty of several years' imprisonment.

Perhaps the chief significance of the Göttingen raid had been that the sparks blown across the Rhine from the French revolution of 1830 had, as was to be expected, set fire in some quarters to academic feeling in Germany. The *Burschenschaft*, as has been seen, had never wholly died

out in the universities; and a series of *Burschentage* held, from 1826 onwards, in several of them had kept the flame burning, though they had been mainly occupied with internal contentions[1]. At the Frankfort *Burschentag* of 1831, the majority of its members declared themselves prepared to join in popular insurrectionary movements. A similar resolution was passed at Stuttgart, later in the year; and the practice now arose of forming, within the students' associations (*Verbindungen*), political clubs, which echoed the advanced political opinions uttered in the Chambers of Baden and other parliamentary states, instead of dwelling on the old patriotic ideals of Arndt and Jahn. In any case, the movement in the universities would add to the ferment provoked by the revolutionary agitation in the south-west; and the Hambach festival of the following year, as has been seen, furnished the academical element, also, with an opportunity for joining in a general demonstration of ulterior designs.

To the German Governments it seemed the culminating proof of a state of feeling, in both north and south, so alarming as to call for some sort of fresh repressive action. After much discussion with Maltzan, the Prussian envoy at Vienna, who would have preferred further Carlsbad Conferences, Metternich, after declining to adopt Marschall's suggestion of a revision by the Diet of the constitutions already in existence, resolved, in the present instance, on acting through it in another way. It would suffice, he thought, to draw tighter the Federal policy which the Carlsbad decrees themselves had initiated. This line of

[1] These turned chiefly on the difference between earlier and later principles of association, represented respectively by the *Arminen* and the *Germanen*. In the former, the spirit of a militant Christianity still sought to assert itself; in the latter, French influence was perceptible. At the *Burschentag* held at Dresden, in 1831, Jews were declared to be no longer excluded from the *Burschenschaft*.

action had been approved by Bernstorff, now near the close of his public career, and by King Frederick William III, and was, no doubt, supposed by them to imply moderation. Thus, the two Great Powers—and not Austria and her influence alone—are to be held responsible for the Diet's answer to the manifestations during the last two years of German goodwill towards French revolutionary ideas. This answer took the form of six articles, which, after being approved by the Kings of Württemberg and Bavaria, and received without demur by the other Confederate Governments, were, just a month after the celebration of the Hambach festival—on June 28th, 1832—unanimously adopted by the Diet. They prohibited all unlicensed political associations and popular meetings or festivals, and, in addition, appealed to previous laws, which had never lain dormant, besides specially adverting to the turbulence of the press as a further cause of the present corroborative enactment. The Baden Government was directed to revoke without delay its press law, as offending against the legislation of the Federal Diet; and, in the course of the next few weeks, the chief journalistic organs of Liberalism, from the Baden *Freisinnige* to the Saxon *Biene*, were suppressed, while the leading public writers of the south-west, from Rotteck to Wirth and Siebenpfeiffer, were debarred from editing any periodical during the next five years.

The Six Articles amounted to a police measure which left the constitutions existing within the Confederation in most respects untouched, but which, notwithstanding, reduced the continuance of constitutional government in Germany to a mere pretence. In promulgating the articles in his dominions, even the King of Prussia was fain to point out that public tranquillity had never been disturbed there; while the constitutional sovereigns added divers reservations and *caveats*. King Lewis of Bavaria sent forth a declaration that the Bavarian constitution was not changed by the

articles, which rather gave force to a faithful observance of it; while the Württemberg Government, in the absence of King William in Italy, asserted that the articles were not in any way intended to prejudice the constitution, and, least of all, to interfere with the Estates' rights of taxation. In Electoral Hesse, the diet, which had quite recently passed a statute designed to assure the liberty of the press, was, on a specious pretext, dissolved by Hassenpflug. In Baden, the articles were, as has been seen, resisted by the diet. But the Minister, Winter, found himself unable to do more than temper their severity in executing them. The censorship was restored, and Karl Mathy's *Zeitgeist* remained the solitary journal in the grand-duchy upholding, as best it could, the constitutional cause, till the censor left the editor nothing worth offering to his readers, and Mathy gave up the game, soon afterwards quitting the country.

The grievances of German Liberalism, on the occasion of the adoption of the Six Articles by the Confederation and their enforcement by the several Governments, made themselves heard even in the British House of Commons (August 1832). But a dispatch in which Lord Palmerston lent expression to a feeling of dissatisfaction, widely shared in France, and in which he adverted to the right of the signatory Powers to interfere in the affairs of the Germanic Confederation as warranted by the inclusion of the Federal in the Final Act of the Vienna Congress, received no attention either at Berlin or at Frankfort, and the German Governments were left to deal with their own subjects. On the other hand, the relations were drawn closer between German political exiles and the various associations of French and Swiss republicans, Polish refugees and Italian *Carbonari*, in foreign countries. These relations, besides admitting of being, at any time, turned to the obscure purposes of international conspiracy, could not but help to keep populations so perpetually harassed

as those of the German states were by the action of their Governments, in constant readiness for an outbreak, should opportunity offer. An incident of this kind was that which figures in contemporary history under the not very appropriate name of the Frankfort *Attentat* (April 1833). A band of some fifty conspirators, consisting mainly of students[1], but including, also, Rauschenplat, the hero of the Göttingen outburst and some Polish helpers, seized the guardhouse of the free city, whose entire garrison fell short of 400 men. Although the design had been known on the morning of the day on which it was carried out, the acting President of the Diet took no steps for frustrating it; and, before the guardhouse was recaptured, six soldiers and one insurgent lost their lives. A number of students were arrested, and such was the panic created by the affair, coupled with the news of a similar attempt in Switzerland, that the Diet appointed a new Central Commission for the supervision of political enquiries (June 30th). At the same time, the arrival at Frankfort of 2000 Austrian troops from Mainz gave rise to a ridiculous quarrel as to the supreme military authority in the free city, which very nearly caused the Diet to change its seat and actually brought the Western Powers on the scene as defenders of Germanic independence.

The failure of the Frankfort *Attentat*, however lame had been the ending of the measures taken for its suppression, practically put a stop to the insurrectionary movement in the south-west, though trouble was given in Hesse-Darmstadt by renewed journalistic excesses. But Metternich took advantage of the alarms aroused by this occurrence, as well as of the continued good understanding between Austria and Prussia with regard to foreign affairs, to summon a fresh Ministerial conference to Vienna for the beginning of

[1] A sort of general appeal seems to have been made to the *Burschenschaft* in the previous year.

1834. Since the abolition of the constitutions established in several states had proved impossible, his mind was still set upon rendering them as ineffective as he could, while, at the same time, doing his utmost to quench any anti-reactionary movement attempted at the universities or by the press. Most of the leading German statesmen, as representing the seventeen votes in the *Engere Rat* of the Diet, took part in the Conference, over which Metternich presided with unprecedented arrogance of conviction, while, on behalf of Prussia, Ancillon showed himself more ready than Bernstorff had on occasion proved to follow in the steps of the Austrian Chancellor. Ancillon's place was afterwards taken by Count Albrecht von Alvensleben, a member of the Prussian *Staatsrat* much in the royal confidence and a declared adherent of the Austrian line of policy. Thus, without displaying any of the self-confidence which the success of her *Zollverein* policy might be expected to have at this time inspired in her statesmen, Prussia at Vienna consistently followed the Austrian lead, as did the Governments of Oldenburg, the Mecklenburgs, Bremen and Holstein (Denmark). On the other hand, Bavaria, with Württemberg and Baden, as well as Saxony and Hanover, and several of the lesser states, came near to counterbalancing the Austrian side; and thus the protracted discussions, which were held with closed doors, led to very few results of moment. They included, however, the establishment of a permanent Federal tribunal of arbitration (*Bundesschiedsgericht*), consisting of three judges appointed by each party out of a board nominated by the *Engere Rat*, with an arbitrator-in-chief named by the Diet. To the decision of this tribunal were to be submitted all disputes as to the interpretation of the various constitutions and as to the rights of their representative bodies (Estates). The tribunal was to be summoned by the Diet, any state having the right of demanding such a summons.

Other provisions bound the Governments to prevent their Estates from discussing the validity of resolutions of the Federal Diet, and gave to it the right of arbitration (if required) between sovereigns and Estates in settling budgets which the latter should have declined to vote. But, altogether, it cannot be said that the resolutions of the Conference as to the constitutions, on which the Governments had there agreed behind the backs of both the Federal and the state diets, materially strengthened either the Confederation or the particular sovereigns in their dealings with their Estates. The resolutions as to the censorship increased its rigour and intensified its vexatiousness, enabling any state henceforth to deal with works that had already been subjected to censorship in another; and an intolerably trivial code of rules was inflicted upon the universities, designed, among other things, to impede intercommunication between them.

The resolutions passed at Vienna were, in the end, embodied in a protocol numbering not less than sixty articles; but only some of these, including that concerning the establishment of a *Bundesschiedsgericht*, were afterwards published as Federal laws. The Governments, however, undertook to observe loyally the resolutions which were kept secret, as well as those which were made public. The Bavarian Government, which had throughout led the opposition, made some difficulties at the last; but, on June 12th, 1834, the protocol received the signatures of all the members of the Conference. Thus ended what may perhaps be described as the most futile of all Metternich's achievements in the domain of purely German politics. For the *Bundesschiedsgericht*, though its institution was proclaimed, never met before the year 1848; and the bulk of the Vienna resolutions not only remained secret, but were very partially and very ineffectively carried out. The Austrian plan of scuttling the constitutions after they

had entered port had proved a palpable failure; and, at the very time when the commercial unity of Germany under Prussian leadership was coming in sight, Metternich's Federal policy had struck sail in the face of the advance of constitutional life in most of the secondary and smaller states[1].

The Federal Commission which in 1833 had taken over the pursuit of demagogues from the old Mainz Commission survived till August 1842, when, on the motion of Prussia (whose new sovereign had, two years earlier, proclaimed an amnesty for all political offences), it was adjourned *sine die*.

It seemed most convenient to notice these transactions, which belong to the general history of the Confederation, in connexion with the political development of the state which had, perhaps, the most immediate interest in them. In Bavaria itself, to which we turn again for a moment, the acceptance of the Hellenic crown by Prince Otto in 1832, the establishment, on his behalf, of a regency of Bavarian Ministers in the following year, and the visit of his royal father to Athens in 1835, created a diversion in which King and people were alike eagerly interested. But, at home, the Government was unable to emerge from the uncertain policy largely due to the conflict of tendencies and sympathies in King Lewis himself, and the undecided attitude of Prince Wallerstein towards the continuous recalcitrance of the diet. The King's genuine German patriotism rendered him adverse to any combination endangering the safety or the strength of the nation at large, such as the abortive *Trias*

[1] The mediatised Princes, who had hoped, with the help of the King of Prussia, and more especially with that of the Crown-prince, to profit by the opportunity of the Vienna Conference so as to gain the collective vote half-promised to them in the Federal Act, were referred by the Conference to the Diet, from which they had nothing to hope.

scheme; but he was, at the same time, an ardent believer in the claims of his own monarchical authority. His energies were by no means absorbed by his artistic undertakings, which transformed his capital and immortalised his reign; and he laboured at the details of government as indefatigably as Philip II himself. Unfortunately, at times the voice of reason found his ear difficult of access; and nowhere, as we have seen, had the 'demagogic' persecutions of 1834 and the following years assumed a more ruthless, and a more personal, character than under his sceptre. Although, in general, the country progressed both in its industrial activity and in its educational life, the illwill of the clerical party was not to be met either by half-measures or by moderate-minded men; and, in 1838, the King dismissed Wallerstein, and placed C. von Abel in the leading position in the Government, as Minister of the Interior, with Public Worship and Education[1]. Abel had formerly been secretary to the Hellenic regency and had afterwards become a conscientious convert to ultramontane views; and in him, though originally a Liberal in his opinions, the clericals and the King, after he had gradually come to lean more and more to their side, found a suitable instrument for their policy. The first measure of the new *régime*, trivial in character, gave rise to agitated disputes: all soldiers—Protestant as well as Catholics—were ordered to bend the knee when present at the consecration of the Elements[2]. Propagandist practices were encouraged by the removal of the restriction which had, hitherto, debarred minors from changing their religious confession. The educational system was manipulated in the same spirit;

[1] The office of a President of the Ministry was not revived in Bavaria till later.

[2] It was not till 1845 that the efforts of K. Roth, the orthodox President of the chief Protestant Consistory at Munich, succeeded in putting an end to this usage.

but it is noticeable that King Lewis, whose religious views, though he was an obedient son of his Church, were not ultramontane, consistently refused to allow Jesuit settlements in Bavaria. Yet, though he formally commanded all bishops of his kingdom to train their clergy in the spirit of Sailer, the most spiritually-minded and tolerant of prelates[1], he was unable to restrain the manifestations of a bigotry which gained the formal approval of Pope Gregory XVI, and gravely imperilled the principle of parity between the two Christian confessions of the realm, the glory of the preceding reign. The leader of the ultramontane party was Count Reisach, Bishop of Eichstedt and afterwards Archbishop of Munich; and Görres still survived to stand forth as the prophet of its triumph. The party was in close relations with the leaders in the movement for reviving the claims of Rome which marked this period in other parts of Germany, as well as in neighbouring countries (France and Belgium); it commanded the support of an important section of the old Bavarian nobility; and it had the goodwill of Metternich, who was beginning to value the support of clericalism, in view of the favour enjoyed by it at the Court of Vienna. In general, notwithstanding the efforts of King Lewis to maintain his royal authority above party, the later years were a period of reaction to such a degree that, in 1839, Abel could put forth an ordinance closing the Chamber to all practising lawyers except when specially licensed by the Crown, while the censorship was administered with uncompromising severity. As to finance, the King claimed the right of disposing of the very substantial surpluses (*Erübrigungen*) which, from year to year, with

[1] Cf. Heigel, *Ludwig von Bayern*, pp. 213 sqq. Sailer, who began his clerical life as a Jesuit novice, was afterwards accused of being under the influence of the *Illuminati*. He was, in truth, a faithful son of the Church of Rome, with mystical leanings.

the aid of considerable, and perhaps in some respects excessive, economy in military and certain other branches of expenditure, accumulated in the state budgets; yet, notwithstanding the large sums devoted by him to artistic purposes, he was personally a man of simple tastes and habits. Abel, who contrived to persuade him that political Liberalism was at the root of Protestant complaints, held himself in power even after the scandal created by a public insult offered by him to Wallerstein and followed by a duel. Yet both the Chambers persisted in discussing the religious question, and more especially the subject of conventual establishments. These increased so rapidly that, in 1837, they amounted to 85; eight years later, their number was estimated at 132. The 'Tertiaries' of the Order of St Francis and the Redemptorists, who were attached to the Order of Jesus, were particularly suspected. Early in 1846, Wallerstein obtained the unanimous acceptance by the First Chamber of his motion that no spiritual Order should be admitted into the kingdom which might disturb its religious peace. When, on the other hand, the Bishop of Augsburg moved that a vote should be taken as to whether priority should be allowed in constitutional controversies to the concordats or to the constitution, nearly all the temporal members left the Chamber. The diet was dissolved in May, without any visible change in the conduct of affairs. But the King had come to the conclusion that 'it was of no use going on with Abel[1]'; although the clerical party had not yet lost courage, when, about this time, the King, who had hitherto retained his popularity, became the cause of his own downfall. But the closing events of the Lola Montez

[1] His unpopularity had been increased by the favour shown to the military and official classes by a species of financial bounties. For a detailed account of Bavarian affairs in the successive years of Abel's administration, see the article *Baiern unter dem Ministerium Abel* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VI (1851), pp. 672, 734.

episode coincided so closely with the general outbreak of the revolutionary movement in 1848, that, at the risk of some dislocation, our account of the final part of the reign of Lewis I must be reserved for our next chapter.

From the south-west we pass to central and northern Germany. In the kingdom of Saxony, the troubles of 1830–1 cannot be said to have been originated by the July Revolution, though they were stimulated by it. The first occurrence of disturbances at both Dresden and Leipzig was connected with the celebration, in June 1830, of the tercentenary of the Augsburg Confession, which was made the occasion of demonstrations against the Catholic King and his Minister Einsiedel, who was supposed to favour the rigidly orthodox school of Lutheranism. The *Landtag* of 1830 testified abundantly to the general dissatisfaction with the political stagnation to which the principles of King and Minister had reduced a quick-witted though good-humoured people; but a renewed outbreak at Leipzig in September, which decorated itself with French colours and cries, was put down without difficulty by armed citizens (*Communalgarde*) and students. A rather graver disturbance followed at Dresden; and, as the discontent with the existing *régime* had reached even the junior members of the Privy Council, Einsiedel thought it well to tender his resignation (September 13th). On the same day Bernard von Lindenau, a leading member of the Privy Council, persuaded old King Anton to nominate as coregent his nephew Prince Frederick Augustus, whose father, Prince Maximilian, renounced his own right of succession on his son's behalf. There ensued in Saxony a decade of measured political progress, which gradually transformed the kingdom into a constitutional state. Frederick Augustus, who, on the death of his uncle in 1836, became King, was a prince of thorough trustworthiness, and simple in his ways; he was fond of scientific (botanical) research. Lindenau, who stood at the head of affairs till

1843, had commended himself to the King by congenial tastes, and by a rare unselfish highmindedness, which distinguished him to the last. His assumption of office was speedily followed by the entrance of Saxony into the *Zollverein* (1833), and, even before this date (September 4th, 1831), the constitution was promulgated, which was founded partly on a draft prepared for the Crown by Lindenau's colleague Carlowitz, and partly on another, of which he was himself the author. The new constitution met with as little approval from Metternich as it did from the radicals at home; but, while the new First Chamber provided in it was really a reduced copy of the whole diet as previously in existence, the preponderance in the Second Chamber still remained with the landed interest. Again, the Crown, though contenting itself with a civil-list, retained control over the annual budget, since the passing of it could only be refused by a two-thirds' majority in at least one of the two Chambers. In the large towns and elsewhere, symptoms of discontent still occasionally showed themselves, and a violent unpopularity long beset the King's brother, Prince John, who was a devout Catholic and a friend of the Austrian primacy in Germany, but to whose devotion to the public welfare, coupled as it was with a high sense of honour, active intelligence and fine scholarship[1], scant justice was done by the people. Yet the political advance of Saxony under Lindenau's administration was unmistakable. A new system of municipal government, the abolition of feudal services, a criminal code and a poor law were among the reforms introduced; and more especially the peasantry found a true friend in the Minister. It may be added that the clauses of the constitution subjecting both the Lutheran

[1] Nothing could be more delightful than the picture of his intimacy with the Crown-prince of Prussia (afterwards King Frederick William IV) presented in their *Correspondence*, edited by Prince John George of Saxony and H. Ermisch.

and the Catholic Church to the control of the state, while excluding from the kingdom both the Jesuits and all other ecclesiastical Orders, worked smoothly, although a constant suspicion was entertained of Prince John's reactionary designs on this head. Meanwhile, the progress of industry and trade, upon which the prosperity of Saxony had come to depend most largely, was unprecedented, notwithstanding that, at one time, the condition of the labouring classes in the *Erzgebirge* gave rise to much anxiety.

From about the year 1839 onwards, a marked divergence became perceptible between the views of Lindenau and those of the Liberal opposition; and, two or three years later, he strongly resisted some of their demands, more especially that of a liberty of the press which should extend to pamphlets and journals as well as publications of larger size, and the recognition of the right of the Second Chamber to address the Crown without the concurrence of the First. His resistance to this latter claim, which had become a kind of war-cry with the Saxon Liberals, and a general feeling of uneasiness in his position between King and people, led, in 1843, to his resignation, followed, in 1848, by his complete retirement from public life[1].

Lindenau's withdrawal from office seems to have been regarded as a victory for the reactionary party; and the policy of resistance at once gained ground under the Ministry of Könneritz, who remained at the head of affairs during the next five years. The popular suffering due to natural and economic causes, and the unreasoning illwill against Prince John, as the supposed guiding spirit of the Government and promoter of ultramontane designs upon the religion of the country, continued to spread. In 1845, a visit paid by him to Leipzig, for the purpose of reviewing the civic guard, was

[1] Lindenau died in 1854, having ordered all his literary and scientific papers to be burnt. But his life is a noble monument of antique virtue.

made the occasion of a disgraceful riot, which obliged him to quit the town. A leading part was played in this episode by Robert Blum, at that time cashier to the municipal theatre, a democratic agitator of extraordinary ability and irresistible power as a popular orator, who managed to quiet the mob after the troops had fired on it[1]. The day was not distant when he was to become one of the most powerful of German demagogues. In the meantime, he and others were assiduously and in the face of a rigid application of the censorship preparing the ground for Saxony's share in the revolution of 1848; and already in the Saxon diet which assembled in the autumn of 1845 a petition from him was presented demanding that an oath of fidelity to the constitution should be administered to the royal troops. Citizens' clubs were founded in the principal towns; and, though the distress of 1846–7 diverted public attention from the proceedings in the Chambers, it could not but add to the prevailing unrest.

If, in Saxony, the landed nobility and its scions had, even in a period of political advance, continued to keep a disproportionately large hold on both the legislation and the administration of the state, the kingdom of Hanover had, under its constitution of 1819, as it had under that of 1814, remained virtually under the rule of its nobles. But, here as elsewhere, there had been a steady growth of dissatisfaction with the system of government more or less restored with the dynasty; and Münster, in whom successive sovereigns had placed implicit trust, inevitably became the object of a concentrated unpopularity. The news of the

[1] Blum had from the first taken an eager interest in the German-Catholic movement, which had met with much favour in Saxony, and with which the Saxon Ministry had imprudently interfered by prohibiting any meetings or associations in which the Augsburg confession was called in question; and the names of Ronge and Czerski (see *post*) were wildly cheered by the Leipzig rioters.

French revolution could not fail to cause much excitement in the land of the Guelfs, which, when their rule was in abeyance, had experienced the advantages, as well as the disadvantages, of the French *régime*. In January 1831, there were disturbances at Osterode, and, as has been seen, a week of 'revolution' at Göttingen; and, although these manifestations were suppressed, it seemed no longer practicable to retain Münster at the head of the Hanoverian Government. There was, naturally, not a little jealousy of him among those resident Councillors who conducted the administrative work of the kingdom, and who found the control of the German Chancery in London and of the omnipotent Minister difficult to bear. On February 12th, 1831, he was, accordingly, relieved of his official duties by King William IV, and retired to the estate at Derneburg conferred on him by royal dotation, there to review (as he was well entitled to do with satisfaction) his past achievements, including the constitution of 1819, which he had always regarded as final. At the same time, the Duke of Cambridge, hitherto Governor-general of the kingdom, was appointed Viceroy, so that the centre of the Hanoverian Government might avowedly be its own capital. He was one of the ablest, as well as the most conscientious, of the sons of George III, and the character and temper of his rule unmistakably contributed during its continuance to smooth the course of events in Hanover.

No very salient administrative changes followed immediately on Münster's fall; but the draft of a revised constitution was prepared by Dahlmann, and discussed at length by a commission of the two Chambers. A decisive part in the final settlement was played by the learning and judgment of J. K. B. Stüve (shortly afterwards chosen Burgomaster of Osnabrück, of which he was the historian). The new constitution simplified the financial system of the state by uniting the accounts of the royal domains and

those of the public taxes—a measure afterwards, unfortunately, undone; but the control of the public expenditure was only to a very limited extent in the hands of the Estates, while their legislative functions were restricted to the initiation and the approval or disapproval of new laws, the Government reserving to itself their formulation. Of the two Chambers, the First continued to represent the nobility exclusively, and was thus in frequent conflict with the Second, in which, besides the prelates, sat representatives of the towns and of the peasantry in nearly equal numbers. For the rest, eight-ninths of the First, and five-ninths of the Second, Chamber were officials of the Crown. In a word, the new Hanoverian constitution, which was signed by King William on September 26th, 1833, was the most conservative among all the German constitutions of the period, and was coldly received by the bulk of the population, while the nobility, with Freiherr G. von Schele as their leader, turned their eyes to the chances of the future.

These chances were manifestly in favour of a reaction. The character of the heir-presumptive of the Hanoverian throne, Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, was no secret either in England or in Hanover. In his native land he was, probably, the best-hated man of his generation, a ruthless adversary of any and every reform, and willing to make an end of it, whether by open or by secret means, brutally rough in personal intercourse, and trustworthy neither in word nor in deed. He was, however, very far from being devoid of cleverness, and had that kind of indomitable obstinacy and self-assurance which, in the end, sometimes makes for popularity. He was 67 years of age when he came to the throne, and personally little known in Hanover. In a confidential letter to the Prince-regent, he had protested against the constitution of 1814, as well as against that of 1819, declining any personal communication with members of the diet. On the

other hand, he had approved of the draft of the revised constitution which care had been taken to submit to him in 1831, and certain minor changes had been introduced into it in deference to his suggestion. Then, however, he fell under Schele's influence, and, when the constitution was finally laid before him in 1833, and he was invited to take his seat in the First Chamber, he replied that he had previously protested on the ground of the assent of the *agnati* not having been formally sought, and that, being as yet insufficiently acquainted with the new constitution, he could not, for the present, hold himself bound by it. The Hanoverian Ministers replied that the sanction of the *agnati*, though desirable, was not legally necessary; and, though the Duke's intention of upsetting the constitution gradually became clear to them, left matters as they were till the death of King William in 1837, without having ever ventured to ask for a guarantee of the constitution from the Federal Diet.

The consequences of this negligence or pusillanimity were not slow in declaring themselves. On June 28th, the new King Ernest Augustus arrived in Hanover, where his first step was to adjourn the Chambers, Stüve alone venturing a word of half-protest. On July 5th, a patent, countersigned by Schele as the new Cabinet Minister, was issued, announcing the King's accession, together with a declaration that the constitution of 1831 was not binding upon him and furnished no sufficient guarantees for the lasting welfare of his subjects. The other Ministers, on being called upon for their opinion, stated that the constitution could not be changed unless by constitutional means, and then held their peace. The King, after a holiday at Carlsbad, where he was in frequent communication with Metternich, now returned to strike a series of blows at the existing political institutions of his kingdom, culminating in a second patent, formally abolishing the constitution of 1833 and restoring that of 1819. A

remission of taxation was added, by way of mitigating the shock. The King was now quite satisfied that he had 'clipped the wings of this democracy,' and that his will, seconded by the resolute activity of his Minister, would carry the day. The earliest resistance with which he met was the protest of seven professors of the University of Göttingen, drawn up by Dahlmann and signed by him and six colleagues, whose names were of so high repute as to bring home the significance of their joint act to every educated German[1]. They declared themselves bound by the constitution of 1833, and unable to take the oath of homage without adhering to this obligation. They were all ejected from their professorships by cabinet order. An outburst of popular indignation at the condemnation of the Seven Professors followed, almost as notable in its way as the popular enthusiasm aroused by the acquittal of the Seven Bishops; and the King's insulting sarcasm on the occasion, as to the kinds of folk that could always be had for money, was wrathfully stored in the remembrance of the nation. Then, encouraged by the paucity of those who followed the example of the professors, the King entered into an obstinate conflict with every corporation and every individual in his kingdom who stood by the constitution. In the end, by the unscrupulous use of every despotic device within his reach, and after obtaining, in 1839, from the Frankfort Diet a declaration that it declined to intervene in the Hanoverian constitutional difficulty, he, in the following year, induced the Chambers, elected by an intimidated majority of the constituencies, to pass a vote in favour of discussing the draft of a new constitution, which was actually promulgated on August 6th, 1840. It included all the securities for which the King had contended,

[1] The 'Göttingen Seven' were Dahlmann, Gervinus, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, the theologian Ewald, the jurist E. Albrecht and the physicist Wilhelm Weber. The first four of these were driven from the kingdom.

above all, establishing the principle that his Ministers were not responsible to the diet and separating the royal domains as sources of revenue from the proceeds of the public taxes[1]. It, also, provided that mental incapacity alone should exclude from the succession to the throne—so that the blind Crown-prince would of right follow on his father.

The ruthless pertinacity of King Ernest Augustus, the zealous services of Schele (who died in 1844), and the weariness that gradually befel the opposition, whose leader, Stüve, was excluded from the Chamber, were not the only factors in the triumph of King Ernest Augustus's will over the cause of lawful right. He must have secured Metternich's approval of his action; for the Frankfort Diet, in answer to a petition prepared by Stüve, after long deliberations stultified itself by refusing to employ its own powers in the matter (1840). But, in his anti-constitutional campaign, Ernest Augustus was, also, supported by both the King of Prussia and his son the Crown-prince; it was long before any of the exiled Göttingen professors found admittance in Prussia. Thus, though, as has been seen, the old King of Hanover sturdily held out against the entrance of his state into the *Zollverein*, and, though in general there was little love lost between the Hanoverian and the Prussian Government, he was encouraged to adhere without compromise to the policy on which he had, from the first, determined. One of his very last public utterances, made before the revolutionary current of 1848 induced even him to pause in his course, was his spoken intimation to his Estates that he had, once for all, decided never to allow publicity to the proceedings of his Chambers—with which, even though they did his will, he was perpetually at issue.

[1] This proved the reverse of a gain to the King, as the restored Treasury Board (*Schatzcollegium*) now watched with special care against any addition to the public as distinct from the royal expenditure.

Before we pass, in conclusion, to the political condition of Prussia itself in this period of alternating expectation and disappointment, some reference must be made to a member of the Confederation destined to play a fatal part in its later history. In the general agitation consequent upon the French July Revolution, the anxieties of Schleswig-Holstein to which, in 1822, the Frankfort Diet had all but turned a deaf ear[1], revived afresh, though there was as yet no thought of a rising against the Danish rule. In the autumn of 1830, Uwe Lornsen, at that time bailiff (*Landvogt*) of his native island of Sylt in the North-Frisian archipelago, an ancient home of free popular institutions, produced a brief pamphlet[2], which, while dismissing the political separation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein as unthinkable, sketched in broad outline the constitutional liberties necessary to their future. The appeal, at first, met with no response; it was frowned upon by Duke Christian August of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg—a rather arid country magnate who, albeit he took the opportunity of telling his royal kinsman some home-truths as to administration, had scant sympathy with democratic ideas, but stanchly upheld his own family rights—and by his brother, Prince Frederick of Noer; and not a single petition was sent up in favour of its demands. Gradually, however, the main purport of the pamphlet found its way to the hearts and minds of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, at no time a rapidly responsive race, and was more especially approved by the middle class, which had hitherto inclined to remain indifferent to the endeavours of the nobility on behalf of their ancient rights. Public feeling in the duchies soon rose so high that, in May 1831, the old King Frederick VI declared his intention of summoning consultative provincial Estates, on the Prussian model, in Schleswig,

[1] Cf. pp. 151–2, *ante*.

[2] *Über das Verfassungswerk in Schleswig-Holstein.*

Holstein and Lauenburg, as well as in Jutland and Zealand. In the assembly of Schleswig-Holstein notables hereupon held at Copenhagen in 1832, N. Falck (the leader of the patriotic party in the duchies since Dahlmann's departure thence in 1829) vainly insisted on the necessity of a joint diet of the two duchies. Their two separate diets assembled in 1836. They were elected on a sufficiently broad basis, and the King went out of his way to recognise the legal bonds between the two duchies, and even sanctioned the establishment of a provincial administration and a supreme judicial tribunal common to both. Before long, however, these concessions on the part of the Danish Crown aroused angry comment at Copenhagen, where a nationalist party formed itself, popularly known as the Eider-Danes, who advocated the Danisation of Schleswig, at the risk of the possible loss of Holstein to the monarchy. On the other hand, Lornsen, after his release from prison, urged the establishment of a Schleswig-Holstein state connected with Denmark only by the rule of the same sovereign; and even this personal union might before long be dissolved, in the event of the failure of the Danish dynasty in the main line, to which the succession in Schleswig-Holstein was limited. Between these extreme views, it seemed, at first, as if the compromise of simultaneous diets in Jutland, Schleswig and Holstein, which had ultimately been accepted, might endure. But, already at the 1838 meeting of the Schleswig Estates, while the demand for a joint diet of the two duchies was renewed, a march was stolen upon the Schleswig-Holsteiners by a vote, carried by a narrow majority, sanctioning the use of Danish in the Danish-speaking districts of the northern part of the duchy. This vote was the first triumph of the Eider-Danes and their determined leader at Copenhagen, Orla Lehmann, himself a Schleswiger by birth. Duke Christian August, who might on this occasion be regarded

as the leader of the conservative minority, had, in the previous year (1837), put forth a legal argument in favour of the claims of his line, in answer to the assertion of the Danish democratic party that, in the duchies too, the succession was subject to the Danish *lex regia* of 1665. The assertion was untenable, inasmuch as, while the indivisibility of the two duchies had repeatedly been acknowledged by the Danish Crown, the *lex regia* had never been proclaimed as law in either Schleswig or Holstein.

In 1839, however, Christian VIII succeeded, as of right, to the entire monarchy over which his predecessor had held sway for more than half a century. In Denmark, his accession was regarded as full of promise both for a democratic development (it was not forgotten that, in 1814, he had, as regent of Norway, sworn to a free constitution of an advanced type), and for a union of the Danish and Schleswig diets, Holstein being left outside the new constitution. The Schleswig-Holsteiners, on the contrary, remained intent upon a legislative union between the duchies, while with Denmark they desired no tie but a dynastic one, so long as this remained in force. The sense of legal right which Falck and Dahlmann had consistently striven to inculcate had, through Lornsen's devoted efforts, taken possession of all classes; and the head of the House of Augustenburg might, it was felt, be trusted to hold to his rights, which he more than once declined to abandon by voluntary resignation[1]. In 1844, he secured the services of Karl Samwer, who became one of the most indefatigable supporters of the Augustenburg claims.

King Christian VIII, at first, carefully refrained from identifying himself with the democratic Eider-Danish party, and showed himself conciliatory as to the Schleswig language

[1] The King's nearest relative in the female line was his brother-in-law, Landgrave William of Hesse, whose son, Landgrave Frederick, was also heir-presumptive of the electorate of Hesse-Cassel.

question and on other points. He expressly confirmed the ancient privileges of Schleswig-Holstein, and appointed Prince Frederick of Noer to the honorary position of Governor of the duchies. But the pressure upon the King was one which he could not long continue to resist; in 1842, the Danish army was remodelled in such a way as to abolish the independent *status* of the Schleswig-Holstein regiments, and there were other signs of the coming crisis. The Eider-Danes were in full activity, interchanging demonstrations of friendship with their Scandinavian kinsmen on the other side of the Sound, and applying their whole machinery of agitation in order to inspire the peasant population of northern Schleswig with a wish for closer union with Denmark. On the other side, the conviction now took root in the duchies, that the safety of their political future was inseparable from the establishment of the legitimate right of succession. On July 8th, Christian VIII, in an 'open letter,' announced that a documentary enquiry by a commission[1] had established it as certain that the same law of succession applied to Schleswig as to Denmark, and that, in consequence, he and his successors would consider themselves bound to maintain the union between these parts of the monarchy; as to Holstein, further enquiry would determine to which parts of that duchy the same conclusion was applicable. In the duchies, the excitement was overwhelming: Prince Frederick of Noer and a number of other high officials resigned their posts; and the Schleswig diet, all but unanimously, carried a resolution proposed by the Duke of Augustenburg in favour of a constitution common to the two duchies,

[1] The report of this commission was never published in its entirety. Its argument seems to have rested on the fact that in one division of Schleswig (the so-called 'Gottorp portion') the authority of the *lex regia* was acknowledged at the time of its union with the rest of the duchy in 1721.

and another urging the admission of Schleswig into the Germanic Confederation. As the Government maintained an unyielding attitude, the diet ended with the secession of the large majority of its members. The Duke, also, sent a protest against the open letter to the Frankfort Diet, in which he was joined by all the princes of his and the Glücksburg line, except the young Prince Christian of Glücksburg, who had recently married a daughter of the King's sister, Landgravine Charlotte of Hesse. The Diet, in reply, went so far as to reserve to itself 'the eventual assertion of its constitutional competence' to interfere. Public opinion in Germany was vehemently excited by the full revelation of the policy of the Danish Government in the open letter (of which King Christian had in vain attempted to tone down the effect) and by the imminent peril to the German nationality in Schleswig; and popular indignation was raised to a great height by the arguments and admonitions of learned and well-known voices and pens, from Dahlmann to Gervinus, and from Radowitz to the poet Geibel. Undoubtedly, the patriotic spirit was further stirred, instead of being depressed, by the coldness exhibited towards these manifestations in foreign countries. French feeling showed itself specially sympathetic with the aspirations of Denmark, the old ally of France; while, on the other side of the Channel, a vague feeling of jealousy against any increase of the power of Germany on the shores of the North Sea and the Baltic suggested a kind of journalistic comment which henceforth did all that it could (and this was not a little) to embitter the nascent struggle. Russia altogether approved of the present Danish policy, with an eye to the eventual reassertion of claims (settled so far back as 1767) of her reigning dynasty upon the Gottorp portion of Holstein. Metternich, more and more disposed, as has been seen, to abstain from intervention, especially in the case of a threatened nationality, was with difficulty persuaded by

the Prussian Government that inaction was impossible; for King Frederick William IV had become convinced of the justice of the Augustenburg claims. Thus, on September 17th, 1846, the Federal Diet produced a resolution calling upon the King of Denmark to pay due regard to the rights of the Confederation, the *agnati* and the Holstein Estates, and in the meantime urging the several German Governments to restrain the passionate expressions of a praiseworthy patriotism. The year 1847 was, in Denmark and the duchies, occupied with elections for the new diets, and with preparing for parliamentary compulsion, on the one side, and for resolute resistance on the other. It was clear that on the settlement of the succession, in the first instance, everything depended; for King Christian's son and heir, after being divorced from two princesses in succession, was unlikely to marry a third. On January 20th, 1848, Christian VIII died, and his successor Frederick VII stood face to face with the resolute Danish democracy.

Inasmuch as, in this period, the two Mecklenburg duchies, where, under mild rulers, the aristocratic Estates continued to hold their own, remained, politically as well as commercially, more or less secluded from the rest of Germany, while Oldenburg, mainly populated by peasants, attained to no kind of constitutional government, we may now conclude this summary survey by some account of the course of affairs in Prussia. The great men of the last generation, who had borne a chief part in the building-up of the new Prussia, nearly all passed away at the beginning of the period between the two revolutions—Stein and Niebuhr, Gneisenau and Clausewitz, died in 1831. Prussia, at this time, was slowly carrying on the inner reconstruction of the state which the great changes of the years 1813–5 had rendered imperative, while securely establishing the

great commercial union in which a few farseeing minds already recognised a main basis of her political hegemony over Germany.

Little or no disturbance of public order occurred in Berlin or elsewhere in the Prussian monarchy that was traceable to the example or influence of the July Revolution, though some rioting, caused by working-men's grievances and speedily suppressed, occurred in the streets of Aix-la-Chapelle in August, and in those of the capital in September. The province of Posen remained quiet. The only quarter in which the rule of the King of Prussia was at this time called into question lay in a very different direction.

After the restoration of that rule in Neufchâtel on Napoleon's fall, the principality had been admitted as an additional canton into the Swiss Confederation, and thus now owed a double allegiance. Hardenberg had arranged that the relations of the principality to the Confederation, of which it was the sole monarchical member, should be managed, without any direct intervention on the part of the King, by the Neufchâtel Council of State, consisting of officials nominated by him. The inhabitants thus came to be divided into two factions—the republicans, who aimed at complete union with Switzerland, and the royalists, who comprised the patrician families and, at first, the larger part of the general population. But the news of the French revolution of July 1830, as a matter of course, strengthened the republican party, which Swiss and Baden journals alike strove to encourage; and the King was, consequently, induced to promise the Neufchâtellois a reformed constitution, on the model of that adopted by most of the cantons. A friendly settlement seemed at hand, helped on by the presence of a conciliatory commissioner, General von Pfuel. But a riot which broke out on his quitting Neufchâtel, after being first repressed by federal troops, had in the end to be put down by him at the head of the militia, and things

once more fell back into their former condition. This went on for several years; but the violent factiousness which had been aroused on both sides, grew into a demand, on the one side, for the secession of Neufchâtel from the Swiss Confederation, and, on the other, for the transformation of the principality into a republican canton. Frederick William III, while unwilling to abandon his rights, first sought to induce what was now the royalist minority in Neufchâtel to restrain their efforts, and, in 1833, formally refused the petition of the legislative body for separation from Switzerland. A suggested compromise, by which Neufchâtel would have remained in the Confederation, though under a less stringent form of union, was abandoned; and thus here, too, a more decisive conflict was visibly preparing itself. The state of things was successfully veiled from the eyes of the new King, Frederick William IV, when, in 1842, he paid a visit to his principality, and met with a reception from his good Neuenburgers which filled his heart with joy. So early as 1846, he recognised that it was incumbent upon him to uphold the principle of cantonal sovereignty within the Swiss Confederation, and his diplomacy pressed the maintenance of it upon the Great Powers. In the principality, however, there was strong difference of opinion; and, when the *Sonderbund* war was actually at hand, and Neufchâtel was called upon to take part in the struggle, the request made by the aristocratic party, under Baron Chambrier, that the canton should be allowed to remain neutral, was inevitably rejected at Berne. But Neufchâtel was not molested; the King, for his part, sent no troops; and, when the issue of the war had been decided, no penalty was inflicted upon the canton by the Confederation beyond the payment of a moderate fine, in the form of a contribution towards its wounded and relicts fund; and the payment of this was permitted by the King. At Christmas 1847, the Prussian Governor

quitted the principality. So far as Neufchâtel was concerned, everything—including honour—had been lost, before, as will be seen, its future was settled by the revolution of 1848[1].

In the Prussian monarchy at large, there was a growing conviction, which the events of 1830 and the following years could not fail to strengthen, that the time had come for the King to redeem his promise of May 1815 by summoning a general or united diet, composed of representatives of the provincial Estates. At the same time, it was felt—and in December 1830 D. Hansemann, a Rhenish manufacturer of notable political insight, expressed the feeling in a pamphlet addressed to the King[2]—that the provincial Estates themselves had ceased to correspond in their composition to the growth of the material prosperity as well as of the intelligence of the middle classes. At the same time, well administered as the state was by the officials of the Crown, it was manifest that trade and industry could not advance and expand as they ought, at a time when the gradual extension of the *Zollverein* was opening new opportunities and facilities, so long as the existing Prussian system of finance remained unaltered. The population was not yet in a condition to bear any material increase of the taxes, while, by a law passed in 1820, no public loan could be raised in time of peace without the approval of those united Estates which had never as yet been called together in a body. Thus, money was wanting for the railways and for other large operations of pacific industry. In the meantime, the reorganisation of the system of internal administration was steadily carried on. In March 1831 was promulgated a revised municipal code (*Städteordnung*), which, on the one hand, gave increased

[1] As to the *Sonderbund* war, cf. pp. 237–8, *ante*.

[2] *Denkschrift über Preussen's Lage und Politik*. Hansemann became Minister of Finance, for a short time, in 1848.

powers to civic bodies for making local statutes, and, on the other, secured to the Government definite rights of supervision. But so incomplete was, as yet, the sense of inner coherence in the monarchy, that the code by no means met with universal approval, and the Crown declined to make its acceptance compulsory. In the whole process of the reorganisation and consolidation of the monarchy, the Prussian Government showed the same prudent self-restraint which accompanied the process of the building-up of the *Zollverein*; yet it cannot be gainsaid that the general conduct of affairs in the last decade of the reign of Frederick William III betrayed the absence of the strong guiding will essential to the maintenance of the position Prussia was entitled to claim in Germany and in Europe. As the years went on, the King became more apprehensive of the dangers inseparable from decisive action, and, even in the matter which was, perhaps, nearest to his heart, the Union of the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches in his dominions, he had, in the end, to give way, practically, to a resistance which he could not overcome.

True to one of the best traditions of his House, he had striven to bring about a union of Churches, which should be complete without being obligatory, and had, in this sense, proposed to memorise the tercentenary of the Reformation by introducing into the famous garrison church at Potsdam a liturgy which he thereupon called upon other churches in the kingdom to adopt. The movement was not set on foot without forethought; the ground had been prepared for it by the writings of Schleiermacher and other Prussian divines; it had been anticipated by a successful effort in the same direction in Nassau, and was speedily followed by others in parts of Hesse, in Baden and in certain of the smaller German principalities. In Prussia, the proposal met with widespread, though not universal, acceptance; but it was soon found that the preliminary difficulty of

providing the United Prussian Church of the future with something in the nature of a synodal constitution was insuperable, and that it was, consequently, necessary to limit the scheme of Union to the service-book (*agenda*), and more especially to the liturgy of the Communion. The King, upon whose personal (episcopal) action the main responsibility thus fell, accordingly took on himself the task of drafting an *agenda* which should obviate the objections urged against that approved by him for use at Potsdam in 1816, and, without extensive expert aid, prepared the *agenda* for the Court and cathedral church at Berlin, which he issued in 1822 and, together with an 'abbreviated liturgy,' laid before the consistories, calling upon the clergy for a definite expression of opinion concerning it. To his mortification, the new *agenda*, though largely put into use, met with much adverse criticism; and an order, issued in 1825, giving no choice except between the acceptance of the new *agenda* and the continued use in any particular parish, without alteration, of the service previously used there and now approved by the King, was received with protests by the magistrature and a number of clergy of the capital, with Schleiermacher at their head[1]. The resistance which followed was very general, and only subsided when provincial commissions were named and varying series of formularies were issued by them; it continued, however, in Silesia and Pomerania, and, here, the King allowed the application of force, with the result that some of the clergy were ejected, and some of the congregations emigrated. At last, in 1834,

[1] At a rather later date, a tempest was raised by the introduction of the new Berlin hymn-book (*Gesangbuch*), which a commission including both Schleiermacher and Neander drew up, but which (with the connivance of the Crown-prince) was successfully withstood. It was regarded as unsatisfactory even by so advanced a theologian as Bunsen, who compiled a rival collection as 'a book of public and private devotion.'

he so far yielded to the logic of facts as to issue a cabinet order insisting on the general use of his *agenda*, but expressly declaring that the Union signified no relinquishment of particular confessions or creeds, that it was not compulsory, and that the acceptance of the new *agenda* did not involve the acceptance of the Union. In the simpler words of Ranke, the Union of the confessions, which, in 1817, it had been sought to bring about, had dwindled into one of worship only; and a work which, if accomplished by consent, would have deserved to be reckoned among the noblest achievements of the House of Hohenzollern, was left half-done. And even this result had not been reached without a resort to religious compulsion quite foreign to the historic spirit of Brandenburg-Prussian rule[1]. But, so long as King Frederick William III lived, no change was permitted in the general religious policy of the state[2].

By the side of these ill-devised efforts to secure the benefits of religious union to its Protestant subjects, the Prussian Government had, in these years, to carry on its first open conflict with the Papacy and its claims. Elsewhere, it has been noticed how persistent, and to what degree successful, these claims had been in Bavaria, and other parts of Germany. In Prussia, the relations between the state and

[1] The emigration of about a thousand poor Silesian Old-Lutherans, part of whom made their appearance at Berlin, was a doleful experience for the friends of toleration; nor was it an edifying coincidence that about this time (1837) a body of Lutheran families ejected from the Zillerthal in Tyrol on account of their religion and the calumnies which it had provoked were, by the generosity of Frederick William III, settled in the 'new Zillerthal' on the slopes of the Giant Mountains in Silesia.

[2] For a fuller account of these transactions, and their antecedents and consequences, cf. the articles on *Kirchenagenda*, by G. Rietschel, and on *Kirchliche Union*, by A. Hauck, in vols. v and xx (1901 and 1908) of Hauck's edition of Herzog's *Realencyklopädie für prot. Theologie und Kirche*.

the Church of Rome were, in 1821, regulated by a bull of Pope Pius VII, sanctioned by King Frederick William III with a reservation of his own rights and those of his Protestant subjects—not a concordat, but a settlement which, on both sides, was accepted as one of peace. But in Gregory XVI (1831–46) the advanced, or zealous and anti-Liberal, party, in which the Order of Jesus was the moving element, had a pontiff of determination and courage; and Cardinal Lambruschini, who was Secretary of State during the greater part of this pontificate, was himself a leading member of this party. It could hardly be expected to look with complacency on the paritative rule in Prussia, in the Catholic Rhinelands more especially, or listen with indifference to the reiterated complaints of the Polish clergy in Posen. Already before the election of Pope Gregory, protracted negotiations had been carried on at Rome concerning the perennial question of marriages between Catholics and Protestants, and the education of children springing from them. The Prussian negotiator had been Bunsen, who, so early as 1824, had taken Niebuhr's place at the head of the Prussian legation at Rome, where he held a position as unique in its way as had been that of his great friend and patron. Bunsen was a man of unusual learning, especially in the history of religion and in adjacent fields of research, and of still more uncommon activity of mind. But what, more than anything else, marked him out among the statesmen and diplomatists of this age, and, from the time of their first intimate intercourse, in Italy onwards, endeared him to the Crown-prince, afterwards King Frederick William IV (with whom he had many, but by no means all, ideas and predilections in common), was an aspiring enthusiasm which pervaded his conception and treatment of affairs whether of Church or of state, and which is very meanly judged by those who deride it as a kind of self-delusive vanity. In 1830, the negotiations in

question seemed to Bunsen[1] to have been brought to a satisfactory issue by a brief of Pope Pius VIII, dated March 25th, which permitted mixed marriages on certain conditions, falling short of their complete recognition by the Church of Rome. This solution was, however, regarded as inadmissible by Altenstein at Berlin; and, though the Archbishop of Cologne (Count Spiegel), after consultation with the bishops of his province, suggested a secret understanding which would meet the scruples of the Prussian Crown, the royal acceptance was not accorded, and the hopes of Bunsen, on his return to Rome, remained unfulfilled. The tension, therefore, continued; and, when, in 1835, Archbishop Spiegel suddenly died, much depended on the choice of his successor. The Prussian Government, under whatever influences, surprised Lambruschini himself by going out of its way to name Freiherr Droste zu Vischering, formerly Vicar-general of Münster, and notorious by reason of his controversy with the moderate school of Catholic theologians who followed the teaching of Hermes, as well as of his opposition to mixed marriages. Before consecration, he had sent forth a conciliatory pronouncement; but, after he was seated on the archiepiscopal throne, open war was declared. A beginning was made by the issue of a papal brief condemning the views of the Hermesians, and by the proscription of a number of theological teachers at Bonn, whom the Archbishop deemed guilty of holding opinions which Hermes, in his lifetime, had taught unreproved, and which seem to have been shared by a large proportion of the Rhenish clergy. Then, he prohibited in his province any mixed marriage

[1] See *Extract from Retrospective Notes, written by Bunsen in* 1840, in *Memoir* by his Widow, vol. 1 (1868), pp. 402 sqq. For the early relations between Frederick William as Crown-prince and as King, more especially with regard to ecclesiastical matters, see the first four sections of Ranke's *Aus dem Briefwechsel F. W.'s IV mit B.* (1873).

unaccompanied by a promise on both sides of bringing up the children issuing from it as Catholics. A succession of conflicts now followed, turning on remonstrances and counter-remonstrances as to the instructions sent by the Rhenish bishops to their vicars-general, on the general relations of the Archbishop to the authority of the state, and on communications entered into by him with Belgian ultramontane prelates. In the end, the Archbishop, having taken up an attitude of unyielding resistance to the temporal authority, was arrested and, provisionally, removed to the fortress of Minden (November 1837), where, as he refused to promise not to return to Cologne, he was detained for more than a year[1]. On the public, the whole affair made an impression which was favourable to Rome, less for her own sake than because the Crown's action was resented as despotic. Archbishop Droste-Vischering was afterwards permitted to reside on a family estate in Westphalia; but, as will be seen, he was not allowed, even after the accession of Frederick William IV, to return to Cologne, though granted leave to reside at Münster, where he died in 1845. Meanwhile, at Treves, the chapter had, in 1839, chosen one of the canons, Arnoldi, to fill the vacant see; but the Crown had not approved his election.

The ultramontane movement was not slow in spreading from the west to the east of the monarchy, where the ground was really more propitious to its reception. The Archbishop of Posen, Martin von Dunin, in January 1838 issued a pastoral letter prohibiting mixed marriages unaccompanied by a promise of Catholic education for the children, and, on refusing to withdraw his letter, was sentenced by the Posen tribunal to six months' imprisonment in a fortress, the

[1] This strong measure was not, as has been supposed, taken by Bunsen's advice, though it was upheld by him as in accordance with the principle of the connexion between Church and state, which it was the obvious desire of the Curia to overthrow.

bishops of Ermeland and Culm deeming it incumbent on them to follow his example. (He was restored on the accession of Frederick William IV, and not long afterwards issued another pastoral letter deciding the treatment of mixed marriages for his province in practically the same sense as that in which it had been settled on the Rhine.) Confronted by so determined and all but general[1] an attitude of resistance, the Prussian Government, aware of the intention of the Curia to isolate it as much as possible in the struggle, sought to obtain the cooperation of other German Protestant states, but in vain. The literary campaign, on the other side, was mainly carried on from Munich, through the newly-founded *Historisch-politische Blätter für das Katholische Deutschland*, to which Görres (whose *Athanasius* in 1837 sounded a furious blast against the sacrilegious state) was a contributor, and of which his son was one of the editors. In 1838, the Prussian Government sought to allay Catholic feeling by giving away its whole contention in the matter of mixed marriages. A cabinet order, though maintaining the inhibition to the clergy against making a formal demand of Catholic education for children from such marriages, left the decision of doubtful cases in the hands of the bishops, thus committing the real decision to them. Yet, since at that time Archbishop Droste-Vischering was still kept in prison, the Pope declined to receive Bunsen on his return from Berlin (where he had just prevailed upon the King to relieve Catholic soldiers from the obligation of attending Protestant services) and, in April 1838, he quitted Rome 'on leave of absence.' The episode was now closed.

The Ministerial changes of the last decade of Frederick

[1] The Prince-bishop of Breslau, Count Sedlnitzky, a highly-cultivated and gentleminded prelate, declined to resist the authority of the state. He was, in consequence, called upon by the Pope to resign his province, and was, in the end, allowed to do so by Frederick William IV.

William III's reign, in general, indicated no material alteration in the character of his policy at home or abroad. In 1832, Bernstorff, whom it had been sought to retain in office by appointing Werther (hitherto Prussian envoy at Paris) second Minister for Foreign Affairs, was obliged by persistent illhealth to resign, and the state was thus deprived of the aid of his wise and temperate judgment, of which, though Bernstorff certainly was out of sympathy with Liberal ideas, the value has perhaps been underrated by some historians. Inasmuch as Eichhorn, in his turn, cherished no friendly feeling towards the other two Eastern Powers, Bernstorff's place was taken by Ancillon. He was, as has been seen, a man of versatile ability, but without enough strength of character to hold his own against pressure, and, therefore, more ready to follow the lead of Metternich, especially in Federal affairs, than his predecessor had, at times, proved to be. Maassen, the eminent Finance Minister, died in 1834; Ancillon in 1837; in the same year Duke Charles of Mecklenburg, who had presided in the *Staatsrat* and had long been regarded as the leader and mouthpiece of the extreme reactionary faction, passed away, together with Witzleben, one of the most highminded of the King's intimates, whom he had named Minister of War in 1834, but whom broken health had three years later obliged to retire from office. Much had been hoped from his ability as head of the military administration; but he had only had time to take part in a change of very doubtful wisdom affecting the condition of the army. Though the public finances were in a sound condition, there were strong objections with which even Boyen, called into council, agreed, to the reduction of the period of army service from three to two years—a measure which, with certain modifications, began to be carried out in 1833. Wilhelm von Humboldt's return to the *Staatsrat*, after the July Revolution, though, probably, intended to gratify Liberal opinion, had

no political significance; he died in 1835. Beyme and Altenstein passed away in 1838 and 1840 respectively. Among the Ministers newly appointed in this period none attained to great reputation, and nearly all were conservatives of one shade or another—even Count Alvensleben, who, to the general surprise, was, in 1834, made Minister of Finance, instead of L. S. B. Kühne, whose services had been of signal value in the *Zollverein* negotiations. After him, Flottwell and Count Arnim-Boytzenburg, in turn, held this office, but neither with much success. In the department of law and justice, Kamptz, the fierce foe of demagogy, who had lately stood at the head of the Rhenish administration of justice, was, in December 1838, constrained to withdraw from this side of his public activity.

Meanwhile, the new generation of conservatives, who were looking forward to the opportunities of a new reign, and back to ideas and institutions of which they hoped it might witness the revival in a moderated but not less enduring form, was conspicuously active[1]. The contributors to the *Politische Wochenblatt*, founded at Berlin in 1831, followed and developed the principles of a political philosophy diametrically opposed to that of the *contrat social* and treating the state as a natural growth arising out of historic conditions of society, of which the Swiss K. L. von Haller was both originator and prophet[2]. This inspiration was at once romantic and ultramontane; though most of these writers, like Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach (of whom more below),

[1] An elaborate and interesting eulogy of the Prussian Government from 1815 onwards, as having consistently carried out the principle that wise statesmanship 'will be careful that all new rights shall, as it were, spring from old establishments,' will be found in *A Vindication of the English Constitution* by 'Disraeli the Younger' (1835).

[2] The title of his *magnum opus*, translated into several languages, indicates its purpose: 'Restoration of Political Science or Theory of the natural-social as opposed to the chimaera of the artificial condition.' (The first volume appeared in 1816, the last in 1825.)

were orthodox Protestants, while Joseph von Radowitz, the 'soul of the early volumes of the journal' and the 'hotspur of the band of anti-constitutionalists' who united under its banner[1], may be described as a Liberal Catholic, their ideal was the independence of the Church in its relations to the state. To the historic point of view of these writers a notable contrast was offered by the philosophical criticism of public law in the writings of E. G. Gans, the principal contributor to the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (established in 1828) and the editor of Hegel. The death of Hegel himself in 1831—a year before that of Goethe—had made less of a gap in the intellectual world of Germany than it would have caused half a generation earlier. He was out of sympathy with the July Revolution and the political movements connected with it, as interfering with a completed outline of historical development. Schelling, Hegel's chief rival or (judged from a different point of view) his philosophical contrast or complement, did not actually take up his residence at Berlin till ten years after Hegel's death; and, in Prussia more especially, the Hegelian philosophy had long continued to be regarded as a system of acknowledged authority, which it only remained for his successors to perfect in details. But many of the younger Hegelians, while adhering to their master's method, chose to put their own interpretations upon his conclusions, and came to be reckoned among the least scrupulous of unhistoric radicals. Schleiermacher, the spiritual force of whose theological teaching gave to it a force unparalleled in this later age, to whom the heart of the nation went out in his recognition of religious life as a necessity for man, and whose writings may be said to summarise the creed of the United Evangelical

[1] Its motto was taken from de Maistre: '*Nous ne voulons pas la contre-révolution, mais le contraire de la révolution.*' As to the political and religious standpoint of Radowitz at this stage of his career, see Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 sqq.

Church, died in 1834. In the following year appeared the boldest attempt yet made by a German theologian to cast aside all efforts at harmonising faith and evidence on *a priori* principles, and to apply the critical method fearlessly to the scriptural foundations of Christianity. D. F. Strauss's *Life of Jesus* was condemned or half-ignored even by some of the older rationalists[1]; but it had the effect, not only of leading to further enquiry on similar lines, but, in consequence, also to an increase of rigour in the orthodox camp and to closer relations between it and the conservative party.

The historic method proper of treating politics was in this period represented by the *Historisch-politische Zeitschrift*, begun in 1832 and edited by Leopold von Ranke, the founder of a school of historical research which was to command the future of his science; but the political influence of this journal was insufficient to keep it alive for more than four or five years, though in the next reign its eminent conductor was repeatedly consulted on political problems.

In the world of politics proper, there was, in the period now under survey, little instructive or productive Liberalism to be found in the Prussian capital; though there was here enough and to spare of Liberal protest and malcontent comment among *frondeurs* such as Varnhagen von Ense, a diplomat out of office but not exactly a fish out of water, whose diaries, of this period more especially, are an endless rehearsal of tantalising complaints. Russia was the chief object of Liberal abuse; and, as already noted, a constant stimulus was, after 1831, supplied to this antipathy by the Polish refugees and their friends, to which, in East Prussia, was added the irritating effect of Russian frontier policy[2].

[1] See, as to the relations between Strauss and Baur, two interesting articles in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, June and July 1915.

[2] The frontier was closed in seasons of cholera, and the prohibitive commercial policy persistently pursued by Russia for a time, stopped all lawful trade with the eastern provinces of the Prussian monarchy.

On the whole, public opinion remained unstirred by violent manifestations in the last decade of the old King's reign. In the years following on 1830, the police, largely owing to the unhappy zeal of Kamptz, continued its periodic raids on 'demagogy,' which, so far as Prussia was concerned, resulted, in 1836, in not less than 204 students being sentenced to various penalties (that of death was in no instance carried out). And, as the years went on, signs of unrest began to show themselves among working-men, whose conditions of labour and life could not be quickly accommodated to the economic changes brought about by the progress of trade and industry which marked the success of the *Zollverein* policy of Prussia. The increase of comfort and luxury in the commercial classes was inevitably followed by an influx from the country into the towns; and, while the number of great capitalists increased in Prussia as in other parts of Germany, the working-men were as yet unorganised in their dealings with their masters. There was, accordingly, among the working-classes in both town and country, much suffering, and discontent; and the troubles due to demagogy, and still more to the measures taken for its repression under Frederick William III had hardly come to an end, when a more serious danger to social order arose in the condition of the working-classes, more especially in Silesia. Emigration was not a remedy of which most of the Prussian provinces were in a position to avail themselves so readily as certain other parts of Germany—Suabia and other parts of the south-west in particular—from the whole of which, in the years 1830 to 1840, not less than 182,000 emigrants found their way to the United States.

For the rest, as is frequently the case in periods of comparative political stillness, the desires and the animosities of the educated part of the community found their chief vent, more especially in such a centre of intellectual life as Berlin, in the literary controversies—or squabbles—

of the age. The death of Goethe (March 22nd, 1832) had raised the new literature of radicalism, which had first announced itself in the writings of Heine and Börne, to a position of commanding supremacy. Both these writers, whose names it became usual to couple together as if they had been literary equals, resembled each other in their deliberate exaltation of French, at the cost of German, ways of thought and feeling. Theirs were, in the popular fancy, the most conspicuous figures among the real or pretended exiles or refugees at Paris, of whom a number called themselves by the yet more imposing title of *Die Geächteten*[1]—the outlaws—the name of the journal edited as their organ by Jacob Venedey, whose criticism raked the whole arena of western politics and society, descending with the bitterest hostility upon the affairs of Prussia. Some of these men were, no doubt, nothing more than clamorous talkers; but others were conspiring with their friends in Switzerland and Germany, or with homeless Poles, with a view to the next outbreak of the revolution. Among its prophetic promoters, German university students were, of course, to be found[2]. At a rather later date, a strong communistic element manifested itself among Germans living in Switzerland or in Paris, where radicalism in the person of Arnold Ruge was drawn into its current, and even Heine was induced to contribute, for a time, to the international organ *Vorwärts*. But, at home in Germany, public attention was only gradually drawn to this new development, and to the system of secret societies, which,

[1] That Heine had no right to either title is now established with certainty. See Appendix xxxi to vol. v of Treitschke's *History* (*Das Märchen vom Flüchtling Heine*).

[2] One of these was Theodor Schuster, who fled from Göttingen after the outbreak there in 1831, and in 1834 was a member, of a very dubious sort, of the League of Outlaws. See as to him a paper by A. Stern, *ap.* H. Haupt, *op. cit.*, vol. III.

in conjunction with associations of working-men, furthered the spread of communistic ideas. In the times of which we are now treating, the literary world was under influences of a less combative though remarkably stimulative type, such as those which reigned in the most celebrated Berlin *salon* of this age, that of Varnhagen's wife, Rahel, a woman of greater intellectual power, though perhaps less piquant originality, than her contemporary Bettina von Arnim, with whom it is her fate to be brought into unceasing comparison, and a critic of all things under the sun. The new cosmopolitan, sceptical, realistic school of writers, mainly prosaists, who were saluted by their generation and themselves as 'Young Germany' can hardly be said to have mastered the nation as a whole; but their productions exercised a disquieting, unsettling effect upon the public, and were by the authorities regarded, like everything else that was not according to rule, as tarred with the 'demagogic' brush; so that, at the instigation of the Diet in 1834, all the Governments undertook to endeavour to prevent their spread. A controversy followed, in which Heine and Börne were of course to the front, and in which they were held to have crushed the truculent conservative Wolfgang Menzel, who, after having assaulted Goethe and Hegel, had now fallen foul of Gutzkow and the other Young Germans. These writers were, perhaps, at their best when they transferred their attention to the stage, which in Germany, as in France, had at this time come to be a concern of very general interest.

It was in the midst of these manifold currents and counter-currents that, on June 7th, 1840, the reign of Frederick William III—a reign marked by severe trials and arduous labours—came to a close. Prussia, and with her Germany, for whose future everything depended on the course of policy and action which would be taken by the chief German state under its incoming ruler, saw themselves

face to face with the opening of a new era. Frederick William III, whose intellectual grasp had never been great, but who had drawn strength from his plain devotion to duty and honest directness of purpose, had never lost control over the government of his state; but he had, more and more, lost the faculty of contributing to shape the future of his monarchy and, with it, that of the German nation. Two years before his death, he had drafted the heads of a last will, of which his death had prevented the execution. The concept insisted upon the maintenance of the religious Union, which had, perhaps, been the work of his life nearest to his heart; and it expressed his determination to leave the absolute sovereign authority which he had inherited from his ancestors undiminished in the hands of his son. That son needed no paternal admonition to ensure his care for the religious life of his people, in which he, too, after his fashion, cherished a supreme interest, or to keep alive in him a consciousness of his divinely-bestowed sovereign right. But, while his brilliant intellectual gifts and his wide knowledge of men and things had rendered him far more alive than his simpleminded father had ever been to the significance of the deepest problems, whether religious or political, of the age, he was, except in moments of sudden insight and afterwards in the long days of despondency, blind to his own inborn incompetence in action.

King Frederick William IV was born on October 15th, 1795, as the eldest son of his father and of his mother, afterwards adored by the nation as Queen Louisa. He was, together with his brother William, with whom, notwithstanding the differences of character between them, he was on terms of mutual affection and trust, carefully, but perhaps not very skilfully, educated by Dr Friedrich Delbrück up to a comparatively late age (in consequence of the vicissitudes, at that time, of the royal family), and was then transferred to the charge of Ancillon, at that time pastor

of the French church at Berlin—a writer on philosophical and historical subjects of some contemporary reputation. It was Ancillon's cleverly sententious teaching, rather than the training of his military governors, which moulded the Prince's eager and vivacious mind. He took some part in the campaigns of 1813 and 1815, and approved of the edict of May 1815, which promised Prussia a constitution, though he likewise approved of his father's postponement of the execution of his promise. His marriage with the Bavarian Princess Elizabeth remained childless, but was a source of happiness to him from first to last; some years afterwards (as had no doubt been all along intended), she became a Protestant. Her general influence upon him was kindly and at times restraining; it could hardly fail to strengthen his love of art and antiquity, which was always part of his nature and which was further developed by what in those days formed an epoch in many cultivated lives—a sojourn in Italy. These studies interested him on their own account, but more especially in their connexion with national and, above all, with religious history; the restoration of the Marienburg, the home of the German Knights, and still more the completion of the cathedral at Cologne, were to be among the great achievements of his reign. Unlike his brother William, he was not a soldier in his tastes or habits, though, from a sense of duty, he took a notable interest in military manœuvres. In general, he was easy of approach, as he disliked superfluous formalities and possessed a ready and sympathetic imagination. He was always full of plans and schemes; but his political influence had hitherto been small, though, on occasion, it had been placed at the service of friends or causes which he had at heart. The constitutional movement, insofar as it was derived from the ideas of the first French Revolution, was on the whole repellent to him; on the other hand, he admired English institutions, from the Church to the

House of Lords, as having their roots in the national history.

The first acts of the new reign were all in the direction of grace. On October 10th, 1840, the King signed an ordinance which secured an amnesty to all political offenders and promised pardon to all fugitives who should return to the country. Arndt was restored to his professorial chair at Bonn (where he was speedily elected Rector of the University); Jahn was relieved of police supervision and decorated with the iron cross. The brothers Grimm were named members of the Prussian Academy. The religious disputes still open at the time of the King's accession were, as will be seen immediately, brought, as speedily as possible, to a peaceable close. The danger of war with France being steadily faced in conjunction with the other Great Powers, it was with high hopes, as well as with sentiments of mutual trust, that the new King and his subjects made ready for the great ceremonials attendant on the formal opening of the new reign.

In the draft of his will mentioned above, Frederick William III had prescribed that, in case of a new loan being required, a United Diet should be summoned, composed of 32 members of provincial diets and the same number of members of the *Staatsrat*; furthermore, no change should be made in the existing constitution which should not have received the assent of a gathering of notables. Although there was no immediate need of a new loan, Frederick William IV[1] resolved to summon this united diet of 64 members without delay, and to inform the provincial Estates, assembled at their several centres for the act of homage, of his intention to remit certain taxes by way of a free gift to his

[1] The account of the constitutional history of the first seven years of Frederick William IV's reign given here rests on a comparison of that of Treitschke's narrative with Ranke's admirable summary in vol. VII of *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, art. *Friedrich Wilhelm IV*.

people. In the *Staatsrat*, however, Boyen's was the only voice in favour of the royal design; and, after an interview between the King and Metternich at Pillnitz in August 1840, it was dropped. But, during the King's visit to Königsberg, whither he repaired at the end of the month to receive the homage of the Estates of the provinces of Prussia and Posen, the former directly asked for the convocation of a United or general *Reichstag* of the monarchy, and were in reply informed that the King had no intention beyond that of cherishing and developing his father's design of granting a constitution based on the system of provincial Estates. Thus, though at the subsequent act of homage at Berlin (October 15th) the King's speech, calling upon his lieges to affirm their willingness to be faithful and helpful to him, evoked an enthusiastic 'aye' from the assembled multitude, the first great opportunity had been lost, and the new reign had brought its first great disappointment. Schön, who at Königsberg had, at first, thought the King more Liberal than himself, now sent him an outspoken pamphlet[1] intended to open his eyes to the situation—but in vain.

Frederick William IV, as will be seen, in this matter knew his own mind, and this was well; but it was not so well that he was determined to go his own way. Before we speak of his attempt to deal with the constitutional question which, as both he and his subjects were aware, must be the main problem of the opening years of his reign, till the Revolution took it out of his hands, it may be convenient to recall his personal surroundings in this period of transition, and to note how far they were, in a general way, amenable to the influence of his lofty ideals.

There were few Ministerial changes consequent on the old King's death—though it was still a secret to all but the intimates of Frederick William IV how little final

[1] *Woher und Wohin* (1840), which ultimately brought about its author's downfall.

reliance he was wont to place upon the mere agents and instruments of the policy elaborated by his own mind, under the inspiration, as he believed, of the Power that makes kings. Early in 1841, Boyen, whose recall into the *Staatsrat* had been regarded as a concession to Liberalism, was replaced at the head of the department of War, and he remained for some years the only popular member of the Ministry, of which he formed part till 1847[1]. But, though unchanged himself, he found it not easy to accommodate himself to the fashions of the new sovereign, who interfered a good deal, in his clever way, in the administration of the various departments. In that of Justice, where Frederick William IV had good reason for wishing to bring about a reform of the existing penal procedure, Kamptz was, much against his will, relieved of the task left to him of codifying the common law of the land, and his place was taken by Savigny, with whose conception of law—elaborated by him with masterly ability—the King and those who shared his ideas on this head were in complete sympathy. Alvensleben's place as Minister of Finance was taken by Bodelschwingh, though the former was persuaded to remain in the Ministry. Among the late King's Ministers, his personal relations had been closest with Wittgenstein, the Minister of the Royal Household, in which office (after they had for a time been associated as colleagues) he was succeeded by Count Anton zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, a general

[1] Although Boyen was, in many respects, not favourable to the royal policy in matters of both Church and state, the army benefited by his administration. A very important reform introduced by him, though he was not to live to see its effects, was the arming of the whole of the infantry with the new breech-loading rifle. The reorganisation of the army was not accomplished during his tenure of office, and, while he did everything in his power to keep up the *Landwehr*, the two years of service in the line were, as the Prince of Prussia and others became convinced, too short a period to ensure the requisite efficiency.

in the army and (a combination not unfrequent at this time) a pietist. The Ministry of Public Worship was, after much deliberation, by an ill-fated choice given to Eichhorn, one of the ablest servants of the state, to whose exertions the successful extension of the *Zollverein* had been primarily due, but whose gifts did not lie in the direction in which they were now applied. Eichhorn's name came to be identified with some of the most unpopular aspects of the earlier part of Frederick William IV's reign. Though the King's intimates, Bunsen and Radowitz, had no sympathy with the obnoxious Minister, Frederick William clung to him with the utmost fidelity, declaring 'the preservation of him to be self-preservation.' The changes in the Home and Foreign Offices (1842) are noticed below. The presidency of the *Staatsrat* was, as a matter of course, conferred upon the sovereign's eldest brother, who was, at the same time, created Prince of Prussia.

Intellectual ability and spiritual enthusiasm were the best of passports to Frederick William IV's personal friendship, and already as Crown-prince he had found men possessed of these gifts with whose political and religious principles his own were so fundamentally in agreement that one of them could afterwards speak of him as formerly the head of their 'party[1].' Many of them belonged to a society or club which was accustomed to meet in the house of Count Karl von Voss in the Wilhelmstrasse at Berlin. Among them were the brothers Gerlach, especially the elder two, Leopold and Ludwig (the youngest, Otto, was a divine), avowed disciples of the Haller school and born representatives of a patriotic and unflinching conservatism. Ludwig, the second, has already been mentioned as the intellectual leader of his party; he was a high legal official of great learning, uncompromisingly loyal to the principles of a Christian state, an orthodox Church, and the dual supremacy

[1] *Denkwürdigkeiten Leopolds von Gerlach*, vol. I, p. 90.

of Austria and Prussia in the Germanic Confederation. Leopold, the eldest of these three brothers, after having long been personal aide-de-camp to Prince William, afterwards Prince of Prussia, attained to a very close intimacy with the King, and a unique influence at Court. With both brothers, the religious ideal was paramount in their conception of the state[1]. Their orthodox standpoint, which was not precisely that of the King, was again not quite in harmony with the pietism of another general, L. G. von Thile, who in former days, when in close relations with Frederick William III, had warmly supported the military ideas of Scharnhorst. His influence upon the new sovereign was anti-Liberal, but he was a fatalist, and in 1848 his political views altered. Another pietist, whose ideas dated from the days of the War of Liberation—a gentle and devout Christian as well as a brave officer—was General Count von der Gröben; and a third was Freiherr Senfft von Pilsach, who, through his and Ludwig von Gerlach's brother-in-law, Adolf von Thadden-Trieglaff, kept up a close connexion with a devoutly religious and resolutely conservative section of the Pomeranian nobility. Another member of the Wilhelmstrasse Club was General Freiherr zu Canitz und Dallwitz, who at a later date (1845) succeeded H. von Bülow as Minister of Foreign Affairs and who performed the duties of this office with both activity and insight till the fatal March 1848. He was a high-churchman, but a man of independent mind, distinguished as a military writer, and intimate with Savigny and Clemens Brentano.

Yet another military—and afterwards political—counsellor of a different type, whose stimulating intellectual

[1] Both Ludwig and Leopold von Gerlach have left memoirs (published 1903 and 1891–2 respectively). Those of the latter, who in 1850 became Adjutant-general of the King, are invaluable for the inner history of the reign of Frederick William IV, and are written with great *verve* and power of observation.

ability and originality of thought commended him to a closer intimacy with the King than perhaps any other of his advisers, was Joseph von Radowitz[1]—a name notable, as has been well said, if only for the fact that its owner strove to bring about most of what was afterwards achieved by Bismarck, and, in addition, the religious reunion of Germany. Radowitz had convinced himself by historical rather than theological study of the divine office of the Church to which he belonged, but, holding the belief that 'every truth is Catholic,' was ready to recognise its operations even in other communions. Politically, he held the views of a constitutional Liberal, but, as we should say, on wholly independent lines; and it was, primarily, in the interests of the national future of Germany that he placed his services at the King's disposal. The ascendancy which, more especially in German affairs (for in the Prussian constitutional question he supported the King's design), Radowitz gained over the royal mind surpassed even that of Bunsen, who, though himself fertile in ideas, was rather a sympathetic recipient and trusted executant of the King's conceptions than an adviser able, on occasion, to point the way to action. (At the time of Frederick William IV's accession, moreover, he was under a momentary cloud[2].) In the midst of Ministers, courtiers and counsellors, Alexander von Humboldt maintained a position at the Prussian Court at once commanding and confidential—unfortunately, though probably few royal courts have offered so little material for scandal, the great *savant* descended to note what of the kind he could gather for the willing ear of Varnhagen.

[1] See F. Meinecke, *Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution* (forming the concluding volume of P. Hassel, *Joseph Maria von Radowitz*), 1913.

[2] Bunsen's general position is well and justly defined in the opening passages of W. Ubricht, *Bunsen und die deutsche Einheitsbewegung* (1910).

Humboldt was the acknowledged chief of the world of science at Berlin; and his *Kosmos*, of which he presented the first volume to the King in 1845, found in him the most appreciative of patrons. Frederick William IV added a 'peace class' to Frederick the Great's famous order '*pour le mérite*,' besides in every way promoting the interests of the Prussian Academy and of the universities of the land, Berlin and Königsberg in particular. He encouraged great historical undertakings—the *Monumenta Zollerana* and the works of Frederick the Great in particular, whose popularity as the national hero was appreciably heightened by the accompaniment furnished to the latter publication by Menzel's inimitable historical drawings. He encouraged scientific travel by grants such as those to R. Lepsius, the eminent Egyptologist, and Karl Ritter, the father of modern geographical study, and endowed the meteorological institute, where H. W. Dove carried on his labours. Though of the earlier discoveries of German chemical science the most renowned were those made at Giessen by Liebig, the pioneer of modern physical research, the most comprehensive applications of modern physical enquiry were made by a younger student of natural science, H. Helmholtz, then an army doctor at Berlin. Among the newly-appointed professors in the university of the capital were, besides Schelling, F. Rückert, the celebrated poet and orientalist. In historical research and exposition, Ranke long remained without a rival at Berlin. Droysen at Kiel was occupied with Schleswig-Holstein politics, though not absorbed by them; for Dahlmann a chair was at last (1842) found in a Prussian university, at Bonn. Far different were the views of Julius Stahl, who in 1840 succeeded to the chair of Gans, with whom he had little in common but his learning and his Jewish descent. In addition to his popularity as an academical teacher, this powerful dialectician and eloquent writer long remained the philosophic guide of

those who followed the ideal of a Christian-Germanic monarchy, which animated so much of the conservatism of the age.

It has already been pointed out that Frederick William IV's intellectual disposition was, above everything else, artistic; he was never quite happy except among artistic surroundings; and few modern sovereigns, perhaps not even Lewis I of Bavaria, have stood in more instinctively intimate relations with the leaders of the world of art[1]. He drew Cornelius from Munich to Berlin (though, unfortunately, the highest aspirations of the great painter were to be disappointed by the abandonment of the grand architectural scheme of which his frescoes were to form a crowning feature), and afterwards employed his compeer Kaulbach (to whom Berlin was probably more congenial) upon the adornment of the New Museum. This building was the work of Stüler, who on the premature death of Schinkel, the architect of the Old Museum and an artist particularly congenial to the King, had taken his place. Meanwhile, Rauch continued to work on his masterpiece, a monument worthy of Prussia's greatest King. The parks and gardens of Berlin were transformed by Lenné, the creator of the *Tiergarten*; and the surroundings of Sanssouci, with their churches, gained a new charm from the realisation by Persius of the King's designs. In music, Mendelssohn for a short period, and Meyerbeer for a longer, held the foremost place in the Prussian capital.

It was, perhaps, hardly the fault of Frederick William IV that he had comparatively small success with his poets. Tieck, whose name was most prominent among those of national reputation attracted to Berlin, really belonged to a past day, though some of his eccentric romantic comedies

[1] See a striking passage in L. von Gerlach's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. I, p. 308, as to the King's great architectural ideas and achievements.

were revived on the stage; the genius of Rückert had few points of contact with the life of Court and society. Of the younger poets who came to Berlin some were impenitent radicals like Freiligrath, or Herwegh, of whom more immediately. The only rising poet of note who cherished an unfaltering belief in the destiny of Prussia, was a denizen of the free and Hanseatic city of Lübeck, Emmanuel Geibel. Willibald Alexis (Häring), whose historical novels did honour to Brandenburg, met with only moderate favour.

Under the influence of the general sentiments of enthusiastic loyalty displayed on his accession, though followed by disappointment that no royal announcement should have at once satisfied the constitutional desires of his subjects, Frederick William IV, so early as February 1841, addressed himself to the further development of the existing system of Estates. During the last three years of his predecessor's reign, the provincial diets had been left unassembled; but the new King now summoned them all for regular sessions. The occasion was seized by Johann Jacoby, a Jewish physician who was to become prominent as a Liberal leader at Königsberg, for a categorical statement, embodied in a pamphlet circulated among the provincial diets, that the King was bound by his father's promise of 1815 to grant a genuine popular representation to his subjects. The King resented the publication as 'revolutionary'; and, at his suggestion, it was prohibited by the Federal Diet. Meanwhile, the trustful spirit in which the Prussian provincial diets had opened, had been met, on the King's part, by promises to assemble them biennially, and to allow the printing (though for members only) of their proceedings, together with their replies to Government proposals. He also authorised them to appoint committees, for consultation by him on subjects affecting the welfare of several or all the provinces. This concession, as going beyond the previous practice of provincial diets, created a considerable

impression. Yet it was clear that this instalment of privileges must be held insufficient; for neither would the provincial diets remain content with purely consultative functions, nor was the country likely to acquiesce in the King's scheme of gradual progress, by means of the committees proposed, towards a general or united diet (*Vereinigter Landtag*). The provincial diets, when assembled, were consulted on a proposal to reduce taxation, and presented with an (imperfect) account of the public expenditure during the last ten years (1830–40); but they were, in due course, dismissed without any disclosure of the King's ulterior intentions. The single provincial diet which had exhibited any recalcitrance was that of Posen, where, in order to appease the Polish nobility and clergy, Flottwell's strict administration had been superseded by the more conciliatory sway of Count Arnim-Boytzenburg, which, however, the King, whose ear was always open to Polish grievances, thought scarcely conciliatory enough[1]. Of more immediate significance was the administrative change in East Prussia, where the head of the Government, Schön, the incarnation of East Prussian Liberalism, had been carrying on war *à outrance* with the Minister of the Interior at Berlin, G. A. R. von Rochow, who was popularly, but perhaps not altogether fairly, regarded as the incarnation of reactionary statesmanship. Thrice the great man tendered his resignation to the King, and the third time it was accepted (March 1842), when, though complimented with the antique dignity of margrave of Marienburg, the restlessly self-conscious statesman saw his career virtually at an end. He fell, *more suo*, not without noise; and, in June, a few days after his own dismissal had been made public, it was followed by that of his adversary, Rochow, whose office as Minister of the Interior was taken by Arnim, and held

[1] Flottwell was transferred to the government of (Prussian) Saxony. He afterwards became Minister of Finance.

by him amidst difficulties, as will be seen, till 1845. Finally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was, about the same time, entrusted to the Liberal Freiherr Heinrich von Bülow, who had long successfully filled the office of Prussian envoy in London, where Bunsen now succeeded him.

Bunsen had already paid a visit to the British capital in 1841, when he was charged with the congenial task of negotiating the proposal of a joint Anglo-Prussian bishopric at Jerusalem. In connexion with the long-standing Syrian troubles, Frederick William IV had suggested to the Great Powers the expediency of establishing at Jerusalem a garrison jointly furnished by the Great Powers for the protection of the Holy Places; and, after this scheme had come to nothing, the humiliating position of Protestant Christians at Jerusalem induced him to take steps for their being placed on the same footing as the Latin, Greek and Armenian Churches there. In November, the Archbishop of Canterbury consecrated Dr M. S. Alexander, a Jewish convert of German birth, to the new bishopric; but the step was popular neither with the High Church party in England nor with the great body of German Protestants; and the result cannot be said to have been commensurate with the thought and money expended on it by Frederick William IV[1]. Bunsen's success in the matter, no doubt, helped to bring about his appointment to the London embassy, where no diplomatist has ever done so much to strengthen the intellectual and moral, as well as the political, ties between the German and British nations.

[1] The case of the new episcopate was argued by H. Abeken in his *Letter to the Rev. E. B. Pusey* (who had stated his view in a letter to the Primate), 1842. See *Life of Heinrich Abeken* (Engl. tr., 1911), where more will be found on the subject. A second Bishop of Jerusalem (Gobat) was afterwards appointed; but the union between the Anglican and German Churches in Jerusalem came to an end in 1887.

King Frederick William IV himself, it should be added, was a warm friend of England, where he was afterwards grossly misjudged, and of the English alliance, which was, of course, greatly strengthened through the influence of Queen Victoria's gifted consort, and of his wise counsellor, Baron Stockmar. Early in 1842, the King paid a visit to England, on the occasion of the christening of his godson the Prince of Wales, and returned fuller than ever of admiration for British institutions, though of that which in the eyes of most of his subjects was of paramount importance he was still unprepared to bestow on them more than a shadowy semblance. He had previously visited Russia, as well as the eastern and western provinces of his own kingdom; and it was in September of the same year that his speech on the memorable occasion of the laying of the second foundation-stone of Cologne cathedral once more aroused extraordinary enthusiasm, and that he passed on from the Rhine to Neufchâtel.

On his return, the King, with whom all seemed hitherto to have gone well[1], carried out his undertaking of summoning the newly-formed committees of the provincial diets, which had hitherto taken no action as such, to meet as 'United Committees' (*Vereinigte Ausschüsse*) at Berlin. The Prince of Prussia and the Minister of the Interior (Arnim) deprecated this step; but the King seems to have had no intention of allowing the discussions of what was, in some sense, a representative body to extend beyond the subjects on which he chose to ask for their opinion. The United Committees —together numbering 98 members—which assembled, on October 18th, without opening speech or address, soon found that, while the questions proposed to them for discussion were partly superfluous, partly of a miscellaneous

[1] See the summary of the 'brilliant' success of the first two years of the reign in Leopold von Gerlach's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. 1, pp. 84 sqq.

kind, the state guarantee which they were ready to give to the railways was useless without a loan, which they had no power to approve; and, after a few weeks, they dispersed, not much better contented than when they had met. Inasmuch as at this very time the King was disclosing to his Ministers his design of ultimately summoning all the provincial diets as a united diet in the event of a public loan or an increase of direct taxation being needed in time of peace, it is tolerably obvious that he thought the necessity for such a summons unlikely at present, and that he as yet entertained no design of giving it periodical fixity. Meanwhile, in March 1843, the provincial diets were again assembled; and, since they were on all sides inclined to extend their operations, while, with the ready help of the press, their grievances became widely known before the answers given to them by the Government, these bodies proved far more difficult of management than on the previous occasion. At Posen, the King's Polish sympathies were tried hard; and the one legislative proposal made to all the provincial diets—the adoption of the new penal code, which had been at last elaborated—was vehemently resented in the Rhine province, where nothing was considered satisfactory short of a distinct code, based on the French. The King, however, still refused to hasten the execution of his, or of any other, plans for the completion of the constitution on a really representative basis, and rejected a judicious compromise suggested by Arnim, whose resignation was hereupon offered, but refused. Fresh difficulties occurred; the advice of Bunsen, when on a visit to Berlin, was asked, and Metternich was consulted, whom the King informed that he would grant no modern constitution, no charter, and no periodicity of or elections for *Reichstage*. His mind was for a time occupied with the more tentative counter-project of a standing committee of the provincial diets, to be summoned every four years; but, gradually, he began to

reconcile himself to the notion of a general diet, and to devise safeguards for its action. A *curia* or section consisting of lords (*Herren*) was to be added; and the assembly was to meet, not in the populous capital, but at Brandenburg. As the great constitutional change seemed to become more imminent, the Prince of Prussia demanded that the *agnati* of the sovereign should be consulted by him in a matter of so much moment, but was informed that legal opinion had decided this to be unnecessary; whereupon he, for the present, refrained from discussions concerning the constitution, of which he was popularly regarded as a determined adversary. Arnim, on the other hand, insisted on the fixed periodicity of the contemplated United Diet as indispensable, and was this time allowed to resign, Bodelschwingh, then looked upon as a reactionary, taking his place (May 1845). The King had, twice over, vindicated his reliance on his own judgment, and a constitutional commission was appointed to recommend a final settlement of the problem.

Thus, as the first five years of the reign—an unfortunate *quinquennium*, in spite of its hopeful beginning—drew to their close, and as the King stood face to face with the task of solving what still seemed the great question of his reign on his own account and by his own methods, the task was a heavier one than if he had sought to absolve it while still surrounded with the popularity which had welcomed him on his accession. This popularity had already undergone serious diminution. Yet, so far as his personal will could assert itself, the spirit of his government had been the reverse of narrow and illiberal. While, in the autumn of 1841, his Ministry entered into protracted deliberations as to the amount of liberty to be allowed to the Prussian press, he let it be known in the provinces that he recognised the necessity of free journalistic discussion, so long as no offence was committed against public decorum; in May 1842, the censorship of pictures was abolished, so that caricatures

were once more free in the monarchy of Frederick the Great. A few months later, all books of more than twenty sheets were similarly liberated; while it was ordered that all untrue statements should be corrected in the newspapers that had been guilty of them. It was hoped that this treatment of the press, which contrasted favourably with that prevailing in most German states, would prove enduring. The *Rheinische Zeitung* and other Liberal papers of varying shades in the north might thus be able to hold their own against the Augsburg *Allgemeine*, which, although subject to both Bavarian and Austrian censorship, contrived to go some way with the times, without ever losing its close contact with Metternich and his henchmen, or ceasing its hostility to Prussia. But this hope was, in the first instance, short-lived. The plan of founding a leading Prussian journal under the editorship of Dahlmann fell through, when he demanded that it should be assured freedom from censorial supervision. And, before long, an incident petty in itself—the publication, in the *Leipzig* (afterwards *Deutsche*) *Allgemeine Zeitung*, of a magniloquently insolent letter addressed to the King by the radical poet Georg Herwegh[1]—put a stop to the brief heyday of a free press in Prussia. The *Rheinische Zeitung* was suppressed (with the result that much of its influence was inherited by the *Kölnische*)[2], and the unlicensed publication of pictures was once more disallowed. About the same time (February 1843), the censorship was elaborately reorganised in the shape of a Supreme Censorial Tribunal, consisting of seven lawyers and three laymen, while local and district censors under the control of the Ministry of the Interior were added. This

[1] Herwegh protested against being held responsible for the 'indelicacy' of the publication of this 'private' letter. See V. Fleury, *Le Poète Georges Herwegh* (1911), pp. 107–8.

[2] See K. Buchheim, *Die Stellung der Kölnischen Zeitung im vormärzlichen Liberalismus* (1914), p. 8, n. 4.

change, too, was tentative; but it was confessed to be a failure before it was swept away by the Revolution of 1848.

In matters of ecclesiastical policy, Frederick William IV was, primarily, moved by his desire to realise high ideals on which his heart was bent rather than concerned in taking account either of the actual religious controversies around him or of the fluid state of public opinion on matters which he judged from his own high and deeply-meditated point of view. In the controversy with Rome, of which the settlement still remained incomplete, the King sought at once to prove his conciliatory disposition, which he flattered himself would be reciprocated by the Papal Government, by restoring Archbishop Dunin to his faithful flock at Posen, as well by allowing Archbishop Droste to remove to Münster, though not to return to Cologne. (As for the Posen Archbishop, he soon proceeded to assert his advanced views, and, in 1846, virtually secured the right of his sanction being required for every appointment of a teacher of religion in his province.) The remaining differences with the Curia the King hoped to settle by direct negotiation, and, for this purpose, he sent to Rome a Liberal Catholic who was a personal friend of his own, Count Brühl, a son-in-law of Gneisenau. But his efforts were unsuccessful, although, early in 1841, an attempt was made through the mediation of the ultramontane Bishop of Eichstedt (Count Reisach) to induce Droste to ease matters by resigning his archiepiscopal office. In the meantime, Brühl had reappeared at Rome, with the offer of fresh concessions; mixed marriages were to be under the entire control of the bishops; and, by way of facilitating further relations between Church and state in Prussia, a separate Catholic section was to be formed in the department of Public Worship (*Kultus*) at Berlin. In the midst of intrigues, fostered by agitation in the provincial diets of Westphalia and the Rhine province, for the restoration of Archbishop Droste, the King had at

last agreed to the compromise of allowing him to return for a single day in order to consecrate his coadjutor, when fresh contentions arose as to the choice of a personage fitted for that office. In the end, on the suggestion of King Lewis I of Bavaria, the name of Bishop Geissel of Speyer was proposed by Brühl, on a third visit to Rome, and accepted there; and, after an interlude which, but for Droste's refusal to repair to Cologne to consecrate him, had nearly landed Arnoldi, Bishop-elect of Treves, in Geissel's place at Cologne, Geissel's nomination was finally agreed upon, Droste submitting to the will of the Holy Father, while reserving his own archiepiscopal rights. The dispute had come to a close at last. Archbishop Droste died at Münster in 1845; and his successor's conciliatory ways and politic course of action (though he found means of furthering the power of his Church), did much for the invigoration of religious life among the Catholics of the west, and on the whole exercised a pacific influence.

The episcopal election at Treves, of which the result had, for the sake of peace, been twice renounced by the Bishop-elect, Arnoldi, was allowed by the Prussian Government to be held over again, when he was duly chosen once more and, this time, approved by the King. Two years later (1844), he celebrated this victory of the Church by allowing the revival of the exhibition at Treves of one of the seamless coats which had in turn called forth the enthusiasm of pilgrims, who, this time, numbered more than a million, and thereby gave rise, not only to criticism and scandal, but to a movement which for a time seemed likely to become a serious danger to the authority of the Church of Rome. At Breslau, the prelate chosen in Sedlnitzky's place as Prince-bishop was a man of advanced years; but, in 1844, Melchior Diepenbrock, then a canon of Ratisbon, succeeded to the prince-bishopric. He was a prelate of great moral force and intellectual breadth; but, like

Geissel at Cologne, vigilant in the assertion of the claims of Rome[1].

Meanwhile, the Catholic section in the Ministry of Public Worship had got to work, and (inasmuch as the proposed periodical meeting of Catholic bishops could not be summoned to Berlin till it could be counterbalanced by a Protestant chief consistory, which it had not as yet been possible to organise) served the interests of the Catholic hierarchy as an administrative authority quite as well as a nunciature (to which the King continued to refuse his assent) might have done. Thus, in Prussia, too, the influence of ultramontanism had materially increased, though falling short of that which it commanded in Bavaria under the Abel *régime*[2].

Most religious, as well as political, movements, are, in time, followed by a reaction; and the history of the chronic advances of the power and influence of the Church of Rome signally illustrates this experience. Such a reaction, as just noted, connects itself with the notorious exhibition of the seamless coat at Treves in the summer of 1844. Johannes Ronge, a young Catholic priest who had recently been suspended from his chaplaincy at Laurahütte in Upper Silesia because of his authorship of a free-thinking newspaper article, had taken it upon him to address an 'open letter' to Bishop Arnoldi of Treves, denouncing in abusive language the 'idolatry' of the proceedings sanctioned by him. The feeling against ultramontanism was strong in Silesia since Sedlnitzky's resignation[3]; and, so early as March 1845, Ronge formed at Breslau an independent congregation, consisting chiefly of middle-class folk but soon joined by two priests of note. Just before the publication of

[1] The nomination of all professors of Catholic theology in his province became virtually dependent on his approval.

[2] Cf. p. 274, *ante*.

[3] Sedlnitzky at a later date became a Protestant—the first Catholic bishop since the Reformation who took this step.

Ronge's letter, another Catholic priest, Johannes Czerski (who had clandestinely married) quitted the Church of Rome with several adherents, and set up a 'Christian-Catholic' congregation. Gradually, some twenty-two congregations formed themselves in various north-German towns, which assumed the name of German-Catholics (*Deutschkatholiken*). This movement attracted the attention of many earnest and highminded men, as well as the ready response sure to follow any cry of emancipation from Rome. It is, however, stated that the total number of 'German-Catholics' never exceeded 60,000—the maximum number of congregations being 298—and that quite half of the members of the entire body were Silesians. In March 1845, a council of the new body was held at Leipzig, when the more advanced sections carried the day, which were in favour of complete separation from the Church of Rome in matters of both dogma and worship, on the basis of the confession drawn up by Ronge at Breslau. Ronge's vainglorious assumption of the part of a second Luther, however, inevitably brought about a reaction within the reaction; and, in a very short time, the whole movement began to ebb. It has been seen[1] how it played a part in the Leipzig riot of August 1845. In Prussia, the King appears, in the first instance, to have hailed its advent as a shedding of their faithless members by both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches; then, in his generalising way, he resolved to seize the opportunity of regulating, once for all, the position of religious difficulties, whether Catholic or Protestant, in his monarchy.

To the Old-Lutherans, whose numbers probably did not exceed 50,000 in all, and whose centre was Breslau, clear recognition was, after some discussion, granted, though they

[1] P. 280, *note, ante*. In 1848, Ronge found his way to Vienna, when at the height of its revolution; but he was no longer more than an agitator.

were not to call themselves a Church (July 1845). More difficult was the case of those Protestants who may be described as rationalists of an earlier school, and whom their adversaries decried under the nickname of 'friends of light' (*Lichtfreunde*). The addresses, devout and plain-spoken, of their leaders had gathered round them large assemblies, consisting mainly of members of that lower-middle-class (as it is the custom to call it) to which, elsewhere, nonconformity has successfully appealed. Among these leaders were Leberecht Uhlich and G. A. Wislicenus, both clergymen in Prussian Saxony, whose meetings were held at Magdeburg and Köthen. In accordance with the decision of the King, the *Lichtfreunde* were offered the choice between conforming and formulating a confession of their own; but it was freedom within, not outside, the Church which they desired; and, in the old Reformation style, a series of colloquies with orthodox theologians was arranged which, at this time of day, could not be expected to lead to any satisfactory result. Hengstenberg's journal, the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, blew a loud trumpet from the walls of the citadel; on the other side, the municipal authorities of Berlin drew up addresses in favour of the free development of religious beliefs. Other demonstrations followed, accompanied by petty persecutions; and it was not till March 1847 that the King felt himself in a position to sign the 'patent of religion' which was to settle the position of the new religious associations. This instrument secured all civil rights to dissidents from the state Church, provided that the associations joined by them had received the sanction of the state; while it recognised all official or ministerial acts (*Amtshandlungen*) in the case of religious bodies which, like the Old-Lutherans, were 'in essential accordance with' one of the two Protestant Churches acknowledged in the Peace of Westphalia. Other sects had to be content with toleration only; and (this point had not been settled until

after much bitter controversy) their marriages, after having been celebrated according to their own usages, were to acquire civil validity by being placed on the registers of the judicial tribunals of the state. The patent was coldly received; the new associations whose *status* it was intended to regulate continued their existence as 'free congregations' (*freie Gemeinden*), cohering with or without confessions or sacraments. Popular meetings for religious purposes had been prohibited so early as 1845; and general interest in the movement rapidly waned. The Magdeburg congregation, at first, displayed signs of vitality; but, on the whole, the experiment of allowing to the Church liberty from within, unaccompanied by any settled confessional basis, once more proved a failure.

As for King Frederick William IV's own scheme of a Prussian Church[1]—independent of the state, but organically connected with it through the King, and at once episcopal and presbyterian—it remained in the regions of the ideal. Certain initiatory steps were, indeed, taken towards its realisation, including the summoning, in 1844, of provincial synods. Furthermore, though the attempt of the King of Württemberg to unite the Protestant Governments of Germany in resistance to the encroachments of ultramontanism, by a revival of the *Corpus Evangelicorum* at the Frankfort Diet, had to be treated as impracticable, a free 'evangelical conference' of deputies from the German Protestant states assembled at Berlin in the beginning of 1846. It led to no direct result, but, together with similar conferences held

[1] It is expounded at some length, but with remarkable lucidity, in the King's letter to Bunsen printed in Ranke, *Aus dem Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelm's IV mit Bunsen* (1873), pp. 47 sqq. It was episcopal—the first bishops were to be consecrated by Anglican or Swedish prelates, and among the whole body of 350 bishops the metropolitans were to be named by the King; and it was presbyterian—the supreme government of the Church was to be in the hands not of a hierarchy, but of a general synod.

at Eisenach in later years, in which, as at Berlin, the leading part was taken by Moriz August von Bethmann-Hollweg, contributed to the invigoration of Church life.

At Whitsuntide in the same year 1846, the earliest general evangelical synod of the realm—consisting of a select body of officials and experts, of whom 37 were clergy and 38 laymen—was summoned by the King to his capital. It was intended to be essentially consultative. Rationalist opinion was all but unrepresented in this assembly, while the adherents of the extreme orthodox party were in a distinct minority there. Much the most numerous party, with K. I. Nitzsch, then professor at Bonn, at its head, was composed of men of moderate views; and, when the assembly proceeded to its primary task, of agreeing on a confession to be generally accepted by the clergy of the Church, a majority approved a formula which amounted to a simplification of the Apostles' Creed, particular congregations being left at liberty to require ampler confessions from their pastors. Progress was also made in considering the future constitution of the Church; and a draft was adopted which, while preserving the system of consistories, with a chief consistory at their heads, added a (lay) presbytery for each congregation. But the General Synod was dismissed without having reached any authoritative conclusion; and the only resolution adopted by it that was actually carried out, in order to balance the intended periodical conference of Catholic bishops, was the creation of a chief evangelical consistory, which held one sitting before the outbreak of the Revolution.

Frederick William IV's religious policy was no doubt prejudiced, in the eyes of many of his subjects, by other proceedings on the part of the Public Worship and Education department, over which, as has been seen, Eichhorn presided for not less than eight years. In Germany, encroachments upon general intellectual freedom have, on the whole, called

forth deeper popular resentment than interferences with the open expression of political opinions. Thus it came to pass that under what was, characteristically, called 'the Eichhorn Ministry,' measures which had the full countenance of the King, and were regarded as directed against the liberty of university and other teaching, provoked widespread suspicions from which the popularity of the Crown suffered more perhaps than from any other cause. Among these were the removal from his chair of Germanic philology at Breslau of the celebrated Hoffmann von Fallersleben, whose epigrammatic verse still preserves some of its sting, and the Ministerial admonition addressed in the same year (1844) to the professors of the University of Königsberg on the occasion of its jubilee. Bruno Bauer, the radical theologian, was refused the *facultas docendi* at Bonn, and there were one or more similar cases. The universities were, in the main, able to hold their own; but in other spheres of national education the domineering spirit of the Minister could not be checked. Great discontent was caused among primary teachers—a class of growing importance, and never wanting in due self-esteem—by the virtual dismissal of the head of the urban Teachers' College at Berlin, A. Diesterweg, who stood foremost in his profession and typified the earlier rationalism which had helped to expand its importance. And, in the secondary schools (the *gymnasia*), though Eichhorn left the old plan of teaching in the main unchanged and judiciously added to it gymnastics (*Turnen*), now no longer tabooed as 'demagogic,' he sought to transform the spirit of religious teaching. Niemeyer's handbook, hitherto in common use in Protestant schools, and also tinged with the rationalistic ideas of the times of its origin, was banished. Nothing could have more surely tended to promote the belief that religious obscurantism was the true note of Eichhorn's system of administration. Colour seemed to be lent to this by the pietism in vogue

among the nobility of certain of the Prussian provinces—in Silesia and in Pomerania, as well as in the adjoining Mecklenburg grand-duchies—and in circles very near the Court at Berlin. This pietism, in consonance with the best traditions of the religious movement of which it was a phase, readily engaged in the good works that interested the charitable, especially the reformatory and other missionary organisations of the age, and betokened the awaking of a living Christian interest in the social welfare of the people. The King's personal enthusiasm in these matters—which culminated in his abortive attempt to found an association designed to comprehend all such Christian endeavours and to bear the name (connected with the medieval annals of his own dynasty) of the Order of the Swan (1843)—brought him little but an accession of unpopularity; so imperfect was his perception of the meaning of Goethe's saying as to the inability of men to do the right thing at the right time. Much the same was the effect of other, equally virtuous but more questionable, attempts made by him to remedy existing evils. His efforts to put an end to the scandalously lax observance of the law of divorce was decried as intended to establish the indissolubility of marriage. Ludwig von Gerlach's unwarrantable use of the King's name in this matter led to his own transfer from Berlin to Magdeburg, and but a fraction of the change designed in the law was carried through. The introduction of a stricter Sunday observance was another reform which the King had at heart, but which exaggerated rumours as to his and Eichhorn's intentions on the subject made it necessary to drop. The dislike excited by all these pious velleities, whether of greater or of less importance, on the part of the King, coupled with the unreasoning fears inspired by the attitude of Eichhorn towards questions involving religious considerations, operated against the maintenance of cordial relations between Throne and people.

Finally, before we return to the constitutional history of the earlier years of this reign, a word should be said as to the economic conditions by which they are marked and which the revolution that closed them found in existence. In the export trade beyond the seas, which was one of the most surprising developments of German commerce in this period and in which Bremen took the lead, Prussia could as yet have no important share; but it was not long before the thoughts not only of merchants, but even of patriots who had no personal interest in transmarine commerce, would turn to the great days of the Hansa, when German trade was protected by German ships of war[1]. Early in the reign of Frederick William IV, whose cousin Prince Adalbert long cherished the idea of a German fleet, the first Prussian ship of war—which long remained the only one—the corvette *Amazone*, was launched for purposes of naval instruction, and in 1843 a committee was formed in Prussia for enquiry into the subject of the defence of the Baltic ports. In these years, there was, also, some talk of Prussian colonisation—again a revival, though of ideas dating no further back than the reign of the Great Elector; and, in the course of Bunsen's embassy, schemes of acquisition in North America—Mexico and Oregon—were actually discussed with the British Foreign Office. Of the German emigration to the United States, of which the tide hardly began to rise till 1846, Prussia continued to furnish no considerable proportion, though a relatively large quota was contributed by the thickly-populated district round Treves; the curious scheme of an organised German immigration into Texas, under the direction of a committee of German reigning and mediatised princes, headed by Prince Charles

[1] For some account of early efforts for the encouragement of maritime navigation and the nascent desire for a German navy of war, see the article *Die deutsche Kriegsflotte* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. I (1848).

of Leiningen (Queen Victoria's half-brother), came to an end with the admission of Texas into the Union (1845).

At home in Germany—and in Prussia in particular—the economic progress already noted[1] continued at an accelerated rate; by the close of the first seven years of the reign, Berlin had become a city of over 400,000 inhabitants, though as yet it could hardly, in its general conditions of life, be reckoned among the chief capitals of Europe. By far the most important economic question of these years was the growth and development of the railway system, which, in the existing satisfactory condition of the public finances, there was a strong wish to bring into direct connexion with the state. The chief obstacle lay in the illegality, should the law of 1820 to which reference has already been made remain in force, of issuing a public loan without the approval of a diet of the whole monarchy (*Reichsstände*); and a compromise had, therefore, to be arranged by which, pending the ultimate purchase of the railways by the state, the chief lines were privately constructed under its supervision and with the aid of state advances and guarantees. Private capital readily flowed into the enterprise thus organised; and, although the eagerness for railway investments did not rise to anything like the same height as that to which it mounted in England, yet the rush of speculation was alarming and had to be subjected to legal restrictions which led to heavy personal losses. Meanwhile, the construction of railways went on apace, and, by 1847, had reached a high total of mileage, while the state (still unable to operate by loans) had guaranteed interest to the amount of nearly 30 million dollars (£4,500,000). Altogether, the private capital subscribed for the Prussian railways exceeded 100 million dollars. In 1847, after the state had undertaken the construction of a short but indispensable line through the

[1] Cf. pp. 221–2, *ante*.

Saarbrücken coal district, it found itself forced by the stoppage in the influx of private capital to undertake another, and very important, line, the Eastern railway, which was to bring Königsberg into connexion with Berlin. The example of Prussia had, of course with fewer difficulties, been anticipated by Brunswick and Baden; elsewhere it was followed with more or less speed and promptitude and completeness. Gradually, too, the main railway systems of Germany entered into mutual understandings and combinations; and, though not a few anomalies remained, due partly to inexperience, partly to jealousy, the Prussian and German railway systems were, on the whole, organised successfully, and with as little of the haphazard element in the process as, in the circumstances, could have reasonably been expected.

The general condition of the working-classes continued to undergo vicissitudes consequent upon rapid economic changes for which Labour was little prepared. These troubles were aggravated by special causes. In 1845, there was great suffering in East Prussia from inundations; and, in 1844, open rebellion had broken out among the weavers in Silesia, whose numbers had largely increased with the progress of trade, but who were found quite incapable of adopting, or competing with, improved methods of industry and were hard pressed by the low prices at which their produce was kept by the merchants and by the importation of English goods[1]. Here, as in East Prussia and other parts of Germany, much was done by official and private associated effort to meet the evil; but in Silesia bloodshed and criminal proceedings followed, and, though the main cause of the crisis was sheer want, a wildly revolutionary association of

[1] The attempt, in July 1844, upon the King's life, by Burgomaster Tschech cannot be described as a sign of the times; but the cynical reception given to the news in some quarters suggested that there was something wrong in the condition of public feeling.

workmen was discovered, the enquiry into which led to the dismissal of Merckel, the Chief-president of Silesia. In 1846 and 1847, the harvests throughout Germany failed, and widespread misery followed again, in East Prussia more especially. The states of the *Zollverein* were far from unanimous as to the remedies to be applied, while, of course, nothing was done by the Confederation; and, while rye had to be imported into them in largely increased quantities, Austria prohibited the export of corn from her dominions. In Upper Silesia, disease and famine raged, and there was an appalling loss of life. In Berlin, pauperism had, by 1847, already reached a considerable numerical height, and the number of political suspects was very great. There were some riots at Berlin in April of this year, which had to be suppressed by the military; a good many welldressed persons were noted among the clamouring mob; and the King's twofold remedy of prohibiting the export of potatoes and closing the brandy distilleries in the city was not regarded as likely to prove effective. Undoubtedly, the prevailing unrest was heightened by the influence of emissaries from the centres of communist agitation in France and Switzerland, and in England, where at the beginning of 1848 Karl Marx and F. Engels, the leaders of German communism, who had joined the great international association of working-men, drew up the manifesto of their party. It proclaimed the necessity of the abolition of all private property in land, and combined with this announcement a declaration of sympathy with the political revolutionary movement throughout Europe[1].

What might have been the effect of the establishment, in the years following on 1845, in such a way as to bring

[1] Marx's own account of the condition of Prussia and other German states in the period from 1840 to 1848 will be found in his articles on *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany* (tr. by E. M. Aveling, 1904).

about relations of mutual trust and goodwill between King and people, of a constitutional system of government in Prussia, it is useless to speculate. In that year, as has been seen, the constitutional movement throughout the country was continuously rising; and the King seemed resolved that a settlement should, at last, be brought about. Of the provincial diets held in 1845, many showed, unmistakably, the growing impatience of the people. In that of Westphalia, Freiherr Georg von Vincke, whose parliamentary career was then beginning, openly called for the fulfilment of the late King's promise of *Reichsstände*; and similar motions found support in all the other provincial diets, except those of Brandenburg and Pomerania. Learned publicists, eager journalists and public meetings, wherever the police allowed these to be held or where they could be disguised under specious pretexts, reiterated the demand. Meanwhile, the constitutional commission appointed at the time of Arnim's dismissal (August 1845) held two series of sittings, and (the Prince of Prussia having signified that, in his opinion, the concession of the United Committees was a fit consummation of the constitutional task left over by the late King) agreed, with but one dissentient voice, to the principle of the convocation of Estates for the entire monarchy—though declaring its preference for the extension of the functions of the existing United Committees. But the King's mind was, by this time, made up. He had resolved to summon a General or United Diet, and to combine with it the establishment, in one form or another, of a section or *curia* of lords (*Herren*). And he had, also, resolved on refusing a fixed periodicity of summons, such as would have been inseparable from a popular representation in the modern constitutional sense, possessed of the tax-granting power, which he had resolved not to concede. On March 11th, 1846, the critical conference between the commission and the Ministry was held, in which, by a majority of 14 to 2

(the Prince of Prussia, while making no secret of his apprehensions, voting with the majority), the necessity of the summons of a general or united diet was approved in principle. And, after some further meetings of the commission, on February 3rd, 1847, the anniversary of Frederick William III's first call to arms in 1813, there appeared, with the signatures of the Prince of Prussia and all the Ministers appended, the royal patent, with accompanying ordinances, by which, in the words of the Prince, the new Prussia was announced, and the old laid to rest.

Complicated as was the announcement of the King's will now made, and as it could not but be in view of his intention that this settlement was to admit of further development in accordance with that will, its provisions should not be left without notice.

The United Diet (*Vereinigte Landtag*) was to assemble at the King's pleasure in times of peace for the approval of loans or the increase of taxation, or for other purposes. It was to possess the right of petition on home affairs, and, when it seemed right to the King, was to discuss such legislative measures as might be laid before it. Within the diet was to be instituted an order of Lords (*Herrenstand*), to consist of 72 great landed proprietors and others (unevenly) selected by the Crown from the provincial diets, which was to deliberate on financial business with the rest of the diet, but on other matters by itself. Finally, the United Committees were to carry on their functions, and to be convened periodically (every few years), while a separate deputation or committee of eight members (one from each of the provisional diets) was to be summoned, at least once a year, for the approval of war loans and the examination of the accounts of the national debt.

Events happened otherwise than King Frederick William IV could have anticipated; but (apart from special points,

which must be left aside here) it is obvious that, although, after long hesitation, a step had been taken which might be regarded as the beginning of constitutional life for Prussia, public feeling could not remain satisfied with the royal promises. Above all, the absence of any promise of a periodical convention of the United Diet was seen to vitiate what was actually conceded. The patent and the accompanying ordinances were, on the whole, coldly received. In parts of the monarchy, votes of thanks were passed; but elsewhere, especially on the Rhine, in East Prussia and in Silesia, the cry arose that the proffer ought to be rejected. So radical a procedure did not, however, commend itself either to general feeling in the kingdom, or, with certain exceptions, to German Liberalism at large. Bodelschwingh, on whom, as Minister of the Interior and Cabinet Minister, the chief responsibility lay, was prepared to carry through the royal will; and, in April 1847, the United Diet—composed of all the members of all the provincial diets—assembled at Berlin, together with its *Herrencurie* of 72 members. Notwithstanding all the defects of the proposed settlement, the significance of the occasion was universally felt. But the King's opening speech, on April 11th, though full of emotion, was unfortunate. His father's constitutional edifice, he declared, was now complete; no written sheet of paper should ever interfere between himself and his people; he would reassemble the United Diet for the grant of taxes or of new taxes, or for whatever other purpose he might think well.

At the very first meeting, Count Schwerin-Putzar, a Pomeranian nobleman, son-in-law of Schleiermacher, who held Liberal opinions in matters of both Church and state, moved an address to the King, of which the drafting was committed to Hermann von Beckerath, a leader in the diet of the Rhine province. The address, which demanded a periodical assembling of the United Diet, was carried in an amended

form which omitted this crucial demand, but in a general way claimed the 'safeguarding' of the rights of the Estates. The King's answer, though not ungracious, disapproved of the term 'safeguarding' (*Wahrung*); on the other hand, it announced that, at the latest, the diet would be reassembled within four years. The problem had thus come to turn on the principle of parliamentary rights; and it was this which the more determined members of the opposition now sought to establish clearly. Foremost among them was Vincke, who now fully established his reputation as a parliamentary debater of extraordinary power, and who attempted to induce the diet to pass what really amounted to a declaration of rights, including its claims of periodicity of summons, and of a share both in legislation and in the financial administration of the state. The vote in favour of the motion, however, fell short of the requisite two-thirds' majority; its supporters were mainly Rhinelanders and East Prussians; and the 'Lords' had declined even to debate the proposal.

But when, hereupon, the diet took up the business proposals of the Government, its indisposition to undertake financial responsibilities while its own legal rights remained undefined became more and more manifest. Stimulated by the eloquence of Vincke, it rejected the proposed loan to the Eastern railway, although the 'Lords,' all but unanimously, supported the project, for which a lance was broken by the young Pomeranian deputy Otto von Bismarck; and the King at once angrily commanded all the works to be stopped. Further financial debates led to no satisfactory results; and, though the diet granted a certain amount of relief to the grievances of the Jews and indulged itself in resolutions on a Polish and on a Schleswig-Holstein petition, it felt that the real question between it and the King was that of its own legal powers. After a long and anxious debate, in which the Prince of Prussia bore a dignified part,

it was at last agreed to approach the King in a spirit of confidence, asking him, not in the way of an assertion of right, but by petition, to assent to the periodical summons of the diet, and, in the meantime, to suspend the election of the United Committees, whose functions he was requested to restrict. The King, while perceiving the drift of this consensus of opinion, could not, even now, bring himself to grant his assent except in his own way and at his own time. He would, he replied, take the question of periodicity of summons into consideration, and would not supersede the approval of laws on the part of the United Diet through deputations or committees. Until, however, everything had been finally settled for completely carrying his patent of February 3rd into effect, it was necessary that the United Committees should be at once elected, so as to attend to the business ready for them. On June 24th, two days before the date fixed for the dissolution of the United Diet, it received a royal message to the above effect. A small minority of deputies (58), led by Vincke, hereupon refused to take part in the prescribed elections; but an overwhelming majority agreed to the royal injunctions. The United Diet then separated, under a general cloud of dissatisfaction and distrust.

Since it was the provincial diets which had to elect the United Committees, it was on the former that the next decision depended. Amidst protests and under reservations, the meeting of the Committees at Berlin was at last brought to pass on January 17th, 1848, and at once set to work on the business immediately laid before it, the consideration of the new penal code. But, before the discussions were at an end, tremendous news had arrived from Paris, and the Committees agreed that the penal reforms approved by them should be, also, submitted to the next United Diet. The King appeared at the meeting of the Committees on March 6th, and announced that by their labours (and by the

institution of a deputation of the Estates for receiving statements as to the national debt) the plan propounded by him on February 3rd, 1847, had been completely carried out[1]. He added, as if stating a logical consequence, that he might now, again on his own authority, grant the petition of the United Diet for periodicity of summons, and for the consequent restriction of the functions of the United Committees of the provincial diets.

The significance of this concession, which the King had persistently refused to make as such, and which now he granted of his own free choice, will be best appreciated in connexion with the change in his German policy at this date, to be noted in our next chapter. It was an issue even wider and greater than that of the settlement, after many attempts and conflicts, of the Prussian constitution, which the mighty movement now breaking in upon it forced on the attention of the German Governments and nation. We have seen how in various parts of the country an agitation of public opinion and sentiment was in progress, which had found many and various opportunities of manifesting itself in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Revolution, whose actual origin, nature and course no man could foresee. Above all, as was inevitable, meetings of every sort abounded, called together for various purposes but made to serve the omnipresent longing—meetings of professors, the class which was to play so prominent a part in the history of the German Revolution itself, and of men of letters, lawyers and followers of other callings. Gradually, political meetings proper began to be held, which took it upon themselves to lay down the principles on which the affairs

[1] The exactness of this statement may be verified by a comparison of the King's scheme as described by him in a letter to Bunsen, written probably as early as 1844, and printed *ap.* Ranke, *Briefwechsel*, pp. 123–4.

of Germany, beginning with the reform of her Federal constitution, were to be ordered and reorganised, inasmuch as the Governments of the several Federal states, great or small, seemed to decline to take the initiative in these national concerns. A meeting held in October 1847 at Heppenheim (in Hesse-Darmstadt), raised the demand for a German parliament, which was rapidly becoming the watchword of the Liberal party, and, as has been seen, it was actually formulated in the Baden Chamber by Bassermann on February 12th, 1848[1]. The feeling could not but arise, even at Frankfort itself, that the time was at hand for a real reform of the Federal organism; and schemes in that direction were actually propounded to the Austrian President of the Diet by Blittersdorff. But, in all schemes or proposals of Federal reform from within, the irrepressible question of the hegemony presented the primary difficulty. Prince Charles of Leiningen, Queen Victoria's half-brother, in a lucid pamphlet composed some time in 1846, advocated the practical hegemony of Prussia, whatever might be decided as to the honorary primacy; and this view, accompanied by a demand for constitutional government, was elaborated by the Queen's consort, Prince Albert, in a *pro memoria*[2] which in September 1847 he transmitted to the King together with Leiningen's pamphlet.

So far, these schemes and proposals had met with a very limited approval on the part of the King. As to the point on which his opinion mattered most, he declared it impossible to expect the German Princes to be willing to waive any of their rights of sovereignty; indeed, although, in his judgment, they ought to consent to such a renunciation in favour of the Confederation, it should not be made in favour of Austria, and still less in favour of Prussia. As

[1] Pp. 260–1, *ante*.

[2] Cf. Sir T. Martin, *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. 1 (1875), pp. 438 sqq.

for himself, he was steadily adverse to any attempt to elbow Austria out of the Confederation by seeking to secure the hegemony for Prussia. The proper place for her king was the second in the Empire, with the captain-generalship of the Imperial army and the arch-chamberlainship.

Such had remained the King's cardinal conceptions as to the future development of the German question and as to his own fitting attitude towards it—the unity of Germany under the joint leadership of Austria and Prussia, with Austria as Imperial head and Prussia as Imperial commander-in-chief. It was in accordance with these ideas that, about this time, Canitz sought to negotiate with Metternich conditions on which the Confederation might be reformed and reinvigorated, and that, in conjunction with the Württemberg Government, the Prussian attempted to carry through the Diet a Federal press-law which, in the states accepting it, would have amounted to an abolition of the censorship. But, neither on this head nor with regard to the proposal of the same Governments (March 1847), that the reports of the most important proceedings of the Diet should henceforth be allowed publicity, would Austria yield assent.

Apart from these efforts on the part of the Prussian Government in 1847 towards uniting the Federal states for objects common to them all, Radowitz, already the King's chief adviser in matters of German policy and Federal reform, drew up a memorandum of historical significance, which, as representing his sovereign's fundamental ideas on its subject, he was, at the end of November, commissioned to present at Vienna. The plan contained in this memorandum was presented by Radowitz as the King's own; he acted on no other responsible authority; and, as a matter of fact, no one else at Berlin seems to have favoured the scheme[1]. It ruthlessly condemned the action of the Confederation

[1] F. Meinecke, *Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution*, p. 58.

during the thirty-two years of its existence, in words quoted in an earlier passage of the present work[1]; and it went on to demand the strengthening of the Federal power—first, so as to ensure the military security of Germany; secondly, so as to protect her laws by means of a Federal judicial tribunal, and thirdly, so as to provide for her material interests by unity of coinage and measures and postal, railway and consular systems, and by the extension of the *Zollverein* to the Confederation at large.

No comment is needed on the many difficulties presented by this excellent scheme, which Frederick William IV (for the draft expressed his intention, if necessary, to go forward alone with it) hoped against hope to carry through in conjunction with Austria. But, before negotiations had begun at Vienna, Radowitz was obliged to repair to Paris, there to attend to the Swiss trouble, which was now at its height. After his return to Berlin (whence the King had very nearly sent him as envoy to the Diet at Frankfort) he, at the beginning of March 1848, went back to Vienna, with instructions to induce the Austrian Government to convene a congress of German Princes for considering the subjects of Federal reform and the present danger of war. He found Metternich not wholly unfavourable to the proposal, which, the Chancellor thought, might conceivably lead to some territorial gains for the two Great Powers. On March 10th, he consented to the summoning of the Congress; but the period for joint action in the direction of Federal reform on the part of the two Great Powers, or under their control, was closed. Within a few days, the Revolution had triumphed at Vienna, and was on the point of breaking out at Berlin.

[1] P. 47, *ante*.

CHAPTER VI

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848–9

Like its predecessor of July 1830, the French February Revolution of 1848 occupied not more than three days—a Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. But, apart from the fact that the rising of February 22nd to 27th, 1848, had a sanguinary epilogue in the events of June 23rd to 26th following, the difference between the two Revolutions was at least as great as was the resemblance between some of their characteristic features. This difference was, above all, due to the cumulative force of progressive ideas, and to the consequent blending of aspirations which in 1830 had diversely moved particular classes of the population. The Provisional Government which on February 24th proclaimed the French Republic, conditionally upon the direct sanction of the people, included both Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin; and the message which ran like an electric spark through all the nations of Europe, was that of a liberty, equality and fraternity to which no bounds were any longer set, or intended to be set.

To Germany this message came in circumstances quite distinct from those in which it was received by any other European nation. We have seen enough of the condition of her working-classes in the towns and in the manufacturing districts, and of the readiness with which they had begun to lend ear to the active propaganda of socialist and communist

ideas, to understand how willingly they would contribute to the realisation of the new ideals brought before them, to the overthrow of existing institutions and to the exchange of a royal army for a people in arms. But the number of populous towns and manufacturing districts in Germany was still limited—especially outside Prussia; the peasantry, still burdened in many parts of the country by feudal exactions or helpless in the hands of the agents of usury, could only in exceptional instances be roused to those combined efforts by which from time to time their grievances forced their way to the front; while the class of small traders, according to its habit, was full of complaints but ignorant as to the requisite remedies[1]. Thus in Germany, even more notably than in France, the movement for political and social changes was set on foot by the higher—that is, the well-educated—middle-class, at all times and in all countries the stronghold and, during the long years of reaction and of opposition to it in Germany, alike the refuge and the seminary, of Liberalism. Moreover, here, the cause of constitutional liberty, and political and social progress in general, had, in the minds of its consistent upholders, come to be inseparably bound up with that of national unity, involving a thorough reform of the Federal system which the Governments had imposed upon the nation by way of a meagre instalment of its claims, and had since applied to purposes directly antagonistic to civil freedom. Thus, national unity and the agencies without which its achievement was virtually impossible—the free utterance of the press and the unrestrained right of public assembly—formed an integral part of the demands advanced in the German phase of the new revolution.

Germany, as we have seen, was still hesitating on the threshold of necessary reform. Constitutional life, indeed, was already a familiar experience to many of her states,

[1] See the remarkable summary of Marx, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

especially those of the south-west; and, in Prussia, the assembling of the United provincial diets seemed at last to point the way to developments that could no longer be arrested. But, as yet—unless Grand-duke Leopold of Baden's admission into his Ministry of J. B. Bekk, a decided though moderate Liberal, be regarded as an exception—there had been no question of the remodelling of existing Governments by the introduction into them of a Liberal or reforming element. Nor—except again in Baden, where the veteran Liberal leader K. T. Welcker, whose famous resolution in favour of territorial constitutions and a German parliament dated so far back as 1831, had again and again been officially reminded that the *raison d'être* of the Baden diet was the discussion not of national, but of territorial affairs[1]—had attention been formally bestowed upon the problem of national union, though, as has been seen, it had recently been considered in the councils of Frederick William IV. Yet, before the actual outbreak of the February Revolution at Paris, a widespread presentiment of the changes at hand was to be found in Germany, as indeed throughout Europe, from Metternich's chancery to obscure workmen's clubs or *cabarets*. The Swiss war and the course of events in Italy had prepared the minds of men for the eruption; and the expected fall of Guizot had seemed like a menace of general collapse when the abdication of his master was still unknown[2]. On February 12th, Bassermann made the motion in the Baden Chamber, already mentioned[3], which has been regarded as the actual starting-point of the German national movement; and, five days later, Blittersdorff, who still represented Baden at the

[1] Cf. K. Wild, *Karl Theodor Welcker, ein Vorkämpfer des älteren Liberalismus* (1913), pp. 204 sqq.

[2] See the striking pages which open Count Hübner's *Ein Jahr meines Lebens*, 1848-9 (1891).

[3] Cf. p. 261, *ante*.

Federal Diet, opened a discussion there as to the measures called for by the special necessities of the time.

But *non tali auxilio* was the descent of the avalanche to be arrested after it had once begun. It may be convenient to note at once that, on February 29th, the presiding (Austrian) envoy directed the particular attention of the Diet to the state of things in Germany at large, and a committee was appointed to report. On March 1st, meeting on this occasion under the presidency of the Prussian envoy Count Dönhoff, the Diet issued an appeal to the nation, bidding every member of it, in his sphere of action, do his best for the maintenance of concord and order. But, though this admonition was accompanied by a string of further generalities, and though within the next few days the Diet passed a series of resolutions displaying its readiness[1] to pour into the old bottles all the new wine at its disposal, it earned no thanks for its pains, being already regarded as itself a useless encumbrance. On March 5th, the Diet declared the individual Governments free to abolish the censorship in their dominions (Württemberg and Baden had already made bold to do this on their own account); on the 6th, it discussed the question, mooted by Baden, of a popular representation being added at Frankfort; on the 10th, it resolved to invite the Governments to send thither persons possessed of their confidence, who should join with it in a revision of the German constitution; and, on the same day, having adopted the once reprobated black-red-and-gold as the national colours, it hoisted them in front of its own legislative palace. But, notwithstanding these efforts, or spasms, the day of the Diet at Frankfort was, for the present, over.

Meanwhile, on March 2nd Radowitz had been again sent

[1] The transformation of Ministries was already in progress in several states; and new representatives or new instructions were beginning to find their way to Frankfort.

to Vienna, and on the 10th the two Great Powers agreed on common action. A circular note was addressed to the German Governments, proposing Ministerial conferences on the reorganisation of the Confederation, and the 25th was fixed as the date on which these conferences were to open at Dresden. Before, however, that day arrived, both the Austrian and the Prussian Governments were in collapse; Metternich had taken flight, and Frederick William IV had capitulated to the Revolution.

One further attempt towards a provisional union of Germany by mutual agreement may conveniently find mention here, though with a slight disregard of the actual sequence of events. The originators of the scheme in question were two brothers, of whom the elder was to play a leading part in the transactions with which this chapter is concerned—Heinrich and Max von Gagern[1]. They persuaded the Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau Governments to send a joint extraordinary embassy to the south-German Courts, in order to induce them to entrust a single Government with the task of summoning a German parliament and

[1] Of the three sons of Freiherr Hans von Gagern, the Dutch and Nassau plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna and through his long life an ardent champion of constitutional principles, the eldest, Friedrich, returned from a long military service under the Dutch colours, which began at Waterloo and ended in the Sunda islands, to meet with his death when in command of troops sent to suppress the first Baden insurrection. The second brother was Heinrich, who early in March was placed at the head of the Hesse-Darmstadt Government and afterwards became President of the Frankfort National Assembly. The youngest was Max, who held a high post in the Nassau service, in which the career of his father, 'born as no prince's subject,' had virtually begun. For an account of his career, which exhibits the strange evolution (assisted by his conversion to Rome) from south-western Liberalism to the whole-hearted espousal of Austrian interests, see L. von Pastor's *Leben des Freiherrn Max von Gagern*, 1912. (See also *post.*) As to the family history in general, cf. *Die Familie Gagern* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. I (1848).

conducting the negotiations between it and the Governments at large. At Carlsruhe, the embassy was reinforced by a Baden, and at Stuttgart by a Württemberg, member; and, at the latter capital, King William imparted precision to the design by insisting that, while to Prussia should be committed the execution of the contemplated national design, she should at the same time be herself provided with a constitution of the south-German type. From Munich the embassy had to take its departure after a stay rendered futile by the troubles which were distracting the Bavarian capital; and, on March 20th, it reached Dresden, whence it passed on to Berlin. Here, however, the result of the insurrection of March 18th and 19th put an end to the unanimity among the envoys; and, after a meeting on the 23rd with the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs (H. A. von Arnim), this attempt to reach the desired end by 'a short cut,' first partially, and then altogether, collapsed.

It would serve no purpose to trace in detail the first effects of the new French Revolution upon the lesser German states; but some examples will show both their rapidity and their general bearing, here and there more strongly marked by special circumstances, upon the progress of events. The Paris tidings met with the earliest, indeed with an almost instantaneous, response in Baden, the frontier-land where constitutional principles had been frankly adopted by the Government and more radical ideas had been openly avowed. On February 27th, a public meeting was held at Mannheim, the most inflammable spot in the grand-duchy, where, under the presidency of the moderate and cool-headed Karl Mathy, a petition to the Baden diet, drafted by the ultra-radical Gustav von Struve, was adopted, which demanded the arming of the people, liberty of the press, trial by jury and a German parliament. These demands, with or without additions, recur in most of the popular risings of the time, and, when granted, formed the 'March achievements'

(*Märzerrungenschaften*) upon which the generation that had shaken them from the tree looked back with pardonable pride. The Mannheim and other petitions from towns of the grand-duchy were to be laid before the Chambers on March 1st by a multitude of deputations. Mathy, perceiving the danger of the situation, persuaded the Government to prevent a collision by granting at once (February 29th) the demands for the arming of the people and trial by jury, and by adding liberty of the press on the day on which the radicals had hoped to transform the Chamber into a revolutionary convention. Thus, instead of the petition being forced upon the Chamber by Friedrich Hecker at the head of a tumultuous mob of his admirers, it was by Mathy's advice referred to a committee, of which Welcker was named reporter, and on March 4th presented in an unobjectionable shape to the Grand-duke, and answered in general terms. Though an outbreak had thus been avoided at both Mannheim and Carlsruhe, the republican agitation in the grand-duchy had by no means subsided, and was only kept in check by Mathy's courageous demeanour and by Hecker's fear of giving the signal for an outbreak too soon. The Liberals, however, thought themselves in a position to turn their attention to German affairs, and it was only in consequence of the failure of the Baden republicans at Frankfort that, at the beginning of April, they once more concentrated their action upon the grand-duchy[1]. In the course of that month, Mathy was admitted into the Ministry; Welcker, who had formerly been one of the most indefatigable assailants of the Frankfort Diet, had previously superseded Blittersdorff as Baden plenipotentiary there.

[1] For the earlier stages of the Baden revolution, of which the later will be briefly treated below, G. Freytag, *Karl Mathy*, pp. 245 sqq. may be compared with K. Wild, *Karl Theodor Welcker*, pp. 232 sqq. See also the first of two articles on the Baden revolution in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. III (1849).

In Württemberg, the year 1848 opened in much anxiety and excitement. Economic distress had in the previous May led to street tumults at Ulm and Stuttgart, which had shown the bitter resentment pervading the populace; and in January the Stuttgart electors issued a list of demands including nearly the whole programme of the party of movement—from the redemption of feudal dues to the arming of the people. But the Government, which commanded a majority in the Chamber, had no intention of giving way to these demands; and the Liberal organ, the Stuttgart *Beobachter*, continued to show wide censorial gaps. In the speech from the throne with which the Württemberg diet was opened in February, the existing unrest was attributed to the machinations of a band of revolutionary refugees in Switzerland; and Römer's motion for enquiry into the employment of the military in the May tumults at Stuttgart, when the King had unwisely been allowed to show himself, gave the Minister Schlayer an opportunity of inveighing magisterially against the opposition. But, on the 26th, the Paris news arrived, followed on the 29th by the publication of what had occurred at Carlsruhe. On the same evening, a popular address was drawn up, and, covered with signatures, it was, on March 2nd, presented to the King. He had, early in the day, anticipated one of its demands by an edict proclaiming the abolition of the censorship, and complete freedom of the press in accordance with the constitution. Petition now crowded upon petition, and numerous deputations sought an audience from the King, who, however, at first held aloof. But a second proclamation fell flat, and it soon appeared, as it frequently did in these crises of agitation, that an immediate personal solution must be found. Schlayer, as the head of the existing Government, must necessarily go; and, after King William had attempted, for a moment, to meet the situation by the appointment of a conciliatory

conservative, Freiherr von Linden, an announcement speedily followed that this nomination had been cancelled and that a popular Ministry would be formed. Hereupon, after some brief negotiations, the King on March 9th named Römer, Duvernoy and Paul Pfizer Ministers of Justice, the Interior and Public Worship respectively, the Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs remaining in office. Thus reconstituted by the inclusion of the three most popular leaders of the opposition, the Württemberg March Ministry came into office amidst general popular rejoicing. But the task which awaited them was one of extraordinary difficulty. Everywhere in state and Church, in the administrative and in the judicial system, a solid mass of usages and precedents, as worked by competent trained agents, was opposed to the reforms demanded by popular opinion in almost every department of public affairs. The tidings of renewed disturbances among the peasantry, greatly exaggerated by report, were of service in rallying the landed interest to the support of Römer's Ministry, more especially as there had been no change in the control of the army; and there seems to have been a laudable readiness on the part of the landed proprietors to cooperate in substantial changes as to the burdens on the land. The Ministry, therefore, hastened to pass the laws necessary for the redemption of tithes and other burdensome duties, as well as measures for the arming of the citizens and for assuring the right of free assembly, and then dissolved the Chamber, where their party had been in a minority (March 27th).

Meanwhile, the Minister of War (Count von Sontheim) had incurred unpopularity by admitting Austrian troops into Ulm—a measure arranged before the change of Government—and by introducing restrictions into the oath to the constitution imposed upon the military; and both he and Maucler, who had hitherto remained President of the Privy Council, had felt themselves obliged

to resign, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count von Beroldingen, following their example. A general meeting for the organisation of political clubs—the chief levers here as elsewhere of political change—had hereupon been held at Göppingen, where the common programme of these associations was settled. It included the abolition of all political privileges, the institution of a genuine popular representation, annual diets, free intercourse between the Chambers and the citizens and peasantry, abolition of the Privy Council and remodelling of the High-court of Justice. Here was at last a real charter of progress, which took complete possession of popular opinion. But the programme of the Liberal associations was, in itself, full of difficulties; and, before the new Government laid down the lines of legislative reform at home, the interest in the great national problems which were being dealt with at Frankfort became paramount Thus, in Württemberg, too, the seminary of new ideas of national progress as well as the ancient home of free institutions, the era of advance, with which the Römer Ministry had been identified, was destined to be short-lived[1].

In Bavaria, where a fresh impulse was added to the conflict with the Crown by the news of the revolution in Paris, the imminent crisis had been prepared by the infatuation of the reigning sovereign, King Lewis. Early in October 1846, Lola Montez, a Spanish dancer of great beauty, and a woman who showed dauntless spirit in the course of a long and varied professional career, arrived at Munich. The King, to whom, in accordance with his custom, she had been introduced after a performance at the Court theatre, and who, having a visit to Spain in view, happened at that time to have been learning Spanish, was greatly interested in her; and she soon made a complete conquest of his susceptible nature, though he denied that she ever

[1] For an account of the 'March Ministry' in Württemberg, see the narrative under this title in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VI (1851).

became his mistress in the ordinary sense of the word. The notion that she had accepted a commission from London freemasons to bring about the overthrow of King Lewis's throne may be set against her own 'disclosure' of an attempt made by Jesuits in Paris to engage her aid in gaining converts to Rome. It was not until after her influence over the King had become well known at Munich that his relations to her were discussed in the public press—and this not in radical but in clerical organs of opinion. Thus there can be no reasonable doubt that it was Lola Montez who, from whatever motive, fully opened the King's eyes to the significance of the policy of his Ministry, and confirmed his doubts as to the possibility of maintaining Abel, and, with him, the declared ascendancy of the clerical faction. He had been obliged to approve the election of Count Reisach, the ultramontane Bishop of Eichstedt, as Archbishop of Munich-Freising, and to refuse the prayer of the Protestants of the Bavarian Palatinate for the holding of an extraordinary synod; and he now, in December 1846, seems to have intended to show his determination to secure freedom of action, by decreeing the separation of the department of Public Worship and Education from the Ministry of the Interior, and its transfer from the hands of Abel to those of the Minister of Justice, Freiherr S. von Schrenck. But the clerical party, far from losing courage, continued, with the aid of Görres and other publicists, to carry matters with a high hand; and they, in their turn, now profited by the unpopularity brought upon the King by his open display of his passion for Lola Montez and his efforts to force her recognition by Court society. It now occurred to her that this matter could be summarily put right by her elevation into the ranks of the Bavarian nobility, to which she declared her own birth corresponded. But to carry out this project, the Bavarian indigenate had to be granted to her in the first instance; and on this step

the King was bound to consult his Council of State. Here, he received no encouragement; but he, nevertheless, insisted upon bringing the thing to pass, and, since this had to be done by means of a royal decree countersigned by one of the Ministers, he called upon Count Bray, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to append his signature. But, the entire Ministry having unanimously resolved to act together in the matter, Abel, notwithstanding strong representations made to him by the King, drew up, on February 11th, 1847, a memorandum, which was signed by all the Ministers. In this famous protest—the 'decisive event[1]' in the strange episode we are narrating—they boldly declared themselves incapable of approving the King's intention and of thus violating the highest obligations which they had undertaken towards him. Accordingly, in unctuous terms and with a side-glance at the dissatisfaction of the episcopacy and a gratuitous reference to the illwill which the proceeding was certain to call forth in the army as well as in the people at large, they offered their resignation, in the event of the King's will remaining unchanged. On February 13th, Abel, and a few days later, all his colleagues, were dismissed from their offices; and Freiherr Zu Rhein, a Liberal Catholic, accepted the portfolios of Public Worship and of Finance. Among the Departments in the new Administration—'the Ministry of the dawn,' as it was called by poetic journalists—

[1] This phrase, first used in the sonnet composed by King Lewis which found its way into publicity after the dismissal of Abel, seems most obviously to bear the above interpretation. (For the sonnet see Heigel, *König Ludwig I*, p. 265 and *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VII, p. 710.) Sonnet and phrase were bandied about in the ruthless and endless literature connected with the Lola Montez troubles—of which King Lewis was so considerate as to order the most complete collection possible to be preserved. It may be added that, notwithstanding the Ministerial assurances that no copy of the memorandum existed besides the one presented to the King, it was immediately published in north-German and in French newspapers.

which, in the first instance, was designated as 'provisional,' those of Foreign Affairs and of Justice were entrusted to G. L. von Maurer, the eminent historian and writer on public law, who, like Abel, had served the new kingdom of Greece, and who was the first Protestant ever made a Minister in Bavaria. It was he who signed the patent of indigenate for Lola Montez, hereupon created Countess von Landsfeld. But the incident was as yet far from being closed.

The dismissal of the Abel Ministry, which in itself might not have been ill received by a large part of the Bavarian public, was followed by the removal or transfer of a number of persons in high positions who had refused to countenance the intrusion of the adventuress into society. The scandal caused by these proceedings and the joy of the democratic press fell in with the wrath of the ultramontane party at the dismissal of the Abel Ministry after the failure of their *coup*; and it was only natural that the University of Munich, both professors and students, should have thought their intervention necessary. Professor E. von Lasaulx, renowned as a philosophical archaeologist, who was a conscientious ultramontane and a nephew of Görres, moved in the Senate that a tribute of recognition should be paid by the University as the foremost moral corporation in the state to the Minister who upheld the cause of morality. His motion was lost; and he was at once, by royal ordinance, relieved of his professorial functions. This step was followed by the dismissal, or transfer to other posts, of certain professors belonging to the orthodox party, one of whom was Ignaz von Döllinger. A large students' demonstration on March 1st in honour of Lasaulx ended in a popular tumult in front of the abode of the Countess, who disdainfully gazed at it from her windows. Military had to be called in; and the King, who had suddenly made his way on foot to the house, was, on leaving it, badly mobbed

After this, order having, with some difficulty, been restored among the students of the University, further enquiry into the late riotous occurrences quashed, and a further sop thrown to academical ire by the sanction of a new *Verbindung* which some of the younger members of their body were desirous of forming (the Isaria), the King recovered the goodwill of the students, and was honoured by a torchlight procession. Meanwhile, his Government continued a Liberalising—in the judgment of the ultramontane press, a Protestantising—course, and the diet was practically unanimous in demanding the abolition of the censorship. Neither the King nor the diet was, however, contented with the action of the Ministry, and, early in December 1847, it was shaken by the dismissal of Maurer, who had given deep offence to Countess Landsfeld by avoiding her personal acquaintance in accordance with the condition he had made on accepting office. Zu Rhein's resignation followed, and, in the course of the month, the Ministry was reconstituted, Prince Wallerstein taking the departments of Foreign Affairs, Public Worship and the Royal Household, while that of the Interior was bestowed upon von Berks, who had been Wallerstein's right hand in his previous Ministry, and who of late had continuously devoted himself to the personal service of the Countess. The new Ministry, in accordance with the tendency to display characteristic of its chief, showed itself disposed to pursue a more distinctly Liberal policy than its predecessor, favouring the freedom (with certain restrictions) of the press, and taking a progressive line in university affairs. But, while any reconciliation of the clerical party to the Government was out of the question—the treatment by the latter of the Swiss Jesuits sufficed to forbid it—Wallerstein could hardly be expected to satisfy all the demands which, by the beginning of 1848, the radicals were everywhere bringing forward, while those reforms which his Ministry adopted or promised

were regarded as tainted in their source. The patroness of the 'Lola Ministry' thus once more proved a disturbing influence in whose presence the maintenance of public tranquillity was impossible.

The next notable incident in this history of errors was a provocative speech delivered by Minister von Berks at a solemn drinking-bout held by the Alemannia, a small association of students who, after being expelled from another club for having taken part in social gatherings at the house of Countess Landsfeld, had now come to be looked upon as a sort of bodyguard of the favourite, and were, as such, boycotted by the students at large. Berks's double-edged praise of the Alemanni was followed by an article in a semi-official paper which contrasted their loyalty with the corruptness of many of the other students. In the midst of the general excitement which now ensued in the University, and which its authorities were unable to allay, Görres died, on January 29th, in an odour of sanctity, not to say a halo of martyrdom. He was buried two days later, without any disturbance except that the appearance of Countess Landsfeld in the street among the spectators of the procession was indignantly resented by some of the students. Two successive attempts to hold a solemn students' gathering at Görres's grave ended, on February 7th, in a tumult in the university buildings which wreaked vengeance on the detested Alemanni, and which neither the rector (Thiersch) nor Prince Wallerstein succeeded in repressing before it communicated itself to the streets. On the next day but one, in consequence of the insolent personal intervention of Countess Landsfeld on behalf of her 'bodyguard,' the outbreak was renewed, and had, finally, to be stopped by troops. On the same day, a royal order was made public closing the University, and ordering all students not domiciled in Munich to leave the city. On the 10th, the King curtly refused an immediate reply to

a civic deputation sent to the palace to deprecate this step, while a multitude gathered outside and military measures of defence were taken. Before the tumult had subsided, the King quietly drove to the theatre. Meanwhile, however, information had been received from various parts of the country, where there was much political ferment, which in Franconia (Nürnberg) and the Palatinate had found expression in demands for a German national parliament, and, more immediately, for the assembling of the Bavarian diet; while in the old Bavarian provinces clerical influence was at work from an opposite point of view. At Munich, the day had not passed without a public meeting in the *Rathaus*, which was repeated on the 11th and at which the expulsion of Lola Montez (together with the dissolution of the Alemannia) was openly demanded. Thus, on the evening of the 10th, the King composed a conciliatory letter to the Burgomaster, announcing the reopening of the University for the coming summer session; and on the following day it was made known that the Countess had orders to quit Munich. She proceeded as far as Lindau, where she awaited events in the company of three Alemanni (the rest had taken their departure to Saxony). Her Munich villa would have been demolished behind her back, had not the King, with his usual personal courage, appeared on the spot and demanded that his property might be left in peace.

Although the King regarded the clericals as at the bottom of the movement (soon afterwards, by way of retaliation, he summarily dissolved the Congregation of the Redemptionists), it had been, as was already seen, stimulated by the general current of events in Germany, and more especially in the south-west. It soon became apparent that the cry for the summoning of the diet could no longer be resisted; but the King still hoped to be able to delay the date on which it was to assemble till May 31st.

The delay was suspected, more especially as the unpopular Berks remained in office, notwithstanding the warning addressed to the King by Prince Charles of Leiningen as President of the Upper Chamber, and there was a fear of military measures being taken for securing the capital. On March 2nd, some rioting having begun in face of Berks's residence, soldiers were called out, and a few barricades were erected. On the next day a petition for the immediate convocation of the diet, after being covered with about 10,000 signatures, was forwarded to the King, together with an address to the same effect from the members of the Upper Chamber (*Reichsräte*) present in the capital. The half-concessions hereupon made by the King, the temporary retirement of Berks (who had contrived to escape) and the promise of a speedier assembling of the diet, failed to allay the prevailing excitement. On March 4th, it was resolved at the *Rathaus* to demand from the King complete liberty of the press, the arming of the people and the imposition upon the military of an oath to the constitution. He refused; and, though the statement seems unproved that, at one moment, he gave full powers to Prince Karl Theodor von Wrede, who was in favour of a summary use of force, it is certain that all the troops were under arms and that guns were planted in front of the palace. The populace replied by storming the civic arsenal or museum of arms and equipping itself with the antique weapons preserved there. A sanguinary conflict was only avoided by the announcement, made through the King's brother, Prince Charles, that the Chambers were to meet on March 16th. On March 6th a royal proclamation, bearing unmistakable marks of the King's hand and countersigned by the Crown-prince, with the other princes and the Ministers, promised the fulfilment of the popular demands all along the line—including complete freedom of the press, Ministerial responsibility and imposition in the

army of an oath to the constitution, and at the same time identifying the King and his Government with the movement for German unity and Federal reform. The patriotic feeling which inspired King Lewis in making these declarations was beyond a doubt genuine; yet, when it came to carrying them out, and when he perceived that the first measure of importance to be adopted must be the broadening of the existing basis of the representative system, he very soon repented of his promises. And the revulsion was brought about by the cause to which the beginning of the conflict had been due.

The royal patent of March 6th had been received in Munich with unbounded popular rejoicing; and the appointment of the Liberal leader Thon-Dittmer as Minister of the Interior, while Wallerstein (for whatever reason) was soon afterwards relieved of the Foreign Department, increased the new feeling of goodwill towards the Crown; while in the provincial towns the promise of an espousal of the German national cause had an excellent effect. But, on the very day fixed for the first meeting of the Chambers, March 16th, there was a renewal of rioting in Munich, due to the rumour that Countess Landsfeld had returned to the capital. She had, as a matter of fact, paid a visit to Munich in the night from March 8th to 9th, and had been admitted by the King to an interview of several hours. On the 16th, the mob, after taking into its own hands the task of discovering whether the Countess was in the neighbourhood of Munich, or in the city itself, made up its mind that she was hiding in the chief police-office. The building was stormed and sacked, and a general panic prevailed. On the following day, a royal edict proclaimed that the Countess had ceased to be a Bavarian subject; and the Ministers took the further step (afterwards pronounced illegal by the courts) of ordering that, in case this undesirable alien should place her foot on Bavarian soil, she should be at once arrested and removed

to the nearest fortress. (The head of the police, who was supposed to be of her faction, was dismissed from his office.) The Lola episode had thus been brought to a humiliating end, and the quiet of the Munich streets, for the time, restored.

On the other hand, a decree, issued on March 7th, reviving the laws for the redemption of burdens on the land, failed to stem the agitation among the peasantry which, more especially in Franconia, had assumed alarming proportions. The members of the diet assembled at Munich were awaiting its solemn opening by the King, when the news of the success of the Revolution, first at Vienna and then at Berlin, reached Munich. Metternich's fall must have been known in the Bavarian capital on the day before that of the King's proclamation. But his spirit had been broken by his own experiences, and he now threw up the game. On March 18th, a rumour spread through Munich that a palace-revolution was being mysteriously prepared, and led to counter-demonstrations of loyalty towards a sovereign still widely popular. On the following day, a family council was held, to which King Lewis declared his intention of resigning the crown in favour of Crown-prince Maximilian; and, on the 20th, he actually resigned. The news startled the Munichers in the middle of the ensuing night, and, in the morning, the King's last proclamation to his subjects made its appearance. A new spirit, he said, had begun to show itself in Bavaria, deviating from that of the constitution to which, for three-and-twenty years, he had remained true. And so, though he had served the state as if he had been the officer of a commonwealth, he resigned the crown, while continuing faithful in heart to Bavaria and to Germany. Such was the end, not unaccompanied by some touching demonstrations of loyalty, of a reign in which loftiness of purpose had curiously mingled with perversity in action. The life of King Lewis lasted for nearly twenty years longer, and its concluding chapter was

not undignified. But, from March 21st, 1848, his son Maximilian II, who on that day took the oath to the constitution, reigned in his stead; and, strictly speaking, the Bavarian revolution was at an end. Under the new sovereign, the promises of March 6th, which he had confirmed in his speech from the throne on the 22nd, were gradually carried out, though the manifestations of the partisans of a social republic in the autumn (a riot caused by them in Munich in October had to be repressed) hampered the efforts of the Liberal section of the Ministry, the leading representative in it of constitutional Liberalism, Freiherr G. von Lerchenfeld, being, before long, obliged to resign (December). Meanwhile, the ultramontane party resumed its activity, as was shown by the meeting of bishops at Würzburg in October, which received the blessing of the Pope and was greeted as 'the first national council of the century.' But the work of the Revolution could not be undone, and, in the words of a recent writer, 'the spring storm of 1848 swept away the last remains of the Middle Ages in Bavaria[1].' The part played by her in the new phase of the German question will be noticed below.

In Hesse-Darmstadt, the border-state between north and south, where there were no famine troubles of a very serious kind in 1847, the disturbances during the following two years would not have gone beyond some rioting among the peasantry, Jew-baiting and a few ecclesiastical quarrels, had it not been for the disturbances at Mainz and for the general sympathy in Rhenish Hesse with the revolutionary movements in Baden and the Palatinate[2]. The news of

[1] H. Ockel, *Bayerische Geschichte* (Sammlung Göschen, 1910), p. 116. For an account of the Bavarian revolution see the writings mentioned in a previous note. An article in vol. 1 of *Die Gegenwart* is violently partisan.

[2] See an art. in vol. v of *Die Gegenwart* (1850): *Hessen-Darmstadt in seiner neuesten politischen Entwicklung.*

the proclamation of the French republic reached Mainz on the evening of February 27th, 1848, and, already on the following evening, a public meeting was held there and a strongly-worded address to the Second Chamber at Darmstadt adopted. Here, on the same day, Heinrich von Gagern, who had resumed his parliamentary career, insisted on the summoning of a national representation and the appointment of a chief of the German state. Some bad excesses followed on the part of the peasantry in the Odenwald and elsewhere, but were put down without loss of life. On March 5th, the Hereditary Grand-duke Lewis, who had returned to Darmstadt amidst rejoicings, was proclaimed coregent with his father; and the grant of the usual 'March' demands was promptly announced, in an edict bearing the signature of Gagern as Minister of the Interior. On the 9th the military took the oath to the constitution. At Hanau a project was entertained of separating from Hesse-Cassel and joining Hesse-Darmstadt; but Gagern is said to have communicated the scheme to Cassel, thus helping to bring about the concessions which saved the situation there. A brief period of illusive hopes set in at Darmstadt, where the recognition of the French republic and the grant of an amnesty to political offenders were voted; a resolution for the removal of Prince Emil, who showed much self-control as President of the Upper Chamber, was withdrawn. The enthusiasm of Chambers and capital was not, however, shared in some of the rural districts, where the peasantry rose to urge their time-honoured grievances, especially those against the *Standesherren* and other large landed proprietors. Concessions were exacted from the Counts of Erbach, and the possessions of the Riedesel family suffered much damage. On the Rhine—at Mainz—the proletariat vented its spite against the steamtugs on the river, and afterwards on the Taunus railway outside the gates. And, here, another cause of trouble had arisen, by which the whole community was

momentarily affected. On March 22nd the friction which had arisen with some of the Prussian soldiers of the Federal fortress came to a head, and for some time there was great apprehension among the citizens of their being terrorised by the garrison. According to the rules for the management of the fortress secretly adopted in 1832, the civic guard, whose services had been recently called upon by the municipality, could not be summoned under arms without the approval of the Federal authorities in the fortress; and this sanction it had been omitted to obtain. Though the troops, especially the Austrian, at first showed no unfriendliness towards the civic guard, illwill grew on both sides; tavern quarrels and the temporary arrest of a non-commissioned officer followed; and, on May 21st, the beginnings of an armed conflict having taken place, the Prussian governor of the fortress issued a proclamation dissolving the civic guard and demanding the delivery to him of all its arms. Mainz was declared in a state of siege; the gates were closed and guns mounted for their protection; and the soldiers were informed by their commander that, but for the entreaties of the unoffending, he would have opened fire on the town. The soldiery remained dissatisfied, and the tumults were renewed; and, though the state of siege was ended, measures of precaution long continued to be taken and a commission of enquiry was appointed, which transferred its powers to the Darmstadt Government. Though the casualties had been greatly exaggerated (three citizens had lost their lives), the disarming of the civic guard and the satisfaction of military complaints at the cost of public feeling had given great offence, and furnished a deplorable illustration of a deep-rooted antagonism[1].

Meanwhile, Gagern had, as has already been noticed[2],

[1] As to these events see *Die Mainzer Vorgänge von Mai* 1848, in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. I (1848), pp. 421 sqq.

[2] Cf. p. 352 *note, ante*. The French sympathies of Mainz, from

from the first regarded his position as grand-ducal Minister mainly from the national point of view; and the thought was even cherished in the grand-duchy that under his guidance the coregent might conduct the affairs of the empire as its Vicar so soon as it should have been established. In May, the Minister's unequalled popularity had placed him in the presidential chair of the National Assembly at Frankfort, and he resigned his Darmstadt Ministry in favour of his political associate H. K. Jaup, who continued to hold office under Grand-duke Lewis III (from June 16th). Jaup opposed the popular cry for the dissolution of the existing diet and the convocation of a constituent assembly, and broke up a large popular gathering held on July 23rd on the Kranichstein near Darmstadt. The disunion between the two divisions of the grand-duchy enabled him to continue a cautious policy, without provoking serious disturbances; and, after prolonged discussions in the Chambers, the new electoral law was not promulgated till several months after their dissolution—in September 1849, some time after the last sparks of revolutionary fervour had been extinguished in the grand-duchy.

In Electoral Hesse, as we saw, after as well as before the accession of Elector Frederick William I, the grievances against his government had accumulated; but for the moment all was quiet. When the news from Paris arrived, the diet had just been adjourned, and the Minister Scheffer was ill. Hanau, Marburg and some smaller towns speedily sent deputations to Cassel, where they were coldly, in one instance, indeed, cynically, received by the Elector. Then the capital woke up, and on the 6th, further deputations having waited on the Elector, Scheffer made things easy

the days of the French Revolution onwards to 1848, are described by Oncken, *op. cit.*, in his essay on Ludwig Bamberger, himself a native of that city.

for him by resigning. The Estates were hereupon summoned for March 11th, to discuss the legislative enactment of the liberty of the press, which by law already existed. At the same time, the German-Catholics were assured the free exercise of their religion. These concessions were made known, on March 6th, to a multitude which, though judging them insufficient, dispersed quietly. On the following day, however, a further series of concessions was solemnly promised by the Elector to a fresh deputation, including, besides liberty of the press, trial by jury. Cassel now seemed quieting down; but agitation continued at Hanau, where on March 8th a public meeting drew up what it was pleased to call an *ultimatum*—a further extension of demands, culminating in the removal of all restrictions on any constitutional rights, to be granted within three days; in case of refusal there was talk of a transfer of this part of the electorate to the grand-duchy. But, on the 11th, an electoral proclamation duly announced the required concessions, and some popular Ministerial appointments (Eberhard and Wippermann) were added to clinch the bargain. Herewith, the revolutionary movement in Electoral Hesse really came to a close, and things now took their normal course, although no Ministry could have an easy time under the Elector, and although in the rural districts there were some demonstrations against landed proprietors and Jews, and in the capital against the Elector's life-guards, who had for a time to be suppressed. After, at last, settling the question of the *Rotenburger Quart* in favour of the state, and passing provisionally a moderate new electoral law, the Chambers were dissolved in October. In no other German state had more been accomplished for the establishment of the government on a genuinely constitutional basis. The Eberhard (March) Ministry did not come to an end, or Hassenpflug return to power, till February 1850; but, before that time, the course of national

affairs had seriously affected public feeling in Hesse-Cassel[1].

The course of the revolution in Nassau was almost unique, but must here be dismissed in a very few words[2]. A corner of Germany which had formerly been one of the most conservative of populations now proved to be undermined by revolutionary ideas of great intensity; and the determining element in the movement which ensued, though its action was assisted by an overgrown body of malcontent officials, was the peasant proletariat of the forests with which a great part of the country was covered. The development of the constitution and the settlement between sovereign and state of the rights to the domains proved to be questions of secondary moment as compared with that of the right of the peasants to pick up wood in the forests. The popular agitation at Wiesbaden in 1848 began on March 1st; and on the following day a public meeting was held there, at which the usual demands were put forward. Already on this occasion the peculiar character of the gathering was noticeable; and, on March 4th, about 30,000 peasants had assembled at Wiesbaden, for the most part unarmed though not unprovisioned, and with very scant notions as to the reasons for which they had been summoned. Having been informed that the domains were to be declared state property, they inferred that a distribution of the public possessions was to take place, and many had brought money-bags with them, wherein to deposit their share of the proceeds. The Ministry were wholly unprepared either with a policy or with the means for resistance; and the arming of the newly-constituted civic guard created no sense of security. But an insult offered to the Nassau flag

[1] See the earlier part of *Kurhessen seit dem März* 1848, in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VI (1851), pp. 531 sqq.

[2] Cf. *Nassau's politische und sociale Zustände*, in the same collection, vol. V (1850), pp. 273 sqq.

by some foreign adventurers was resented by the populace, which welcomed the Duke on his arrival; and his proclamation on March 4th, promising the grant of the popular demands, seemed to put an end to the old condition of things and a seal on the revolution with almost patriarchal ease. Such, however, was not the case. The influence of August Hergenhahn, a lawyer who had for some time been President of the Chamber of Deputies and had from the first assumed the leadership of the movement, was unable to contain it within the constitutional limits to which he consistently adhered[1]. The peasant insurrection, which now spread through the duchy, was directed to its own ends, of which the first and foremost was the freedom of the forests, in other words, the destruction of the game and the appropriation of the timber. The game survived, but the forests were in a large measure devastated; and, military intervention having failed, it was only gradually that the more reasonable portion of the peasantry began to stop the process of destruction. The next point was to abolish the system of rural mayors (*Schultheissen*) imposed upon the peasantry by the Government; and this was summarily accomplished without any attempt on the part of the latter to stay the anarchy which, though without much violence, accompanied the transition to a more acceptable method. The day of taxes and rents was supposed to be over; and the actual government of the country was for a time carried on by committees of safety (*Sicherheitsausschüsse*), rapidly called into life in the towns and villages, with a central committee at Wiesbaden[2]. The new single Chamber, elected in accordance with a law rapidly passed by the Chambers

[1] See Wippermann's art. on Hergenhahn in vol. XII of *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*.

[2] It was this central committee which in conjunction with other committees in the vicinity of Johannisberg prevented the seizure of Metternich's domains and the famous cellars of wine there.

that had preceded it, was composed of peasants and of officials—the latter intent upon a republic in which each member of their class should be an autocrat. Hergenhahn, whom the Duke had on April 16th appointed President of his Ministry, and who took an active part in national affairs at Frankfort, had little or no authority at home, where indeed the whole administration of the duchy had passed the verge of bankruptcy. His Government came to an end in June 1849, when Duke Adolphus, who had throughout looked upon it with disgust, appointed in its stead a Conservative Ministry under Freiherr F. von Wintzingerode.

In the kingdom of Saxony, as has been seen, the ground had been very assiduously prepared for political change. Immediately on the arrival of the great news from Paris, the Leipzig town deputies (a body distinct from the mainly Conservative Town Council) addressed the King, directing his attention both to national needs and to the question of the liberty of the press; but this deputation was coldly received, and a second was promised increased facilities on the second of the above heads only, which the Federal Diet had already left to the judgment of the particular Governments. The Ministry of Könneritz and Zeschau was very unpopular in Saxony, more especially the Minister of the Interior, Freiherr von Falkenstein, notwithstanding the great services he had rendered by his bold economic policy in the famine times of 1846–7. But his propitiatory resignation on March 3rd could not stop the prevailing agitation; and, on March 6th, King Frederick Augustus issued an appeal to his people, promising the convocation of the diet by the beginning of May, when a new press-law should be brought forward. Though at Dresden public feeling was thus contented, Leipzig and most of the kingdom remained unsatisfied; at Leipzig a great procession to the capital was planned, and Prussian troops (though, as Könneritz

always asserted, not at his request) were advancing upon the north-western frontier. On March 12th a large public meeting was held at Leipzig, and A. von Carlowitz, the Minister of Justice, whose influence over the King had long been unrivalled and who had been specially charged by him to report on the condition of that town, recommended his sovereign to give way. The notion of substituting Beust for Könneritz having been abandoned, the whole Ministry resigned on March 13th, and their successors took office three days afterwards. At the head of the new Administration was placed K. Braun, President of the Second Chamber, who enjoyed the regard of all parties; among its other members were the eloquent Professor von der Pfordten (Foreign Affairs and, afterwards, Public Worship), whose conservative leanings were gradually to declare themselves, R. Georgi (Finance) and Count von Holtzendorff (War), with the popular favourite Martin Oberländer. Their programme was the acceptance of the 'March' demands; and the abolition of the censorship was speedily followed by an amnesty for political offences and other Liberal measures; while a commission was appointed to enquire into the condition of working-men. But the discrepancy between the political views of the several members of the new Ministry soon became apparent, corresponding as it did to the difference between the moderate Liberalism of the *Deutsche Vereine* and the enthusiastic republicanism of the large majority of the *Vaterlandsvereine* (the followers of Blum), which strove for the control of Saxon politics. Great excitement was caused by the burning, on April 5th, of the castle of the mediatised Prince of Schönburg-Waldenburg; and the system of 'communal guards' was extended over the country at large. On May 18th the last diet chosen under the old electoral law met; but neither of the two drafts of the new law proposed to the Second Chamber met with acceptance. The republican party now revealed

its ultimate designs, and even attempted to censure the Government for sending troops, at the request of the Central Government at Frankfort, to put down disturbances at Altenburg and Weimar. There can be no doubt that von der Pfordten cherished the ambition of securing to Saxony, by means of a protectorate over the Thuringian states, an influence in German politics such as she had not enjoyed during the last generation; and the Thuringian Governments, with the exception of Saxe-Meiningen, proved not unwilling to secure themselves in this way against possible Prussian designs of aggrandisement.

In November, a blow fell which united the Saxon democracy in grief and indignation. The direct effect of the execution of Robert Blum at Vienna (which had to be left unavenged) was in favour of the radical party, and it carried everything before it in the elections for the new diet, which was to assemble under the new law early in the following year. The Ministers hereupon sent in their resignation, and, though it was not accepted by the King, it was repeated and accepted on February 24th, 1849. The democratic party had the satisfaction of bringing to its fall a Government whose moderation seemed intolerable to an electoral body passionately excited by the catastrophe of a great demagogue; but the real cause of its collapse was its want of homogeneity. Still, the March Ministry of 1848 marks an epoch in the history of the kingdom of Saxony; though the wave of the revolution had here not yet spent its full force. But its spasmodic final effort is inseparable from the movement for a national constitution on behalf of which it professed to be made[1].

[1] For the history of the revolutionary movement in Saxony up to the end of February 1849, compare J. Flathe, *Geschichte von Sachsen*, vol. III (1873), pp. 563 ff. with the latter part of the art. *Das Königreich Sachsen...bis zum Rücktritt des Märzministeriums* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. V (1850).

In Ernestine Saxony, the revolutionary movement caught fire with the utmost speed. In Meiningen, where the finance committee of the diet happened to be assembled, it at once prepared the usual demands which were in part granted by Duke Bernhard on March 8th. On the same day, Duke Ernest II returned to Gotha from a journey in Spain and Portugal, and before nightfall granted his subjects liberty of the press. The concession was followed by others, including the abolition of patrimonial jurisdiction and the omission from the Duke's title, as sovereign, of the clause 'by the grace of God.' A constituent assembly met at Gotha on June 18th, and passed a new electoral law, by virtue of which a diet of 20 members met there on October 2nd, and voted the fusion of the income received from the ducal domains with that derived from the public taxes. In Coburg, where a constitution was already in existence, a new electoral law had been passed on April 22nd; but the wish of Duke Ernest II to bring about a complete union between his two duchies was frustrated by the opposition of both their diets. In radical Altenburg, where, after the erection of barricades, the town was occupied by troops under Saxon command as representing imperial authority, Duke Ernest intervened as pacificator; in the end, Duke Joseph abdicated in November in favour of his brother Duke George.

Special interest attaches to the course of events at Weimar[1], where liberty of the press was readily granted by Grand-duke Charles Frederick; for this merely amounted to restoring what, much against the grain, his father had, in 1819, been obliged to withdraw. He also added a promise that the proceeds of domains and taxes should form one state-fund as at Gotha. On March 11th, a multitude

[1] The Princess of Prussia (afterwards Empress Augusta) briefly refers to these '*évènements de ma pauvre patrie*,' *A. d. litterar. Nachlass d. K. A.*, ed. by P. Bailleu and G. Schuster (1913), vol. I, p. 316.

assembled before the palace at Weimar demanded and obtained the dismissal of the veteran and now unprogressive Minister C. W. Schweitzer, in whose stead C. B. von Watzdorf, a genuinely constitutional statesman of high ability, became head of the Government, the second place being taken by the favourite of the populace, the advocate W. E. O. von Wydenbrugk. Though the popular excitement, fomented at Jena—which university town had, in fact, become the centre of democratic club agitation throughout Thuringia—continued, and in October led to armed intervention by Saxon troops, in both these towns the reconstituted Government contrived to steer its course (Wydenbrugk being soon sent as plenipotentiary to Frankfort, where he was also deputy in the Parliament), till in 1850–1 the grand-duchy, too, had to accept the reaction.

It may be added here that in Schwarzburg-Sondershausen the usual concessions were, on March 14th, demanded and made, and, a few days afterwards, a new diet was summoned for the discussion of the requisite legislative changes. Although in the autumn Saxon and Prussian troops occupied the principality, in the following year a democratic constitution, with Ministerial responsibility, was established; but the new electoral law and the constitution were alike abolished by the diet which sat in 1852–3. In Rudolstadt, where the beginning of the movement had been accompanied by scenes of much violence, its course resembled that in the sister principality.

Thus, in Thuringia, the seat of several Governments distinguished, in the past as well as in the present, by their insight into the interests of their subjects, it had been made manifest that the previous condition of things could not be maintained without a central authority to fall back upon. Attempts were made in 1848 and 1849 to find the requisite basis of strength in a smaller union among the Ernestine duchies themselves, with the addition of the

Schwarzburg and Reuss principalities. These efforts were largely due to Watzdorf, upon whom they brought the suspicion of scheming for a Weimar hegemony in Thuringia; but nothing came of them, except a system of judicial administration common to Weimar and the Schwarzburgs, where, as was just noted, the revolutionary movement had likewise made itself felt. In the Reuss principalities, the usual popular demands were put forward, and, for the most part, granted without resistance; but Prince Henry LXXII, the representative of the Ebersdorf line, revoked the concessions he had made, resigned his principality to his kinsman Prince Henry LXII of Schleiz, and died, in the odour of self-sacrificing adherence to principle, in 1853[1].

In the Anhalt duchies, surrounded as they were by Prussian territory, it might have seemed as if a union on a common constitutional basis might have been eagerly desired and more promptly accomplished. But such was not the case, since, in this instance, no one member of the ancient house had exercised a personal ascendancy like that to which from Albert the Bear to the Old Dessauer their dynasty had owed its prominence in different periods of German history. At Bernburg, the small committee of four (at one time five) persons (the *Conferenzrat*), which, since the accession of Duke Alexander Charles in 1834, had indifferently managed the affairs of the duchy, mismanaged the revolution, or rather provoked it by means of a proclamation, dated March 13th and calling upon the population to give utterance to its wishes, so that they might be speedily met in a spirit of mutual confidence.

[1] The main facts as to the movement in Thuringia are given by E. Devrient, *Thüringische Geschichte* (1907), pp. 158–61. As to Coburg-Gotha see Duke Ernest II's *Aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit*, 3 vols. (1887–9). As to Watzdorf, see art. in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XLI (1896).

In response to two public meetings, several of the demands brought forward there were granted, and great rejoicings followed; but the Ministry disagreed on the question as to whether the constitution, discussed at the new *Landtag*, which met at the end of July, should, since the Duke of Bernburg was childless, be a joint constitution for the three duchies; and a new Ministry under von Krosigk, appointed by the Duke, could not obtain the confidence of his subjects. When the diet hereupon resolved that the Duke of Dessau should be made regent of Bernburg, Duke Alexander Charles decided to dissolve the assembly (December 14th), and to impose (*octroyer*) a constitution upon Bernburg by his own will. At the new elections in the following February, which were very favourable to the popular party, tumultuous scenes occurred, and the duchy had to be declared in a state of siege. The previous attempt at intervention from Frankfort could not be renewed with any prospect of success, and, after the duchy had drifted towards reaction, the union with the two other Anhalt duchies came to pass naturally with the death of the Duke (1863).

These two duchies—Dessau and Köthen—had, since the death of Duke Henry of Köthen and Pless in November 1847, both been under the rule of Duke Leopold IV Frederick, who had been Duke of Dessau since 1817. In both, the people had really had no voice in the government, and the movement of March 1848 was eagerly welcomed. In Dessau, the Habicht-Köppe, and in Köthen the Gossler Ministries were formed, on a more or less Liberal basis, and on July 31st a joint diet of the two duchies proceeded to discuss the draft of a joint constitution of a democratic type, which on October 29th received the ducal sanction. But the good understanding between the Duke and his subjects was not enduring; the constitution was abolished in 1851; and, while the union between Dessau and Köthen was not carried into effect till 1853, that between Dessau-Köthen

and Bernburg had to wait ten years longer. The united duchy in 1859 received a joint constitution, long after the earlier paper constitutions had been superseded or swept away[1].

Like Anhalt, the Mecklenburg grand-duchies were by their geographical situation, as well as by dynastic ties, obliged to have frequent regard to the advice or wishes of Prussia. Schwerin and Strelitz, although their Estates met in common, had remained separate in executive and in administration; and in the diet the seaport Wismar, together with several ecclesiastical towns, and the principality of Ratzeburg (which belonged to Strelitz), were left without representation. As for the peasantry, notwithstanding that serfdom had been abolished in 1820, emancipation was, in many parts, still little more than a name; and in some quarters the bad old traditions of *Bauernlegen* (suppressing the peasants) had not altogether died out. The desire of the nobility to maintain their domination both in the *Ritterschaft* (Estate of Knights) over its non-noble members, and in the *Landschaft*, or Estates at large, had called forth opposition from 1845 onwards, and, in March 1848, a thorough change in the existing system of representation was urgently demanded, especially in the maritime towns and in Schwerin. The usual symptoms having made the helplessness of the Governments manifest, liberty of the press was at once (March 16th and 29th) granted both at Schwerin and at Strelitz; and, soon afterwards, an extraordinary diet was promised, which met at Schwerin on April 26th and proceeded to discuss a new electoral law. Wismar, with the ecclesiastical towns Bützow and Warin, was immediately granted representation, and the general principle of free but indirect election was laid down. Meanwhile, the agitation continued, especially among the

[1] For a full account of Anhalt affairs see two articles *Die anhaltischen Herzogthümer* in *Die Gegenwart*, vols. IV and V (1850).

farm-labourers, and there was much dissension between the 'constitutional' and the democratic factions. On October 31st the Chamber elected on the new system met; and, after an endless series of debates, a fundamental constitutional law (*Staatsgrundgesetz*) was adopted, signed for Schwerin by Grand-duke Friedrich Franz II on August 23rd, 1849, and proclaimed on October 10th following. On the other hand, Grand-duke George of Strelitz protested, and his protest was vigorously upheld by part of the *Ritterschaft*, which in October met in a body at Rostock, and by Prussia. By a treaty concluded in 1442, the House of Brandenburg possessed certain claims on the succession in Mecklenburg; but Prussian influence, which in May 1849 brought about military conventions with both duchies, had from the beginning of the year been at work there for less remote purposes[1]. In the end, Lützow's Ministry in Schwerin, after throughout steadily upholding the new constitution against the pretensions of the *Ritterschaft*, was, in March 1850, obliged to resign in consequence of the decision of the Central Commission of the Confederation, which had appointed a tribunal of arbitration to settle the question of the Mecklenburg constitution. In September, the tribunal at Freienwalde declared the fundamental law of October 10th, 1849 invalid, and the old constitution, as it had existed before 1848, restored. The Grand-duke of Schwerin accepted the pronouncement in a spirit of hope which did him credit. In the *Landtag* of the old type, which assembled at Malchin in February 1851, the predominance of the nobility was revived, with certain reservations of little moment. Thus, in the larger of the two Mecklenburg grand-duchies, the goodwill of the Grand-duke had not availed against the insistence of the nobility upon its privileges and against the influence of Prussia; while in

[1] See the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of Leopold von Gerlach (vol. I, 1891, pp. 218 sqq.), who was himself sent to Mecklenburg.

the smaller, the same combination, favoured by the reigning prince, had remained paramount[1].

In the kingdom of Hanover, as has been seen, the obstinate resolution of Ernest Augustus had proved so completely victorious that, in the first instance, he thought himself able to treat the revolutionary movement of 1848 with contempt, and then to meet the petitions addressed to him from Hanover, Hildesheim and the other larger towns of his kingdom by concessions which, in 1837, would have been regarded as quite satisfactory. A civic deputation from his capital, which waited upon him on March 7th, was apprised that liberty of the press would be granted, with certain reservations, and that the Chambers had been summoned for the end of the month; but that there could be no question of the King's agreeing to a popular representation at Frankfort, inasmuch as 'it is the duty of the sovereigns to provide for the welfare of their subjects.' Among the public meetings which followed, one at Osnabrück, where Stüve appeared, adopted a democratic programme of sixteen points, including Ministerial responsibility and the imposition upon the army of an oath to the constitution. The dilatory, though conciliatory, policy in which the King hereupon engaged came to an end under the influence of the news from Vienna and Berlin; and, on March 20th, a short royal proclamation announced the substantial concession of the popular demands, the union of the public accounts and those of the royal domains among the rest. The Ministerial changes which followed were settled more quickly than might have been expected;

[1] For a long, and necessarily complicated, account of this phase of the perennial Mecklenburg constitutional conflict see the article *Mecklenburg in den Jahren* 1848–51 in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VI (1851), and, for brief statements, O. Vitense, *Mecklenburgische Geschichte* (1912) and W. Herbst's *Encyklopädie d. n. G.* vol. III (1886), art. *Mecklenburg*.

and Stüve, formerly head and front of the opposition against the *coup d'état* of 1837, was appointed President of the Ministry which superseded that of the hated Falcke (a favourite of Metternich's). On the day on which Stüve took office, the King issued an ordinance abolishing the cabinet and restoring the former independence of the several Government departments. The disturbances which followed (including an exodus of students from Göttingen in the old style) were no longer of importance; and the Government in September 1848 carried a constitution which virtually transformed that of 1841 into a revised edition of the fundamental law of 1833. Stüve's firmness and moderation, and the personal liking which the King had conceived for him, would have carried the day (a transitory disagreement with the Second Chamber notwithstanding), and a complete reconciliation between the King and his subjects might have been brought about, had it not been for the German question, on which cooperation either with Frankfort or with Prussia proved impossible. But the forces of the reaction were at work against Stüve, and in October 1850 his Ministry came to an end, without, however, any actual change in the policy of the Hanoverian Government up to the death of Ernest Augustus (November 18th, 1851)[1].

In the neighbouring duchy of Brunswick, it was not to be expected that Duke William, a Prince of very different antecedents and disposition from his kinsman of the younger line, would adopt any policy but that of non-resistance towards the movement of March 1848. In reply to a petition from the municipal authorities of his capital, he, on the 13th, granted full liberty of the press, and, after a few days later a tumult had been suppressed, on April 3rd expressed to the newly-assembled diet his wish to see the settlement

[1] See *Das Königreich Hannover in seinen öffentlichen Zuständen* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. x (1855).

of all differences left outstanding by his predecessor. Without any difficulty, and without the resignation of the Minister, Freiherr Wilhelm von Schleinitz, the democratic revision of the constitution was completed; and, though in 1851 it was arrested by the reaction which then set in, Schleinitz's wise conduct of the affairs of the duchy continued till his death in November 1856.

In Oldenburg, the land of marsh and *Geest*, with a population as steady as the soil is unsettled and during the main portion of its long history singularly self-contained and self-reliant, the period of French occupation (1810-4) had left some elements of progress behind it. But the grand-duchy (as it now gradually came to be called) had never possessed, and indeed had long not known the need of, money-granting Estates, and is spoken of by Treitschke as the only German state that had done nothing before 1848 towards carrying out art. XIII of the Federal constitution[1]. Thus it was, to all intents and purposes, an innovation when, on March 3rd, 1848, the worthy Grand-duke Augustus (Paul Frederick Augustus), who since 1829 had ruled with almost patriarchal authority, was called upon by a deputation from the town council of his capital (which, together with Jever, a town in the north near the Jahde, took the lead in the movement) to grant a constitution 'after consultation with men of experience from all parts of the country.' Other petitions to the same effect followed, and further demands were pressed upon the Grand-duke, of which he accepted only that asking for the proposed Chamber the rights of taxation and legislation. On the morning of the 19th, when the news of the Vienna and Berlin insurrections reached Oldenburg, a grand-ducal proclamation stating the chief

[1] As Oncken, in his essay on Grand-duke Peter II, shows, this is not quite correct. A constitution had been drafted soon after the French July Revolution, but abandoned in deference to the objections of Russia and Denmark.

heads of the intended constitution was issued, and received with general rejoicing, especially as the Minister, Freiherr W. E. von Beaulieu, and other unpopular officials quietly resigned. No disturbances occurred, except in the distant Oldenburg principality of Birkenfeld (situate in the south-eastern corner of the Prussian Rhine province), where the head of the administration, Hannibal Fischer, of whom more was to be heard later, was driven into temporary retirement.

When the promised Chamber of 34 members met on April 27th, it proved refractory, and the Grand-duke undertook that a freshly-drafted constitution should be submitted to a specially-named committee. A new and more acceptable Ministry was appointed, and the Grand-duke voluntarily proposed that such of the grand-ducal domains as were not his private property should be treated as belonging to the state. Thus, when the first diet elected on the new system met, it was prevailed upon to leave an absolute veto on legislation to the Grand-duke, and, after some months of haggling, agreed to a reasonable settlement of the civil-list. The differences between Prince and people had thus been overcome, so that, on March 1st, 1849, the new constitution could be proclaimed, and on the 11th following celebrated by popular festivities. There were in Oldenburg no social elements of resistance to the changes of the new era; and, although Ministerial crises and parliamentary dissolutions followed, the relations between diet and Government did not interfere with the regular course of public life. During a considerable part of 1850 the diet remained unconvoked; and in April 1851 the Ministry, which in national affairs seems to have been somewhat in advance of ordinary public feeling, was reconstituted. The Oldenburg state, which had entered with goodwill into the movement for political progress, could hardly be expected to withstand the reaction; and, in September 1851, the diet

resolved upon a revision of the constitution, which was carried through without much difficulty in the following year. The new fundamental law was published in November 1852, and in the following month the army was relieved of the oath to the constitution[1].

Among other north-German principalities whose systems of government were temporarily affected by the revolutionary movement of 1848–9 may be mentioned Lippe-Detmold, where, for the new constitution approved by Prince Leopold in 1849, the old one of 1836 was substituted by his successor and namesake in 1853; and Waldeck, where the Liberal constitution of 1849 was remodelled in a reactionary sense in 1852.

It is perhaps of greater interest to note the influence of the Revolution of 1848 upon the political life of the three northern Hanse Towns. For the history of Frankfort-on-the-Main was to so great an extent merged in that of the Confederation of which it was the seat as to make any reference to it unnecessary here, beyond the statement that, after it had recovered its independence in 1813, its constitution was completed in 1816, on the new lines of a participation of the civic body in the elections to the governing body, the Senate. Herein Frankfort followed the example of Bremen, in age the first of the Hanse Towns. While, thanks largely to the genius of her eminent Burgomaster, Johann Smidt, the mercantile progress of Bremen, since she had been freed from the French yoke, had been extraordinary, her internal advance had been less rapid. In 1815, indeed, the old struggles between the Senate and the *Schütting* (the aldermen of the Company of Merchants) had

[1] See art. *Das Grossherzogthum Oldenburg in seinen öffentlichen Zuständen* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. IX (1854). Cf. Oncken's essay on *Grossherzog Peter von Oldenburg* (1827–1900) in *Histor.-polit. Aufsätze und Reden* (1914), vol. I.

come to an end; and the Senate, a large proportion of which consisted of 'men of learning,' had abandoned its right of filling up vacancies in it by cooptation in favour of an elaborate indirect process in combination with the representative civic body (*Bürgerschaft*). The financial condition of the state was satisfactory, though largely relying on that spirit of independent effort which was peculiarly characteristic of Bremen social life. But there was much that was antiquated in the life of the community in both town and country, and there were many complaints against the existing educational system. Though as a matter of fact there was little corruption in the government, the mass of the population had accustomed itself to look upon the public administration as carried on in the interest of a few families, more especially since not more than about 600 persons were entitled to be summoned to the meetings of the civic body. Thus there was material for agitation in March 1848; and, on the 8th of that month, the Senate was besieged in the *Rathaus* by a multitude petitioning for a new constitution based on the principle of equality of rights for all, with the accompaniment of the usual demands. The Senate, after pointing out the necessity of the assent of the *Bürgerschaft*, granted what was asked; and, for a time, the leaders of the democracy, and more especially a carpenter named Wischmann, were masters of the situation. Instead of 600 select members, the *Bürgerschaft* now numbered a total of 1200, who elected a representative body of 300, and with these now lay the main administrative authority of the state; for the Senate, reduced in numbers and practically elected by the *Bürgerschaft*, retained a suspensive veto only. It was not, however, till the middle of 1849 that advanced democratic opinions asserted their preponderance among the citizens—a result ascribed largely to Rudolf Dulon, a rationalist Bremen cleric, who as speaker and journalist became a central figure of radicalism for

north-eastern Germany, seconded by a bankrupt agitator, Johannes Rösing. But, by this time, the Senate had recovered courage, and the reaction was beginning to assert itself in other states. A protracted conflict followed. After the Senate had demanded from the *Bürgerschaft*, in September 1851, a revision of the reformed constitution, the Federal authority intervened; and, in March 1852, a conservative revision of the electoral law and the constitution was set on foot. But, though the revolutionary movement thus came to an end (Dulon was silenced and his journal suppressed), the old constitution was only partially restored, for the *Bürgerschaft* remained an elected body, albeit consisting only of 150 members chosen according to a system of classes. The Senate had, however, recovered its absolute veto, and, on the whole, its authority had gained rather than suffered by a movement which had been too sudden for the traditional forces of Bremen civic life[1].

At Lübeck, the Senate and *Bürgerschaft*, whose twelve colleges each had a vote in discussions with the Senate, were on very good terms (as became a political community long limited to very modest numbers), when the Revolution of 1848 knocked at its door. Liberty of the press was, of course, granted, and a revised constitution was proclaimed, on April 8th, as valid from that day. But as the new *Bürgerschaft* was to be elected by the citizens in classes, there was a residuum of non-voters, in whose interests a mob, on October 9th, laid siege to a meeting of the privileged body. Finally, on December 30th, the revised constitution was promulgated by the Senate, in which the electoral franchise, to be exercised in eleven electoral districts, was made universal and certain lesser changes were introduced. This constitution endured, thanks to the restored mutual

[1] See *Die freie Stadt Bremen in ihrer politischen und culturgeschichtlichen Entwickelung* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VIII (1853).

goodwill and the inherited love of liberty traditional in the ancient head of the Hansa[1].

Finally, in Hamburg, which in the matter of constitutional reforms had lagged behind the sister-towns, outstripped by her in commerce, not a little bitterness had, of late years, arisen between Senate and *Bürgerschaft*, partly on account of the enormous expenditure consequent upon the great fire of 1842, partly from other causes. A long-standing grievance was the virtual restriction of membership of the *Bürgerschaft* to owners of freehold landed property of a certain value (1000 dollars specie within the town or double that value without) (*Erbgesessene*); and, in February 1848, a committee had been formed for drafting a petition for the removal of this restriction. The meeting for the signing of the petition had been fixed for March 3rd, on which day, though not at the meeting itself, some disturbances took place. On March 9th, at another public meeting, eleven points (afterwards increased to twelve), including universal suffrage and eligibility, were agreed upon; and, at an unusually large assembly of the *Bürgerschaft* (901), on March 13th, in the midst of great public excitement, a deputation to the Senate was chosen. But it soon appeared, to the resentment of the multitude, that the men elected were all members of the *Bürgerschaft* itself, and in fact out of sympathy with the twelve points. Hereupon, the democratic clubs in the city began to agitate for the election of a constituent assembly; and, after a long struggle had resulted in the acceptance of such an assembly by Senate and *Bürgerschaft*, it held its first meeting on December 17th and chose Dr Baumeister, the head of the entire reform movement, as its chairman. The constitution elaborated by it, and representing above all the views of the *Deutsche Klub*, the organ of the 'respectable democracy,' was finally

[1] See art. *Lübeck in seinen neueren und neuesten Zuständen* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VIII (1853).

passed on July 11th, 1849. It provided for a *Bürgerschaft* of 500, elected for two years on a broadly democratic basis, and, directly elected by it, a Senate or *Rat* of nine members, with six syndics as expert assessors, which, instead of an absolute, was only to have a not very effective suspensive, veto. The existing Senate, not unnaturally, objected, and the situation was complicated by the arrival in Hamburg on August 13th of part of the Prussian troops returning from Holstein. A collision with the murmuring multitude was avoided by the tact of their commander; but, a few days later, a large Prussian force, with artillery, occupied the city.

The situation had changed with regard to both internal and external affairs. As to the former, though on September 20th the *Bürgerschaft* courageously asserted the right of free meeting, it shortly afterwards approved the Senate's proposal of a joint commission of nine for the revision of the constitution passed by the constituent assembly. That assembly held its last meeting on May 2nd, 1850; and on May 23rd the joint commission submitted the revised constitution, which, having been approved by the Senate, was adopted by a majority in the *Bürgerschaft*. It constituted a Senate of fifteen, jointly elected by the Senate itself and the *Bürgerschaft*, and a *Bürgerschaft* of 192, half of whom were to be chosen secretly and directly by the citizens of the state, while the other half were to be elected indirectly by landed proprietors and others. The revised constitution inevitably gave rise to both democratic and conservative protests; and the Senate abstained from hurrying matters. At last, on April 27th, 1852, a committee of the Federal Diet prohibited the introduction of the constitution in its existing (revised) form; and on August 21st, 1853, an Austro-Prussian note objected to any attempt at making the (unrevised) constitution of May 1850 the basis of a renewed revision. The impasse was complete, and with it

the triumph of the policy of conservative half-resistance was assured[1].

Although, in surveying the movement which, in or about March 1848, spread with unexampled rapidity through nearly every German state and shook many German thrones, it is not always possible to distinguish cause from consequence, the irresistible force exhibited by that movement in the secondary and smaller states of the Confederation was indisputably due, in the main, to the extraordinary suddenness and apparent completeness of its triumph, at the first onset, in Vienna and in Berlin. The Austrian revolution of March 14th and the following days was slightly earlier in its outbreak than that which ensued in the Prussian capital, and which owed something, at least, of its violence to the news from Vienna. In itself, the helpless collapse, in the face of a clamorous city, of a Government renowned as the Austrian had been during the last half-century is perhaps the most astounding episode in the whole story told in the present chapter. The effects of this revolution upon what then still bore the name of the Austrian monarchy can here only be noted in passing, while the consequent successive changes in the relations between that monarchy and German national life will become apparent as we proceed. Of the incidents marking its actual course, only so much will be noted as may suffice for making our narrative intelligible as a whole.

In the period following on the Revolution of 1830, Metternich, as has already been observed[2], though not adverse in principle to measures of reform, had, in internal as well as in Federal and foreign affairs, become more and more disinclined for change. As the years went on, and illwill towards the existing system of government, or at least dissatisfaction with its results, accumulated on all

[1] See art. *Hamburg's Verfassungskämpfe während d. letzten zehn Jahre* in *Die Gegenwart*, vol. IX (1854). [2] Cf. pp. 241–2, *ante*.

sides, he had all but come to cherish a quasi-fatalistic belief that the present condition of things would last his time, and that he need not look beyond. Yet this belief did not go very deep, and dark clouds were visibly gathering round the aged statesman[1]. In February 1848, his personal position, notwithstanding the prestige still attaching to his name, could hardly be called stable. The Emperor Ferdinand was a nullity; Archduke Lewis, the president of the Conference of State, shunned responsibility; Count Kolowrat, with his reputation for Liberal opinions in home matters, still seemed a formidable rival. Thus, the Chancellor of State, in the opinion of one of the ablest and the most faithful of his subordinates[2], stood 'alone, crippled, powerless.' And, on all sides, grave perils were portentously arising for the state. In Switzerland, the defeat of the *Sonderbund* by the Confederation, which calmly defied the intervention of Austria and Prussia, had raised the self-consciousness of some of the radical cantons so high as even to imperil the security of the Lombard frontier. In Italy, stirred, even before the outbreak of the French Revolution, from Turin to Rome, and from Rome to Sicily, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, never reconciled to Austrian rule, was on the eve of revolt. The leaders of the party of reform had been arrested at Venice; on February 22nd the Viceroy, Archduke Rainer, proclaimed a state of siege at Milan; and the Austrian Government placed its whole trust in the army under the vigorous and circumspect command of the veteran, Field-marshal Count Radetzky. In Hungary, the arduous struggle carried on by the Magyars on behalf of ancient constitutional rights and complete racial ascendancy had advanced into a new stage with the accession of Archduke Stephen to the dignity of Palatine. More moderate counsels had been entirely cast into the

[1] In February 1848, Metternich was in his 75th year.

[2] Count A. von Hübner, *Ein Jahr meines Lebens*, 1848–9 (1891), p. 8.

shade by the demands of the advanced party headed by Kossuth; and, as yet, the Slav populations, from Croatia to Transylvania, had been unable to assert their nationalist pretensions in the face of the Magyars. Galicia was quiet, under the strong rule of Count Franz Stadion. In the so-called German provinces (including Bohemia), symptoms of discontent had, indeed, made their appearance; but these seem to have been, in the main, due to the sufferings caused by the bad harvests of the last two years. Especially in Vienna and its neighbourhood, there had been some rioting, accompanied by attacks upon bakers' shops; and political feeling had begun to show a bitterness unusual in that light-hearted capital, and, among members of the educated classes, was venting itself in periodical debates, especially in the rooms of the Legal and Political Reading Club (*Juridisch-politischer Leseverein*).

Metternich was not long in perceiving the significance of the events at Paris, and, on February 28th, wrote to Berlin, requesting that Radowitz might once more be sent to Vienna in order to settle measures of joint action. But in the evening came the news of the proclamation of the French republic, and on the next day Vienna had become a general discussion forum. A financial panic followed, and spread rapidly to Prague and to Pest. The Chamber of Deputies at Pressburg, without a mandate for the purpose and without the assent of the Magnates, adopted an address demanding a responsible Hungarian Ministry; and Kossuth, with Joseph Irinyi and others, drew up a kind of national charter with twelve points (including the union of Transylvania with Hungary). But their negotiations with certain Vienna radicals—mainly, it would seem, students—for a joint management of the revolutionary movement came to nothing; and in the Austrian capital the agitation, as was inevitable, took a turn of its own.

The Estates of Lower Austria were to meet on March 13th,

and Court and Government began to prepare for this as for the critical date. There was some talk of bringing the popular Archduke John on the scene; but his time had not yet quite come. The friends of Kolowrat, and the *entourage* of Archduchess Sophia and her husband Archduke Francis Charles (heir to the throne and father of the young Archduke Francis Joseph, to whom at Pest Kossuth had already pointed as the coming constitutional king), were alike speculating on the expediency of concessions to Liberalism, which could not but include the removal of Metternich. As yet, he had not thrown up the game, and was negotiating with Radowitz, who had duly arrived at Vienna on March 4th, for a congress of Princes at Dresden, where (with the countenance of Russia) measures should be adopted for the advancement of Federal reform. But neither Metternich nor anyone else displayed any intention of conjuring the lowering storm at home by means of concessions. He had told Hübner in a parting conversation that he looked upon himself as one of the pillars of a vaulted structure which on their withdrawal must fall to the ground. But he was losing all hope of being long able to defer either his own downfall or the outburst of the revolution. In an address for presentation to the Lower Austrian Estates, prepared in the house of Alexander Bach, an advocate who played a prominent part in the political agitation, and numerously signed at the reading-club and elsewhere, a definite line of action was clearly laid down. For, not only did it call for the familiar series of legislative and administrative reforms—including popular representation with the power of imposing taxes; but it insisted on the necessity of Austria being on her guard against the national programmes of both Frankfort and Pest, and relying on the principle of centralised and democratic unity. Much about the same time (March 11th) an address, voted by a public meeting at Prague, which proclaimed the unity and equality of Germans and Čechs,

was sent up to Vienna, for what it was worth as an expression of the opinion of the Bohemian capital and population.

On March 12th, the Sunday immediately preceding the day of the meeting of the Lower Austrian Estates, a clamorous assembly of students in the University voted a petition which two popular professors (Hye and Endlicher) undertook to lay before the Emperor, but to which, at the *Burg*, they received no binding reply. Meanwhile, the Council of State was induced by Metternich, who had on the previous day received reassuring reports from the chief of the police, Count Sedlnitzky, to agree to inform the Estates on the morrow, that it was the Emperor's intention to summon a meeting of representatives of the several old-established provincial Estates for discussion, with a committee appointed by the Emperor, of their rights of representation. It was thus by means of a modified imitation of the Prussian *Vereinigte Landtag* that this device—almost the last—of Metternich proposed to avert the threatening catastrophe.

The eventful thirteenth of March at Vienna began with another tumultuous gathering of students in the University, whence they marched in a long procession to the *Landhaus*, in which the Lower Austrian Estates were assembling. Here, in the presence of a large crowd, a young medical man named Adolf Fischhof assumed the direction of the students, and, after much turbulence inside and outside the hall, at length obtained an assurance equivalent to an acceptance of their demands by the Estates. A large deputation from these now proceeded to the *Burg*, followed by an excited multitude. Military preparations had been made, and some fatal collisions occurred between soldiery and populace along the route, whereupon the rioting spread further. The Burgomaster, Czapka (who soon afterwards had to throw up his office), was urged to induce the commander of the troops, Archduke Albert, whose first measures had been energetic, to order their withdrawal; but he deemed it

wiser, in view of his unpopularity, to resign his post. Within the *Burg* itself the utmost confusion and distress prevailed. The State Conference could not make up its mind to adopt either Metternich's advice that the garrison of the *Burg* should remain entirely on the defensive till reinforcements had arrived from Bohemia and Moravia, or the proposal of Archduke Max and Field-marshal Prince Windischgrätz to open fire with heavy guns on the multitude. At last, it was resolved to issue a proclamation that the Emperor was prepared to grant to the Estates everything required by the existing condition of affairs; and, after much hesitation, the students were given permission to arm, and were speedily supplied with arms from the arsenal. In the midst of the hurlyburly of Ministers, officers, deputations and others in the apartments of Archduke Lewis, which had for the moment become the centre of government (or anarchy), Metternich, when his resignation was on all sides demanded or pressed upon him, bore himself with perfect self-possession. On his appealing to Archduke Lewis, he was told to decide for himself, and thereupon announced his readiness to resign. The words which he added and the letter of resignation to the Emperor which he immediately drew up were calm and dignified, and manifestly sincere. The power before which he succumbed was a *de facto* power; the principle to which he adhered was the *de jure* principle. In the same night he was entreated by Windischgrätz and the Empress to reconsider his determination; but he refused. His public career had come to an end[1], while

[1] On the day after his resignation the Prince and his wife took flight from Count Taaffe's house to the Moravian frontier, where for a few days they found refuge at Felsburg, a country-seat of Prince Liechtenstein. Thence they had to take their departure for Olmütz, and, being there refused admission by the local authorities, pursued their way, amidst many discomforts, difficulties and dangers, to Teplitz, Dresden, the Hague and, after a fortnight's rest there, to London, which they reached on April 21st. Their

fire and sword were at work outside the Emperor's palace. No humiliation was spared the fallen statesman, though, happily for the fair fame of Vienna, he escaped unscathed from that city. Nor, though he lived till 1859 and saw Vienna again, and though he by no means remained mute or uncomplaining as to the course of public events and changes of policy which he survived to see, was any vestige of an influence formerly unequalled in extent and continuousness ever recovered by him.

Metternich's downfall, unlike that of many a Minister upon whom popular wrath has concentrated itself in the day of revolt, was at once followed by a complete change in the system of government with which he had been identified; and the only question now seemed to be the rate of speed at which the new order of things should come into existence. The students of the University and the civic guard, whose numbers were augmented, shared the responsibility of keeping order, except in the *Burg* and at the Bank and the War-office, and on the whole did their duty efficiently, though at one of the gates and in some of the suburbs the mob was master of the situation. Windischgrätz, who on the 14th was made responsible for the security of the capital, preferred to bide his time and only proclaimed a state of siege in some of the manufacturing suburbs. Meanwhile, in response to continued public meetings (where Bach still played the leading part) and deputations, the enrolment of a national guard and the abolition of the censorship of the press were officially announced. In the State Conference, it was proposed to

flight from Vienna was organised, and their whole journey to the Hague guarded, by Baron Charles von Hügel, the eminent naturalist, traveller and diplomatist, whose family had been intimate with Metternich's, and who showed to him a chivalrous fidelity. See Baron A. von Hügel's memoir of his father (Cambridge, 1905), and cf. the interesting *Story of the Escape of Prince Metternich*, published by Baron F. von Hügel from original papers in vol. 1 of *The National Review* (1883).

add the voluntary grant of a constitution; but to this the majority demurred, preferring the promise of a meeting of Estates, from all parts of the empire except Hungary, to be held on July 3rd. But the cry for a constitution continued; and, on the 15th, the Emperor, accompanied by Archdukes Francis Charles and Francis Joseph, drove through the streets of Vienna, and, to the multitude which thronged round his carriage, promised the grant of 'everything.' On the same day, Archduke Stephen, the Palatine of Hungary, arrived in Vienna with the Hungarian address, now accepted by the Magnates, and was received with unbounded enthusiasm, as was Kossuth, who followed in his wake. It seemed as if a golden age had opened on both sides of the Leitha; and a general illumination of the capital, amidst which the good Emperor once more showed himself to his beloved Viennese, closed the fourth day of the victorious Revolution.

The Vienna news was joyfully received in the different parts of the monarchy. The Palatine of Hungary had been created Regent with the right of proposing for appointment a responsible Ministry; and Kossuth returned to Pressburg as the hero of the day. As in Hungary the difficulty of the relations with Croatia (where the office of *Banus* was at the time vacant) was for the present ignored, so at Prague, where the promise of a constitution had met with an eager welcome, and the perennial jealousy between Čechs and Germans was for the time repressed. At Graz, the capital of Styria, where the first consequence of the news had been an angry demonstration against the Jesuits, the diet of the duchy and the municipality petitioned for far-reaching constitutional changes. In Cracow, the Governor (Count Moritz Deym) was prevailed upon to release a number of (Polish) political prisoners. This example had to be followed at Lemberg, the capital of Galicia; but here Stadion refused to allow a general arming of the population, and, relying on the Lemberg garrison, set the first example

in Austria of successful resistance to the revolutionary movement. With this exception, its advance was unchecked throughout the monarchy; and its first and decisive stages had an immense effect in every part of Germany and, as will be seen, met with an immediate response at Berlin.

In Vienna, events continued their course. Although order continued to be maintained (though not without difficulty) by the students and the civic guard, so that on March 18th Windischgrätz issued a notice that tranquillity was now returning to the capital, and although some attempts were made to restrict the growing licence of the press, the tide was still flowing onwards. A new Ministry was formed on the broad basis of the promises of March 15th. The Presidency was, as a matter of course, conferred upon Metternich's rival, Kolowrat, and Count Ficquelmont took Foreign Affairs, which had been temporarily carried on by Freiherr von Lebzeltern. The department of Finance fell to Freiherr von Kübeck, whose great experience, more especially of railway matters, had secured him general confidence. The Ministry of War remained unfilled till the beginning of April, when (Archduke Albert having resigned the military command in the whole of Upper and Lower Austria) it was accepted by P. von Zanini. Count L. Taaffe, Minister of Justice, was known as a strictly Conservative official; on the other hand, Liberal opinion was gratified by the nomination of Baron Sommaruga as the head of a newly-formed department of Education. But the most popular choice was that of Freiherr Franz von Pillersdorff as Minister of the Interior. He had long been a prominent official, but also a consistent friend of reform; and when, on May 4th, he exchanged the Home Office for the Presidency of the Ministry, it seemed to have found its proper chief. Count Kolowrat's resignation 'for reasons of health' was followed by that of Freiherr von Kübeck, who was succeeded by the resourceful Freiherr

Philip von Krauss. Before this, the imperial State and Conference Council was dissolved—in other words, the Cabinet, which had long stood behind and above the Ministry in Austria, had ceased to exist, and with it had gone the influence of Archduke Lewis, who, with the Emperor's permission, withdrew altogether from public affairs. Officially, nobody now stood between the Emperor and his Ministers, upon whose advice, on constitutional principles, he had alone to depend; though it was announced that the assistance of his brother Archduke Francis Charles was still at his disposal, and suspected that his sister-in-law Archduchess Sophia was always ready with her counsel. It should be added that the fall of Metternich had drawn after it that of the chief of the police, Sedlnitzky—whose office, including the supreme censorship of the press, was now abolished, its functions being merged in those of the State Chancery—and that of the Burgomaster of Vienna, Czapka.

The new Ministry, both before and after its partial reconstruction, had to face a task of unexampled difficulty. While there was hardly a part of the monarchy from which pressure was not being put upon it to satisfy demands for radical political change, the capital remained in a condition approaching political and social anarchy, tempered only by the efforts of the City Council, the Civic Guard and above all the committee of the University students, which was at this time accepted by the public as a kind of tribunal of arbitration on all matters of dispute. It was not wonderful that the incense of all this admiration and adulation, which treated them as a sort of Government behind or above the Government, should have mounted to the students' heads. The anarchy which they pretended to control found its most blatant utterance in the suddenly emancipated press, which rushed headlong into the wildest and grossest licence. At the same time, the change in the conditions of journalism attracted back to Vienna political

writers of mark who had voluntarily expatriated themselves in the days of repression—such as Ignaz Kuranda, editor of the Leipzig *Grenzboten*, and Franz Schuselka, whose return signified a notable addition to the combative strength of the progressives.

But the unanimity of purpose among them was already in danger[1]. In its earliest stage, the revolution had been favoured by all classes except those on whose support the old *régime* had rested—the aristocracy, together with a large proportion of the military and civil services, and the *haute finance* and those under its control. From the movement, so far as it had gone, the middle-class alone could be said to have derived any appreciable benefit; while, as yet, it had no reason for fearing the working-class, and had failed to perceive the significance of the symptoms of the inevitable social conflict which had from the first made themselves manifest in the revolution of Paris. But this good understanding between the classes, largely due to their mutual ignorance of one another, and cemented for the moment by the idealist enthusiasm of the University students, soon showed signs of giving way; and, so early as March 26th, Vienna was alarmed by rumours of an intended rising of workmen, to meet which military precautions were, as it proved unnecessarily, taken. In order to mitigate the increasing distress, the Government set itself to provide various public opportunities of work—the clearing of the channel of the Danube, the erection of buildings by the riverside, the repair of roads, and the like. But the mass of the unemployed seemed desirous of licence rather than of work, and indulged in demonstrations by day and night, as if life had no other object. The excesses committed against religious houses in or near Vienna, on the other hand, were not to be laid specially to the charge of working-

[1] Cf. Marx, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution, or Germany in* 1848, Engl. Tr. (1904), pp. 40 sqq.

men; indeed, the most scandalous of them was an attack made by armed students upon the Liguorian convent at Stockerau. The rural districts it was, at the same time, sought to keep quiet by the promise of relief from payment of *robot*—the compensation of landowners to be settled before the lapse of a year. In all these matters, the Ministry endeavoured to conciliate public opinion as best they could. One right, which had not yet been regulated by law—that of free petition and association—was granted without stint, as it certainly could not have been refused without danger. On April 1st appeared the new press-law, which contained certain very moderate reservations; but, when a students' deputation, accompanied by Kuranda and Schuselka, remonstrated on the subject with Pillersdorff, he declared himself ready to consider a counterdraft to be prepared by the students. Finally, with the sanction of the Government and the municipal authorities, a committee of citizens was formed (April 16th) for the maintenance of public and the protection of private safety and property. It is noteworthy that, in the midst of all these difficulties and troubles, the news from Italy, true or coloured, caused a burst of patriotism, in the shape of volunteer enlistment in which all classes—including students and handicraftsmen (though the latter not without some attempts at intimidation by their fellows)—took part in considerable numbers. On March 22nd-3rd, Radetzky evacuated Milan; on the earlier of these days, the Venetian republic was proclaimed; on the 23rd, Charles Albert of Sardinia crossed the Ticino. It was not till May that the Austrian Commander-in-chief issued forth from the Quadrilateral, and began the struggle which led up to the great victory of Custozza (July 5th), followed in the next year by Novara and the complete triumph of Austria.

To return. On the German national question the new Austrian Government showed itself not less pliable; and all the earlier proceedings at Frankfort (of which more

below) preparatory to the establishment of a German parliament and, through it, of a national empire, were eagerly supported by Viennese Liberalism. The Ministry, again, joined in with popular feeling, and a comprehensive deputation to Frankfort was accompanied by the confidential commissioner of the Government, Anton von Schmerling, who afterwards held a leading position there. On April 2nd, the German flag (black, red and gold) fluttered from the tower of St Stephen's, as well as in front of the University *aula*, while a third was borne into the imperial presence, where it was received 'with emotion.' When, at the end of April, the elections to the Frankfort National Assembly were held in Austria, the results were not decisive, and the Austrian deputies, so far as they put in an appearance, from the first held an isolated position there. At Vienna, popular feeling had not yet troubled itself as to the connexion between the national movement and the idea of a Prussian hegemony, though the Austrian Foreign Office was alive to these contingencies under the new as it had been under the old *régime*, and Ficquelmont, so early as March 24th, issued a precautionary circular despatch on the subject.

Meanwhile, in the Austrian monarchy itself, the constitution, in whose name so many changes were being effected, was slowly struggling into existence. Members of the various provincial diets, to the number of thirty, in response to Pillersdorff's invitation, gathered in Vienna to discuss the clauses of the constitution with the Lower Austrian Estates; and in several of the diets themselves—in that of Carniola at Laibach, in that of Styria at Graz, and elsewhere—petitions for specific changes were drawn up. Everywhere, except in Tyrol, where loyalty to the Throne continued to be the sole political inspiration, the cry was for revision, reorganisation, reform. But the most far-reaching demands for change came from Prague, whence two great petitions were in turn sent up, the second bearing

the signature of the Governor, Count Rudolf Stadion, extorted from him by a clamorous multitude. He at the same time tendered his resignation, which was accepted (April 6th), and in his place Count Leo Thun, one of the most widely trusted of the Bohemian nobles, soon afterwards assumed the direction of affairs at Prague. The answer to the second petition promptly followed, promising the grant of perfect equality between the Čech and German nationalities and the speedy summons of a Bohemian diet, as well as full consideration in the coming general diet at Vienna of the Bohemian demand for the union of Moravia and (Austrian) Silesia with the Bohemian kingdom under a central administration at Prague. Home rule policy found definite expression in the refusal of the National Committee at Prague, and of the Slav districts of Bohemia in general, to take part in the elections for the Frankfort parliament, while in the mixed districts they were only partially held. The Bohemian Government (Count Thun had not yet entered on office) feebly announced that these elections were permitted, without being obligatory, and a cry, which necessarily created alarm in Hungary, arose for a parliament representing all the Slav subjects of the Austrian monarchy, to be held at Prague. On the other hand, Eger and several other German towns protested against the National Committee and its scheme of home rule; so that here, too, the evolution had been rapid, and disunion was patent.

In other parts of the monarchy, also, the racial conflict between Slavs and Germans continued unappeased. In Galicia, though the resolute rule of Count Franz Stadion had averted any violent outbreak, an amnesty for political offences proclaimed on March 20th had failed to calm the national agitation, it continued at Lemberg, and in a highly organised form at Cracow, where a serious rising was put down by force (April 26th–7th), and communist agents were

at work among the Galician peasantry. But a Ruthene counter-manifestation, and unwillingness to offend Russia, operated against concessions to the Polish nationalists.

Throughout the Hungarian kingdom, and in Transylvania (except among the Saxons at Hermannstadt), the idea of union and the success of the national movement were hailed with enthusiasm; and the Government at Vienna was soon obliged to place the whole administration of the kingdom in Hungarian hands, reserving to itself only the nomination to the supreme command of the army and the right to certain financial exactions. On the other hand, the Slav movement against Magyar domination was growing apace. Already on March 23rd, Baron Jellačič had been named *Banus* by a national assembly of the 'three united kingdoms Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.' The demands of the diet which hereupon met at Agram (May 1st) were not all granted by the Austrian Government; but the appointment of the new *Banus* as Field-marshal and Commander-in-chief of the Military Frontier showed that the movement against the Magyar pretensions was not unwelcome at Vienna. The Hungarian diet, in its turn, sent reassuring messages to Agram, and was hereupon dissolved by the Emperor in person (April 11th). But the Slav agitation continued to increase, both among the Serbs, in the south, where the Illyrian tricolour was universally hoisted as the symbol of national union, and in Transylvania, where the 'Rouman' element was incited against Magyar and 'Saxon' domination, and the Saxons in their turn were unwilling to be merged in the Magyars. The Croatians under their new *Banus* (whose pretensions were, again, opposed by the Italian Dalmatians) were struggling for the cause of the Slav nationality, and of their own political existence, against the Hungarian Government and its attempt to supersede Jellačič; for Kossuth was resolutely driving the ship of state forward into the tempest, sending

plenipotentiaries to Paris and to Frankfort, and evoking enthusiastic efforts for the creation of a national Hungarian army. Such were some of the troubles which confronted the helpless Government at Vienna, at a time when the Austrian dominion in Italy was still in jeopardy.

As the discussions concerning the reorganisation of the monarchy continued among the deputies of the several Estates assembled in Vienna, and among the Ministers who were preparing a constitution, to be imposed by the authority of the Crown, it was clear that the future of the Slav nationality in its dominions would be hardly less difficult to determine than the relations between Austria and Germany, and that the latter could not fail to be affected by the former. While the statesmen of the older school, even the Liberally-disposed veteran Baron Philip von Wessenberg, would not listen to the ideas of a federation which should include with the Hungarian and Bohemian a kingdom of Slovenia comprising southern Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and the Littoral, the revolutionary party proper desired a German national monarchy, in which the German parts of Austria should be merged. In contrast with these fanciful schemes, the draft constitution finally promulgated by an imposing State Conference, held for the purpose in the presence of all the Archdukes in Vienna and signed by the Emperor (April 25th), proclaimed the union of all lands forming part of the Austrian monarchy as an indivisible constitutional state. The familiar 'March' concessions were granted to all subjects of the empire; while the diets in the several provinces were left in existence, a general diet of two Chambers (the senate to be nominated by the landowners and by the Crown), and a national guard for the entire monarchy, were established. Pillersdorff's constitution[1]

[1] For the text of this constitution, modelled by Pillersdorff on those of Belgium and Baden, see appendix to vol. 1 of Frhr. J. A. von Helfert's *Gesch. der Oesterreichischen Revolution* (1907).

was on the whole well received; but the conflict was not one to be settled by a sheet of paper.

Although vigour had been infused into the military administration by the appointment as Minister of War, in Zanini's stead, of the veteran general Count Theodor Baillet von Latour (who had taken prompt measures for the strengthening of the army in Italy, and, for this reason, would not send an Austrian corps to take part in the Schleswig-Holstein campaign), the radicals were compensated for this appointment by that of Baron Doblhoff, a politician of democratic sympathies, as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. At the same time, Wessenberg was named Foreign Minister in the place (temporarily filled by Lebzeltern) of the unpopular Ficquelmont. But neither the changes in the Ministry nor the exertions, such as they were, of the Central Committee formed on May 5th out of those of the citizens, the students and the National Guard, produced confidence at Court; and, once more, a crisis, if not a catastrophe, was felt to be imminent. On May 13th one of those mysterious rumours which have been thought suggestive of a secret understanding between the instigators of the various insurrections of this epoch spread at Berlin, to the effect that on May 15th there would be a great outbreak at Vienna.

On May 9th, Emperor Ferdinand had signed a provisional order for the elections for the general Austrian *Reichstag*, which was to meet on June 26th. This order was considered unsatisfactory, and the agitation against the constitution of April 25th was, probably with the aid of Hungarian influence, continued. Count Hoyos, the commander of the National Guard, now amounting to 40,000 men, was instructed to dissolve its committee, which had petitioned against this electoral order; but, in the end, it undertook to dissolve itself, and he resigned his office. On the evening of the 14th, both the National Guard and the military, with

artillery, were for a time under arms. Thus the 15th opened amidst great excitement, though on this very morning an official proclamation announced that the working-classes were in a condition of tranquillity. A tumultuous demonstration in the *aula* of the University against the constitution and for the establishment of a single-Chamber diet, as well as for the continuance of the committee of the National Guard, was taken up by the working-men in the suburbs; and the departure of the military was added to other demands. While the Ministers took shelter behind the necessity of obtaining the Emperor's consent, a vast procession of students, national guards, and working-men bore a monster petition through the streets, laid siege to the *Burg* and frightened the Emperor. When Hoyos stated that the National Guard could not be depended on, and there were only 8000 soldiers to oppose to them and to 6000 students, Pillersdorff threw up the game; and, early on the following morning, his manifesto apprised the revolutionised city of its triumph all along the line. The dissolution of the committee of the National Guard was revoked; the constitution of April 25th was to be reconsidered by the *Reichstag*, together with the electoral law; and the *Reichstag* itself was to consist of a single Chamber of members elected without any census. The security of the capital was committed to the joint charge of the military and the National Guard; but it was only at the request of the latter that the soldiers were to be permitted to intervene. Pillersdorff and his colleagues, who signed this manifesto, declared that they only held their offices till the Emperor could appoint other advisers in their place who possessed the public confidence. The Emperor approved this offer of resignation; and the deadlock was thus complete. There was but one thing which could heighten the general panic; the *Kaiserstadt* suddenly became apprehensive of the departure of the sovereign. The plan of his flight had been

carefully prepared, and, in view of the arrangement that, from the 18th onwards, the *Burg* was to be quietly garrisoned by the National Guard and the military, it was successfully accomplished on the previous day, when (without the knowledge even of Pillersdorff) the Emperor was carried off, with Archduke Francis Charles and his family, to Salzburg, and thence to Innsbruck. Here they were welcomed with enthusiastic loyalty on the evening of the 19th; and, on the next day, an imperial proclamation 'To my peoples' was issued, promising attention to their wishes, if 'really general' and prepared in legal form. At Vienna, the Ministry, on hearing of the flight, notified it to the public, adding that Count Hoyos had been sent after the Emperor to persuade him to return. The news created a 'really general' consternation, and, while an attempt to excite the working-men to the appointment of a provisional Government with a view to the proclamation of a republic was indignantly repressed, the Ministry was supported by the great majority of the population in its measures for the public safety. There was no longer any question of quarrelling with the constitution of April 25th; and, while the existing committees were reorganised, a new Committee of Twenty was appointed, in whose loyalty it was thought possible to put trust; the National Guard was placed under the orders of the commander of the military, Count Charles Auersperg; and in it the academic legion was declared to be incorporated as a no longer independent body. From several of the provinces came assurances of loyalty, and in Prague it seemed as if Count Leo Thun would be able to preserve the authority of the Government.

But, very soon, the revolutionary party at Vienna recovered from the effects of the panic caused by the Emperor's flight. The university year had been by authority declared to have terminated; but the students' committee announced that the academic legion would

under no condition dissolve itself; and, when its dissolution within four-and-twenty hours was ordered, its members refused to lay down their arms (May 26th). Hereupon, large bodies of working-men from the suburbs advanced upon the inner town; the first collision with the troops ensued; alarm-bells sounded, and barricades were erected. Deputations pressed in upon Pillersdorff and his colleagues, who, at their wits' end, promised everything demanded—the maintenance of the academic legion, the provision of employment, the confinement of the troops in their barracks unless their aid were requested by the National Guard. But even these and further promises proved unavailing; the barricades remained, and Hoyos was deliberately left in the hands of the citizens as a hostage for the Government. Attempts were made to detain other officials, but these were frustrated; on the other hand, there was a general flight of persons of mark or rank, and even of members of the Administration. Finally, Pillersdorff committed the whole of the property of both state and dynasty to the guardianship of a new committee, which superseded the old civic committee and consisted of one hundred members: citizens, students and national guards[1]. For the time, this Committee of Security, of which Fischhof assumed the direction, showed itself conscious of its high responsibility. Meanwhile, those who desired a restoration of the old order—and their number had been swelled by the events of May 26th—continued, without any real hopefulness, to look towards Innsbruck. Hither the diplomatic body had followed the Emperor; and, supported by numerous deputations and addresses, negotiations continued as to his return to his capital. Pillersdorff, however, and those of his colleagues who temporarily remained in office with him, declined to guarantee the Emperor's safety by agreeing to make the

[1] The City Council named twenty members, and the several companies of the National Guard and the academic legion one each.

military power once more independent of alien control; and Stadion, who paid a visit to Vienna in hopes of reorganising the Government there, perceived that the time for such a process had not yet come. In the Austrian capital the work of the Revolution could only be undone by uprooting it; and for this purpose a different agency would have to be employed.

While the Hungarian Government was striving to establish relations of intimacy with the German national movement at its Frankfort centre, the Slavs throughout the Austrian monarchy were becoming more and more aware of the danger threatening their nationality by the achievement of German unity; while the political existence of Croatia and the neighbouring lands was imperilled by the newly-organised Magyar state. Hence the desire of the Croatians and other southern Slavs in the monarchy to bring about an understanding with the Čechs of Bohemia and Moravia, and, if possible, with the Poles, the favourites of European Liberalism; and the scheme, entered into with protestations of loyalty to the dynasty, of a general Slav congress at Prague. This Congress, of which the Čechs composed more than two-thirds, was designed to bring about an offensive and defensive alliance among the Slav populations, followed by the reconstruction of the Austrian monarchy as a federal state free from the control of a united Germany; but, though the several populations concerned communicated their various demands to the Austrian Government, the whole Congress was on the point of adopting as its final resolution a manifesto drafted by the Bohemian historian Palacký and appealing to the democratic sympathies of a future congress of European nations, when a sudden stop was put to its proceedings. In June, an insurrection of Čech national guards and students broke out in Prague, devoid of any distinct purpose and, as it would seem, instigated by Magyar intrigue, and the Congress was ignominiously dispersed. Windischgrätz, whose

resumption of the military command had caused much irritation in the Bohemian capital, without difficulty suppressed a rising on June 12th; but, Count Leo Thun having fallen into the hands of the students, negotiations ensued, during which the insurgents brought forward their demands, amounting to the cessation of any but a personal union between Bohemia and Austria. The Government commissioners sent from Vienna were prepared to give way and, in return for the removal of the barricades, to relieve Windischgrätz of his command. But, on the renewal of the rising by irresponsible combatants, he decided on demanding the unconditional surrender of the city. Hereupon, Prague capitulated unconditionally; martial law was proclaimed, the Čech national guards were sent about their business, and numerous arrests took place.

The significance of the Prague insurrection lies in the fact that Windischgrätz treated it as a revolt against all authority, while at Vienna, where it had been at first resented as an anti-German movement, it soon came to be regarded by the democracy now in power as a conflict with brute military force. But its repression broke up the Čech party of movement; the promised Bohemian diet was never held, and the pan-Slavic agitation was for a time silenced. Above all, the surrender to Windischgrätz had given self-confidence and self-consciousness to the army, which was heightened by Radetzky's initial successes and what might almost be termed the second declaration of war in Italy (July 1st)[1].

Yet, though the final conflict with the Revolution was thus preparing itself, some time elapsed before it was actually waged. The forces on which the revolutionary movement depended, however suddenly set to work, had overspread a wide area and gone deep down into the

[1] The feeling that Austria still existed in the camp of her heroic general found expression in Grillparzer's famous lines.

population. In all the larger towns, and more especially in the capital, the radical elements in the population had driven on the movement to a stage far more advanced than middle-class Liberalism had had in view, when it was itself carried away by an impulse now difficult to moderate. And the class most powerfully affected by this advance was the peasantry, which in Austria, as in many other parts of Germany, once more firmly believed that its liberation from the burdens shutting it out from freedom would be achieved by the Revolution. Until serfdom had been wholly abolished, and the emancipation of the peasantry made a reality, the Revolution could confidently fall back on this section of the population. This fact, and the consequent necessity of satisfying the demands of the peasantry, became very evident in the proceedings of the provincial diets held in the interval which ensued before the final stage of the revolution at Vienna.

In the Upper Austrian diet, which assembled on July 24th, the representatives of the peasants included in it insisted on precedence being given to the question of the redemption of the burdens imposed on their class; and, as they scouted the view of the majority that compensation should be given to the landowners for the loss of *robot* and tithe, the diet was closed (September 26th) without a conclusion having been reached. In the Styrian diet, notwithstanding the protests of the peasants, the principle of compensation for the loss of tithes was adopted. Here and in Moravia, the chief controversies turned on race and language, as to which no definite conclusion could be reached; in Tyrol, where, except in the Italian districts, there was no difference of race, and where there was no trace of serfdom or of patrimonial jurisdiction, the diet addressed itself to the religious question, resolving that public worship should be restricted to the Church of Rome, although other confessions should not be formally excluded.

At Vienna, as in Bohemia and Galicia, no diets were at this time held; but the Ministry continued to look forward to the promised meeting of the *Reichstag* for support in its difficulties, of which none was more pressing than the financial: the deficit of the year ending in June 1848 amounted to 35 million florins, and the desperate expedients of the Finance Minister Krauss had brought only very partial relief. Since the Emperor's return to Vienna seemed indefinitely postponed, Pillersdorff, who was still there, and Doblhoff, who with Wessenberg was in attendance at Innsbruck, arranged that Archduke John should open the *Reichstag* in the sovereign's place. Accordingly, on June 15th, the Archduke was by an edict from the Emperor appointed Regent at Vienna till the imperial return; and, ten days later, he assumed the office, his election as *Reichsverweser* at Frankfort being by that time assured. Meanwhile, the elections to the Vienna *Reichstag* continued on the broadest basis of suffrage, under the management of the Committee of Security and the Democratic Club. This led to a quarrel between these bodies and Pillersdorff, who was at the same time urged by a deputation from Prague to direct the removal of Thun and Windischgrätz; and, the demand for the dismissal of Pillersdorff himself having been received by the Regent without an immediate refusal, he sent in his definitive resignation (July 8th), which was followed by that of two other Ministers. Hard measure has been dealt out to Pillersdorff, whose withdrawal was honourable to him, in reviewing his administration as a whole; nor can it be denied that few Ministers have more consistently followed the line of least resistance. Yet it may be questioned whether, without his self-sacrifice, the fabric of the state could have been kept together at all, and it is not easy to suggest who would have done better in his place. When about to depart for Frankfort, Archduke John charged Doblhoff with the formation of a Ministry, which took

office on the Archduke's return (July 19th). Together with Doblhoff's own name, those of the new Ministers of Commerce (Hornbostel) and of Justice (Bach) were intended to create confidence in the democratic character of the new Cabinet; but Bach, though remaining in touch with the party of movement, had of late kept his own counsel. When, in July, the *Reichstag* opened, nearly one-quarter of its total (383) consisted of actual peasants, and less than one-half of the entire body spoke German as their native tongue[1]. A Čech (Strobach) was chosen President, and he or the Polish Vice-president (Smolka) conducted the proceedings to the end. The *Reichstag*, before long, voted an address to the Emperor, which explicitly demanded[2] his return; and, on August 12th, he was, after an absence of three months, brought back to Schönbrunn. Of the general business of the *Reichstag*, the most protracted and the most important was, as was to be expected, concerned with the demands of the peasantry. A motion (by Hans Kudlich) for the abolition of all servile burdens, provision of compensation being held over, was, from every possible point of view, debated, in one form or another, for six weeks till, the Government having through Bach taken its stand on the principle of compensation, it was finally rejected; but, on September 7th, it was resolved that the abolition of burdens adopted by the *Reichstag* should be communicated to the Ministry for assent and execution[3]. Herewith, the interest of the peasantry in the proceedings of the general diet ended, while that of the general public had already turned from these to Hungarian and Croatian, as well as to Italian, affairs.

[1] Before it came to a close, this 'polyglot diet' adopted a resolution, that, for the benefit of its members, any motion proposed to it should on demand be translated into Polish, Ruthenian, Bohemian or Wallachian; Italian was allowed to be used in debate.

[2] *Forderung* was the term finally adopted.

[3] This seems to be the meaning of the chancery phrase '*zur beistimmenden Festigung*.'

While, as has been seen, the favourable results of the campaign in Italy encouraged, alike in military and in political circles, the hope that by a vigorous concentration of action the Austrian monarchy might yet recover itself, in both Hungary and Croatia the hostility between the nationalities was kept up by the diets of Pest and Agram, which sat in the summer of 1848. The Austrian Government gradually abandoned its intention of upholding the ascendancy of Hungary over Croatia and Slavonia, together with the maintenance of the union between Hungary and Transylvania; and Jellačič, the *Banus* of Croatia, became convinced that only with the goodwill of Austria could the southern Slavs become independent of Magyar dominion. His time came when Hungarian opinion, under the inspiration of Kossuth, and trusting to the creation of a national army, began to regard Austria as an alien Power, and to sympathise with Italy in her struggle for freedom and with Germany in her efforts towards national unity. If Austria ceased to be a German state, it must become a Slav empire, which would crush Hungarian autonomy. Armed conflicts broke out between the Hungarians and the Serbs of the Banat; and, by the middle of September, the Austrian Government made known its intention of withdrawing its recent concessions to Hungary. By the middle of September, too, the dictatorship of Kossuth was practically established, the Honved army formed and an unlimited issue of paper money put in circulation. Most of the fortresses in the kingdom soon fell into the hands of the Hungarian Government, including Komorn.

On September 16th, Jellačič, still acting on his own account, crossed the Drave; and, eight days later, an imperial edict forbade any attack upon him. The Palatine resigned his office; and in the diet Kossuth proposed an extraordinary vote for the compensation of landowners obliged to give up the *robot*. The Austrian Government, ignoring the

sympathy of the Vienna populace with the Magyars, sent to Pest Count Francis Philip von Lamberg, a Hungarian magnate of conservative leanings, to stay the autocracy of Kossuth and bring back diet and people to relations of loyalty with the Crown. The answer of the diet was to declare Lamberg an outlaw; and when, on the following day (September 28th), trusting to his commission of supreme authority over both Magyars and Croatians, he had arrived at Buda, he was brutally murdered by the mob on the bridge leading to Pest. The panic which seized on the population after the commission of this crime was changed into exultation by the success of the Hungarian troops at their first encounter with Jellačič's army, followed by his retreat and the capitulation of two Austrian generals. Hereupon, the Hungarian diet having been formally dissolved, and Jellačič appointed regent in command of all the troops in the kingdom, war was declared against Kossuth and those who had joined him in usurping the government.

Everything now depended on despatching a sufficient body of troops to Hungary in aid of the *Banus*. But in Vienna there was no sympathy with the imperial army either in the *Reichstag*, declared permanent by its own unanimous vote, which rejected with contumely the proposal for a vote of thanks to the troops that had been victorious in Italy, or among the democratic clubs, which set up a central committee of eight or ten persons under Tausenau's direction, and in a turbulent assembly convened by him assured the Magyars of the assistance of the people of Vienna. When the War Minister Latour ordered the departure of some of the troops in Vienna—first an Italian and then a German battalion—as reinforcements for the army in Italy, their unwillingness to set off called forth popular applause and support; while in other parts of the city isolated bodies of soldiery were attacked by the populace. While Strobach declined to summon an extraordinary

meeting of the *Reichstag*, the fury of the mob became uncontrollable and found a victim in the unpopular Latour, who was murdered with bestial savagery (October 6th). The remnant of the *Reichstag* insisted on holding a sitting late on the same night, and, after declaring itself permanent, appointed one more Committee of Safety, to carry on affairs with what remained of the Ministry before its democratic reconstruction. At the same time, the transport of troops by the railways was prohibited, so as to thwart any attempt to strengthen the imperial forces.

Once more, the Emperor fled (October 7th), this time directing his flight to Olmütz, and issuing a manifesto denouncing the anarchy he left behind him and bidding those gather round him 'who loved liberty and Austria.' With the approval of Stadion, Wessenberg and Bach, the Slav majority of the *Reichstag* quitted Vienna for Prague, while the impotent rump in the capital exercised a sort of joint authority with the committee of students and a newly-formed Common Council. It was noted that the peasants of the rural districts round the capital, instead of flocking to the support of the Viennese, contented themselves with raising generally the prices of foodstuffs.

While, in these circumstances, the *Banus* and his broken and unaugmented troops stood awaiting events at Pressburg, Prague was, on October 18th, startled by a proclamation of Windischgrätz, that he was about to march upon Vienna in order to suppress the rebellion there. He praised the Čechs for their loyalty, and, while the leader of the southern Slavs was left out in the cold, an imperial proclamation (October 19th) announced the appointment of his rival to the chief command of all the Austrian forces except those under Radetzky in Italy. Then, leaving Bohemia and Moravia denuded of troops, Windischgrätz, at the head of an army well supplied with artillery, advanced upon the doomed capital.

Here all was disunion, soon to become anarchy. As the

Finance Minister Krauss remained at Vienna, the pretence was at first kept up that the seat of the Administration was still there (as a matter of fact it was on the point of melting away at Innsbruck), and that the city was resisting, not the commands of the Emperor, but the usurped authority of his generals, Windischgrätz and Jellačič; and all the measures of the former against Vienna were declared illegal by the rump of the *Reichstag*. On the strength of this pronouncement, again, the Common Council took into pay a 'mobile' division of the National Guard, and, with the Committee of Safety, organised other armed bodies. But the real conduct of affairs was left to the democratic clubs, and it was through them that Wenzel Messenhauser, a journalist who had formerly served as lieutenant at Lemberg, was appointed to the provisional command of the National Guard. The real military chief was the commander of the mobiles, Joseph Bem, who had done and suffered much for the Polish cause and gained military laurels at Ostrolenka (1831).

Vienna's preparations for resistance called forth widespread democratic sympathy. The Frankfort National Assembly could not be induced by the democratic party to do more than send two commissioners, Welcker and Mosle, to Olmütz, where Windischgrätz informed them that the Austrian constitution was not in danger; but the Left on its own account sent from two of its clubs Robert Blum, with three companions, to carry to the Viennese champions of freedom the fraternal salutations of many thousands. Blum delivered a rousing speech and drew up a manifesto; and then, with his colleagues, joined the *corps d'élite* of the defensive force. After a brief but courageous service in arms, Blum on the 28th advised the discontinuance of the struggle, and from the 29th withdrew from any personal participation in it[1].

[1] Cf. the account in K. Biedermann's *Dreissig Jahre deutscher Geschichte* (1881), vol. I, pp. 332–3, based on the statements of Blum's son in the biography of his father, and of his companion J. Fröbel

Windischgrätz's movements had, according to his wont, been slow, but unfaltering. On October 20th he announced his approach from Lundenburg; and, after allowing an interval for reflexion, began operations on the 26th. On the following day he issued a proclamation announcing that his patience was exhausted, and on the 28th began his attack upon the suburbs of Vienna. On the 29th, the city had quite lost heart, and he might have effected an entry; but, on the 30th, the news that the Hungarian army under Moga was at hand caused hope to flicker up once more. Twice the Hungarians had crossed the Leitha and withdrawn again; but, encouraged by a visit from Kossuth, they on the 30th stood at Schwechat, some 10 miles from Vienna, where they were met by Jellačič and easily driven back into Hungary. The junction between the Hungarian and the Viennese insurrection had been effectively prevented. Messenhauser was helpless; and, though, after Windischgrätz had on the 30th occupied all the suburbs, there was some fighting, and in the city some intimidation of those who advocated surrender, no organised resistance was offered. Bem contrived to escape to Pressburg. When the bombardment touched the *Burg*, all was seen to be over. On the evening of the 31st, the troops entered the inner town, and on the following morning the black-and-yellow standard fluttered on the tower of St Stephen's.

On the same day, the arrests began. They were very numerous, and many informers gave ignoble aid; but the sentences, which included Messenhauser's and those of two active journalists, were relatively few—about 150 in the course of six months—and it seems as if the proceedings of Windischgrätz were, on the whole, arbitrary rather than vindictive. The most conspicuous victim was Robert Blum, 'a bookseller from Leipzig,' who, after being sentenced to

to the Frankfort Parliament; but compare Fröbel's own account, *Ein Lebenslauf*, vol. I (1890), pp. 208 sqq.

be hanged, was shot on November 9th. (The life of his companion Julius Fröbel, who had also been sentenced to death, was spared because he had written against the Frankfort nationalists[1].) The execution of Blum implied open defiance of the National Assembly, in which he had, from the first, been one of the most prominent figures; and it was accepted in this sense at Frankfort, where a protest against the deed was almost unanimously carried, and where the Ministry was called upon to demand the punishment of its perpetrators, Schmerling (now one of the Ministers) being thereby put into a position of great difficulty.

Amidst general gloom, an imperial rescript dated October 22nd definitively ended the sittings of the *Reichstag* at Vienna, and, in compliance with the approval by the Čechs of the suggestion of their leader Palacký, summoned the whole body for November 15th to the little town of Kremsier in Moravia, the summer-residence of the archbishops of Olmütz. Although, not having arrived in full numbers for the diet, the Čechs were defeated in the presidential election (Smolka was chosen) they dominated the diet, in which a German democratic Left had only with reluctance consented to take part. Meanwhile, though the real holders of authority at Vienna were Windischgrätz (to whom Radetzky sent warm congratulations) and his army, a new Ministry was constructed under the presidency of the 'army-diplomat' Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, a cold cynic with a personal record full of scandals, but a man of singularly calm judgment and powerful will[2]. Bach and

[1] See *Ein Lebenslauf*, where he makes out a good case for himself, though with many words. Windischgrätz, though he may have thought one deputy enough for his purpose, would hardly have set Fröbel free had he not had some sort of hopes of him. They met again at the time of Fröbel's service to Austria, as to which see *post*.

[2] The Princess of Prussia (afterwards Empress Augusta) describes the concealed passion of his nature as 'quite southern.' *A. d. Nachlass*, vol. 1, p. 141.

Krauss retained their portfolios; the most important additions were Count Franz Stadion as Minister for Home Affairs, and, as Minister of Commerce, Karl Ludwig, afterwards Freiherr von, Bruck, deputy at Frankfort for Trieste (which owed him its commercial rise and the foundation of the celebrated *Austrian Lloyd* line of steamships). At the same time, the plan began to mature of bringing about the resignation of the feebleminded reigning Emperor, and of putting his nephew Archduke Francis Joseph in his place. The plan had been promoted for some time, especially by the Archduke's mother, Archduchess Sophia; but was not carried out till December 2nd, when the Emperor Ferdinand renounced the throne, and Archduke Francis Charles his right of succession in favour of his son.

Before this, the diet at Kremsier had entered into a long series of constitutional debates, running, as it were, parallel with those at Frankfort. Rejecting a counterdraft composed for Stadion by Helfert (Under-secretary of State and afterwards historian of the Austrian revolution), it proceeded to deliberate the *Grundrechte* of the monarchy, starting with the article (approved by a large majority but afterwards not inserted) which declared all state authority to be derived from the people. As to the further debates, while in ecclesiastical matters the diet followed the principles of Joseph II, the struggle between centralisation and federalism, after Palacký had prepared a thoroughly federalist draft of the new constitution, ended, to his disgust, in the exclusion of justice and administration from the range of rights to be assured to the several provinces. For the rest, the two-Chamber system was to obtain in the federal parliament; and to the Chamber of deputies the country districts were to send between three and four times as many members as the large towns. The Magyars very soon perceived that this constitution was both wholly incompatible with the independence of Hungary and based

on the principle of the satisfaction of the claims of nationalities, and accordingly refused assent to the change in the person of their King.

The future of Hungary was, however, being decided nearer home, and on the battlefield. The operations of the Magyars against their Slav adversaries on the south and south-east were only partially successful; but a royal manifesto which, while confirming the abolition of *robot* and tithe, called upon the Hungarians to acknowledge the authority of their crowned King was, together with a proclamation by Windischgrätz, rejected with scorn, and the repudiation of Ferdinand's abdication was speedily followed by the proclamation of a national levy against the enemy of the nation (December 13th). But the defeat of Perczel at Moor on December 30th created a panic at Pest, which, after the diet had transferred itself to Debreczen, was quitted by the last Hungarian troops on January 4th, 1849. The course taken by the war in Hungary—the dissensions between the diet, the committee of defence under Kossuth, and Görgei, and between him, Dembinski and the other generals, cannot be narrated here. After the decisive Hungarian victory of Isafzeg (April 6th), Windischgrätz fell back upon the neighbourhood of Pest; soon after which he was honourably dismissed from his command. Jellačič's interests drew him south, and on April 19th the Hungarians gained the further victory of Nagy Sarlo. While the Austrian army was taking up a position for the defence of Vienna, the Hungarian declaration of independence was issued (April 14th) and a republican Ministry formed.

The Magyars had now, under Kossuth's leadership, identified themselves with the cause of revolution pure and simple, and abandoned altogether the standpoint of historical rights. But there was something lacking in the national support of this policy, and a doubtful note in the proclamation of it to the army by Görgei, its most

trusted general, now Minister of War. And, as a matter of fact, the last stage of the war had already opened with the official announcement at Vienna (May 1st) of Russian intervention (actually begun at Kronstadt on the Roumanian frontier so early as February).

The diet at Kremsier had meanwhile continued on its course, without contributing to a settlement of the relations between Austria and Germany any more than it had to the pacification of Hungary. As to the former, no settled plan could be agreed upon, or was indeed possible, so long as the constitution of the Austrian monarchy was itself undetermined; and, after the Frankfort parliament had begun, on October 20th, a debate on the article of the proposed German constitution prohibiting the political union of any portion of the German state with any non-German territory, the Ministry at Vienna left no doubt as to its resolution to abstain for the present from any further discussion of Austro-German constitutional relations. Schmerling, accordingly, resigned the Ministerial post to which he had been appointed at Frankfort, where for a time, as we shall see, the policy of excluding Austria from Germany prevailed. But the day for the victory of that policy was not yet.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the current of opinion at Frankfort, and of the dreams of a great united Slavo-German empire at home, the Schwarzenberg-Stadion Ministry pursued its course; and of a sudden, on March 6th, Stadion, with Helfert, arrived at Kremsier to announce that the imperial Government had resolved to impose (*octroyer*) a constitution of its own devising. This constitution, dated March 4th, declared Austria an independent, indivisible and indissoluble monarchy, all of whose provinces were to enjoy the same rights. As the basis of these, the *Grundrechte* laid down at Kremsier were adopted, but in a much altered form; thus, religious freedom was limited to the domestic practice of any other than the Catholic form of faith.

Hungary was to preserve her own constitution in so far as it was not incompatible with that of the empire and with the maintenance of the rights of nationalities; and, since Croatia and Transylvania were declared independent of her, while the Military Frontier was placed directly under the Austrian War Office, and the prospect of a Serb *woiwodship* was held out, the meaning of this reservation was obvious. The position of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom in the empire was to be regulated by a special statute. For the rest, the legislation of the empire was to be carried on in two Chambers, the electoral franchise for the second to be on the broad basis of one deputy for every 100,000 persons, and the first to consist of representatives of the several provincial diets.

Though the Government constitution was at first received with all but unanimous illwill at Kremsier, in the end only an insignificant minority (33) protested against it. Nevertheless, though the constitution laboriously prepared by the diet remained a dead letter, the Government substitute was received unfavourably throughout the empire. It caused deep disappointment among the Čech populations, and met with vehement protests both at Agram and at Carlowitz, albeit Jellačič could not be brought to make himself the mouthpiece of southern-Slav disappointment, while Vienna and Galicia were under military government, and Hungary and Lombardy in a state of war. But the *coup* had served its purpose in leaving no doubt at Frankfort as to the general future policy of Austria, and, as will be seen, the offer of the imperial dignity to the King of Prussia completed the rupture. Any further participation of Austria in the work of Federal union having been definitively abandoned, her deputies to the National Assembly were recalled on April 5th.

But, for the far larger part of the populations of the Austrian empire, German national affairs were at most of

very secondary interest. The Hungarian war, as has been seen, entered into its most critical stage in May. All the endeavours of Hungarian emissaries to obtain support in west or east had failed, and, on May 18th, Kossuth's call of the whole population to a holy war went forth; but the dissension among the leaders remained unhealed. The Russian intervention, officially announced at Vienna on May 1st and proclaimed by the Tsar on May 11th as an act of resistance to an integral part of the great European revolution, had been invited so far back as March in the form of the entrance of 30,000 Russian troops into Transylvania, and, now that the Austrian army had virtually evacuated Hungary, had been hastened at the request of the Austrian Government. It weighed heavily on the mind of the new Austrian commander Baron Julius Jakob von Haynau, who brought with him from Italy a reputation for ruthless energy, that, according to the agreement between the two Governments, the Russian troops were not to be under Austrian control, while their commander-in-chief, Prince Paskiewitch, was to exercise some sort of supreme authority over the whole of the allied forces.

The dissensions among the leaders and the consequent changes in the military command contributed to the ultimate breakdown of Hungarian resistance, but cannot be said to have been its primary cause. After some delay in the Austro-Russian preparations, the victorious Austrian advance on the right bank of the Danube ended on July 12th with the surrender of Pest and the flight of Kossuth to Szegedin, where, a few days later, the Hungarian diet assembled for its last sittings. The struggle was really over; but the party of peace was unable to assert itself, and, on August 1st, Haynau, whose bitter jealousy of Paskiewitch had prevented effective cooperation between them, occupied Szegedin. When Görgei, after a series of reverses, at last made his way to Arad, where he had hoped to join

the other chief Hungarian force, he found it on the morrow of a defeat under Bem at Temesvar (August 9th); and now Kossuth, before flying for his life (August 10th), abdicated all personal authority and offered his dictatorship to Görgei, who made use of it to capitulate with 23,000 men to Paskiewitch at Vilagos. The date of the catastrophe was August 12th; and, within little more than a week, the last Hungarian force in arms—some 5000 men—had found refuge in Turkey. The Hungarian insurrection, and with it the last struggle of the Austrian Government against the revolution, was over; for Radetzky's victory of Novara on March 23rd had ended the struggle in Italy, and the peace concluded in July restored to Austria her Italian dominions with their former frontiers; though Venice held out till August 22nd, when its revolutionary Government, the only one in Europe which had entered into treaty relations with that of Hungary, capitulated to the Austrians. But, though the Austrian revolution was at an end, the constitution which was to have descended on the empire as a settlement of all its troubles never became a reality. It had in truth only been designed as a provisional arrangement; and nowhere was it, or were any of the changes introduced by it, regarded as capable of endurance. Possibly, Stadion—one of those statesmen whose force of character is wont to gain for them popular confidence—might have secured a fair period of trial to the machinery which the constitution had been instrumental in calling into existence; but, already by the middle of April 1849, his mind was known to be giving way, and a month later the sagacious Alexander Bach was appointed his successor. The *octroyée* constitution of March 4th had failed to gain the approval of the main body of the subjects of the empire. The Roumans of Transylvania had at once protested against what they regarded as its curtailment of their rights; and in Hungary, so long as Kossuth still maintained his authority, it was felt

that the March constitution would, even more effectively than his dictatorship, destroy the historical basis of Magyar rights. In the years which followed, few complaints were heard against the continuance of the March constitution; and formally it lasted till its abolition in March 1853. But the populations of the Austrian monarchy had, for the present, lost their interest in constitutional problems. As for Hungary, what mattered was the continued existence of the nation as such. The terrorism of Haynau, the execution of Batthyány, the forcible inclusion of thousands of Hungarians in the Austrian army, the banishment or imprisonment, for long years, of many others—all these were regarded as the inevitable though cruel consequences of unsuccessful insurrection. But it was after the military *régime* had come to an end, and when the national life began to be infiltrated with alien elements, colonies of Austrian officials being introduced into Hungary, and Bach's system of centralised administration set to work, that an impassable gulf established itself between government and people, and that the national hatred of Austria became a permanent part of Magyar life. Elsewhere in the monarchy, and even in the German provinces, which naturally derived the greatest benefit from the system of centralisation which under the March constitution it was sought to realise, the cost of government was felt to be unbearable, and gradually came to present itself as the strongest argument for change. Though direct taxation was doubled in amount within the eleven years from 1847 onward, loan upon loan had to be contracted, and the public debt, in the same period, was increased by a milliard of florins.

Thus the Austrian revolution, though blood and iron had ended it in the capital of the monarchy as well as in its remoter dominions, had left behind it effects which no making or granting of constitutions could avert or assuage, and which no temporary success in the readjustment of

Austria's relations with Germany at large could in the end obscure. Meanwhile, for the future progress of Austria one beneficent result at least had been secured by the revolution itself. The most successful endeavours of the reaction would at no time attempt to restore the former subject relations of the peasantry to the holders of the land, or exclude any class in the monarchy from a public share of civic rights. Thus, though, except in the matter of these enduring gains, the revolution had broken down in the Austrian monarchy, its efforts had not been altogether fruitless; and, when the system of centralised absolutism had become bankrupt in its turn, the lessons of a twofold experience proved not to have been learnt in vain[1].

If the main features of the Vienna insurrections of 1848 could not be recalled without indicating their connexion with the progress of the revolutionary movement, from its outset to its close, in the whole expanse of the Austrian monarchy, no account of the 'March days' at Berlin and their consequences for Prussia would be intelligible which failed to touch on the relation of these events to the German national movement, of which they in so peculiar a fashion affected the course. The political life of Prussia, indeed, from this date onwards becomes, whether it would or not, so intimately interwoven with the course of this movement that Prussian and national German affairs can no longer be treated separately. The Berlin catastrophe of March 1848, in particular, is best understood, and its historical significance is most fully appreciated, if the relations to the national movement of King Frederick William IV and his counsellors, as well as of the other forces called into play in the course of these events and transactions, are from the outset taken into account[1]. The doubts and difficulties which still beset any review of this passage of history aiming

[1] Cf. A. Springer, *Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden*, 1809, part II: *Die Oesterreichische Revolution* (1865), pp. 329 sqq.

at accuracy and completeness, cannot be discussed in this place[1].

Frederick William IV's personal horror of all revolutionary proceedings—a horror which would be best depicted by a selection from the florid invectives in which his pen was wont to indulge on the subject—had undergone no change when the movement that had cast down the throne and the political system of Louis-Philippe swiftly went on to menace the various centres of government in Germany. Indeed, before it approached the Prussian capital, it had rapidly annihilated the remnant—or, it would perhaps be more correct to say, destroyed the shadow—of the King of Prussia's sovereignty in his outlying principality of Neufchâtel. On the very eve of the Berlin outbreak, he is found engaged in seeking to obtain British intervention on behalf of his princely rights with the diet of the Helvetic Confederation at Berne[2]; but he never made any attempt at reasserting them, although it was not till nine years later (in 1857) that, after a counter-revolution which occupied a single day, he renounced them in perpetuity.

Yet, side by side with his hatred of revolution, Frederick William IV's mind had never ceased to harbour high hopes for the national future of Germany and for the part to be played by Prussia in their consummation. The proposals brought to Vienna by Radowitz early in March 1848 were pressed upon the Austrian Government, and accepted by

[1] Cf. the remarkable essay *Zur Genesis der preussischen Revolution*, reprinted in vol. II of H. Oncken's *Historisch-politische Aufsätze* (1914). The method here commended is, in the main, that of F. Rachfahl's *Deutschland, König Friedrich Wilhelm IV und die Berliner Märzrevolution* (1901), where the events of the Berlin insurrection themselves and the different versions of them are also subjected to a searching investigation. For details of the actual struggle see Gen. H. von Meyrinck's *Strassen-Kämpfe in Berlin, 18–19 März, 1848*; ed. H. Kohl (1911).

[2] See *Aus dem Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelm's IV mit Bunsen*, pp. 180–1.

it under the influence, in some measure at least, of the startling news from Paris; but they were still compatible with joint exertions, whether these proved successful or not, on the part of the two Great Powers for a real reform of the Confederation. But events hurried on, and the all-important demand of a German national parliament, raised at Heppenheim in October 1847 and formally preferred by Bassermann in the Baden Chamber on February 12th, 1848, was urged with fresh instance in that of Darmstadt by Heinrich von Gagern and his friends. It was reiterated in popular meetings at Stuttgart, Mannheim and Offenburg, where, on March 19th, the moderate Liberal Mathy stood by the side of the radical Hecker. A fortnight earlier (March 5th), fifty-one politicians of more or less mark, nearly all of them hailing from the lesser states of southern Germany, had met at Heidelberg, where an ominous divergence of opinion had manifested itself, Hecker and his ally G. von Struve proposing a German republic as the end in view, while H. von Gagern advocated a hereditary German empire. At last, it was agreed to postpone the decision as to the form of the new German state, and, for the present, to appoint a committee for promoting the direct popular election of a national parliament. This committee was to consist of seven members, including Gagern and F. von Römer, now Ministers of State in Hesse-Darmstadt and Württemberg, together with the staunch Liberal Welcker and the popular Itzstein, both members of the Baden Chamber. On March 12th it issued an invitation to all members of Estates or legislative assemblies throughout Germany to meet at Frankfort, on March 30th, for discussion of the necessary preliminaries. The summonses to this *Vorparlament*, as it came to be called, were afterwards extended, especially by Itzstein, whose views had assumed a more and more radical hue, to other persons supposed to enjoy the confidence of the German people.

Meanwhile, as has been seen, the Federal Diet, assembled, in the absence of the Austrian envoy, under the presidency of the Prussian, Count von Dönhoff, had on March 1st issued a patriotic appeal to the nation, and had decorated the mansion in which it met with the German tricolour. There is no sign of the Prussian Government having disapproved of this proceeding; indeed, it had at once taken up a friendly attitude towards the national movement, and concurred in the resolution passed by the Federal Diet on the same date (March 1st), calling upon the several Governments to appoint, as additional to the seventeen members of the standing Smaller Council (*engere Rat*) of the Diet, a further body of seventeen persons in enjoyment of public confidence (*Vertrauensmänner*), to assist in the revision of the Federal constitution. Among those sent to Frankfort on this errand, Prussia deputed Dahlmann, the oracle of constitutionalists; Austria, Schmerling, one of the most capable and quicksighted of her statesmen; Württemberg, Uhland, whose voice, long silent in poetry, had been consistently heard in defence of the liberties of the people; Baden, Bassermann, the pioneer of the national Parliament; the Free Towns and Holstein, Gervinus and Droysen, foremost in their respective spheres as patriotic historians — all of them men who, together with their colleagues, might be called the very flower of German Liberalism, chiefly of the academic type.

On March 11th, when Max von Gagern set forth on the circular tour, mentioned above[1], to the German Courts, Canitz, the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed him that the project of a national parliament was quite compatible with that of a congress of Princes, on which Radowitz and Metternich had agreed.

Thus, though this joint scheme of the two Courts remained standing for what it was worth, the Prussian

[1] See pp. 352–3, *ante*.

Government, and King Frederick William in particular, were manifestly advancing, step by step, towards avowed support of the German national movement. This advance was accelerated by the alarm felt by some of the south-German Governments as to the bellicose intentions of the new French republic[1], and expressed by King William of Württemberg through a special envoy sent to Berlin on March 10th. This monarch urged his Prussian brother (who, by the way, heartily detested him) to grant a constitution to his own subjects, in token of his desire to arrive at an understanding with the states of the south-west. With the exception of Bavaria, who still held back, these states were thus on the way towards offering Prussia the hegemony which hitherto only a few farsighted political thinkers outside Prussia had looked forward to her assuming.

It must have been with the intention of meeting the national movement as well as the wishes of the Liberal party at home half-way, that, on March 6th, Frederick William IV apprised the committees of the United Prussian diet of his decision to grant, in principle, the long-desired periodical convocation of that body. He had, with much difficulty, allowed himself to be persuaded by Bodelschwingh to take this momentous step, even before Radowitz, the consistent advocate of a national German policy, had made up his mind as to the expediency of constitutional concessions. Bodelschwingh himself (who cannot be blamed for failing to foresee the immediate consequences of his withdrawal) once more insisted on resigning the headship of the Ministry, on the ground that he would be mistrusted after

[1] *Per contra*, Max von Gagern, as Frederick William IV afterwards told Leopold von Gerlach (*Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. I, p. 187), when at Berlin on March 18th, tried to bind the King over to Liberalism by pressing upon him an alliance with France against Russia; but against this scheme, which was to include the formation of a Polish national guard, Frederick William held out.

having, when in office, steadily resisted the demand now about to be granted; and, this time, his resignation was accepted. His post was hereupon offered by the King to Count Alvensleben, a conservative of an older type and a statesman of varied administrative experience; but he promptly declined it, and negotiations were then opened with Count A. H. von Arnim-Boytzenburg, formerly Minister of the Interior. On March 14th the royal edict summoning the United Prussian diet for April 27th, and referring at length to the subject of Federal as well as Prussian reforms, made its appearance. On the same date, Bodelschwingh, when inviting his kinsman Georg von Vincke, with Ludolf Camphausen of Cologne and other leading constitutional politicians, to visit Berlin in order to discuss the situation, and thus taking the first step towards establishing a direct connexion between Liberalism and the government of the state, explicitly pointed out that 'great reforms' were, in his judgment, needed in order to satisfy public opinion in Germany.

The Prussian Government had, before this, been made aware of the demands pressing upon it from different parts of the monarchy. In Silesia, the terrible sufferings inflicted in 1847 by famine and typhus on part of the population, and the ruin to which the hand-loom industry of the mountain villages seemed doomed by the changed conditions of trade[1], had been deepened by misgovernment; and the prevailing discontent had assumed serious proportions. Although the rumoured proclamation of the republic at Breslau proved a fiction, a committee of public safety had been set up there; and a representative commission, including the eminent financier B. E. Abegg and Heinrich Simon, was sent to Berlin to lay before the Throne the

[1] These troubles form the subject of G. Hauptmann's celebrated play *The Weavers*, 'a drama of the forties,' published in 1892 and first acted in the following year.

'seven supplications' of the Silesians—a sort of charter of radical home reform. In the Rhine province, which was full of elements of opposition and in close touch with France, only the prosperous middle-class could be said to be loyally attached to the Prussian monarchy; so that the fear of secession was not to be regarded as wholly chimerical, and the aid of high ecclesiastical authority had to be called in for the preservation of public order. At the same time, it was the middle-class, the stronghold of Rhenish Liberalism, with its centre at Cologne, in which the demand for a Prussian constitution on a broad basis was most urgent and most continuous.

Under such influences, as well as others closer at hand, the new line of Government policy was rapidly taking shape at Berlin. Yet the plan of a conference of Princes was still, at least formally, kept up; and, indeed, it was not made public till March 15th. But the scheme was already dead, unless it were transformed by the new proposal to hold the conference at Potsdam, instead of, as previously intended, at Dresden. On the 15th, however, arrived the news of the outbreak of the Vienna revolution and of the downfall of Metternich. No time was to be lost if Prussia, unhampered by any present interference on the part of Austria, was to place herself at the head of the national German movement. On March 17th, the Prussian official journal[1] was instructed to taunt Austria with having at last entered upon the path of reform which she had long avoided and which had long been followed by Prussia; and on the morrow, the fateful March 18th, the Prussian Government lifted the veil from its intended course of action. This was done by means of the memorable royal edict which, drafted by Bodelschwingh as a parting service and approved by his destined successor Arnim, and Canitz, the King was, on the

[1] The *Preussische Staatszeitung*. See A. Stahr, *Die preussische Revolution*, part 1, sec. 1 (2nd ed., 1851, pp. 72–3).

morning of that day, persuaded to sign, though he stumbled for a while at the odious word 'constitution.' The edict explicitly avowed the sole purpose of assembling the Prussian diet on so early a date as April 27th to be the discussion of measures rendered indispensable for Prussia herself by the proposals for the regeneration of Germany about to be laid by Prussia before the other Governments. Alleging recent events at Vienna as a reason for speed, the edict went on to recite the changes held necessary by the King, if Germany was to be transformed from a confederation of states into a Federal state—freedom of settlement and of the press, unity of judicial administration and of measures and coinage, and, crowning all, a common military system modelled on the Prussian, with a Federal flag and fleet. Since the end could only be compassed by agreement between princes and people, a preliminary representative body, elected from all classes within the limits of the Confederation, must be summoned at once; and the establishment of this implied the existence of constitutions in all German states. The part to be played in the new Federal state by Prussia and her sovereign was left undefined; but a reference to the Prussian victories of 1813–4 was supplemented by a wish that at the head of the Federal army should be placed a Federal commander-in-chief. This, as we shall see, was the form under which Frederick William IV consistently pictured to himself the ultimate hegemony of Prussia; the additional feature of a formally supreme Habsburg Emperor was not introduced on the present occasion.

It would thus be a mistake to suppose this edict to have been primarily designed for staying the insurrection which was actually on the point of breaking out. Beyond doubt, it was partly intended to avert demands which the Prussian Government could not, or would not, concede; but its main purpose was to meet the national aspirations and, while leaving Austria out of the reckoning, to assert Prussia's

claim to the leadership in Germany. Neither Bodelschwingh nor his sovereign knew how imminent was the supreme peril; in the words of the former, 'the revolution in Prussia was now over.' On the evening of March 17th, a deputation from Cologne, headed by the Chief-burgomaster, von Wittgenstein, had arrived at Berlin, commissioned to describe public opinion on the Rhine as in a most dangerous state of tension, and to demand concessions much the same as those of the royal edict. Early on the following morning, this deputation was received by the King, and informed by him that its demands accorded with his own intentions; and he returned a similar answer to a second deputation, composed of magistrates and town-councillors of Berlin, and headed by Burgomaster Krausnick (afterwards almost as unpopular as was his fellow Chief-magistrate at Vienna). By noon the royal edict had been printed, and placarded on the street-walls. In the afternoon of the same day, Berlin was in open revolt.

The actual genesis of the March revolution of 1848 at Berlin—which began on the 18th and to which on the 21st the King did final homage—cannot, after all that has been said and written on the subject, be regarded as perfectly clear. Naturally and necessarily, the unrest which had taken hold of most German capitals and larger towns was also rife at Berlin, where special reasons accounted for its spread. It was asserted at the time, and by no one with more emphasis than by the King (in the appeal 'to his dear Berliners' put forth at the height of the crisis), that this agitation was due, in the first instance, to a band of ruffians, for the most part aliens, who during the previous week had baffled all attempts at unearthing them, and who were guilty of the beginning of the bloodshed. Frederick William IV repeated and expanded these assertions in a letter to Bunsen written less than two months later[1], in which

[1] May 13th. See *Aus dem Briefwechsel*, etc., p. 185.

he declared that, for weeks, 10,000 certainly, and probably double that number, of the vilest rabble (*Gesindel*) had surreptitiously found their way into Berlin, and lain hidden there—among them a scum of Frenchmen, Poles and south-Germans (especially Mannheimers), together with some persons of a better class, said to have been Milanese counts, merchants and others. He added that he was in possession of official evidence proving that the ringleaders had fixed the fall of Berlin for March 18th. It was, also, positively stated that the nucleus of this alien body consisted of Poles, in the first instance of such as had escaped sentence in the great state-trial following on the abortive Polish insurrection of 1846, or had since undergone brief terms of imprisonment; by them, or through their agency, funds were said to have been provided and a rising organised[1]. But it seems certain that no considerable number of those who manned the Berlin barricades were aliens, although, more especially at some of the most hotly-contested points in the capital, Poles, Frenchmen and south-Germans may possibly have taken part, and a few may have lost their lives[2]. Migratory elements of this sort were traced in other insurrections of these troubled years; but the early phases of the outbreak at Berlin may be explained without the assumption of any extraneous element of unusual magnitude Berlin had a large industrial population, among which the Paris news rapidly spread; and, so early as March 10th-13th, an address was circulated among working-men asking the King to appoint a Ministry taken from their body. The university students, too, were, in the main, likely to respond to an appeal to their sympathies, though they were not, as a body, lifted to the crest of the wave like their fellows at Vienna. The Jewish element, prominent at Berlin, in the

[1] See above, p. 434 *n.*, as to the design of utilising Polish patriotism for war against Russia.

[2] Cf. Rachfahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–5 and *note*.

literary and journalistic, as well as in the commercial, spheres of life, cherished grievances which naturally inclined it to the side of change. Finally, the lowest part of the population—the 'residuum'—was stirred at a relatively early date; and already on the 16th an alarming proportion of very rough and queer gentry were noticed mingling with the respectable inhabitants who crowded the streets[1]. And yet, it was not any revolutionary or radical agency which provoked the Berlin insurrection; rather, it was the fact that moderate Liberalism, as represented by the great body of the citizens of Berlin, unaccustomed to riots and risings, and imbued with the traditional Prussian spirit of reverence for the Throne, was suddenly attracted into the revolutionary and radical camp, and thus made possible the sudden outbreak and its almost instantaneous spread.

In Berlin, as elsewhere, the Paris tidings had very speedily led to public gatherings, at first of a quite irresponsible kind, where the stereotyped demands for the establishment of a constitutional system of government were brought forward. The favourite place for these meetings was an open part of the *Tiergarten*, in the vicinity of *cafés* and dancing-saloons, called *Unter den Zelten*, where, previous meetings having been held on March 6th and 7th, an assembly of between 3000 and 4000 on the 9th, after some orderly speeches, voted an address containing the usual demands (not comprising that of Ministerial responsibility). After being signed by about double the above number of names, and acclaimed by a large body of students, this address was on March 14th presented by the town-council to the King, who replied in some colloquial words of little significance.

To understand what followed, it should be remembered that in no German capital had the daily life of the citizens

[1] Cf. Heinrich Abeken, *Ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit* (2nd ed., 1898), p. 144.

been subjected to so constant and so irksome a pressure by the military as it had at Berlin. This burden was felt even in later days, when the town began to approach the character of a *Weltstadt*; but, in the period of which we are now speaking, the middle and lower classes of the inhabitants had come to look upon the soldiery with long-accumulated illwill, while, among the officers, those of the Guards, in particular, were regarded as types of an odiously arrogant caste.

Although on March 10th all public meetings like that of the previous day had been prohibited, large bodies of working-men—among whom there had recently been much distress at Berlin and elsewhere—assembled in the *Tiergarten* on Sunday, March 12th; when some sudden apprehension of a disturbance led to the breaking-up of the meeting by the police. The multitude was thus driven along the *Linden* into the neighbourhood of the royal palace; and here, a sudden charge of cuirassiers of the guard terrified the crowd, and caused some casualties, including one death. Elsewhere in the town, too, a few acts of violence were committed by the soldiery, and, in one place, a sort of barricade was erected by way of reprisal. There was another large popular meeting in the same place on the 13th; and by the 15th the general resentment of the conduct of the military became widely manifest. They were insulted by the populace; one or two ineffectual attempts at barricades followed; and a deputation of town-councillors urged on Bodelschwingh the demand which was to become the watchword of the Berlin revolution —the withdrawal of the troops. His promise, in reply, that the soldiers should not be employed against the populace except where life or property should be in danger, was of no avail. On the 16th, when it had become more and more evident that further concessions would be necessary, and when the news of the Vienna revolution had arrived, the friction between populace and soldiery continued, and, in a conflict in front of the opera-house, several lives were lost.

Next day, things were quiet[1]; but the whisper, already spread on the 16th, gained ground that a great popular rising was intended for the morrow.

Yet, when, on the fatal 18th, the multitude, agitated afresh by the rumours which preceded the publication of the royal edict, was once more surging towards the royal palace, it was observed to consist mainly of decently-dressed and wellbehaved people, though now and then ominous cries were raised for the withdrawal of the troops. The King, after receiving the deputations, showed himself on the palace balcony, with Arnim and Bodelschwingh by his side, of whom the latter read out the edict to the crowd. It was received with much cheering, accompanied, however, by renewed cries for the withdrawal of the soldiers, who had been massed in considerable numbers in the yards and round the entrances of the palace. Soon, while from the town-hall the magistrates were sending forth a placard with the news of the royal concessions, and ordering the illumination of the capital in token of the public joy, the angry cries for the removal of the troops swelled into a clamour so unbearable that the King quitted the balcony, asking, it is said, for an hour's repose.

The crisis was at hand. The Governor of Berlin, General von Pfuel, who during the past week had been anxious to restrain the impatience of the troops in the city, numbering about 14,000, was, during a brief absence from the palace, superseded in the chief military command by General von Prittwitz, commander of the Guards and a thoroughgoing adherent of the military party, of whom the Prince of Prussia was regarded as the head. Prittwitz was,

[1] Indeed, on the 17th, Abeken (*op. cit.*, p. 145) comments on the wholly unpolitical character of the agitation at Berlin, where so far there had been 'no unpopular Ministerial name, no open abuse of any member of the royal family; no attempt at looting or incendiarism.'

hereupon, ordered by the King to clear the palace square (*Schlossplatz*). The precise words of this order are uncertain; but nothing of the nature of a riot had, as yet, taken place. Before, however, the two squadrons of dragoons of the guard commanded to execute the order had advanced far, the multitude pressed forward in their way, waving white handkerchiefs and calling out 'Back with the soldiers.' Great disorder ensued, and in the midst of it a few of the troopers used their sabres; while some infantry marched forth from the palace-gates in support of the dragoons. During the advance of the foot-soldiers, two shots were fired—as seems certain, not by command, but by accident. Nobody was hurt; but the crowd immediately dispersed in all directions, with cries of treason and massacre. The belief spread like wildfire, that the people had been lured into the palace square and its vicinity, so as to be sacrificed to the detested soldiery; and this 'misunderstanding,' which a large flag, hoisted immediately, in vain proclaimed to be such, became the immediate cause of the outbreak of the insurrection.

For, even if a design had been formed for beginning the insurrection on this very day and in some such fashion as that actually adopted, this would account neither for the extraordinary suddenness of the outbreak, nor for the extent of the area which it, almost at once, covered. Barricades—this time real barricades—were thrown up with lightning speed throughout the town, the pavement being pulled up, vehicles overturned, and so forth. Meanwhile, the military resistance to the rising was not less prompt, and was carried on by Prittwitz on a definite plan, viz. that of recovering from the barricades a definite area south of the Spree—practically the whole of the inner town between the Alexander square in the north-east and the Potsdam gate in the south-west. This was accomplished by midnight.

While the eight or nine hours' struggle was in progress,

the King in no wise interfered with the action of Prittwitz and the troops. Deputation after deputation begged the King to withdraw the soldiery; but these entreaties were met by his firm refusal to comply until the barricades should have been removed by their occupants; in one case only, that of the most important barricade of all, in the *Breite Strasse* leading directly out of the *Schlossplatz*, he would not allow the troops to attack till 9 p.m., when there was no longer any hope of its being voluntarily taken down. After the main barricades had been removed, Georg von Vincke (summoned, as we have seen, to Berlin) presented himself, still in travelling-dress, before the King, on whom he pressed the withdrawal of the troops, so as to avoid a resumption of the conflict on the morrow. Soon afterwards, Prittwitz was admitted to the royal presence, when he urged that, unless the insurrection could be at once completely suppressed, the troops should be withdrawn from Berlin, and that with them the King and the royal family should quit the capital. The idea of leaving Berlin had, it appears, occurred to the King already before the outbreak of the insurrection, but had been abandoned because of the illness of the Queen. In advising the withdrawal of the troops, as well as of the royal family, now that the force of the revolt had beyond doubt been broken though it had not yet been entirely repressed, Prittwitz—unless (which is quite unlikely) he mistook the military situation—must have been actuated by a purpose in full accordance with the wishes of the military party. They detested the policy of concessions to the demands of Liberalism and of the German national movement in which the King had engaged, and they would have liked, by putting an end to the revolution, to leave, as it were, *tabula rasa* for the entire restoration of monarchical authority[1].

[1] The view that this advice was given to the King with the intention of inducing him to *reculer pour mieux sauter*, and that it

Prittwitz, however, could not persuade the King to go beyond a command that, while the inner town, now in the hands of the military, was to be held by them, no further advance on their part was to be attempted. At 2 a.m., orders were given by the General for the holding of the present position, which was to be strengthened by the addition of further troops; but -as if the idea of the royal departure, to be followed by an investment of the capital, had not yet been relinquished —a body of cavalry was directed to take up a position outside the town. Meanwhile, the King, perhaps in some measure under the influence of Vincke's urgent representations, was drafting with his own hand a proclamation, destined to acquire a dubious celebrity, to the citizens of his capital. It has often been said that the proclamation *An meine lieben Berliner*, intended for issue on the following morning, was premature—in other words, that it ought to have been postponed till the insurrection was really at an end. So much, however, is clear: that the King meant the appeal to have the effect of putting an end to the barricades and to the insurrection of which they were the visible sign; while it was at the same time to assure to himself the enduring goodwill of his subjects as implying his distinct and definite adhesion to their patriotic and national claims. In this spirit we may conclude it to have been written, and in this spirit it was certainly, in a large measure, received. It was sent in manuscript to Bodelschwingh, with a letter bidding him, unless he thought it inexpedient, send the document to the press at once, with any corrections he might think proper. Bodelschwingh seems to have obeyed without demur.

The proclamation, which, though rhetorical in form, was

quite tallied with Prittwitz's subsequent acts, is justified, above all, by a passage in Leopold von Gerlach's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. 1, pp. 729–30, first noted by Oncken and cited by Rachfahl, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

short, consisted, in substance, of two parts[1]. It defended the royal troops against the charge of having begun the fray, the origin of which it, not altogether judiciously, ascribed to alien influences; and it pledged the royal word that, if the barricades still standing were removed, and a deputation of reasonable men sent to the King, the troops should at once evacuate all the streets and squares of the town, with the exception, temporarily, of the requisite buildings of the palace and the arsenal (*Zeughaus*), and a few others. There followed a reference to the great aspirations of Germany and Prussia, for the sake of which what had happened ought to be forgotten, as the King had forgotten it.

With the multitude, which received the royal appeal with mingled satisfaction and suspicion, it may be said to have, on the whole, fallen flat; but this does not prove it to have been either insincere, or inconsistent with the political attitude which the King had deliberately assumed. Prittwitz, when the proclamation became known to him in the early morning, whatever his feelings, made no attempt to disobey his sovereign's will, and seems, in the first instance, to have lapsed into sullen inaction. Before long, however, doubts began to arise as to the exact interpretation to be put on the King's decision; and a new 'misunderstanding' followed, almost as disastrous in its consequences as that of the previous day.

In the palace, March the 19th began with a further series of deputations, sent, more or less, in response to the royal appeal; and their members jostled the crowd of courtiers and superior military officers who filled the hall of audience. The King, though overdone with advice, appears to have adhered to the course of action which he had announced. Wherever the barricades were removed, the troops facing them withdrew. (In one case, the insurgents treacherously seized the person of General von

[1] The text will be found in Stahr, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–9.

Möllendorf; and it was afterwards falsely said that the King's subsequent order for the withdrawal of the troops was given to save that officer's life.) At last, the King was assured by a deputation headed by the Second-burgomaster of Berlin, Naunym, which was received by him in the presence of the Prince of Prussia, Prittwitz, Bodelschwingh, Arnim (who arrived before the dismissal of the deputation to enter upon his duties as the new head of the Ministry) and many others, that nearly all the barricades in the *Königstadt*[1] had been removed, and that, if the whole of the military were now withdrawn from the streets, they could promise the speedy restoration of order. Hereupon, although the Prince of Prussia advised that the exact condition of the barricades should be, in the first instance, ascertained, it was resolved to begin the general withdrawal of the troops, and to proceed with it as the removal of the barricades continued, instead of deferring the withdrawal of the troops in front of each barricade until it had been actually removed. The King ordered Bodelschwingh, with whom he had passed into an inner apartment, to communicate this decision to the generals and others assembled in the hall; and Bodelschwingh announced it without any conditional clause. Whether this omission was the act of the King, or was due to the perturbation of mind in which the ex-Minister seems to have quitted the royal presence, the unqualified order for a general withdrawal of troops was a fateful step. It aroused the deepest resentment in the members of the military party present, and led to an altercation between the Prince of Prussia and the King, in consequence of which the latter is said to have once more modified his order. If this was so, it made no difference, since instructions for the withdrawal had at once been sent out in all directions. With a swarming multitude at their heels, the troops poured in towards the palace, concentrating

[1] The central area of the town, around the palace.

upon it and the arsenal, in accordance with the orders issued earlier in the day. And now occurred the strangest of all the strange incidents with which these two days were crowded—incomprehensible, unless it was caused by a dogged determination on the part of Prittwitz to allow the worst consequences to follow the hateful royal order.

Neither had the King at any time entertained any notion of the immediate abandonment of the palace (and, with it, of his personal safety and that of his Queen and Court) or of the arsenal; nor was there any such thought in the mind of the Prince of Prussia, who went down the palace stairs to greet the returning troops and then reascended them, or in Arnim's. The troops were now massed in the palace and the adjoining cathedral squares, and hemmed in by a constantly increasing multitude. Prittwitz, on the ground that he could not keep the men together if they were prevented from using their arms, ordered the troops to return to their respective barracks. In the palace, there were left only a single company and twenty-five riflemen of the guard, besides six companies in the inner and outer yards. In the arsenal, a single battalion remained, and even this was marched out early in the afternoon. The gates of the palace were neither bolted nor barred, and the courtyards were filled with a mingled throng of soldiery and mob. It was then that a ghastly fancy took possession of some of the leaders of the populace. The corpses of the insurgents who had fallen on the barricades were, with wounds still gaping and wreaths decking their heads, borne into the inner court of the palace, where, in response to savage cries, the King and Queen had to show themselves in an open gallery, and to salute the mangled bodies lifted up to them. Finally, the King was made to descend into the yard, and listen to the hymn with which the multitude thought fit to conclude the ceremony.

The troops had now been withdrawn; and Berlin, whose

wrath, as has been seen, had been, almost exclusively, directed against them, and had been inflamed into fury by their all but complete repression of the insurrection, was satisfied. The report of the nomination of new and popular Ministers added to the general contentment. That a civic guard should be immediately enrolled for the protection of both Court and city seemed a necessary measure, to which the King, with the approval of some generals around him, gave formal assent from a balcony of the palace. The head of the Berlin police, Minutoli, who enjoyed a curious popularity among the citizens, was placed in command of the civic guard[1], and 6000 rifles from the arsenal were distributed among its members. A detachment, after listening to an admirable speech from Town-councillor Duncker, quickly cleared the palace courtyard. No excesses took place here or elsewhere; even the palace of the detested Prince of Prussia was spared after being, in Parisian fashion, marked 'national property.'

Prittwitz's next act seems further to disclose his real motives and those of his friends. Even after the catastrophe of March 19th, the military party sought to induce the King to quit Berlin; and, already on that day, Prittwitz had begun to give orders making for the fulfilment of his ultimate purpose. While, at the palace, it was expected that the troops would, for the present, remain in the barracks into which they had retired, he took it upon himself, on the evening of the 19th, to order two battalions of grenadiers to leave the town; and, on the 20th and 21st, all the troops still in Berlin were sent after them. This was effected, not by a general order, but through instructions issued to the several commanders, bidding them to abandon those barracks which could not be defended and to send the soldiers now occupying them out of town, together with those on whose discipline no reliance could be placed. Before this, the

[1] He laid down the command on April 4th.

Prince of Prussia, who was popularly regarded, not only as the chief of the military party, but as the archfoe of all Liberal and constitutional ideas, had secretly taken his departure from Berlin. Though with many misgivings, he had, as still in name President of the Council of Ministers, conformed to the policy adopted by the King in accordance with the advice of Bodelschwingh, and, while bitterly resenting it, had refrained from stopping the royal order for the withdrawal of the troops. Herein, he had been true to his military sense of duty; nor had the time yet come for his giving expression to the patriotic ambition which he cherished and in which he was encouraged by the counsel of his consort[1]. On the evening of the 19th, he quitted Berlin. He had received information that a demand was to be brought forward for excluding him from the succession to the throne, and, on consulting his royal brother, he had been charged with a 'special mission' to the British Court[2].

Among the troops at Potsdam a strong feeling prevailed that the King ought to be in their midst, instead of depending on the protection of Berlin burghers. But, though it was not his own action which had brought him into his present position, he was still unwilling to take a step which might

[1] See vol. I of the correspondence of the Empress Augusta (edited by P. Bailleu and G. Schuster, Berlin, 1912), which has already done much towards destroying the effect of persistent misrepresentation.

[2] His flight, successfully accomplished in the teeth of much difficulty and danger, was for some time kept secret at Berlin, where, a day or two later, the rumour spread that he had gone to return at the head of an army for the conquest of the capital. He arrived in London on March 27th, and, though there was afterwards some talk of offering him a command in the Schleswig-Holstein war, remained 'in exile' for a couple of months, and then returned with an open promise of adherence to the royal policy. For an authentic account of the Prince's flight see the reminiscences of his faithful companion, 'Major O.' (Stuttgart, *s.a.*) Cf. also *Aus dem Leben T. von Bernhardis*, vol. III, p. 27.

imply an intention on his part to coerce his capital by force of arms, and, on the contrary, resolved to give ocular proof of his sympathy with the wishes of the people, and of his determination to place himself at the head of the German national movement. This was the meaning of King Frederick William IV's unforgettable ride through Berlin on March 21st. Wrapped in the German colours, and accompanied by a suite of princes and generals similarly decked-out, he carried out his design, pausing at successive points in the route to proclaim in eloquent words his devotion to the national cause. However much Berlin might applaud this homage from King to people, even the first effect was not altogether satisfactory, while in wider circles it did more than any other action of his to drag down his royal name. This procession was followed on the next day (March 22nd) by another—the solemn funeral of the victims of the recent insurrection —the revolutionary victims, to wit, for the fallen soldiers were buried in secrecy and silence; and, once more, the King appeared on his palace balcony in the character of a sympathetic spectator.

The direct purpose of the King's ride had been disclosed by his proclamation, put forth on the same day, 'To my people and the German nation.' It announced that the Prussian diet, summoned for April 2nd, would furnish to the sovereigns and Estates of Germany an opportunity for joining the organs of this diet in a united national assembly, which was to decide finally on all matters calling for settlement in the present time of danger at home and abroad[1]. An announcement of the Berlin magistracy, dated March 20th,

[1] This appeal concludes with the celebrated phrase: 'Prussia shall henceforth merge in Germany.' The King afterwards explained these words to have been intended merely to indicate that the Prussian provinces not yet forming part of the Germanic Confederation (Prussia and Posen) ought, in his opinion, to be included in it. See Rachfahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–6 and *Appendix* IV.

stated that the Prussian troops would take the oath to the German constitution, so soon as it was ready. In the meantime, they were ordered to assume the German, in conjunction with the Prussian, cockade. On the same day, an amnesty for political offences was proclaimed.

The Austrian Government, although at the time in dire stress, was by no means blind to the significance of these appeals *ad populum*. The draft agreement between the two Powers presented at Vienna by Radowitz, apparently in ignorance of Max von Gagern's design, so recently as March 19th, according to which they were jointly to summon a Federal representative assembly to sit side by side with the Federal Diet, seemed already laid on the shelf, and with it the plan of Ministerial conferences between the two Powers. In these circumstances, the Austrian Government thought it well to issue, on the 24th, a circular which, in the form of a protest against any alteration of the Federal constitution without the cooperation of Austria, conveyed a direct repudiation of any scheme in the interest of Prussian hegemony. Meanwhile, the contemplated conference of Princes at Potsdam had finally fallen through; and a conversation on March 23rd, between Arnim and Max von Gagern and his colleagues, had shown that Saxony and Baden were unwilling to fall in with the Prussian scheme announced in the proclamation of the 21st; though Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau were prepared to agree that their diets should, with the Prussian, send representatives to the forthcoming national parliament at Frankfort. Thus the Prussian Government seemed little, if at all, nearer to the goal.

It would be to little purpose to enquire whether a more resolute course of action might have been crowned with success. Austria was still in peril of the downfall of her empire, and Tsar Nicholas—*quantum mutandus*—was urging his brother-in-law to assume the lead in Germany. Yet,

however broadly King Frederick William IV might have attested, and continue to attest, his belief in the course of national unity, and his readiness to approve, as a necessary preliminary, constitutional reform in Prussia, the part he had played in the 'March days' at Berlin had unmistakably marred the prospect of his being accepted as a leader by either the sovereigns or the peoples of German states other than his own. And, even if his personal unpopularity—more especially outside his own kingdom—might give way in face of his assurances, it was more than doubtful whether he would rise to the height of the aspirations which he had proclaimed. He was still busily revolving ideas irreconcilable either with the exclusion of Austria from Germany or with the denial of at least an honorary supremacy among the Princes to the head of the House of Habsburg, under whom he would himself be created Imperial commander-in-chief. Added to this, his mental depression at this time was—intelligibly enough—so deep that he was becoming more and more incapable of a bold initiative. Thus, the opportunity (if it was such) was allowed to pass away; and, when it recurred with still greater directness, the external situation had in so far altered that, though Austria still continued distracted, Russia's goodwill had, for reasons which will immediately appear, changed into resentment.

Meanwhile, the Prussian Government had been reconstructed with a view to the task awaiting it. Count von Arnim-Boytzenburg was looked on askance in southern Germany, where his ejection of the Baden politicians Hecker and Itzstein from Prussia in May 1845 was wrathfully remembered; and, among radicals in general, he was decried as an aristocrat. His entrance on the duties of Minister-president, in the midst of the turbulence and indecision of March 19th, had, as already mentioned, been followed by the appointment to the departments of Public

Worship, Home Affairs and Justice, of Liberals—Count Schwerin, Alfred von Auerswald and F. W. L. Bornemann; and, on March 21st, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was entrusted to Freiherr Heinrich Friedrich von Arnim-Suckow, hitherto envoy at Paris, an eager advocate of an advanced German policy, who during the March days had been in close attendance on the King, and was said to have suggested the 'German ride[1].' To him, instead of the Minister of the Interior, were committed the constitutional affairs of Prussia, 'because of their necessary connexion with the constitutional affairs of Germany at large.' It was, however, soon felt that the new Ministry was not popular enough in its composition to secure the confidence of the Liberals, more especially on the Rhine, and that Arnim-Boytzenburg's trump-card, according to which the Prussian United Diet was to be made the starting-point of constitutional reform, was no longer accepted as sufficient. The present demand was for the promulgation by royal authority of a new electoral law, based on the principle of universal suffrage and providing for the choice of a constituent representative assembly without the intervention of the Prussian diet. In these circumstances, L. Camphausen, the more moderate of the two Rhenish political leaders, declined to disappoint public feeling in the west by accepting the Ministry of Finance in Arnim-Boytzenburg's Administration; and the more radical D. J. L. Hansemann (of Aachen) followed suit by a refusal, frankly accounted for by the unpopularity of the President of the Ministry.

Before the Ministerial crisis came to an end, on March 29th, by the resignation of Arnim-Boytzenburg and the appointment, in his place, of Camphausen, with Hansemann (under whom, as a protectionist, the former, as a free-trader, had declined to serve) as his Minister of Finance, the King had continued to pursue a course of action harmonising

[1] He is the 'lame Arnim' of the memoir-literature of the time.

with popular wishes. On March 24th, his personal sympathy with Poland may to some extent have facilitated his assent to the proposed reorganisation of the administration of the province of Posen in accordance with the wishes of the nationalist Polish majority, which was entirely absorbed in this question. On the same day, as will be seen below, he declared himself in favour of the Schleswig-Holstein claims—a concession to popular feeling which can hardly have been whole-hearted, and which was attributed to Arnim's advice. On March 25th, having for the first time found his way to Potsdam, where he took up his residence two or three days later, he delivered a speech[1] to the officers of the guard in acknowledgment of the civic protection afforded him in the capital, which gave great offence to his audience, but must have been intended for a wider public.

Yet the spirit of cooperation with the popular will, or of deference to it, thus manifested by Frederick William IV, cannot be said to have been consistently maintained by him during the troubled, and in part obscure, period of Prussian history which followed. The formation of the Camphausen-Hansemann Ministry was in itself a political event; for the administration of the Prussian state was now, for the first time, in the hands of men of business, belonging neither to the nobility nor to the official class. This very fact made it incumbent on them to adopt a definite policy satisfactory to the great body of public opinion. After much consideration, they resolved that the representative assembly in which the constitution was to originate should consist of a single Chamber (although the two-Chamber system might be established by the constitution itself) and be elected on the basis of unrestricted universal suffrage; but that the law regulating the election of this assembly should be passed by the United Diet,

[1] The speech is given *verbatim* by Leopold von Gerlach, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–9.

which more advanced opinion had been prepared to eliminate from the process. Yet, already before the meeting of the United Diet (April 2nd) which was to witness the entrance of the Ministry on its clear course of policy, the King's repugnance to it was no secret to his intimates. Radowitz, whose loyalty was unimpeachable, but whose elective affinity to many of the King's views had not prevented him from accepting a combination of monarchical principles with parliamentary institutions, wisely advised his sovereign to hold by his promises, but to take as little personal part as possible in the discussion of constitutional schemes[1]. The King, however, though resolved on overcoming his dislike of anything that savoured, in fact or even in name, of 'constitutionalism,' could not bring himself to follow his trusted friend's counsel, or to treat his Ministers as responsible servants of the state. His politico-religious theories and his inmost beliefs united to make him consider himself—and himself alone—directly responsible, and his Ministers merely the agents of his will; and to this conviction was added the bitter sense of the recent collapse of his personal authority. The power of the Crown might some day be restored; and, as he did not dare to call in openly the aid of the conservatives pure and simple who shared his own conceptions of his rights and duties, or to risk a *coup* such as a few hotspurs like Otto von Bismarck would have been ready to support him in attempting, he lent himself, from the end of March onwards, to the growing influence of the body of confidential advisers encircling him. This was the celebrated *Camarilla*, which did not itself disdain the name by which it came to be generally known. Its leading personages at this time were Leopold and Ludwig von Gerlach—the former never far away from the royal presence, the latter brought over, on

[1] Cf. F. Meinecke, *Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution* (1913), pp. 74 sqq.

critical occasions, from Magdeburg; General von Rauch, whom Leopold von Gerlach in 1849 succeeded as Adjutant-general to the King, and who, according to his successor, was even less fettered than he in his communications with his sovereign; General von Massow, Minister of the Royal Household; and, less constantly, the historian Heinrich Leo. General (afterwards Field-marshal) Edwin von Manteuffel, at this time one of the King's aides-de-camp, already belonged to the circle of the royal intimates, though his chief services were of later date. Finally, Marcus Niebuhr, Cabinet Secretary from December 1848, was not long in gaining an important personal influence. Of necessity, this group of advisers did not act together with regularity or with perfect harmony among themselves, and none of them ever acquired that ascendancy over the King's mind which Radowitz and Bunsen from time to time were able to exercise[1]; but their advice was steady, continuous and self-consistent, and from first to last deadly to constitutional freedom. This secret system of government was, of course, greatly favoured by the King's continued residence at Potsdam, and rose to its height when Count von Brandenburg, between whom and the Camarilla much sympathy existed, came into power.

Meanwhile, the United Diet in the capital entered with ardour into its duties, deeming itself called upon not only to pass a law placing the elections for the forthcoming Prussian representative assembly on the broadest of bases, but to lay down binding constitutional principles as to both taxation and administration—including freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary and the right of free association and assembly. The privileged classes, as represented in the

[1] This is confessed with the utmost frankness by Leopold von Gerlach, *op. cit.*, p. 244. For the first attempt at forming a *ministère occulte* (Gerlach's own phrase) see *ib.*, p. 150. As to a sitting of the Camarilla under Brandenburg's presidency, cf. *ib.*, p. 235.

diet, accepted the proposed new electoral law with notable willingness; and the diet also approved the financial policy of the Ministry, who, besides, after careful enquiry, providing a sufficient credit for the public expenditure, appropriated a much larger sum (25 million dollars) to the support of the shaken prosperity of the country—this sum to be raised so far as possible by private effort. These measures, though the response to the last-named was somewhat slow, redound to the credit of the Liberal Ministry and of its endeavour for reasoned progress. It broke up, after a struggle of five months, mainly by reason of the King's want of confidence in it, which the Camarilla lost no chance of fostering, and of his distrust of the policy which he had himself announced as his programme[1].

During these months, the German national movement rapidly advanced by a succession of stages of which the particular German Governments, and the Prussian in especial, found themselves directly called upon to take cognisance. On March 31st, the *Vorparlament* held its first sitting proper at Frankfort. It consisted of between 500 and 600 members, of whom the main body had previously formed part of the legislatures of the several states, Prussia contributing 141, and Hesse-Darmstadt and Baden respectively the disproportionately large numbers of 84 and 72 delegates. On the other hand, Austria was virtually unrepresented[2]. As a matter of course, the large majority of the *Vorparlament* were prominent Liberals; but they were by no means at one, either as to the precise functions they were to fulfil or as to the principles on which they desired

[1] Cf. Gerlach, *u.s.*, p. 151. As to the proceedings of the United Diet, see H. Mähl, *Die Überleitung Preussens in das konstitutionelle System durch den zweiten Vereinigten Landtag* (1909), and J. Hansen, *König Friedrich Wilhelm IV und das liberale Märzministerium Camphausen-Hansemann i. J.* 1848 (1913).

[2] At first one Austrian delegate, and then two, attended.

their joint action to be based. Professor K. J. A. Mittermaier of Heidelberg, an eminent jurist who had for many years presided over the Second Baden Chamber, but who proved ill-fitted for the new model of the *Vorparlament*, was elected its president. To the programme or plan of action drafted by the Commission of Seven, which laid down the principles of the constitution of a monarchical federal state, Struve at once opposed an elaborate outline of a republican constitution on the lines of the American union; but, after vehement discussions, it was resolved to pass on to business; and a law for the elections to the National Assembly was passed on the basis of universal suffrage, but not necessarily of direct election. When, hereupon, the *Vorparlament* proceeded to the appointment of committees, the republican party again intervened with a proposal, made by Hecker, that the present assembly should declare itself permanent until the meeting of the actual parliament—the object being to constitute the *Vorparlament* the ruling authority in Germany, to the exclusion of the Federal Diet, which, having been largely renovated in its composition, but remaining in fact as impotent as ever, continued to meet. Hecker's motion was successfully resisted by H. von Gagern, who, being a Minister of State, had declined the presidency of the preliminary assembly. On the ground that 'to build up, not to destroy' was the needful task, he proposed a committee of fifty members, upon whom should devolve the preparations for the election of the National Assembly; and the motion was carried by the same majority as that which had rejected Hecker's (368 to 143 votes). It was subsequently agreed that the future constitution of Germany should be 'wholly and solely[1]' determined by the National Assembly; but, when Welcker protested against the implied line of action

[1] '*Einzig und allein*,' the pregnant phrase in A. von Soiron's motion.

as being one which would lead to civil war, the resolution was explained as not intended to preclude subsequent negotiations with the particular Governments. No understanding on the subject was, however, reached between these and either the *Vorparlament* or the Committee of Fifty.

The *Vorparlament* separated after the election of this committee; but in this election, while six places remained open for Austrian members, and a representation was accorded to the Left in the persons of such leading members of the party as Blum, Jacoby and H. Simon, the extreme men—Hecker, Struve and their immediate following—were passed over. They at once seceded from the *Vorparlament*, having virtually determined to resort to the *ultima ratio*, an appeal to arms. The Committee of Fifty, of which Soiron was elected chairman, was not lacking in patriotic activity; but, in truth, neither had it legal authority for the position which it assumed, nor had any but a few of its members great personal ascendancy. Yet, not only did it fix the electoral unit for the National Assembly at one member for every 50,000 souls (instead of 70,000 as first fixed by the Federal Diet, which, however, at once acquiesced in the change), but it demeaned itself as if it had been a sort of Provisional Government for Germany, and decisively resisted the attempt made by the Federal Diet, at the suggestion of the confidential agents of the particular Governments, to appoint an executive of three, nominated by Austria, Prussia and the rest of the states respectively. Finally, it sought to assert a controlling authority in certain quarters where order had been disturbed—at Cassel, where the obnoxious cavalry of the guard had, it was said wantonly, charged the populace, and at Prague, where a violent outbreak had occurred between Germans and Čechs. Meanwhile, some memorable efforts were made to prepare the ground for the meeting of the National Assembly. Dahlmann

laid before the eminent men associated with him as 'in the confidence[1]' of their several Governments the draft of an imperial law which gave a concrete form to the idea of national unity, subordinating the rulers of the particular states, without ignoring them, to the hereditary authority of the head of the Empire, who was left unnamed. The draft was approved by a majority, without any dissent on the part of the Austrian Schmerling. Other draft schemes mark this period of expectancy—among them the well-known one devised by Prince Albert, Queen Victoria's consort, which was not made public till nearly twenty years afterwards[2].

The champions of republicanism to whom the *Vorparlament* had declined to listen—F. Hecker, the fire of whose eloquence made him a favourite of the multitude, and his fanatically *doctrinaire* associate, G. von Struve—had made their appeal to the populace in grand-ducal Hesse, and more especially in Baden. Here, Hecker proclaimed the republic at Offenburg; and his partisan Fickler was only prevented from leaving Carlsruhe station on the same errand for the south-eastern part of the grand-duchy by the spirited personal intervention of K. Mathy, whose resolution at this time helped materially to maintain constitutional order in Baden for a while. Unfortunately, the gallant and liberal-minded General Friedrich von Gagern, who had been appointed to the command of the Hesse-Darmstadt troops sent out to suppress the rising, was, after the close of a parley with its leaders at Kandern on the Scheidegg, treacherously shot dead—a tragic incident which deepened the division

[1] *Vertrauensmänner.*

[2] It was printed in 1867, with the marginal notes of King Frederick William IV. A short analysis of this pamphlet, of which the Prince Consort's biographer, Sir Theodore Martin, could not obtain a copy, is given in K. Klüpfel, *Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbestrebungen*, vol. I (1872), pp. 39–40. The Prince (not the King) opined that the imperial dignity should be elective.

between Liberals and republicans. But the insurgents were soon scattered, and several of their most prominent men—including the brilliant poet but impracticable politician Herwegh[1]—were fortunate enough to find their way into Switzerland. Hecker, after his election to the National Assembly had been twice declared invalid, betook himself to North America, where he afterwards did good service in the Civil War. But the insurrection unsuccessfully conducted by him in Baden left traces behind it which were soon to lead to its renewal. Struve made another attempt at a rising in September, which was suppressed, on the 24th of that month, by a combat at Staufen-im-Breisgau.

The Schleswig-Holstein war, on the other hand, to which as has been seen the King of Prussia had pledged his support, and which Radowitz urged him to prosecute with all possible energy, speedily aroused an undivided patriotic interest throughout Germany, and did more than anything else to stimulate the desire for national unity. The immediate cause of the unprecedented agitation which had pervaded the duchies in February 1848 was the publication, on January 28th, of the draft general constitution of the Danish monarchy, bequeathed by the late King to his successor Frederick VII as the radical and final remedy against the Schleswig-Holstein movement. This constitution, while leaving the provincial assemblies of the duchies in existence for purely home affairs, united their representation to that of Denmark proper in matters of taxation, finance and legislation which concerned the entire monarchy, and left its future common constitution to be settled by a committee of 18 experts from the duchies and the same number from the kingdom, together with 16 nominated by the Crown. While Holstein would thus be separated from the Germanic Confederation, the union between Schleswig and Holstein would be superseded by a union of both with the Danish

[1] See *post* as to his return to France at this time.

provinces of the monarchy. The 'Eider-Danes' were by no means contented with the policy of this proposed settlement, to which they would have preferred the complete incorporation of Schleswig, with Holstein left out, at the cost of an open rupture with both the duchies. But the general current of public opinion in Denmark was in favour of a conversion of the Danish absolute monarchy into a constitutional state. On the other hand, the protests in the duchies were loud and immediate; and an assembly of deputies of the Estates of both Schleswig and Holstein held at Rendsburg, demanded, together with a general arming of the population, the formal summons of the Estates of both duchies for the discussion of a Schleswig-Holstein constitution and of the admission of Schleswig into the Germanic Confederation. Duke Christian August of Augustenburg now lost no time in coming to the front. On March 27th, as was seen, he succeeded in obtaining at Berlin from the King of Prussia a distinct recognition of the independence and inseparability of the two duchies, and of the inherence in the male line of the right of succession to them—the principle on which the Augustenburg claim depended. Meanwhile, the Copenhagen democrats had taken advantage of the Rendsburg resolutions to insist on the incorporation of Schleswig in the kingdom; and on March 21st a new Ministry was formed at Copenhagen to carry out this programme.

King Frederick VII's policy was now wholly under the control of the Eider-Danes. On the 24th, a royal message announced that Holstein, being a state in the Germanic Confederation, was to receive a constitution of its own, while further safeguards were to be provided for the indissoluble union between the kingdom and Schleswig, though the latter was to be granted certain provincial rights of its own. The immediate reply of the Schleswig-Holsteiners to this announcement of the consummation of the Eider-Danish policy was the establishment 'in the name

of the King-Duke'—though there were many voices in favour of an open rejection of the Danish sovereignty—of a Provisional Government. It consisted of Prince Frederick of Noer (the younger brother of Duke Christian August of Augustenburg), who assumed the military command, and a number of leading Schleswig and Holstein politicians, of whom the foremost (afterwards President of the Government) was Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, who for some years had presided over the assembly of the Schleswig Estates. Its establishment was announced on March 24th in a vigorously-worded proclamation drawn up by Droysen; whereupon it at once put itself into possession of the town and fortress of Rendsburg and, with an armed force of 3000 men, afterwards augmented to about double that total, prepared to resist the onset of the Danish army and fleet. The Duke of Augustenburg—whose sons were never to behold the castle of their ancestors again—took up his residence at Rendsburg, and, by a proclamation dated March 31st, identified himself with the popular rising. He was opposed to the rejection of Frederick VII's sovereign authority, but would have been willing to act as regent of the duchies in the King's name. It would have been hazardous for him to provoke the resentment of the King of Prussia and of the other German sovereigns by taking an illegal step; and, as events proved, that step would have been premature.

Anticipating the chronological sequence of events, we may most conveniently bring to a close this summary of the first stage of the Schleswig-Holstein conflict, begun amidst so much patriotic enthusiasm, but destined to be speedily and ingloriously arrested. The Danish troops rapidly overspread the northern part of Schleswig; whereupon, in accordance with Frederick William IV's promise, a Prussian force under General von Bonin occupied Holstein, remaining, however, on the southern side of the Eider. On April 9th, the Schleswig-Holstein army was attacked by a

much superior Danish force in the neighbourhood of Flensburg and dispersed, a corps composed largely of Kiel students suffering severely near the village of Bau. Schleswig was taken on the 11th and Eckernförde, at the south-eastern end of the duchy, on the 13th; so that the whole of it was now in the hands of the Danes. The humiliation of this blow, unaverted by the Prussian troops in Holstein, was felt and resented throughout Germany; and, on April 22nd, the Prussian and Federal forces—the latter sent out by the Federal Diet at the instance of the *Vorparlament*, and the whole body under the supreme command of the sturdy veteran, General von Wrangel—advanced into Schleswig. Hence, Wrangel on May 2nd continued his march into Jutland, where the neglected fortress of Fridericia at once capitulated to him.

But the invasion soon came to a standstill. Frankfort was enthusiastic, and summoned deputies from Schleswig to the National Assembly; but the midland and south-western Governments took no steps towards a vigorous prosecution of the war; and Austria was occupied with her own troubles. The Prussian Government, however, found itself hampered by the unconcealed illwill of the Russian and British Governments and the warlike attitude of Sweden, as well as by apprehensions of frosts on the Baltic, and by the objections of the conservative party—which came home to the King himself—against a war which so palpably excited democratic as well as national sympathies. Thus, proposals for a settlement were made by the Prussian Foreign Office at Petersburg and in London, where before long they were in substance adopted; and Wrangel was ordered to withdraw his unwilling army from Jutland, where he had already imposed a war contribution. But it soon became clear that the obstinacy of Denmark would, for the present, render any attempts at a pacification futile. Hereupon, the Prussian Government

resolved to conclude a truce on its own account with Denmark; and, through the good offices of Sweden, a meeting of Danish and Prussian plenipotentiaries was arranged at Malmö, who, on July 2nd, agreed on the conditions of a truce. Wrangel was now at once ordered to abstain from further hostilities; but, on the ground that he was Federal as well as Prussian commander, he was fain to demur to this order. The truce was to last for three months, during which no troops of either side were to enter the duchies, and the blockade of German ports was to cease. During the truce, Schleswig-Holstein was to be governed by a commission of five, two of these being chosen on each side and the president coopted. In the duchies the draft truce was received with dismay; but the Duke of Augustenburg thought it prudent to decline interfering at Frankfort. A state of war had actually recommenced on July 24th, when the Prussian Government, with the authorisation of the German national executive (i.e. the *Reichsverweser*), induced the Danish to reopen negotiations, and brought about the signing of a new 'punctation' at Malmö, on August 26th. Both armies were to be withdrawn during the truce, now arranged to last for seven months, with the exception of a garrison force of 2000 men; in the Schleswig-Holstein army the Schleswigers were to be organised in separate sections. As before, the administration of the duchies was to be in the hands of a body of five; and the proposal that the president should be Count Charles Moltke, who was bitterly hated in the duchies as a strong adversary of their rights, was accepted by the Prussian negotiator, General von Below. Furthermore, all the laws and ordinances passed in Schleswig-Holstein since March 17th under the Provisional Government were to be void.

Thus the debate as to the acceptance of the truce, which, as will be seen, was carried on by the National Assembly at Frankfort on September 4th and 5th, and of which the most

notable feature was the passionate attack upon the punctation by Dahlmann, was of the greatest significance. Once more, the Duke of Augustenburg strove to prevent a rupture between the Assembly and the Prussian Government, which might be fatal to any future cooperation between them on behalf of Schleswig-Holstein; and, on September 14th, a narrow majority (258 to 236) of the Assembly declined to agree to the rejection, recommended by its own committee, of the proposed Malmö truce. The Danish Government, afraid of a winter campaign, in which its fleet would be useless, now also accepted the truce, and on October 12th the new Provisional Government—but not with Count Moltke at its head—came into office in the name of 'Frederick VII, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein[1].'

In accordance with the electoral law passed by the second United Diet, the Prussian National Assembly met, on May 22nd, 1848, the thirty-third anniversary of King Frederick William III's promise of representative institutions to his people. It consisted of 402 members, and, though including a large number (178) of officials, also contained a considerable admixture from the lower classes of the population, thus presenting a significant contrast to the meetings of the Estates which it had superseded[2]. Although the moderate Right was very decidedly in a minority, it at first held its own, until the Left came gradually to prevail over the other groups. A moderate Liberal, K. A. Milde (afterwards Minister of Commerce) was chosen President, against B. F. L. Waldeck, who may be said to have been the protagonist of the democratic party from this time forward to its virtual collapse more than twenty years later—a man abominated by Prussian conservatism,

[1] For an account of the Schleswig-Holstein movement from the death of Christian VIII to the truce of Malmö, see J. H. Gebauer, *Christian August, Herzog von Schleswig-Holstein* (1910), pp. 203–53.

[2] Cf. P. Reichensperger, *Erlebnisse*, pp. 54 sqq.

but an able constitutional lawyer, and possessed of an imaginative mind true to its political and religious ideals[1]. In the midst of a city almost as dependent on itself for its protection as Vienna—for the civic guard was long without due organisation, and was looked upon askance by both King and Court—without leaders of parliamentary experience, and under the guidance of a Minister in whom the sovereign showed no confidence, and who himself declared that he regarded his period of office as one of mediation and transition only, the Prussian National Assembly entered on its task. This task was *Vereinbarung* (settlement by agreement): a phrase which became the catchword of its deliberations and was employed even by the Prince of Prussia when addressing it in a speech more honest than tactful. The Assembly and the Crown were to come to an agreement as to the future constitution of the monarchy, and the former was thus virtually denied all claim to the character of a constituent body. The draft constitution, however, which was laid before the Assembly by the Ministers and which proposed merely to carry out the royal edict of March 18th, thus ignoring subsequent events, was regarded on all sides as unsatisfactory. The proposed First Chamber was anti-democratic, and its treatment of the rights of free assembly and association, and the liberty of the press, provisional only, while other guarantees were altogether omitted. The chief historical interest of this draft constitution was that it supplied the basis for later constitutional discussions and for the constitution ultimately imposed by the Crown. At present, it led, not illogically, to a motion calling on the Assembly to acknowledge the deserts of the combatants of March 18th and 19th, which could only be got rid of by means of a not

[1] Waldeck was imprisoned on a charge of high treason during the latter half of the year 1849, but acquitted. He was a fervent Roman Catholic, and an accomplished poet.

very ingenious adoption of the order of the day. And, on June 15th, the draft constitution, with which little or no way had been made, was, by a vote of 188 to 142, referred to a lengthy process of consideration and report by committees which implied infinite delay. Before the Ministry, now definitely reduced to a minority, broke up, a riot at Berlin bore witness to the discontent of the populace with Ministry, Assembly and *Bürgerwehr*. On June 14th, the *Zeughaus* (arsenal), which was guarded by a single company of the line, and defended by a battalion of the civic guard, was assailed by the mob. After holding out all day, the soldiers in the evening took their departure; and the populace, after being scattered by some firing on the part of the *Bürgerwehr*, was allowed to reenter and plunder part of the arsenal, before it was finally dispersed. The Ministry, hereupon, ordered in three battalions of the line to reinforce the civic guard; but the National Assembly preferred to place itself under the protection of the inhabitants of Berlin, who left it unmolested. But, so early as June 17th, the resignation of three of Camphausen's colleagues (H. A. von Arnim, Schwerin and General von Reyher) was announced; and, on the 26th, his own was made public. His effort, undertaken in a patriotic spirit, had failed except in so far that time had been gained for the tranquillisation (however incomplete) of Berlin and Prussia; and the conservatives and reactionaries had begun to shake off their despondency. Yet he might hope that the work of reconciliation which he had begun—a work differing altogether from the repressive policy which about this very time Cavaignac was carrying out in France—would have a better prospect of success under a Government in more complete harmony with the Assembly; and, meanwhile, the monarchical principle had been safeguarded.

On Camphausen's withdrawal, the King summoned Hansemann, hitherto Minister of Finance, who, though in

many respects differing from his chief, and believed to be more democratic in his sympathies, had not, at least openly, opposed his course of action. Hansemann preferred, while continuing to hold his former office, to subordinate himself outwardly to Rudolf von Auerswald, who, though an avowed Liberal, stood in personal relations with the royal family. He readily consented to hold the Presidency of the Ministry, together, temporarily, with the department of Foreign Affairs. The rest of his Ministry he formed out of the Right and Centre parties, including the President of the Chamber, whose place was taken by W. Grabow, another Moderate, who filled the office (though not quite without a break) till 1866.

The promises held out by the self-styled 'Ministry of action,' when it had at last got under way, were the speedy completion of the draft constitution (with a less exclusive First Chamber) and the formal recognition of the March resolution and its achievements; but its main business was the restoration of the impaired machinery of the state. Radical reforms at home in Prussia it could not summon up strength to take in hand. In national German matters, on the other hand, the strong current of popular opinion forbade any hesitation in its policy.

The elections for the Frankfort National Assembly or Parliament (as, to avoid confusion, we may take leave to call it) had proceeded, partly amidst difficulties to which we cannot here recur, on the new numerical basis and by direct popular vote, both the Prussian and the Saxon Government having desisted from the methods at first proposed by them. Schleswig, as well as East and West Prussia, had, in accordance with a resolution of the *Vorparlament*, been included in the national electoral area. The first meeting of the Parliament had been postponed from May 1st to 18th in obedience to concurrent decrees of the Committee of Fifty and of the Federal Diet, whose coexistence, as legally representing the several German Governments, with the new

organ of the national will forms one of the most curious anomalies of modern constitutional history. As a whole, it admirably represented the German educated middle-class, of which it contained most of the leading members—more especially of the official and professional type, with a smaller proportion of men of business, and a sprinkling of priests, pastors and unprofessional men of letters[1]. The first German Parliament would not have been what it was, had it not begun with an outburst of sentiment, a vote of thanks to one of its most aged and most renowned members, E. M. Arndt, proposed by another popular veteran, F. L. Jahn. At the same meeting (May 19th) it chose Heinrich von Gagern as its President, thereby introducing order and dignity into its proceedings, and submitting to the control of a statesman and patriot whose name and fame became identified with what was best in its own.

Most unfortunately, though not by its fault, the National Parliament found itself without the requisite material for immediately taking up and bringing to an issue the main business for which it had assembled. Dahlmann's draft of a constitution, approved by the Committee of Seventeen, had not yet been discussed by the Federal Diet, before which it had been laid on April 26th and which had asked for instructions from the several Governments. Some attempts

[1] For an account of the proceedings of the Federal Diet, see, besides Biedermann's excellent summary in vol. I of *Dreissig Jahre deutscher Geschichte,* already cited, the same author's *Erinnerungen aus der Paulskirche* (184 ·), and other works; G. Rümelin, *Aus der Paulskirche* (1892); H. Laube, *Das erste deutsche Parlament* (3 vols. 1849); and R. Haym, *Die deutsche Nationalversammlung* (3 parts, 1848-50), the last-named an elaborate *apologia* of the action of the Right Centre party. For a relation of the proceedings of the Federal Diet from the beginning of May to the end of July 1848, see the dispatches of Clemens T. Perthes (who attended it as plenipotentiary of Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Meiningen), a very intelligent but pessimistic observer, in *Bundestag und Nationalversammlung, Frankfurter Historische Forschungen,* VII (1913).

to bring about a representation of the Governments within the Parliament itself having failed, and the idea of increasing the numbers of the Federal Diet, so as to give it the place of a sort of Second Chamber in the discussion of the constitution, having likewise broken down, the Parliament, when it set about its main task, stood in no definite relation to the Governments. Gagern, therefore, had really no other choice, when, with the insight and moral courage of which he was to give repeated proof, he declared the Parliament to be a constituent assembly, and its task that of bringing about an agreement between the Governments and the will of the nation which had called it together. But, from the first, a large proportion of the members of the Parliament perceived the almost insuperable difficulty of securing the desired agreement by discussion or negotiation.

It would serve no purpose to cumber this brief narrative with the nomenclature of the parties and groups which gradually formed themselves in the National Parliament, and which generally called themselves by the names of the hostelries and other places where they were wont to hold their consultative gatherings. Suffice it to say that in the earlier, or constructive, period of the Parliament, the Right, numbering about 150 members, was the strongest single party; it was flanked by an Extreme Right, of which—so strong was the democratic current—Vincke and Radowitz were leading members. The Right proper consisted of moderate and monarchical members, and, because of the elements predominating it, was sometimes described as the Prussian party, and sometimes as the professorial, for the professors of that day at Frankfort were not the visionaries they have been ignorantly supposed to have been. In the Right, and, in a larger measure, in the Left Centre there were democratic elements; but the Left and the Extreme Left were both republican. The relations between the parties and groups necessarily fluctuated, more especially at the time of

the debates as to the election of an Emperor; and, after this had proved abortive, the whole inner life of the Parliament underwent fundamental changes which ended in its collapse.

The first business of the Parliament was to create a provisional Central Power or Authority; and here, of course, the question at once arose, how far the Parliament could come to an understanding on this point with the particular Governments. This was impossible, if the Left succeeded in making the President of the Parliament the central authority responsible to it, or the Extreme Left in vesting this authority in a committee appointed by the Parliament. The debate on this crucial difficulty ran on for six days, and reached its climax in the famous 'bold move' (*kühner Griff*) of Gagern, when he put an end to the dependence of the Parliament on the will of the particular Governments by declaring that the Parliament itself must create the Central Power. He made it clear that the consent of the Governments was afterwards to be obtained; but this would be *ex post facto*. The establishment of a Central Power was accordingly voted, on June 27th, by the imposing majority of 450 to 100; and, two days afterwards, the President proclaimed the election, by the Parliament, of Archduke John of Austria, as Vicar of the Empire (*Reichsverweser*). Four hundred and thirty-six members had voted for the Archduke, 52 of the Left for Gagern, 32 of the Extreme Left for Itzstein. As to the choice itself, had any but an Austrian prince been selected, the refusal of Austria to accept the constitution which the Parliament had in view would have been absolutely certain; and if an Austrian prince was to be chosen, Archduke John was inevitable. His popularity was due to his *bonhomie*, his 'unequal' marriage, and a kindly patriotic pose, which he was unlikely to abandon until German and Austrian interests came into direct conflict.

Soon after his election, the *Reichsverweser* appointed a

responsible Imperial Ministry (*Reichsministerium*). Its headship was offered in succession to Camphausen (who preferred to be accredited as Prussian plenipotentiary to the Central Power), Baron Stockmar, and Prince Charles von Leiningen (who was a general in the Bavarian army). It was accepted by the last-named highminded politician, but resigned by him within a month, when (September 5th) the National Parliament had ordered an enquiry into the Malmö truce[1]. The office was then assumed, in circumstances of great difficulty for an Austrian statesman, by Schmerling, together with the department of the Interior, while that of Foreign Affairs, the project of securing Bunsen for it having fallen through, was entrusted to J. G. W. M. Heckscher, a Hamburg advocate of much debating ability, in whom the Archduke had reason to place confidence. The Ministry of War was, significantly, bestowed on the Prussian General von Peucker, that of Justice (later) upon R. von Mohl of Heidelberg, and that of Commerce and 'the Navy' upon the Bremen Burgomaster Duckwitz. Diplomatic representatives were accredited to Paris and London. After the *Reichsverweser* had sworn to maintain the parliamentary law by which he had been appointed, the Federal Diet, through its President (still Schmerling), formally transferred to him its rights and powers, thus approving his election, as to which it had not been consulted, and, technically, conveying the approval of the Governments, inclusive of the Prussian, whose plenipotentiary bore part in the transaction. In Austria, which was similarly implicated, no notice was taken of the *Reichsverweser's* proclamation, on the principle already enunciated by the Emperor's Government, that no law passed by the Frankfort Parliament could be introduced into Austria without the consent of its Government and *Reichstag*. Meanwhile, the Austrian Government offered no opposition to the action taken at Frankfort and at Berlin

[1] Cf. pp. 466–7, *ante*.

in the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty. The Prussian National Assembly, on the other hand, which claimed at least a share in the decisions of the Prussian Government, approved the election of the Austrian Archduke as *Reichsverweser*, with the reservation that the proceeding of the National Parliament should not be regarded as a precedent, rejecting a logical amendment by the radical Jacoby, that the Parliament had a right to act, but that the election itself was not to be approved.

But it was elsewhere than in the Prussian National Assembly that Prussian opposition to the election soon made itself felt, and encouraged the Hanoverian Government, alone among those of the lesser states, to protest against it. This opposition centred in the Prussian army, allying itself with traditional jealousy against Austria and with thoughts of a separate conjunction between Prussia and her north-German neighbours[1]. When, hereupon, Peucker, the new Minister of War at Frankfort, called on all German troops to attest their allegiance to the new Vicar of the Empire by a public act of homage, King Frederick William IV, in deference to numerous protests, issued an order making this homage on the part of Prussian troops about to take up arms for Germany depend upon the command of the King. This and certain other concomitant reservations went far to imply that the Central Power was to be obeyed —whenever the Prussian Government thought proper. The Prussian Club at Berlin sent forth an address to the nation, branding all those who demanded the 'merging

[1] These thoughts and feelings pervaded a pamphlet, *Die deutsche Centralgewalt und die preussische Armee*, by Colonel von Griesheim, which was circulated gratuitously in the army, and for an account of which see A. Stahr, *Die preussische Revolution*, part I, sec. 2 (2nd ed., 1851, pp. 70–3). Griesheim, who had been the moving spirit of the Prussian War Office, was relieved of his duties there, but not otherwise molested.

of Prussia in Germany'—the King's own phrase, as we know —as foes of the fatherland; and the agitation thus begun spread rapidly through the provinces—Pomerania, Prussia and Silesia in particular. In the end, it found organised expression in the so-called *Junkerparlament*, which met at Berlin on July 24th, under the presidency of a Prussian nobleman of advanced age (von Bülow-Cummerow). This assembly, which professed to have in view the material interests of all classes, but was primarily intended as a demonstration of the landed nobility against middle-class constitutionalism, included, with *ultras* like Ludwig von Gerlach and Otto von Bismarck, former Ministers inclining to Liberalism, such as Arnim-Boytzenburg and Bodelschwingh. And what seems to have been a still wider association, a league 'for King and country,' was founded, which demanded the dissolution of the Prussian National Assembly, if necessary by force of arms. Nor was the King's own mind unaffected by these currents. On the memorable occasion of the sexcentenary of the laying of the foundation-stone of Cologne cathedral, after his eloquence had once more flowed with all its usual brilliancy, he admonished the deputation of the Frankfort Parliament not to forget that 'there are still Princes in Germany, and that I am one of them[1].'

The National Parliament, after the *Reichsverweser* and the Central Power embodied in him had been called into some sort of life, proceeded to address itself to its main task of determining the constitution of the Empire (*Reichsverfassung*). The difficulties surrounding the execution of this task were unprecedented, and the rate of speed at which it proceeded cannot fairly be set down as slow. The real mistake, or misfortune, was that the Parliament had before it no complete draft as the subject-matter of discussion, Dahlmann's draft, as approved by the Seventeen, not

[1] P. Reichensperger, *Erlebnisse*, etc., pp. 120–1.

having proved sufficiently acceptable to public opinion to be submitted to Parliament for this purpose by its constitutional committee, and no amended draft having been obtained in time from the Governments through the agency of the Federal Diet. Yet, had an attempt, at least, been made to settle in the first instance the organic powers and agencies of the newly-instituted Empire—its order of government, in a word, and the guarantees assuring its stability—the resistance of the Governments might possibly have been overcome at the outset. Possibly—but no more; for this would have involved the acceptance of the Prussian hegemony; and the existing objections to the Prussian King and Government might have frustrated the attempt now, as his own objections frustrated it afterwards. As it was, it seemed the obvious course, after the Central Power had been provisionally established, to begin at the beginning and discuss the *Grundrechte* (fundamental rights). No other procedure would have satisfied the democratic Left; nor can the amount of time bestowed on this part of the legislative work, although it occupied the remainder of the summer, be regarded as in itself excessive. The *Grundrechte* comprised the rights guaranteeing the freedom of the individual citizen of the German state, including freedom of thought, speech, assembly and publication, together with the right of equality and the consequent abolition of class privileges and restrictions: all these rights to be guaranteed in the constitutions of the particular states and of the communes of which they were severally composed.

Hardly had this initial section of the constitution obtained its first reading, when the labours of the Parliament were interrupted by a tragic calamity. Nowhere was the feeling of resentment against the Malmö truce more intense than at Frankfort itself, where the discussion of its acceptance or rejection by the Parliament had brought the subject home to the masses. The ultimate confirmation of

the punctation by a small majority on September 16th called forth most violent agitation, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Heckscher, was seized after he had fled the town, and kept prisoner by the populace. On the following day, the agitation, fomented by some members of the Extreme Left, continued; and, on the 18th, the mob penetrated into St Paul's church, the meeting-place of the Parliament, whence it had to be driven out by the soldiery. Some barricades were erected, and lives were lost in taking or destroying them. But most grievous of all was the assassination of two members of the Parliament who had ventured on horseback into one of the suburbs: General H. A. E. von Auerswald (elder brother of the Prussian Minister) and Prince Felix Lichnowsky, a deputy belonging to the Extreme Right and well known for his adventurous character, ability and arrogant defiance of popular views and sympathies. His murder was accompanied by brutal outrage; and the crime, which seemed to pollute the entire revolutionary movement[1], deeply depressed the public mind. Heckscher now resigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which Schmerling took over in addition to that of the Interior.

The Parliament now turned from the *Grundrechte* to the constitution proper, of which art. I enumerated the territories forming part of the future German empire, while art. II declared that, in the case of a German and a non-German land owing allegiance to the same sovereign, the two must have wholly distinct constitutions and administrations. This at once brought to the front the question of the relations between Germany and Austria, which was at this moment itself passing through a constitutional crisis affecting the very existence of the monarchy. Although, therefore, this article was carried by a large majority, which included all the Austrian Liberals in the Parliament, it was

[1] See the funeral sermon by Ketteler (who was a member of the National Parliament) *ap.* Reichensperger, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 sqq.

palpably irreconcilable with the centralising policy pursued by the Austrian Government, after the first shock of the revolution had been overcome. That Government was now about to recover possession of Vienna; and, as has been seen, a prominent member of the Frankfort Parliament, Robert Blum, was one of the victims of the captor's vengeance[1]. Besides putting a tragic end to the career of one of the most capable of the leaders of the German democracy, this event seemed a challenge thrown down to the National Parliament itself; and while, in Saxony, the King's Ministers attended a church service in memory of Blum, the Frankfort Parliament passed, almost unanimously, a motion of solemn protest, calling upon the Ministers of the Central Power to demand the punishment of those who were responsible for his death.

In Prussia, the National Assembly of that kingdom and the Auerswald-Hansemann Government, which it did its best to support, but which found little favour either with the Court or with the populace, had during these months striven to hold their own against both reactionary and anarchical tendencies. Since the attack upon the arsenal in June, the masses in the capital had remained comparatively quiet, though the new police-force (the *Constabler*) met with much illwill; and the Assembly, which regarded itself as permanent till it should have accomplished its constituent task, was busy with constitutional and social problems—the passing of a *Habeas Corpus* act, and the abolition of capital punishment. But before long a new complication arose. A disturbance at Schweidnitz in Silesia had been suppressed by the military with a questionable use of force, which had resulted in a number of deaths; and on August 9th the Assembly, by a vote of 180 to 179, passed a motion moved by Dr Stein, deputy for Breslau, for a commission of enquiry, and for the issue by the War Office

[1] Cf. p. 422, *ante*.

of an order to the officers of the army to abstain from all reactionary efforts and either give their support to a constitutional method of government, or, if unable to take this course, regard it as an *Ehrenpflicht* (duty of honour) to resign their commissions. The hesitation of the Ministry was met by a resolution calling upon them to carry out the whole of Stein's motion; and, this having been passed by a large majority, they at once resigned (September 8th). No doubt, the Malmö truce, for which they were responsible, had added to their unpopularity.

Before this resignation, the Camarilla had been actively intriguing in every direction. Thus it was not wonderful that H. von Beckerath, an influential Crefeld banker and a notable Liberal, who had striven hard to bring about cooperation between the Prussian and the National Assembly, should have failed in his attempt to form a Ministry, in which he had been assisted by another prominent Westphalian Liberal, Mevissen. The King, accordingly, fell back upon the worthy General von Pfuel, formerly Military Governor of Berlin, who made no secret of looking upon himself as a makeshift. To please the Army, Wrangel was appointed Commander-in-chief in the Brandenburg margravates. It is stated that Pfuel thought of Varnhagen as Foreign Minister; but he prudently decided that his time had not yet come, and the office was given to Count von Dönhoff. The Home Minister, Eichmann, who belonged to the pietistic section of the conservative party, was perhaps the most important member of the new Administration. It showed its conciliatory disposition by adopting Stein's motion, with the obnoxious clause as to the officers' duty of honour omitted; and the Crown acquiesced. But, thus encouraged, the Assembly proceeded to vote the removal of the formula 'By the grace of God' from the royal style, and to abolish all titles of nobility. In the midst of the discussion of these and other matters appertaining

to the fundamental laws of the state, the Assembly, now under the sympathetic presidency of H. V. von Unruh, found time to intervene in national affairs. Waldeck's motion declaring that measures of the Central Power needed the approval of the Prussian Assembly before becoming valid in Prussia was rejected by the narrowest of majorities, while a resolution calling upon the Government to intervene on behalf of popular liberty at Vienna was carried by overwhelming numbers. The Government could control neither the Assembly nor the populace; and a German democratic league at Berlin openly proclaimed the democratic republic (October 26th). The capital was gradually relapsing into a condition of wild excitement; but, fortunately, no excesses occurred, and the reactionary party had to make the most of the situation, which it had striven to render as desperate as possible. The opportunity was worked so well that Pfuel incontinently sent in his resignation, and that his successor, Count Brandenburg, himself informed the Assembly of his appointment as head of the Ministry. The Assembly at once resolved to hold a debate on the state of the country.

Count Brandenburg had been eagerly pressed by the Camarilla and by the King to accept office, and was finally brought over from Breslau by Leopold von Gerlach, who believed that, with a firm hand at the helm, Prussia might yet profit by Austria's weakness. The new Minister, who had accepted the call with great reluctance, was the son of King Frederick William II of Prussia and Julia von Dönhoff; and much was hoped from this circumstance and from his being a conservative, who avowedly despised the democratic Assembly, and a soldier in whom the sense of duty was paramount. But Brandenburg had no strong belief in himself, and, frankly declaring himself in need of a political steersman, found one in Freiherr Otto von Manteuffel, a chief official in the Ministry of the Interior of which he was now appointed head. By October 31st,

the rest of the offices were with some difficulty filled up, Foreign Affairs being interimistically taken by Brandenburg himself, War by General von Strotha, and Public Worship by Adalbert von Ladenberg; and the wholly reactionary Ministerial programme was settled between the King and the Camarilla. The Assembly forthwith (November 2nd) voted an address to the Crown, protesting against the new Government and urging the appointment of one possessing the confidence of the country. The King received the address with cold curtness, and in his written reply resumed the abolished 'by the grace of God' as part of his royal style.

A decisive step followed. On November 9th, the Assembly was informed by royal message that it was to be moved to Brandenburg, and that, until the resumption of its sittings there on the 27th, its debates must be discontinued. The President, Unruh, protested; whereupon the Ministers, followed by the party of the Right, quitted the place of meeting. The civic guard, on being called upon by Manteuffel to intervene, refused. On the 10th, Wrangel entered Berlin at the head of a body of troops; and, though the President of the Assembly refused to do more than adjourn, its place of meeting was henceforth closed. The civic guard was dissolved; and, a disturbance having occurred in the capital on the 12th, it was declared in a state of siege. The rump of the Assembly met again during the following days in various hostelries, voted a proclamation to the people, condemned the dissolution of the civic guard as treasonable, and debated the refusal of taxes. In the end (November 15th), after voting this refusal, they were driven out of their last refuge (Hotel Mielentz) by the military. Their last proclamation, signed by the President and 168 members, denied the right of the minority from which they had separated to levy the taxes they had refused. Not very much came of this, though it was thought well to obtain an academical opinion at Berlin

and Halle against this protest, and it was ecclesiastically denounced by the Prince-bishop of Breslau (Diepenbrock).

It may be well to carry on this part of our narrative to its close, before returning to the proceedings of the Frankfort Parliament by which the action of the Prussian Government at home could not remain unaffected. On November 27th, the remnant of the Prussian National Assembly met at Brandenburg; by December 1st their numbers had been increased to 259 (out of 402); but, of these, 76 were members of the Left, who had come only to protest against the removal. Their labours were in vain; for, on December 5th, there appeared a royal decree dissolving 'the assembly called together to agree on a constitution,' accompanied by another, imposing by the authority of the Crown a constitution, with a law regulating the election of the two Chambers before whom it was to be laid for revision, and who were to assemble on February 26th. The election was to be indirect, but the Second Chamber was to be chosen on the basis of universal suffrage. This ended the whole business, or nearly so; for, though the Government immediately proceeded to measures consequent on the *octroyée* constitution, the Second Chamber, which met on February 26th, was dissolved on April 27th, and a new Chamber was elected on July 17th, on a new basis of classes, likewise imposed by royal decree. The public had shown the utmost indifference to this election. Meanwhile, attempts had been made, not wholly without success, to revise the constitution in a conservative sense and in favour of the landed nobility; and, finally, as will be seen, Brandenburg and Radowitz, with the utmost trouble, succeeded in prevailing upon the King to take the oath to the amended constitution. Thus the Prussian Revolution came to a somewhat lame, and, as it was afterwards to prove, a partially impotent, conclusion[1].

[1] For an account of these matters, which belong to the history of the reaction, see *Denkwürdigkeiten d. Ministers Otto Frhr. von*

At Frankfort, where the *octroyance* of the Prussian constitution had been viewed with general disfavour and the constitutional settlement on independent lines had been regarded by Gagern and those who thought with him as a hindrance rather than a help to the growth of the Federal state, other issues had been rapidly determined. The continued conduct of the foreign policy of the Central Power by the Austrian Schmerling having become impossible, the *Reichsverweser* had induced Gagern to become Minister of Foreign Affairs and then, in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the Parliament, President of the Ministry (December 1848). Gagern's policy, as announced to the Parliament, was to acknowledge it impossible for Austria to enter into the German Federal state on the conditions of art. II of the proposed constitution[1]; but, instead, to bring about, by agreement with Austria, a league or wider federation with her, in the meantime maintaining the old Confederation, but refusing to negotiate with Austria as to the constitution itself. Against this programme the Austrian members of the Parliament all but unanimously protested; and, henceforth, they formed a faction of their own, coalescing, however, on the question of the exclusion of Austria with ultramontanes and particularists under the attractive name *Grossdeutsche*, and designating their opponents (who, by the way, included E. M. Arndt) as *Kleindeutsche*. At the same time, the *Grossdeutschen* and the Left, in their turn, entered into closer relations, inasmuch as the Left was opposed to the monarchical form which the majority desired the Federal state to assume; whereas the Austrians detested the Federal state itself, notwithstanding the assurances of Schmerling, now, like Camphausen, plenipotentiary with the Central Power. Finally, contrary to the opinion

Manteuffel, vol. I (1901), pp. 44 sqq. See also F. Meinecke, *Radowitz*, etc., pp. 178 sqq.

[1] Cf. p. 478, *ante*.

of the majority of its Constitutional Committee, the Parliament, by a vote of 261 to 224, authorised Gagern to enter into 'ambassadorial negotiations' with Austria—in other words, to deal with her as outside the Federal state itself, though at liberty to conclude a wider union with it.

Next came the decision as to the Chief (*Oberhaupt*) of the Federal state. In the Constitutional Committee, the minority, headed by Dahlmann, including deputies from nearly all the larger states except Austria, proposed a hereditary empire. The other side had various counter-suggestions to offer: a responsible president, a directory, a monarchical *rota*; and a motion that the headship should be hereditary failed to obtain a majority (211 to 263), though another, in favour of its being held by a German sovereign, was carried (258 to 211). The draft of the Imperial constitution (*Reichsverfassung*) had now been completed; and, after it had been read for a first time, a request was sent to all the Governments, inviting amendments in time for the second reading. But the question of the Chief of the State was still left open; and King Frederick William IV's ideas on the subject, and on the constitution of the Empire in general, were passing through a succession of phases[1]. Gagern had had an interview with the King shortly before accepting the presidency of the Frankfort Ministry, and Arndt, too, had written to him. The answers, which had been kept secret, had not been encouraging; the King had reiterated his belief that the House of Habsburg was entitled to the Imperial throne;

[1] The history of the King's shifting views concerning the Imperial crown is too long and intricate to admit of further treatment here. It may be read, together with a statement of his opinions on the German question in general, and his idea of submitting the *Reichsverfassung* to a states' house nominated by the German sovereigns and a college composed of members of their own body, in H. von Petersdorff, *König Friedrich Wilhelm IV* (1900), pp. 121 sqq.

he had also shown dislike of the National Parliament and qualms of repentance at having associated himself with the movement of which it had been a result. He told Beckerath that 'he was no Frederick the Great,' and to Bunsen's persistent admonitions he replied (December 12th) expressing his bitter contempt for such a crown. But, after a futile secret negotiation with the Austrian Government at Olmütz, January 23rd, he was at last, with the aid of Bunsen, prevailed upon by Brandenburg to authorise the circulation of a note, drafted by Camphausen, and expressing the King's opinion in favour of Gagern's policy of the smaller Federal state—the logical antecedent of Prussian headship. The Austrian Government at once protested against the scheme as overriding the rights of the Emperor of Austria and seeking to establish not a federal, but a unified state. A new spirit of resistance had taken hold of Austrian statesmanship with the accession of the new Emperor and the entry upon office of Schwarzenberg[1].

On February 16th, another Prussian note went to Frankfort, in favour of Austria remaining part of the German state; and this was the King's last official word before the critical moment arrived. Yet it was known that even the Prince of Prussia and trusted conservatives such as Rauch and Senfft von Pilsach were in favour of the King's acceptance of the Imperial crown, should it be offered to him. He had recently appointed a new Foreign Minister in the person of H. F. von Arnim-Werbelow (till recently envoy at Vienna); but the decision was entirely a matter for himself. Would he prove equal to announcing his readiness to assume the German hegemony, when the time came? And it came, at last, with unexpected suddenness.

In the National Parliament, on March 10th, Welcker, long known as a resolute opponent of Prussian principles of government and hitherto an adherent of the *Grossdeutsche*

[1] Cf. p. 422, *ante*.

party, to the general surprise brought forward a motion that Parliament should by one and the same vote pass the Constitution and confer the crown upon the King of Prussia as hereditary emperor. At first, no other member of the party followed his example; but two Austrians belonging to it (Alfred von Arneth and Joseph von Würth) laid down their mandates. Vincke and his followers, although they would have preferred a previous agreement with the Governments, waived this objection. But a small democratic group, led by Henry Simon, while in favour of the hereditary Empire, held guarantees to the people indispensable; and their vote against Welcker's motion determined its rejection by a majority of 31. Hereupon the constitution was voted in paragraphs, and this process offered an opportunity of securing the support of the recalcitrants for a renewed vote on the headship. The veto of the head of the state was, by a majority, declared not absolute, but suspensory only; and, by means of this concession to democratic principle, a vote of 267 to 263 in favour of a hereditary Empire was obtained. On March 27th, the second reading of the constitution was carried; and, on the following day, by 290 votes, 248 members absenting themselves, King Frederick William IV of Prussia was elected German Emperor.

A few days afterwards, a deputation of thirty-two members, headed by President Simson, and including a representative of every German state except Austria, took their departure from Frankfort for Berlin. King Frederick William had found time for an attempt to reassure his nephew King Maximilian II of Bavaria, while at the same time asking his support for a provisional Prussian leadership. On April 3rd, the King of Prussia received the deputation. He thanked them for the great mark of confidence implied in their offer of the crown, but stated that, before accepting it, he must await, not only the assent of the other German sovereigns, but an understanding among them and with

himself as to whether the constitution passed by the Parliament were satisfactory, and (here a reference to the suspensory veto might be read between the lines) would furnish him with the necessary powers for directing the destinies of Germany. This reply was not an absolute refusal; but it made acceptance of the crown, at best, conditional, and placed the whole constitution in jeopardy, by subjecting it to the sanction of the several sovereigns. After rejecting a proposal to press the King to make known his acceptance of the Imperial crown to his own dominions and to those of the other states which had approved the constitution, the deputation resolved to transmit, instead, a statement that, the validity of the constitution having been declared dependent upon the approval of the several Governments, the offer of the crown must be held to have been declined. Finally, the Prussian Ministry contented itself with referring to a circular already issued (April 4th) and embodying the King's answer, with the addition that Prussia was ready to place herself at the head of a federal state formed by the free consent of the Governments; and the deputation, after waiting upon the Prince of Prussia, quitted Berlin.

In Frankfort, attempts were now made, both by the *Grossdeutschen* and the Extreme Left, to fall back on their former proposals; but, by a decisive majority (267 to 159), the Parliament determined, on April 11th, to uphold the constitution in its entirety. A proposal on the part of Prussia to take over provisionally the exercise of the Central Power, if the *Reichsverweser* would give it up into her hands, was frustrated by his resolving, on second thoughts, to hold on. The result was that the main body of the lesser states accepted the constitution; and their conduct on this occasion proved, once more, that their continued existence, undoubtedly in most instances desired by their populations, was no real impediment to securing the essential conditions

of German unity. The Parliament had itself implied as much when it passed from a motion for their mediatisation to the order of the day[1]. On the other hand, the four kingdoms—Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony and Hanover—took no step towards acceptance of the constitution; and the Vienna Government was encouraged to recall the Austrian members formally from Frankfort.

Thus, though the new Second Chamber at Berlin declared its acceptance of the *Reichsverfassung*, the Prussian Government declined to follow suit; and no declarations on the part of the Frankfort Parliament urging the recognition of the complete constitution as implying the Prussian headship of the Empire could prevail. The Prussian Second Chamber, as has been seen, was dissolved; and the Hanoverian and Saxon Chambers likewise, so as to leave greater freedom of action to the Governments—to the Saxon, aid was personally promised, in the event of consequent disturbances, by Frederick William IV. In Württemberg only, the King gave way, though making no secret of the recognition having been extorted from him. On April 28th, the whole episode was brought to an end by Frederick William IV's definite refusal of the Imperial Crown; while at the same time, in a circular note not even communicated to Frankfort, he invited those of the Governments which were disposed to accept his summons, to send plenipotentiaries to a conference at Berlin.

Herewith, a new stage begins in the relations of Prussia to the national movement and to the National Parliament. Under the advice of Radowitz, who from the end of April 1849 onwards may be regarded as the real director of the foreign policy of Prussia, she entered upon an attempt to secure national union under her direction by her own method, i.e., by a federation designed, brought about and

[1] Cf., as to the debates in question, Haym, *op. cit.*, part II, pp. 77–112.

managed by herself. The Parliament had to choose between abandoning its task and leaving Prussia to accomplish this work, or, after twenty-nine German Governments (including Württemberg) had accepted the *Reichsverfassung*, to seek to bring the remaining states into the circle by means of a general agitation, and a persistent encouragement of such expedients as petitions, addresses and deputations. Finally, on May 4th, the Parliament fixed July 15th for elections to the first legislative Diet of the Empire (*Reichstag*), and August 22nd for its date of meeting. In the meantime, the sovereign of the largest state represented at this diet was to carry on the regency of the Empire till it should have been recognised by Prussia, when its headship should at once be assumed by her King.

Berlin and Frankfort, then, were each to go their own way. Meanwhile, though the legitimate agitation on behalf of the constitution set on foot by the Parliament had begun, the Extreme Left had resolved on using it for its own ulterior ends. The movement thus passed from the sending of addresses, of which an endless number poured into Berlin, and from similar demonstrations into a new stage—that of insurrection. Early in May 1849, popular risings, which may be regarded as the final explosions of the German Revolution, occurred, almost simultaneously, in Saxony, the Bavarian Palatinate and Baden. With the suppression of the last-named of these, the movement, which, as we saw, had taken its rise in the same quarter, came to an end.

In Saxony, after the democratic party had, in February 1849, brought the Moderate Liberal Government to a fall, its successor, of which a high legal official, Held, was president, with Beust remaining as Minister for Foreign Affairs, sought to conciliate public opinion, and Saxon troops were sent to Schleswig-Holstein. But, at the same time,

Beust persistently manœuvred against the exclusion of Austria from the German state, and the achievement of a Prussian hegemony. When King Frederick Augustus II refused the recognition of the *Reichsverfassung*, as to which he declared himself entirely at one with Prussia, the majority of the Ministry (which had only held office for two months) resigned; and a new one, in which Beust and the War Minister Rabenhorst retained their places, was formed by Zschinsky. The revolutionary party now availed itself of the popular feeling in favour of the *Reichsverfassung* to organise a general resistance to the Government; and, with the help of the numerous democratic clubs in the kingdom, this took the form, first of the refusal of taxes provisionally levied by the Government on its own authority, and then of an open summons to arms. The real objects of this revolt were obscure to the masses, and perhaps to some of its instigators; but some of those who took part in it were actuated by high motives or by a genuine fanaticism—such were the worthy Heubner, Richard Wagner, the famous director of the King's music, and the eminent court-architect Semper. In this rising, too, foreigners took part, and one of its leaders was the Russian revolutionary Michael Bakunin.

On May 3rd, the prohibition by the Government of a parade of the civic guard in honour of the *Reichsverfassung* gave the signal for the outbreak; barricades were erected, and the arsenal and royal palace were attacked. On the following morning, the King and Queen, escorted by Beust and Rabenhorst, took refuge in the fortress of Königstein; and Dresden was left for the moment without a Government. The rumour having rapidly spread that the Prussians were coming, a number of democratic deputies and municipal councillors took it upon themselves to set up a Provisional Government. At the head of this stood Tzschirner, an able revolutionary of the extreme type, with Heubner, the honest

radical politician just mentioned, and Todt, formerly Liberal leader in the Chamber and then a Government official, as his colleagues; but the part played by the last-named in the revolt was insignificant. The conflict began on May 5th, the royal troops holding the whole *Neustadt*, and the palace and the arsenal in the *Altstadt* on the other side of the Elbe. The rest of the *Altstadt* was in the hands of the insurgents, whose numbers continued to increase by an influx from the country. On the 6th, the opera-house was burnt down, together with the picturesque *Zwinger* and many of the valuable royal collections for which the Saxon capital was celebrated. Though, already on the 5th. the first battalion of Prussians had arrived, and was followed by a second on the 7th, there was some hard fighting on both this and the following day, and the beautiful city long bore the marks of the conflict. By the 9th, however, it had been quelled, and the Provisional Government had withdrawn to Freiberg. The disturbances in the country were put down without much difficulty; but a severe retribution awaited those to whom participation in the rising could be brought home. Heubner paid the penalty with his life; Tzschirner and Todt escaped; Bakunin's death-sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life, and he remained, first in Saxon, then in Austrian, and finally in Russian confinement, till his escape from the last in 1861. The Saxon Government, it may be added, did not immediately revoke the constitutional changes of 1848; but in 1850 the reaction was formally set on foot, and the Estates of the constitution of 1831 were restored[1].

In the Bavarian Palatinate, whose contiguity with France, like that of its neighbour Baden, made any rising peculiarly dangerous, the popular movement was, in the first instance, directed to the question of the *Reichsverfassung*,

[1] For a full account of the Saxon insurrection and its antecedents see *Die Gegenwart*, vol. VI (1851), pp. 613–72.

but speedily took a wider range. Though Gagern sent a commissioner to keep them within bounds, these regions had been fired by the insurrectionary attempts of Hecker and of Struve in the preceding year; and, for a time, the Bavarian Palatinate was without regular government, since no reliance was to be placed on the troops that had been levied there. A Provisional Government was hereupon established by the insurgents, who on May 18th concluded a treaty with their brethren in Baden, declaring the two countries to be one for military purposes. The Bavarian Government, a large proportion of whose troops were in Schleswig-Holstein, though it sent a corps under the Prince of Thurn and Taxis, which bombarded Ludwigshafen, was thus, likewise, obliged to have recourse to Prussian military support.

Finally, in Baden, the rising began, on May 10th and 11th, with a mutiny of the grand-ducal troops at Rastadt, who 'fraternised' with the citizens. In a popular meeting which followed at Offenburg, on May 13th, the republic was openly proclaimed. On the same day, the garrison at Carlsruhe mutinied, and it fell to the civic guard to protect the arsenal against a sustained assault. In the evening, Grand-duke Leopold took his departure, accompanied by his Minister of War; and, here too, a Provisional Government was established by the general committee (*Landesausschuss*) of the popular associations, which had been nominated at Offenburg. Its president was Lorenz Brentano, a Mannheim advocate who was a follower of Itzstein and a deputy on the Extreme Left at Frankfort: and what may be called an anarchic reorganisation of the grand-duchy began. Brentano, who was not a fanatic, but devoid of scruples, and two coadjutors, were, by a constituent assembly which met at Strassburg, formally appointed 'triumvirs.' The grand-ducal Government was in great difficulty; it solicited aid from the Central Power at Frankfort: and it could

hardly but be aware that Bavaria was, as of old[1], casting greedy eyes upon the grand-duchy, and thinking of a partition of it between itself and Württemberg, the Bavarian Palatinate to be made over (by way of compensation) to Prussia[2]. In any case, Grand-duke Leopold had no choice but to turn, on his own account, to Prussia, whose Government was under no obligation, as it had been in the case of Saxony, to furnish aid, but could not look with indifference upon a rising which affected the two Federal fortresses Rastadt and Landau (in the Bavarian Palatinate). By the end of May, a treaty was concluded, through which Grand-duke Leopold bound himself entirely to Prussia's German policy. He appointed a new Ministry; and, on June 13th, two Prussian army-corps, of about 25,000 each, under Generals von Hirschfeld and Count von der Gröben, with the Prince of Prussia in supreme command, entered the Bavarian Palatinate. Another corps, of about the same numbers, sent out by the Central Power, of Mecklenburg and Hesse-Darmstadt troops, under General von Peucker, crossed the Main, and at Oppenheim in Hesse-Darmstadt defeated an attempt of the insurgents to assume the offensive; while yet another of 8000 Württembergers, after suppressing a rising at Heilbronn, guarded the north-eastern frontier, and 10,000 Austrians stood in Vorarlberg.

Against these forces, the Baden Provisional Government had about 20,000, and that of the Bavarian Palatinate about 12,000, men under arms. Of the former all but 1000 or thereabouts, of the latter some 3000 were mutinous soldiers, so that they formed a dangerous force, which during the course of May were increased, in Baden, by some 14–15,000 civic guards; and volunteers were coming in. The insurgent force included a Polish and a Swiss

[1] Cf. pp. 62, 112, *ante*.

[2] See as to this scheme of von der Pfordten's, Meinecke, *Radowitz*, etc., pp. 243–4.

legion, and other foreigners; at a later date the renowned Mieroslawski assumed the supreme command; the Hungarian Türr and a French General Snayde (*ci-devant* Schneider) were also among the commanders.

The Bavarian Palatinate having been rapidly reduced, von der Gröben on June 20th entered Baden, in order to cooperate with the other Prussian corps and with Peucker. Here the resistance was stouter, and Mieroslawski once more proved his capacity as a commander. The battle of Waghäusel (June 20th) was well contested, but ended in the defeat of the insurgents; Heidelberg was soon afterwards occupied, and Mannheim had to open its gates. But, after several combats, Mieroslawski was obliged to retire behind the Murg, and, after a gallant fight at Oos (between Rastadt and Baden-Baden), threw up his command, and made his way back to France. Colonel Sigel took the command in his stead. Not long afterwards, however, the whole body of the insurgents, including the members of the Provisional Government, crossed into Swiss territory, Sigel and his band being the last to cross the frontier (July 11th). In the course of their flight, as indeed earlier, the insurgents are said to have committed divers depredations. Rastadt alone, the federal fortress on the Murg near where it flows into the Rhine, held out, with 5–6000 men, among whom were many foreigners. But, after the bombardment had begun, and some sorties had failed, the place capitulated, unconditionally, on July 23rd; and the rebellion was at an end. No mercy was shown by the military tribunals, and all the sentences were carried out. Among those shot was A. von Trütschler, who had played a leading part in the democratic party at Frankfort and in Saxony. The poet Gottfried Kinkel was sentenced to imprisonment for life, but escaped from Spandau, with the aid of his wife and his friend Karl Schurz (afterwards an eminent American citizen). Grand-duke Leopold returned to Carlsruhe, with his conservative Ministry, on

August 18th; but, as he had, in the first instance, to form a new army, Prussian troops remained in occupation of the grand-duchy till November 1850[1].

The effect of the insurrections in Saxony, the Bavarian Palatinate and Baden, even before they were suppressed by the military power of Prussia, was unmistakable. Middle-class opinion, from which German Liberalism had always derived its chief strength, withdrew from the movement in support of the Imperial constitution according as the revolutionary party perverted it to ulterior purposes, and the excesses of that party seemed to warrant the resistance of the Governments. The moderate party in the Parliament itself began to doubt how far it could continue to support a cause so utterly misused. On the other hand, the intervention of Prussia had caused the gravest misgivings. After angry discussion, a casual motion calling upon the Central Power to oppose in every way the unauthorised interference of Prussia in Saxony as a serious violation of the peace obtained a majority (May 10th). But the Prussian Government now, under the inspiration of Radowitz, resolved to compass its end on the parallel lines of an understanding with Austria and the establishment of a federation of as many of the other states as possible under Prussian headship. Its reply to the vote of May 10th was the recall of all the

[1] For a narrative of the revolution in Baden see a section of vol. III (1849) of *Die Gegenwart*; and for an account of the Palatinate-Baden war, *ib.* vol. V (1850). From the trustworthy autobiography of a participant in the Baden insurrection—K. H. Schaible, 37 *Jahre a. d. Leben eines Exilierten* (privately printed, 1895), p. 166—it appears that he and others in like case were sentenced not only to incarceration, but to the loss of their property, there being imposed upon each individual the payment of about 3 million florins, a sum equivalent to the total cost of the suppression of the rebellion. He was himself afterwards let off with a payment of 7000 florins; and no account of the sums confiscated seems to have been published by the Government.

Prussian members of the Frankfort Parliament (May 14th). The most notable of them, however, protested against this measure, and remained at their post. The collapse of the National Parliament, now that the two Great Powers had shaken off their connexion with it, had become inevitable. The new discords which had broken out among its members cannot fairly be laid to its charge. The alliance between the Right and the Left was not the kind of *bloc* (to use a term of later date) which could be maintained now that its original purpose had passed away; only a portion of the Right and the Centre still trusted to the arithmetical fact that 29 Governments had accepted the constitution. The proposal of the Left that Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, whose popularity had risen high because of his share in the catastrophe of the Danish ship of the line *Christian VIII* in the harbour of Eckernförde (April 5th, 1849), should be appointed to the governor-generalship (*Statthalterschaft*) of the Empire, the office being interimistically held by Gagern, who favoured the motion for a time, was carried against the vote of the Right (May 19th), but soon vanished into air.

Shortly before this, Gagern's Ministry had broken up. He had made a last attempt to give life to the constitution by committing it to the care of the Central Power, which was at the same time to resist anarchical attempts by the populations and unwarranted repression by the Governments. But the *Reichsverweser* refused his assent to this comprehensive scheme; whereupon Gagern and his colleagues resigned their offices. Archduke John accepted this step and formed a new Ministry consisting of members of the Extreme Right, with the sententious Dr Grävell, a jurist formerly in the Prussian service, as President and Minister of the Interior; General Jochmus, a military adventurer (who had recently figured as pasha in Turkey, and was to end as an Austrian field-marshal) as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Marine; Prince Wittgenstein, leader of

the Darmstadt *Grossdeutschen*, taking War and the excellent senator Merck of Hamburg Finance. This oddly-composed Government was met with an almost unanimous vote of want of confidence from the truncated Parliament. For the party which to the last had striven for a Federal Empire under Prussian headship, but which no longer had any positive policy before it, there now remained no course but the abandonment of a hopeless endeavour. To prevent so fatal a secession, it was proposed to prorogue the Parliament, in which Reh had succeeded Simson (invalided) as President. This expedient having been declined by the Right, on May 28th sixty-five members, including Gagern, Dahlmann, Simson, Mathy, Beseler and Arndt—in fact, the nucleus of the Prussian-Imperialist party—quitted the Parliament in a body, declaring the only alternative to civil war to be the transfer of the constitutional work to the individual Governments and the development of the national cause. By this secession, the Left and the Extreme Left became the majority, and the number required for a vote was lowered from 150 to 100. Soon afterwards, the remainder of the Centre seceded, and, on May 30th, a majority of the rump voted the removal of the Parliament from Frankfort to Stuttgart. Hereupon the President, Reh, resigned, and his place was taken by Löwe of Calbe—the last of a very varied series. The *Reichsverweser* had refused two formal summonses to lay down the Central Power sent to him by the Prussian Government; nor was it, as we shall see, till near the end of the year that he parted from the last shadow of authority.

The rest of the story of the National Parliament is a sorry epilogue. The President of the Württemberg Ministry, Römer, formerly an eminent Liberal leader, had been a deputy at Frankfort, and took part in the first meetings of the rump at Stuttgart. But he soon feared for the tranquillity of the kingdom; and, after some unpleasing incidents, the Assembly was on June 13th requested to remove to

some meeting-place beyond the frontiers of Württemberg, the Second Chamber of the kingdom on June 18th declaring the National Parliament in its present composition illegal. On June 18th, the rump, notwithstanding, held a sitting, but found its place of assembly closed and soldiery obstructing the approach. At a meeting held by them there was some futile talk of removing into Baden territory. But all was over. One of the members who shared in the closing ignominy was Uhland, whose German muse had long remained silent, but whose patriotic faith had held out to the last.

The national movement, as embodied in the National Parliament, had failed, and had earned for itself the usual reward of failure, which has been dealt out to it in no sparing spirit. Yet, though they could not command success, neither the Parliament nor the movement represented by it had laboured altogether in vain. They had not prevailed, because the German populations were still new to constitutional life and to the participation of the people in the conduct of its own affairs; the Estates of old days had been broken in pieces, and the constitutional precedents of the West had been only in part assimilated. Yet even this obstacle might have been overcome, now that Germany's ablest and strongest minds—the very flower of her intellectual life—were found ranged on the side of unity, had it not been for the resistance of the Governments. This resistance, though virtually all of them had been transformed in their personal composition to meet popular demands, was strengthened by the widespread feeling of distrust and dread aroused by the extravagances and excesses of the extreme party. But the reaction was strong enough in itself; for the German nation, though it had learnt to think, had not yet learnt to act without its Governments; and what might have been made possible by the troubles of Austria, was made impossible by the

unmanly weakness—there is no other word for it—of the reigning authority in Prussia. Thus, the great opportunity passed away, though not wholly without gain to the nation. At least, it had essayed a national political life, though from those beginnings had sprung the division into parties which in Germany more than elsewhere have since proved one of its main difficulties. And, from the advance in the social life of the several states which the labours of the National Parliament had sought to carry to completion, was one from which there would also be no turning back. Although the economic unity of Germany had (notwithstanding the previous expansion of the *Zollverein*) remained, like the political, uncompleted, and although the industrial not less than the political freedom of the individual was still subject to restraints, great progress had been made in both fields. Moreover, as has been noted in the case of particular states, the land and those who laboured on it, had, though not everywhere or in all respects, been freed from the most oppressive of the burdens upon them; while the working-men of the towns had learnt their earliest lessons of association and self-organisation—the processes in which lay not the least of their hopes for the better days of the future.

All these benefits were to show themselves forth gradually: for the present the dulness of disappointment was sinking down upon the most intellectual part of the nation, nor was its life brightened by any literary influences which had outlasted the impulses of the political movement. Those impulses had not been many or strong in the period of conflict; Young Germany had aged, without leaving successors of talent equal to its own; among poets only a name or two stand forth from this season of political enthusiasm—Herwegh's perhaps and Freiligrath's, who at least represents a brilliant modern variety of romanticism, and Geibel's, who alone was to live to see the triumph of

the national aspirations which his limpid verse had helped to foster.

The final efforts of the revolutionary party had been overcome with the decisive aid of Prussian bayonets in central Germany, and, practically, by them alone, in the south-west. With the Prussian Government lay now, if ever, the chief responsibility for the national future. How it sought to meet that responsibility, while steadily keeping in view the indispensable condition of its own ascendancy, must be told in another chapter. The story of the Berlin Conference and the Gotha gathering, of the League of the Three Kings and of the Prussian 'Union,' and of the *Interim*, is a continuation of that of the Revolution and of the frustrated great movement for national unity. Yet the end of the continuation is Olmütz, where the subtly-devised and loftily-conceived designs of Radowitz succumbed to the cool resolve of Schwarzenberg, the 'second founder' of the Germanic Confederation.

CHAPTER VII

ERFURT AND OLMÜTZ

The downfall of the German National Assembly, begun at Frankfort and completed at Stuttgart, could not but present itself to many patriotic minds as the tragic catastrophe of the movement for national unity of which that assembly had been designed to become the living symbol. But there still remained to be played out an epilogue of great significance for both the present and the future of German political life. Nor did it, either at the time or in the most competent judgment formed at a later date, seem impossible that the Prussian Government might, by resolute but circumspect action, though in gradual and at first restricted fashion, have achieved the result which the supporters of her leadership at Frankfort had, without any fault of their own, proved unable to bring about. Bismarck, who shared the opinion that Prussia's best opportunity for securing the direction of German affairs had been the interval between the success of the insurrection at Vienna and the withdrawal of the troops at Berlin, likewise considered that a favourable chance once more, though less unmistakably, offered itself now, and that this chance was thrown away[1]. The story of the attempts which were made and failed, and which ended in the humiliation of Prussia, and in the triumph of the reaction with which she herself

[1] *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, vol. I, p. 59.

became for a time identified, is complicated and uninspiring; but Radowitz's failure has in it an element of pathos which is not lessened by the ineradicable weakness in action of his royal friend and master; and the whole episode is so instructive that a brief outline of it cannot be spared.

The Prussian policy of 'Union'—to call the project, never brought to completion, by the name which during the later part of these transactions, it, as it were, technically assumed—really began with King Frederick William IV's proclamation to his people issued on May 15, 1849. Count Brandenburg, though unwilling to press the King too far in the matter of the Imperial crown, was anxious for a firmer bearing towards Austria and her partisans, and had suggested to the King to summon Radowitz to his counsels. Radowitz, for whom Frederick William IV cherished a personal admiration and attachment exceeding perhaps, in their combination, what he felt for any other man, appeared in the Prussian capital on April 25th; and, from this time onward to the end of the crisis to be related in the present chapter, the German policy of Prussia was directed by him. His authority was exercised by virtue of the confidence reposed in him by his royal master, which in its turn rested on the harmony between their ideas up to the point where conception was called upon to pass into action. The proclamation of May 15th, which may be regarded as the first-fruits of this relationship, was issued on the very morrow of the recall of the Prussian representatives from the Frankfort Assembly, whose death-warrant was thereby signed. All the more impressive was the announcement of the King's intention to resume, in conjunction with the Governments of those of the larger German states which had joined hands with him, the work which had been begun at Frankfort. On the basis of the constitution adopted by the National Assembly (the *Reichsverfassung*) it was now

promised to bestow on the German nation a new constitution providing an executive which would be one and undivided (*einheitlich*), and secured by means of a popular representative with legislative functions. To this end, the King had, already on April 28th, invited the German Governments to join in a conference at Berlin. With the Austrian Government, to which an invitation had been sent with the rest, negotiations were opened for obtaining its assent to the simultaneous establishment of a smaller (*engerer*) federation under Prussian headship, and of a wider league between this federation and the Austrian monarchy. On these proposals the German policy of Prussia, as directed by Radowitz, hinged.

He presided, as Prussian plenipotentiary, at the Berlin conference summoned by the King, which actually began on May 29th. So far, only Austria, Bavaria and Hanover were represented there; for the whole body of the lesser Governments had approved the Frankfort *Reichsverfassung*, as, much against the grain, had the King of Württemberg. But the Austrian Government, though still in the midst of the Hungarian insurrection, was under the strong control of Schwarzenberg, who had quite recently imposed a constitution in harmony with his own principles upon the moribund diet at Kremsier. Thus, after the first meeting of the conference at Berlin, the Austrian plenipotentiary withdrew, on the ground that Austria could not treat on the basis of a smaller federation under Prussian headship. At the same time, the Bavarian plenipotentiary (though King Frederick William had just returned in high spirits from a visit to King Maximilian at Munich) announced himself to be without instructions, and ultimately declared that Bavaria could not enter a federation placed under a single head instead of a federative directorship. Saxony and Hanover, for their part, gave a conditional assent to the draft constitution proposed by Radowitz on behalf of

Prussia, which was, accordingly, on May 26th signed by the plenipotentiaries of the three sovereigns, together with a treaty of alliance between them, and on the 28th communicated to the other German Governments. But in the fact that the assent of the two lesser states was conditional only lay, as we shall see, the hollowness of the League of the Three Kings (the *Dreikönigsbündniss*), as it was popularly, and delusively, called. For, though the alliance purported to be formed 'for the maintenance of the external and internal security of Germany, and the inviolability of the states allied together,' and though the measures necessary to this end were to be provisionally entrusted to Prussia, the whole scheme had an even less than provisional validity. The Saxon plenipotentiary at Berlin had declared, in an additional protocol, that his Government would not consider itself bound to adhere to the alliance unless Bavaria joined in it; and the Hanoverian Minister (Stüve), in another protocol, insisted upon the necessity of preserving the integrity of Germany by the organic inclusion in it of Austria, which was irreconcilable with the Prussian scheme of a smaller and a larger league mentioned above. By allowing these reservations, the Prussian Government, as a matter of fact, suffered its whole design to be undermined.

The substance of the draft constitution which was to regulate definitively the political future of the German nation consisted of the following provisions[1]. The German Empire was to consist of the territories of those states formerly included in the Germanic Confederation which accepted this constitution, the relations with Austria being left over for later mutual agreement. Instead of a hereditary emperor, there was to be a director of the Empire (*Reichsvorstand*) whose dignity (whether hereditary or not

[1] Cf. K. Klüpfel, *Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbestrebungen*, vol. I (1872), pp. 156 sq.

was left unspecified) was to be associated with the Prussian Crown. In order to give them a share in the supreme Imperial authority, a College of Princes was to be established, whose assent was to be requisite for the decision of questions of superior importance, and in which there were to be six votes, of which Prussia and Bavaria were to have one each. But the executive remained with Prussia. A Parliament (*Reichstag*) was to be set up, consisting of two Houses, of which the *Staatenhaus* was to be half nominated by the Governments, half by the representative bodies of the several states, while the *Volkshaus* was to be wholly elective, but according to the system of graduation in three electoral classes obtaining in Prussia since the im- of position of the constitution of April 1849. The director the Empire—here was a distinct change from the Frankfort constitution—was to have an absolute veto, in addition to the executive power. A Federal judicial tribunal was to be established, with a view to the protection of the rights of the particular states. The *Grundrechte* approved at Frankfort were in substance adopted, although their introduction into the several states was left in the hands of the particular Governments.

Meanwhile, the Austrian and Prussian Governments had been carrying on negotiations as to the concomitant design, which Radowitz had for some time been discussing with Gagern and other Frankfort *kleindeutsche* friends, of an indissoluble league between the proposed federation under Prussian headship and the entire Austrian monarchy. To this end, Prussia proposed an arrangement by which the existing Federal fortresses should be placed in the hands of this wider league. But Schwarzenberg was, from the first, thoroughly hostile to the scheme; Canitz, who was charged with the negotiation at Vienna, had no belief in the proposal; and Brandenburg, the head of the Prussian Government, was unwilling to press it against Austrian

repugnance. Thus, without being openly rejected, Radowitz's plan made no way at Vienna. Already at the beginning of April, the Prussian Government had signified its willingness to take over provisionally the exercise of the Central Power; but the *Reichsverweser* at Frankfort, who was fully cognisant of the state of feeling at Vienna, would not listen to any suggestion that he should transfer the formal authority left in his hands to Prussia. Furthermore, a scheme for providing for a joint diplomatic representation as towards foreign Powers, which gave great offence to the lesser states, was made much of—more, Bismarck afterwards thought, than it need have been—as an unmanageable difficulty. Certain neither of itself, nor of the states with which it was deliberating, the Prussian Government failed to impress either friends or adversaries by a resolute attitude. Nor can there be much doubt that, though Radowitz failed to see through their intentions, the bearing of Saxony and Hanover, as well as that of Bavaria, in these discussions and negotiations was from the first determined by an understanding with Austria, the conduct of whose policy had the situation, as the phrase is, well in hand. For a time, negotiations went on with Bavaria, and von der Pfordten was continually on the wing. Moreover, so long as Austria's struggle with the Hungarian insurrection continued, it was obviously premature to oppose the designs of Prussia too openly; and, before this burden was shaken off, there supervened the risings, already noted[1], in Baden and in the Bavarian Palatinate, which latter province Prussian arms recovered for Bavaria when all but lost to her. Thus, the prospects of the Prussian scheme were not wholly hopeless in the summer of 1849, more especially if the adherence of the petty states could be secured. And, after the rump of the National Assembly had been broken up at Stuttgart, it became obvious that,

[1] See the previous chapter.

if that scheme (in which, after all, there remained a sum of liberties very much larger than could have been obtainable before 1848) were wrecked, nothing remained but to fall back on the old Federal Diet. Of this alternative Austrian statesmanship had never lost sight; but its meaning was only too clear to those who continued to cherish any of the aspirations which it had been sought to realise at Frankfort.

Accordingly, an attempt was made by the members of the Federal state party (*Bundesstaatspartei*) who had remained behind at Frankfort, and of whom several of the leaders had been in close touch with Radowitz, to strengthen the hands of the Prussian Government, which however took no part in the proceeding and, indeed, showed lack of intelligence in omitting to facilitate it. Nearly one-hundred-and-fifty members of the defunct National Assembly, where all of them had sat either on the Right or in one of the Centres, in response to an invitation issued by Gagern, Dahlmann, the Badener Mathy, the Nassauer Hergenhahn, and certain other members of the party which had consistently worked in furtherance of the idea of a Federal state, assembled on June 25th and 26th at Gotha. The deliberations which they held here were conducted in private, but became known through the press. Only a minority of those who put in an appearance demurred to following the Prussian lead; but some, such as Gervinus and Häusser, would, in *doctrinaire* fashion, not budge from the line of adherence to the accepted *Reichsverfassung*; while Vincke evinced a deep distrust of the mysterious purposes of Radowitz, who was not gifted with the art of disarming suspicion, and who was not present at Gotha in person. On the other hand, Gagern, Beckerath, Simson, Jacob Grimm (always singleminded and clearsighted), and the large majority of those in attendance at Gotha, were in favour of immediate action, if the situation was still to be

saved, and if the resumption of the supreme control of German affairs by Austria, now on the eve of the collapse of the Hungarian insurrection, was to be prevented. Accordingly, on June 28th, 130 of the politicians assembled at Gotha signed a declaration pointing out that the *Reichsverfassung* could no longer be put into force in the form in which it had been, satisfactorily at the time, carried at Frankfort. In its stead, the Gotha Assembly recommended the adoption of the constitution approved on May 26th by the Alliance of the Three Kings, and further advocated the immediate summons of a *Reichstag*, as to the elections to which it was prepared to leave a fairly free hand to the several Governments, lest the whole design should split on the rock of objections taken to the retrograde electoral law proposed as normal in the draft constitution. The minority, headed by Vincke, which held out against these resolutions numbered not more than seventeen. Thus, there can be no doubt that the German policy of Radowitz had never before met with so conspicuous and wide an approval. When the Prussian Chambers met in the latter part of July, having been elected in accordance with the three classes system, the majority was found to favour the German policy of Radowitz and the 'Gothaers,' as they were called; but the democratic press heaped unmeasured invective upon it and upon its supporters.

Thus, so far as political feeling both in Prussia and in the rest of northern and central Germany inclined to a moderate Liberal, but at the same time national, policy, the idea was taking root that the chance of realising the idea of national unity had now come to depend on the success of the plan devised by Radowitz and approved at Gotha. The support accorded to it lacked the enthusiasm which is rarely called forth by the 'second-best'; but good progress was made with the scheme. By the end of August, all the German states, with the exceptions of Austria, Bavaria and

Württemberg, together with Hesse-Homburg, Liechtenstein and Luxemburg, had signified their adhesion to what was now called the 'Union'—the name originally suggested for designating the wider league with Austria having been transferred to the smaller federation and being now officially applied to it. A Federal arbitral tribunal had actually been established at Erfurt on July 2nd; and, though the summons of a *Reichstag* had continued to be delayed, a motion for such a summons was on September 26th brought forward by Nassau in the administrative council of the Union. No resolution on the subject was, however, reached till a month later.

But, in truth, the consummation so devoutly wished was as far as ever from having been reached. By the middle of August, the Hungarian insurrection was crushed; the Austrian Government could breathe again; and Schwarzenberg felt that the time was at hand for courageous intervention in German affairs. And, while in Prussia a powerful party, which had never ceased to have its representatives near the person of the sovereign, remained wholly out of sympathy with the movement for national unity and afraid of nothing so much as of an open rupture with Austria, Frederick William IV could himself at no time throw off his feeling of loyal attachment to the House of Habsburg, and his desire to show to it every consideration in his power. Thus, the policy of Radowitz, which had seemed to be moving steadily towards its goal, was crossed by the revival of the opposition of Austria, or rather by a presentiment of that revival on the part of the Governments which had originally joined with Prussia in the *Dreikönigsbündniss*. But on Prussian statesmanship itself, though not on the action of Radowitz, must fall the blame of having, with incredible weakness, at this very time consented to a secret temporary understanding with Prussia's rival, who was no longer crippled in the contention.

The idea of going, as it were, behind the policy of Radowitz and, by means of a provisional agreement with Austria, taking over in conjunction with her the control of the states belonging to the old confederation while the new federal constitution was still unsettled, seems to have been suggested by Canitz so early as the beginning of July, when Austria's difficulties in Hungary and Italy were as yet by no means at an end[1]. But the active impulse to negotiations with this end in view was given, a month later, by Freiherr L. M. von Biegeleben, a Hesse-Darmstadt statesman who had distinguished himself as Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Ministry of the *Reichsverweser* at Frankfort, and whose sympathies, though Radowitz had at one time sought to secure his services, proved to be Austrian. To his efforts was, largely, due the conclusion, on September 30th, of an agreement between the two Great Powers, which was to last till May 1st, 1850, during which period they were, in the name of all the German states, to take over the Central Authority and, as representing the Germanic Confederation, to watch over the internal and external security of them all; while, in the meantime, the future constitution of Germany was to be settled by free discussion between the several states. This was the so-called *Interim*, to which Schwarzenberg had agreed in the well-warranted hope that it would serve as a transition to the restoration of the old Confederation. A day or two before the adoption of the *Interim*, the King of Prussia had met the young Emperor of Austria at Teplitz; and, soon afterwards, the Tsar sent an arrogant letter to his Prussian brother-in-law, admonishing him to hold fast by the Austrian alliance. At Frankfort, the *Reichsverweser*, who had hitherto declined to abandon his authority, now prepared to take this step, and, before

[1] F. Meinecke, *Radowitz*, pp. 328–9.

the end of the year (December 20th), actually resigned it into the hands of the Commission of Four nominated as their executive by the two Great Powers[1].

By consenting to the *Interim*, Prussia had lost the vantage-ground which she had occupied and had, at the same time, prepared the collapse of the *Dreikönigsbündniss* and of the Union into which it had expanded. On October 19th the Administrative Council of the Union had resolved that the election for the House of popular representatives in its Parliament should be held on January 13th, 1850. But, on the very next day (October 20th), the Saxon and Hanoverian Governments, after some preliminary manœuvres, cast off the mask and, protesting against this resolution as contravening the purposes of the alliance, declared that, acting in accordance with the reservations made by them at the outset, they must now secede from the Union. This was the thank-offering of the King of Saxony for the recent preservation of his throne by Prussian arms; as for the King of Hanover, the step was taken without the cognisance of his Minister Stüve, who resigned office in consequence. The whole plot was thus laid bare; and the seceding Governments had contrived to take the life out of the Union, so soon as Austria had found herself in a position to resume her opposition to the Prussian design and to the policy which it represented. But the Prussian Government cannot be acquitted of shortsightedness in ignoring the reservations which had been made by Saxony and Hanover at the time of the conclusion of the *Dreikönigsbündniss*, and which were not unknown at other Courts (that of Great Britain, for instance)[2]. In any case, Schwarzenberg was now free to open the campaign of reaction.

[1] He returned to Styria and died in 1859, in an honoured and mentally active old age.

[2] See the reference to Bunsen's statement *ap.* Klüpfel, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

For the policy of Prussia, as it presented itself to Radowitz and those who thought with him in this critical season, the ebb had set in before the flood-tide had carried it to the goal which they had in view. For the moment, however, notwithstanding the overclouding of the prospect before Prussia and the Union, which now consisted only of herself and the petty states, Radowitz did not yet despair of ultimate success. His greatest difficulty, throughout these transactions, had really lain in the half-hearted and vacillating proceedings of Frederick William IV, who trusted his faithful servant, but could not trust himself. At this very time, Radowitz had succeeded, after untold exertions, in which he had the loyal support of the head of the Government, Brandenburg, in preventing the King from giving unpardonable offence to the constitutional party in Prussia and to German Liberalism at large. The moment had at last arrived for the King, in accordance with the provisions of the *octroyée* constitution of December 1848, to swear fidelity to that instrument, which had now undergone the required revision by both Chambers. But, as time went on, his hesitation to submit to this odious ceremony (for it was thus that he regarded the obligation) became insuperable; and it was increased by the advice of Tsar Nicholas to refuse, or at least to postpone, the taking of the oath (December and January 1849–50). Instead of either consenting to take it, or changing his Ministry and refusing, he adopted the middle course of suggesting a number of further amendments to the constitution, all of which were designed to strengthen the royal authority or to benefit the landed interest, whose conservative principles he regarded as the Crown's surest support. Among these amendments was his favourite notion of substituting for the First Chamber on the usual composite basis, a House of nobles. The Ministers agreed to make the attempt, while the Camarilla rejoiced in the possibility that, if it failed, no compromise with

constitutionalism, and no Liberalising Ministry, were any longer possible. The consequence was a series of efforts and intrigues which might have ended in catastrophe—in the outbreak of revolution at home, or in the complete surrender of Prussia to Austrian (and perhaps Russian) control of her German policy. In January 1850, Radowitz (then resident at Frankfort as Prussian Federal Commissioner under the *Interim*) was summoned to the rescue, and, after an incredible expenditure of effort, and with the loyal help of both Brandenburg and Manteuffel, succeeded, by means of modifications as to the composition and rights of the First Chamber and other points which rendered it possible to obtain a majority in the two Chambers for the bulk of the proposed amendments, in persuading the King to give up his objection to taking the oath. The speech which he made on the occasion of taking it (January 31st, 1850), and in which he delivered himself, in no measured terms, on the achievements of the revolutionary epoch, has been well described as forming one of 'the documents of his personal history'; but the storm had been weathered, and, in name at least, Prussia had definitively become a constitutional state.

Meanwhile, the elections for the Union Parliament had been fixed for January 31st, 1850. The adversaries of the Union as now constituted, Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony, with the assent of Hanover, lost no time in producing a new draft constitution of their own devising (February 27th), which received the approval of Schwarzenberg, but on which it seems unnecessary to dwell further here. (This counter-move is sometimes called the Alliance of the Four Kings—*Vierkönigsbündniss*.) The Parliament of the Union actually met at Erfurt on March 20th. It included representatives of Prussia and of the other states which had been members of the old Confederation, with the very formidable exception of Austria, and the four kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and Württemberg, besides

Holstein and Lauenburg, Luxemburg and Limburg, Hesse-Homburg, Liechtenstein and the city-state of Frankfort.

The elections to the Erfurt Parliament had, especially in many of the lesser states belonging to the Union, been carried on with a very faint show of interest, and the democratic party had taken but slight part in them. Thus, the large majority of the popular Chamber (*Volkshaus*) consisted of members of the Gotha party, or of official supporters of the Prussian Government programme, while only a small minority, the *ultras* of Prussian conservatism, including Stahl, Ludwig von Gerlach and Otto von Bismarck, were adverse to it. The deputies sent to the other House (*Staatenhaus*) by the Chambers of the several states, were mostly of the Gothaers' way of thinking; although, significantly enough, the majority of the deputies from the Prussian Chambers in this House could not be safely counted on as supporters of Radowitz's scheme. As Prussian Commissioner of the Union, he opened the debates of the assembly in an impressive speech, calculated to encourage the friends of the Union and of the draft constitution which had served as its basis; but, as a matter of fact, he was already far from feeling sure of his ground, or, in other words, more than doubtful as to the intentions of the King, influenced as he was by his conservative advisers. They feared that the constitution of the Union, though it had in some respects been accommodated, by a so-called additional act, to the continued existence of the Germanic Confederation, would impose upon the monarchical authority the necessity of another parliament, and that the policy of Prussia would be hampered by the action of the College of Princes, notwithstanding the smallness of their states. Thus, while, both in the Erfurt Parliament and in the Prussian Ministry, it was hoped that the acceptance *en bloc* of the constitution and the additional act would definitively establish the Union and the Prussian headship, the King desired that this

acceptance should be followed by a revision of the constitution on conservative principles, including more especially the omission, or at least modification, of the *Grundrechte*; and that, if this revision proved unsatisfactory, Prussia might still reserve to herself the right of dropping the whole design. Radowitz was only too well aware of his master's ulterior intentions, and of his having actually given ear to proposals brought to Berlin by an active negotiator, the Nassau Privy Councillor von Forsboom, with a view to a new *Interim*. In his opening speech at Erfurt Radowitz ignored them; but he soon had to give way before the unwillingness of the King, who, as in the case of the Prussian constitution, was beginning to make difficulties about the oath which he would have to take to the constitution of the Union. Radowitz felt the falsity of his position and repeatedly, though in vain, begged the King to accept his resignation. But he had to abandon his attempt to induce the King and the Ministry to allow the difficulty at Erfurt to be compromised by beginning with revision, while promising ultimate adoption, of the design, and was obliged, in accordance with the King's wish, to propose simply that the revision should precede the adoption. In spite of his recommendation, the two Houses of the Erfurt Parliament, on April 13th and 17th respectively, adopted the May constitution and the additional act *en bloc*; and then, having accomplished the purpose for which they had been assembled, but without securing the promise of the King of Prussia to accept the authority conferred on him by the constitution adopted by them, adjourned (April 29th). Parliamentary history records no more utter fiasco, and Radowitz confessed the burden of responsibility to be almost beyond bearing, did not a sense of duty prevent him from casting it off.

Three days before the close of the Erfurt Parliament, the Austrian Government, as the Power which had held the presidency of the Diet in the old Confederation, issued

an invitation to all the German Governments, to send plenipotentiaries to Frankfort on May 10th, for establishing a provisional Central Authority and revising the constitution of the Confederation in conformity with its original articles. The two alternatives, of upholding and developing the Union on the lines of the constitution adopted at Erfurt, or of falling in with the return to the old Confederation definitively set on foot by the Austrian Government, were therefore now before the King of Prussia, and with them the choice between the counsels of Radowitz and those of the reactionary Camarilla by which he was surrounded. The latter benefited by the growing unwillingness of Count Brandenburg, who was still head of the Ministry, to allow the difference with Austria to reach an extreme point, and by the growing usefulness, as a moderate conservative adviser, of the Minister of the Interior, Otto von Manteuffel. Though cautious in dissent as well as in assent, and above all, anxious to carry on the King's government and not to mar the chances of the future, Manteuffel was at heart adverse to the methods of Radowitz[1]. Once more, the King could not make up his mind. He invited the Princes who were members of the Union to a congress, which was held at Berlin on May 9th, and, when they came, propounded to them the question whether they proposed to adhere to the Union, without even pretending to press them to answer in the affirmative. He was taken at his word by the Elector of Hesse and his Minister Hassenpflug, who had, in fact, only attended in order to declare their recalcitrance; and there were some further signs of defection. In the end, it was

[1] Manteuffel's memoirs, *Unter Friedrich Wilhelm IV*, edited by H. von Poschinger (2 vols., 1901) become of great interest from this point, though he was cautious in the use of writing as well as of speech, and left his friend Küpfer, Councillor of Legation, to furnish more explicit commentaries on the problems of policy which occupied them both.

settled to prolong the Union provisionally till July 1st; as to the further future, a minority was in favour of leaving the determination of it to the several Governments; and the two Hesses, with Mecklenburg-Strelitz and Schaumburg-Lippe, by taking no part in the prolongation vote, signified that they had already seceded. The proposal of Prussia that the Frankfort meeting summoned by Austria should be attended by the members of the Union as a collective body, and pass a protest against the Austrian presidency or the assumption that the meeting represented the entire old Confederation, was carried against the opposition of the two Hesses. But Schwarzenberg declined to listen to the protest. On May 10th, the first sitting of the revived Confederate Diet was held at Frankfort under Austrian presidency, and attended by the plenipotentiaries of the four kingdoms, Hesse-Cassel (Hesse-Darmstadt was represented from the second sitting onwards), Hesse-Homburg, Holstein, Limburg, and Liechtenstein. On August 7th, the assembly once more called upon all the German Governments to send their plenipotentiaries to the Diet; and on September 2nd it reconstituted its smaller consultative body (*Engerer Rat*), which business of a very significant sort awaited.

Radowitz, whose design of 'the German Union,' as it had been rechristened in the additional act, had been saved in the letter rather than in the spirit, might seek comfort in the thought that, in this case, sleep was better than death. But, in spite of the sentiments of the Prussian sovereign and of his conservative counsellors, the question had rapidly been merged in a direct contest for the leadership in German affairs between Austria and Prussia; and the situation might speedily become one in which Russia felt it incumbent on her to intervene. Already in May 1850, there were rumours of movements of Austrian troops, and Prussian military measures were in consequence put in hand; and, towards the close of the month, the Prince of

Prussia paid a visit to the Tsar at Warsaw, whither he was speedily followed by Schwarzenberg.

The first two questions which demanded the immediate consideration of the half-restored Confederation at Frankfort, and by dealing with which it was prepared to effect the recovery of its authority, were those of Schleswig-Holstein and of Hesse-Cassel. In the settlement of the former question, Russia had a very direct interest. Denmark, trusting in the general promise of Russia and France, and in the unconcealed goodwill of the Austrian Government, had insisted on her demand for the maintenance of the indissoluble connexion between Schleswig and the Danish Crown, and, on February 23rd, 1849, had taken it upon herself to denounce the Malmö truce. In April, hostilities were resumed, the Danish army of some 30,000 men being opposed to German forces more than double in numbers and composed of Saxons, Bavarians and other Federal troops as well as Prussians, the command-in-chief over them being soon assumed by the Prussian General von Prittwitz. The Danish fleet of course controlled the sea; yet, as it happened, the first important action of the war was that of Eckernförde, in which Duke Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha had the satisfaction of capturing the Danish frigate, the *Gefion*, while her companion, the *Christian VIII*, a ship of the line, blew up (April 5th). The enthusiasm created by this success was heightened by the storming of the Düppel entrenchment opposite Alsen, behind which the Danish army had retreated, by Saxon and Bavarian troops (April 13th); but, though the Schleswig-Holsteiners repulsed a Danish attack at Kolding, and crossed the Jutish frontier (May 6th), their assault on Fridericia ended in complete defeat (July 6th).

Before this, however, the Prussian Government had resolved to abandon the 'insurgent' duchies, and to negotiate a truce with the Danes, which was actually concluded on July 10th. The negotiations, due in part to a desire to

conciliate Russia as well as the other Great Powers, and in part to the unconcealed aversion with which King Frederick William IV regarded the rising of the Schleswig-Holsteiners against their sovereign, were carried on under British mediation, but at Berlin, in order to dispense with the active patriotism of Bunsen, though even he was in favour of coming to terms. The basis of the truce and peace preliminaries, signed on July 10th, was the establishment of a temporary separate administration for Schleswig, which was to last till the actual conclusion of peace, and to be composed of a joint Prusso-Danish commission, with a British arbitrator. This temporary settlement excited widespread indignation, and was followed by divers protests; but the Prussian Government, falling back on the authority of the commission appointed on the occasion of the '*interim*' agreement with the Austrian, continued its negotiations for a definitive peace with Denmark. It proved, however, impossible to reach a conclusion acceptable to both sides as to what kind of 'independence' was to be granted to Schleswig; and the Prussian negotiator (Count K. G. L. G. von Usedom[1]) therefore proposed to recur, with a reservation of rights, to the *status quo ante bellum*. But this solution, again, seemed too simple to satisfy any of the parties to the dispute; and the Schleswig-Holsteiners gradually lost all confidence in Prussia, while the Tsar made known his opinion in favour of the Danish standpoint, which practically amounted to the incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark.

Thus, after long and weary delay, the affairs of the duchies at last called imperatively for settlement; and it was not long before it became evident to the Prince of Prussia, at Warsaw, and through him to the Government at home, that the Tsar would not vouchsafe any indication

[1] A diplomatist whom Bismarck was wont to deride as an 'amiable minister for conversation,' but who rendered great service to Prussia in 1866 in connexion with the Prusso-Italian treaty of alliance.

of his view of the Austro-Prussian controversy concerning Union and Confederation, until a peace satisfactory to him should have been concluded with Denmark. On the other hand, he threatened intervention, unless the King of Denmark were allowed to restore order in Holstein as well as in Schleswig; and he took the opportunity of referring very plainly to the expediency of putting an end at Berlin to constitutionalism and all its ways.

These broad hints were sufficient, especially as they fell in with the personal inclinations of Frederick William IV, which were in no wise altered by information reaching him from Paris that the President of the French Republic was in sympathy with the claims of Prussia in the German question. On July 2nd, 1850, the peace with Denmark was signed at Berlin. While reserving to the contracting parties all rights in existence before the war, it authorised the King of Denmark to require the intervention of the Germanic Confederation for the maintenance of his rights in Holstein, or, in default of such intervention, to secure those rights by military measures of his own. The evacuation of Schleswig was regulated by a separate protocol.

The Prussian forces, hereupon, took their departure from the duchies. The gallant attempt of the Schleswig-Holsteiners to carry on the campaign on their own account came to an end with the defeat of General von Willisen at Idstedt, on July 25th, and the capture of Friedrichstadt by the Danes, on September 17th. Willisen's attempt to recapture this important position near the mouth of the Eider failed on October 7th; and soon afterwards this Prussian officer, upon whose military knowledge great hopes had been placed, was superseded, and the struggle was over.

The influence of Prussia in Germany, more and more on the wane since Erfurt had displayed the unsteadfastness of her policy, had thus been further depressed by an inglorious pacification, concluded largely, though not

altogether, in deference to the wishes of the Tsar, and by its painful immediate consequences. In the meantime, Schwarzenberg had not failed to impress upon that potentate and his Prussian guest at Warsaw the expediency of a speedy settlement of the German problem by the two German Great Powers. The old *Interim* had run out on May 1st, and now each of them was pursuing its own path. Yet Schwarzenberg was not prepared to propose any fresh constitutional basis in lieu of that which he had consistently rejected; indeed, he was at one with the Tsar (and, on this head, with King Frederick William IV himself) in his antipathy to constitutions, and spoke even of that which had been *octroyée* in the Austrian monarchy with scant respect. Thus, the contradiction between the Austrian and the Prussian points of view remained, after all, irremediable; and the Austrian desire for the restoration of the old Confederation was not to be reconciled with a maintenance of the fundamental conditions under which alone Prussia could assume the headship of a Federal state. Already, Austria was proceeding to take action on the lines of the old Confederation, in which she had been and was the primary Power, and was, for instance, protesting against the military conventions recently concluded by Prussia with Brunswick and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, for the incorporation of their military contingents in the Prussian army—the most practical outcome of her recent intimacy with the Governments of the smaller states.

Yet, for a time, it still seemed as if the two German Great Powers might continue to find it desirable to keep the peace towards each other; more especially as the Tsar had been gratified by Prussia's conduct in the matter of the pacification with Denmark. Moreover, the Ministers at Berlin were, as subsequent events were to make quite clear, very much divided as to supporting or opposing the policy of Radowitz. Stockhausen, the Minister of War,

shared the opinions of the extreme conservative faction, and, to the best of his opportunities, obstructed any action that might tend to bring about war with Austria. Brandenburg, too, who was still at the head of the Government, had by this time lost all confidence in the design of the Union; and Manteuffel was plainly in favour of its definitive abandonment. But the strange idiosyncrasy of King Frederick William IV remained proof against these influences. He had now persuaded himself that to throw over Radowitz, and to abandon a line of policy which without that trusted adviser could not be pursued any further, would be derogatory to his own honour; and, since his royal friend had resolved to hold out by him, Radowitz could not but hold out by the King.

So far as the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein were concerned, a difference between the views of the two Powers had already declared itself, when, at the time of the conclusion of the Berlin peace with Denmark, Russia, France and Great Britain had sought to secure, as a basis of the settlement of the question of the succession, the establishment of the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy. Prussia declined to accept this principle without a previous examination of the conflicting claims in the kingdom and in the duchies. Austria, on the other hand, after providing for the reservation of the rights of the Germanic Confederation as to Holstein, had on August 23rd signed the protocol (sometimes called the first London Protocol), which was to establish the 'indissoluble integrity' of the Danish monarchy. And, early in September, the Austrian Government further gained the approval of the Tsar by causing the Smaller Council (*Engerer Rat*) of the restored Frankfort Diet to declare itself competent to ratify the peace with Denmark (which Prussia had submitted for ratification to the several German Governments) and even, if necessary, to intervene with an armed Federal force in Holstein. But, before the

problem of the duchies was actually settled, another question presented itself for treatment to the restored Confederation; and it was on this that the conflict between the two Great Powers was at last brought to a head.

The affairs of Hesse-Cassel had, under the rule of the Elector Frederick William (who had succeeded his father in November 1847), gone on from bad to worse. The movement of 1848 had, as we saw[1], obliged him to make certain concessions and to name Ministers acceptable to his subjects; but he had changed neither his character nor his determination to undermine and, if possible, to destroy, the hated constitution of 1831. He had joined the Union, but without agreeing to any diminution of his sovereign rights, and, when his Ministers had resisted his wish to secede, had recalled his former Minister Hassenpflug, who since his dismissal had held a high judicial post in Prussia, where he had latterly become involved in a charge of forgery. The King of Prussia, however, allowed him to resign his post (February 1849); and, amidst universal execration, he entered anew upon his official duties as chief of the Ministry at Cassel. His cynical determination, together with a fanatical devotion to the principles of absolutism in state and Church, and an astuteness equally ready to use and to defy the law, made him an object of general and unmitigated hatred. Inasmuch as he could not effect the purpose for which he had reentered the Elector's service without bringing the Union to a fall, he had sworn war to the knife against it and, as a matter of course, against the German policy of Prussia. No time was accordingly lost about practically withdrawing Hesse-Cassel from the Union, and signifying the adhesion of the electorate to the revived Confederation at Frankfort.

The long-standing quarrel between the Elector and his subjects, driven on *improbo labore* by Hassenpflug, very

[1] Cf. p. 371, *ante*.

speedily reached the breaking-point. While calling upon the diet of the electorate for the grant of taxes and other revenue, the Minister insolently refused to lay before it, in conformity with the constitution, the budget of receipts and expenditure, albeit this was in due readiness; and, when the diet refused to prolong any further the authorisation to the Government to levy taxes, declared this refusal to amount to an act of rebellion, as defined by an exceptional law bearing the date of 1832, but abolished in March 1848. Accordingly, though no disturbance of order had taken place in the electorate, he proclaimed a state of siege there. When, hereupon, all the state officials whom his proceedings implicated in this violation of the constitution declined any participation in it, he induced the Elector to quit Cassel and take up his residence at Frankfort. Here he immediately applied for redress to the Federal Diet; and, a few days afterwards (September 21st), the Diet replied by calling upon the Government for a report. Thus encouraged, Hassenpflug issued more explicit directions to the military authorities in the electorate with regard to their conduct in the case of any refusal of taxes or other act of insubordination. When the officers of the Elector's army (all of whom had sworn to obey the constitution) hesitated, and those who refused to carry out the orders of their sovereign were called upon to resign their commissions, nine-tenths of the whole body of officers took him at his word. Thus a Federal execution seemed, indeed, to have become a necessity.

But, apart from the fact that Hesse-Cassel still formally belonged to the Union which remained nominally in existence and of which Prussia was the nominal head, could Prussia allow a territory midway between the two halves of her monarchy, connected with one another by two military roads (*Etappenstrassen*) which she possessed the exclusive right of using for the passage of troops, to be occupied by the forces of the revived Confederation under the control of

her rival? King Frederick William IV might entertain as little sympathy with the defenders of the Hesse-Cassel constitution as with the champions of the constitution at home; but could he ignore the fact that the real point at issue was, as the Bavarian Minister von der Pfordten afterwards openly avowed[1], not the Hesse-Cassel constitution at all, but the administering of a final *quietus* to the Union and to the German policy of Prussia which it embodied? Could he, in whom the pride of the Hohenzollerns was by no means extinct, submit to the open and palpable imposition upon Germany of the will of Austria, in the Hessian as well as in the Holstein question, since he could not see his way to entering the revived Confederation and defying Austria on her own ground? He resolved on resistance, and after the Diet at Frankfort had, as we saw, on September 21st, shown itself prepared for action, approved of the proposal of Radowitz to prevent any unlawful interference on the part of the Confederation in the affairs of Hesse-Cassel. Radowitz was, at the same time, named Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs (September 26th); and the King's Government was thus openly identified with a policy of action.

Unluckily, the legal position taken up by Prussia was, to say the least, doubtful. After the conduct of Hesse-Cassel towards the Union, the Elector could hardly be treated as under any obligation towards that shadow of a federation; and, indeed, the Prussian Government made no such pretence. Neither, therefore, was it entitled to prevent Hesse-Cassel from associating itself with Austria and other states in the revived Confederation. The Austrian Government, accordingly, declared its intention, if necessary, to resort to the use of force in Hesse-Cassel against any armed intervention on the part of Prussia; and Radowitz had to fall back upon the necessity, in the first instance, of securing

[1] Cf. Sybel, *Die Begründung d. deutschen Reiches*, vol. I, p. 311 (popular edition).

the Prussian military roads, which had not, so far, been imperilled. At the same time, overtures were made at Vienna for a settlement of the Holstein and the Hessian difficulties by joint commissioners of the two Great Powers; but this alternative policy did not fail to stir the jealousy of Bavaria and Württemberg, although it was simultaneously suggested that the general question of the future German constitution should be referred to free conferences between all the states. Military movements ensued; and, after the Austrian Government had ascertained that its action in the Hesse-Cassel question had the full approval of the Tsar, a conference took place at Bregenz between the Austrian, Bavarian and Württemberg sovereigns and their Ministers (October 11th), at which an offensive and defensive alliance, which should place in the field an army of 200,000 men, was agreed upon between them. The warlike enthusiasm of southern Germany, or at least of its Governments, seemed to have been effectively stirred.

On the other side, Radowitz and his master still held firm; and, throughout northern Germany and beyond, the belief spread that Prussia had resolved upon retaining control over the policy and constitution of the states which looked up to her leadership, and that, with regard to the two questions immediately at issue, she was determined to uphold the union between Schleswig and Holstein, and the constitutional rights of the subjects of the Elector of Hesse. But, as public opinion stiffened in support of this supposed resolve, and the rumours of war became more persistent, the Prussian Government, too, turned its eyes eastward in quest of the view which the Tsar might take of the conflict. His intention of paying another and longer visit to Warsaw had been announced; and it was resolved to bring home to him during its course the real significance of Prussia's resistance to the action of the revived Confederation, and to represent to him how entirely foreign to her intentions and policy was

any thought of encouraging the revolutionary purposes which he held in abhorrence. Count Brandenburg, still the head of the Prussian Ministry, was sent to Warsaw accordingly, and arrived there on October 17th. Already, however, before he had started on his journey, it had become known that the Emperor Francis Joseph, accompanied by Schwarzenberg, was likewise about to pay a visit to the Tsar. From the first, Nicholas I left Brandenburg in no doubt as to the point on which he laid the greatest stress, viz., the speedy disarmament of Holstein; as to the Hessian and the general German question, he showed himself unwilling to intervene, or in any way to hamper the decisions of Austria. Brandenburg was not without hopes of reaching an understanding with Schwarzenberg; but, when they had conferred, the substance of their agreement was that the Union was practically given up, and that, though free conferences were to be held (at Dresden or Vienna) between the several states as to Federal reform, the Diet of the revived Confederation was not only to continue to sit, but to carry out immediately the Federal execution in Hesse-Cassel. In short, Brandenburg had made up his mind that it was not worth Prussia's while to enter into a war, in which she would have Austria, southern Germany and Russia against her, rather than agree to the recognition of the revived Confederation and to the Federal execution in Hesse-Cassel; as to the Prussian occupation of the military roads, there seemed no reason for apprehending any objection on the part of Austria.

When, on October 31st, Brandenburg returned to Berlin with these preliminary proposals, he found the Prussian capital in a condition of intense warlike excitement. On the following day, the conclusions reached at Warsaw, and his proposal to carry on the negotiations with the Austrian Government on this basis, were laid by him before the Ministry of which he was the chief. He was, at once, opposed by Radowitz, who, as to the burning question of the

moment, declared that, if the Confederation were allowed to carry out the execution in Electoral Hesse, its domination over Germany would be established, and who, therefore, advocated armed resistance to it by Prussian troops, together with the mobilisation of the entire Prussian army and the necessary accompanying measures. These proposals were, indisputably, the logical outcome of the position which had been for some time taken up by the King and his Government. The Ministers von Ladenberg and von der Heydt took this view in supporting Radowitz; but Manteuffel, together with two other Ministers, upheld the views of their chief.

But the decision could be no longer postponed, when, after the close of the Ministerial sitting, the news arrived that on that day a Bavaro-Austrian force of 25,000 men had crossed the Hesse-Cassel frontier; whereupon the Prussian Lieutenant-General Count von der Gröben, whose instructions were in such an event to occupy Fulda, was ordered also to place a garrison in Cassel. These orders were carried out on November 2nd; but, already on the previous day, the Ministers had assembled for a decision under the personal presidency of the King. Brandenburg adhered to his view, and, while advocating the Prussian occupation of the military roads and the territory between them—which would be tantamount to a joint occupation of the electorate by Prussian and Federal troops—opposed the mobilisation of the Prussian army. Radowitz was, on this occasion, supported by the Prince of Prussia, who pointed out plainly that the formal abolition of the Union demanded by Schwarzenberg implied the subordination of Prussia to Austria; while Manteuffel's declaration of the illegality of Prussian intervention in Hesse was reinforced by Stockhausen's opinion that mobilisation would mean war with Austria and Russia, and that Prussia was not equal to a conflict with these adversaries. The meeting was adjourned to the next day, November 2nd, when the

King declared himself in favour of negotiation with Austria on the basis of the abolition of the Union and the withdrawal of Prussian protection from the Holstein Government if it refused to submit to the Danes; while in Hesse, on the requisite guarantees being received, nothing should be done beyond occupying the military roads and the adjoining territory. But, at the same time, he announced himself to be in favour of immediate mobilisation of the Prussian army —the measure to be explained at Vienna as purely defensive in character. On this curiously-balanced method of procedure, the King requested the judgment of his Ministers, offering them a free hand if they should prefer Brandenburg's alternative of negotiation with Austria without mobilisation.

Whether or not the King, in making this extraordinary proposal, still hesitated to adopt Brandenburg's view, the majority of his Ministers, notwithstanding a vigorous demand for immediate mobilisation on the part of the Prince of Prussia, was found to support the policy of caution and to vote with Brandenburg. Their decision was accepted by the King, though he still avowed his own opinion to be that of the minority. Thereupon, Radowitz immediately gave in his resignation, and was followed by Ladenberg and von der Heydt. Brandenburg, whose opinion had in a momentous hour prevailed, was prevented by illness from attending the meeting of the Ministry held on the morrow (November 3rd), but was able to sign and send the dispatch to Vienna. Immediately afterwards, his illness took a violent turn, and on the 6th he died. The fact that legend has obscured, and indeed misrepresented, his action in the great political crisis in which he played a prominent part, cannot affect the conviction as to the perfect honesty and candour of his conduct. The correctness of his conclusion is a different question, virtually forming part of the problem, which, for better or worse, found its solution at Olmütz.

Meanwhile, Prussian troops had taken possession of the

military roads in Hesse, and the whole district between them, including Fulda, and had been everywhere hailed as liberators by the population; while the Frankfort Diet had declined to delay in any way the advance of the army of execution under the Prince of Thurn and Taxis. A collision might, therefore, be momentarily expected; and the excitement at Berlin seemed likely to become uncontrollable. Bohemia was reported full of troops, and Saxony likely to arm in aid of them. In these circumstances, Manteuffel, though it was well known and indeed had been one of the reasons against mobilisation, that the *cadres* of a large number of the Prussian regiments were scattered in various parts of Germany, advised that the army should, after all, be mobilised; and on the morning of November 6th—the day of Brandenburg's death—the King signed the requisite order. Ladenberg and von der Heydt, hereupon, withdrew their resignation; the former was temporarily charged with the presidency of the Ministry, and General von der Gröben was instructed to act entirely as military reasons demanded. An outburst of enthusiasm followed in capital and country. But the mobilisation was declared to be purely defensive; and both Radowitz, who on the same day took his departure into retirement at Erfurt, and Schwarzenberg himself interpreted it as merely covering Prussia's imminent retreat. For the rest, the Austrian Minister insisted on the Prussian troops retiring in face of the Federal in Hesse, as well as on the formal withdrawal by Prussia of the proposed constitution of the Union.

The Prussian Government justified the self-confidence of its opponent. On November 8th, a collision took place between the Prussian and Federal (Bavaro-Austrian) troops at Bronzell near Fulda; but the only casualties were the wounding of five Austrian riflemen and of a Prussian horse, destined to live in story as the white horse of Bronzell. The incident made a great impression,

afterwards changed into savage ridicule; for the Prussian Government ordered its troops to fall back on the military roads, and on the following day announced at Vienna its readiness to concede the Austrian demands as to both the constitution of the Union and the Holstein difficulty. Nothing seemed to remain unsettled except the continued Prussian occupation of the military roads, which would imply the restriction of the Federal execution to the southern part of the electorate. To the attainment of this object, Frederick William IV had now resolved to restrict his policy, which he thereupon sent Radowitz to London to explain to the British Government. His exposition was received with some wonderment, but not without sympathetic assurances of active support, should Russia intervene in any war between Austria and Prussia.

Thus, the situation was still full of danger, and the movement of 40,000 French troops to the western frontier showed how much attention it was attracting in a quarter where it revolted the King of Prussia to look for eventual assistance. On the one hand, the Austrian Government was informed, and the information was on November 15th communicated to the Governments still nominally belonging to the Union, that Prussia regarded the proposed constitution of that association as defunct; whereupon these Governments successively announced their secession from the Union, and it came to an end. On the other hand the King's speech on opening the Prussian Chambers (November 21st) was widely interpreted as warlike; but when, four days later, the Austrian *ultimatum* was presented to him, which demanded, within forty-eight hours, the consent of Prussia to the advance, without let or hindrance, of the Austro-Bavarian troops to Cassel, he replied by the announcement that Manteuffel would be sent immediately to discuss the matter in personal conference with Schwarzenberg. The nomination of Manteuffel was tantamount to

an announcement that a final settlement was at hand; and the gist of his instructions was that, while seeking to bring about an understanding on the points of general German policy already discussed at Warsaw, he should press for an immediate opening of free conferences between the German Governments, to which should be committed the settlement of the Holstein and the Hesse-Cassel question. In the meantime, Hesse-Cassel should be occupied conjointly by Austrian and Prussian troops.

On November 28th, the two Ministers arrived at Olmütz, which had been fixed as the place of conference; and, on the following day, they signed the punctation which is rightly regarded as marking a definite epoch in German political history, and which was summarised by Radowitz in the words: 'Prussia abandons the German cause in return for concessions by Austria which impose no obligation upon her[1].' As to the question immediately at issue, Manteuffel conceded the point to which the King had so long attached primary importance—the advance of the Federal troops through the military road; it was agreed by word of mouth that part of the Prussian troops should continue to hold their position there, and that, with the assent of the Elector, Prussian and Federal troops should jointly occupy his capital, Cassel. Both sides were to demobilise, and, so Schwarzenberg insisted, before the beginning of the conferences. But Prussia's demobilisation was to be entire, and Austria's only partial; and the beginning was to be made by Prussia—a condition which could not but be regarded as a deep humiliation. Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, agreed to the Prussian demand that the definitive settlement of both the Hessian and the Holstein difficulty should be left to the German Governments at large, those of them represented in the Federal Diet and those acting with Prussia naming a commissioner apiece

[1] Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

for the purpose. In Holstein, Prussian and Austrian commissioners were jointly to bring about the submission of the Provisional Government to Denmark and, in case of recalcitrance, threaten it with joint execution in the name of the Confederation. As to the free conferences, which it was agreed to hold forthwith, they were to be based on the proposals made by Prussia at Warsaw (the 'six points'); but Schwarzenberg, now quite sure of his position, made no concessions in advance which he had not made at Warsaw, except that the conferences were to be held at Dresden (and not at Vienna). He assented to the admission of the whole Austrian monarchy into the extended Confederation, and to the right, in principle, of particular states to conclude a union among themselves. But, in the presidency of the Confederation to which the destinies of Germany were once more to be committed, he refused to allow to Prussia a share; and, though he agreed to the establishment of a strong executive, he refused to allow this to be formed by the two Great Powers only – an indispensable security to Prussia, if she was not prepared to be overpowered from the outset.

The Olmütz Punctation[1] could only be regarded as a surrender, symbolised by the Prussian demobilisation which was to follow; and it was in this sense that Bismarck, though on the whole inclined to fall in with the settlement, in a speech delivered in the Prussian Chamber on December 3rd, deprecated so premature a disarmament; there will be, he said, plenty of time for disarming or for declaring war when the conferences shall have reached a positive result. But the die had been cast, and the only defence to be offered on behalf of the Prussian Government was the view that success in a war undertaken by Prussia against Austria and the German south was more than doubtful. Stockhausen's reluctance to go to war, and the

[1] For a clear statement of the substance of the Olmütz Punctation, see Manteuffel's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. I, pp. 337–9.

slowness with which he conducted preparations for it, no doubt added to this feeling. Many years afterwards, when victory had crowned the reorganised Prussian army in two mighty struggles, Moltke spoke of Olmütz as a 'preservation'; but he seems to have included in the reckoning the chance of Russia's taking part in the conflict[1].

Though the Prussian army stood in need of the reorganisation which it was before long to undergo, its numerical strength was undoubtedly superior to that of the military forces which would have been, in the first instance, opposed to it. But a prolongation of the struggle could not have failed to bring Russia into the field; and, since both French and British intervention were, for different reasons, out of the question, she could only have been met on the part of Prussia by an appeal to revolutionary elements—such as Poland, Hungary and Italy—which, even were it conceivable that King Frederick William IV could have been brought to make it, would have set the whole of Europe aflame in a conflict with incalculable results. Schwarzenberg's venture had justified itself, and he had won the game, though it remained to settle the details of the arrangement at Dresden, where, as will be seen, he failed to carry through his scheme of reaction in its entirety. The day of Radowitz was not, however, to return, and the remainder of his life was in the main, though not altogether, spent in retirement. (He died on Christmas Day 1853.) From his retreat he sent forth a new instalment of those dialogues which form a remarkable monument of the problems in Church and state which occupied his generation, and of the farsighted as well as patriotic spirit in which he approached them. The most difficult of them all—the reorganisation of Germany under Prussian headship—it was not given to him to accomplish, and (for he was a lonely man in his public relations) his name has thus been widely

[1] Cf. Meinecke, *op. cit.*, pp. 513–5.

thought to have spelled failure. But the fatality which crushed his aspirations was no fault of his own; it was caused by the royal friendship which, after seeming to trust him implicitly, pierced the hand so eagerly and loyally held out to it.

The Dresden Conferences opened on December 23rd, 1850, and were not closed till May 15th following. The proceedings can here be only related in summary fashion, while of the period of reaction which ensued it must suffice to note certain salient features. Bismarck afterwards contrasted the princely surroundings of Schwarzenberg at Dresden with the humble official *ménage* of the Prussian Prime Minister[1] on the palace-floor above him; and, at first, it seemed as if the Austrian Minister were master of the situation, especially after a visit which he paid to Berlin. But it soon became evident, more especially to the Prussian Second Plenipotentiary, the conservative but clearsighted Count von Alvensleben-Erxleben, in what direction the Austrian policy was carried on by Schwarzenberg, and more openly by the Austrian Second Plenipotentiary Count von Buol-Schauenstein. In the commissions named to draw up reports on the business of the Conferences Prussia was in a manifest minority; and the recommendations formulated by them were in accordance with their composition. The supreme executive power in the contemplated Federation was to be entrusted to a body of eleven, in which the two Great Powers were to have two votes, and the four kingdoms one vote each, the remainder of the votes being so distributed as to leave the Prussian interest in a clear minority. Austria and Prussia were each to hold ready under arms a contingent of 30,000 men apiece; while the states severally or collectively possessed of a single vote

[1] Manteuffel, after having been interimistically appointed President of the Council on December 4th, was on the 9th definitively appointed head of the Ministry by the King.

were to furnish a contingent of 10,000—figures which indicate that the enemy in view was internal rather than external. It may be noted that the smaller states were opposed to any increase of military burdens; and the four kingdoms actually demanded that for the establishment of a Federal navy a unanimous vote should be required. While the right of union between particular states within the Confederation, upon which Prussia had hitherto insisted and upon which Radowitz's German policy had been based, was left aside, the Austrian Plenipotentiaries insisted upon the inclusion of the whole of the Austrian monarchy in the Confederation—a demand which, without the coexistence of a lesser union under Prussian headship, as contemplated in Radowitz's design, had a wholly different significance from that which had appertained to it there; nor, for obvious reasons, was it proposed to include all the Prussian provinces likewise as a complete remedy. On the other hand, the Prussian Government was quite ready to agree to the Austrian proposal to eliminate any suggestion of a popular representative assembly, though the other four kingdoms were afraid of affronting public opinion by this omission.

Other points must be passed by; but, in the end, it proved that Schwarzenberg had stretched the bow too far, and that, when Prussia definitively declined to accept the directorate of eleven, on which the working of the whole scheme in Austria's favour depended, her programme, seemingly assured of success, could, after all, not be carried. The result of long deliberations and much correspondence was, therefore, that it was finally agreed to restore the old Confederation on the old lines; and, so early as March 27th, Prussia informed the states which had formed part of the Union of her intention of sending a plenipotentiary to the Diet, as in former days. But, at the same time, she entered into secret negotiations with Austria for a separate treaty of alliance between the two Great Powers which, in its final

form, bound either of them to aid the other with its whole strength in the event of any hostile attack upon any of its territories, whether situate within or without the limits of the Germanic Confederation[1]. On the day before that on which this secret alliance was concluded (May 16th, 1851), the Dresden Conferences came to an end. The scheme of including the whole of the Austrian monarchy in a confederation in which the influence of Austria was predominant had broken down at the last. But the reaction which reasserted that predominance had triumphed in the restoration of the old Confederation; and the Prussian Union and its constitutional scheme were as dead as were the Frankfort Assembly and its constitution (*Reichsverfassung*). Moreover, for three years, Austria's tenure of her Italian possessions was guaranteed by the Prussian arms. For the German nation, there remained the rather barren consolation that the Dresden Conferences had thrown much additional light on the difficulties which must beset the political future of Germany. Prussia, for her part, could only take refuge in the thought that, while she had escaped the worst consequences of her political defeat, she might now, with clearer insight than ever, labour to prove the impotence, except for those police purposes against the Revolution and all its works in which her Government concurred, of the Federal organisation which she had helped to restore. And in this more or less insidious endeavour, as well as in that of using the old machinery for the restrictive ends indicated, she persistently engaged during the dreary period of reaction which now ensued.

[1] This alliance was concluded for three years (Manteuffel, vol. I, p. 368); it was therefore on the point of running out when, on April 20th, 1854, the two Powers renewed it, in somewhat different terms. The other German states were to be invited to join; and after they had, in the Bamberg Conference (May 25th), asserted the claims of the Confederation to a voice in the European settlement, they came into the Austro-Prussian alliance (July 24th).

The processes of this reaction, which, as a whole, extended over more years than can be surveyed in a connected fashion in the concluding pages of the present chapter, and which, moreover, did not come to an end with the revival, though in different form, of the aspirations towards national unity that had survived the catastrophe here related, have, in part, been mentioned by anticipation in the summary account already given as to the revolutionary movement of 1848–9 and its close. At the point of time which our narrative has reached, the constitutional reforms introduced in the revolutionary period had, in some of the states, such as Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxony[1] and Württemberg, already disappeared. So far as the two Great Powers were concerned, Austria set the example by a series of imperial edicts (dated August and September 1851) which put an end to the constitution imposed in March 1849. No regrets accompanied its extinction, as no blessings had attended its promulgation[2]; and its demise was formally proclaimed on the last day of the year 1853. By this time, the centralised absolute government established in the Austrian empire by Schwarzenberg and carried on by him, and by his successors after him[3], had brought new difficulties and

[1] Cf. p. 492, *ante*.

[2] Cf. p. 429, *ante*.

[3] Schwarzenberg died on April 3rd, 1852. His last political achievement, of which the principal credit belonged to Freiherr K. L. von Bruck, was the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Prussia, which could not be said to cover the failure of these statesmen to bring about the inclusion of Austria with the rest of Germany in the *Zollverein*. Schwarzenberg's place in Austrian history, though in his earlier political activity Stadion, and in his later Freiherr Alexander von Bach had a large share, is a very notable one; but his determination and resource, and his haughty self-confidence, could not permanently avert the change in the relations between Austria and Germany which they had for a time succeeded in arresting. It was finely said of him (by Beust) that he had the greatest contempt for the human race, but not a profound knowledge of human nature.

dangers to the contending nationalities under Habsburg rule, without satisfying even the German provinces, which in certain respects could not but benefit by it. In Prussia, it has been seen how in the period of which some account has been given in this chapter, a constitutional crisis provoked by the scruples of the King had been overcome, instead of leading to a breakdown, like that at Erfurt. At the outset of the period of reaction which followed, the King still hankered after a revocation of his oath; but his Liberal counsellor Bunsen and Freiherr Senfft von Pilsach, the head of the Pomeranian administration, and a conservative of extreme royalist convictions, were at one in advising him against so impossible a course. Ways were, however, found of accomplishing much without accomplishing everything. The Minister of the Interior, F. O. W. Henning von Westphalen, who before his appointment to that office in December 1850, had distinguished himself by the energy with which he had repressed revolutionary measures in Silesia, very successfully carried out the device of treating the constitution as binding in its parliamentary provisions only, and the second part of it, which dealt with the rights of Prussians, as merely enunciating certain principles which, before being applied, would have to be expressed in definite executive laws. Until the passing of these laws, it was argued, those already in existence must retain their validity. This *modus agendi* left open the definition of such principles as equality before the law, liberty of religious confession and the like; and thus it became possible in most administrative matters in both state and Church, not only to stand still, but even to 'revise backwards.' Such was the spirit in which the administration of the Prussian state and the accommodation of the constitution to conservative principles, were, in this period, more or less consistently, carried on. Thus, for instance, the large landed proprietors recovered the patrimonial jurisdiction of which the constitution had deprived

them[1]; and, with regard to the parliamentary machinery itself, while the old provincial Estates and *Kreistage* (periodical meetings of deputies of the circles[2]) were called into life again, the First Chamber was finally transmuted into a House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*), such as had long been the desire of the King's heart, where definite preponderance was assured to the higher nobility and landed gentry (*Rittergutsbesitzer*), who were trusted to acquire a political education *ambulando*. In the affairs of the Church, the Crown showed itself distinctly willing to refrain from supervision of the proceedings of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and to allow the Protestant Churches full exercise of their authority in educational and other concerns, while, at the same time, everything was done to repress independent and unorthodox religious communities. Thus, under the administration of Manteuffel, which lasted till the accession of the Prince of Prussia to the regency in November 1858, the reaction continued without interruption, least of all on the part of the Prime Minister himself. Although clear-sighted and free from fanaticism of any kind, and devoted heart and soul to the public service, he came to allow increasing licence to the proceedings of colleagues more reactionary than himself, and to yield more and more to the influence of the Camarilla around the unfortunate King.

As a matter of course, the two Great Powers, between whom (as has been seen) there was on this head no discrepancy, either of intention or of action, made unscrupulous use of the revived Confederation in order to remove the dangerous democratic element which had found its way into the constitutions of the several states, insofar as these had not as yet purged themselves of it. In the same month of May

[1] In vol. I (all hitherto published) of his ma terly larger biography of B smarck (1909), Erich Marks has dwelt on Bismarck's early activity on this head.

[2] Cf. p. 319, *ante*.

1851 that saw the close of the Dresden Conferences, the Federal Diet at Frankfort was once more complete; and on July 8th the Austrian and Prussian Governments brought forward a joint motion for the application of its powers to the preservation of the internal security of the Confederation. In the same month, the Diet named its principal committees —a political committee, whose members took no shame to themselves in calling it 'the committee of reaction,' consisting of representatives of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and the grand-duchy of Hesse, together with a committee for trade and a Federal judicial tribunal. The 'committee of reaction' reported without loss of time; so that, after the 'so-called *Grundrechte*' had been declared abolished in August, and the particular Governments which had adopted them had been called upon to remove them from their statute-books, a revision of the constitutions involved could be taken in hand. Necessarily, the case of Electoral Hesse received immediate attention; but besides the constitutions of several small states and those of three of the Free Towns, that of Hanover was brought under discussion, and a revision was demanded (May 1852). The consequence was a prolonged struggle between the new King, George V, and the large majority of his subjects, ending in a complete political reaction (1855–7)[1].

In Hesse-Cassel, the Federal execution had been worked with a will in the southern part of the electorate, the Prussian troops having evacuated Fulda. But at Olmütz, while the completion of the execution had been left to Austria and the Confederation, it had been also agreed that the further regulation of the affairs of the electorate should be arranged by commissioners of the two Great Powers and their allies. The obstinacy of the Elector and his Minister had, however, rendered impossible any arrangement acceptable to Prussia; and, on September 22nd, Bavarian troops

[1] Cf. p. 384, *ante*.

entered the capital as part of the Federal executive force. Though the judicial and municipal authorities at Cassel showed every disposition to give way where they could, they had to submit to most oppressive treatment. The Elector returned to his capital before the end of the year; and most of his officers, having withdrawn their resignations, were released from the oath to the constitution. The Federal execution having thus been carried out, what remained was how to deal with the obnoxious constitution itself on which the resistance had been based. While the assembling of the electoral diet was, quite illegally, postponed, the government of the country remained in the hands of the Austro-Prussian Commissioners, Count Leiningen and the highly conservative jurist K. A. A. von Uhden, who had been substituted for the vigorous but openminded General Peucker. On their report, the Federal Diet, on March 27th, 1852, declared the constitution of 1831, with the amendments introduced into it in 1848 and 1849, irreconcilable with the principles of the Confederation, and called upon the electoral Government to promulgate in its place a constitution upon which it should have agreed with the Commissioners. This constitution actually made its appearance on April 13th, and on July 16th the Hesse-Cassel diet assembled, having been elected in accordance with provisions which, in the opinion of the Elector, entitled him to meet it as 'the real Estates.' But it would not be induced to approve the *octroyée* constitution, and resisted so tenaciously that at last, in October 1855, Hassenpflug and his colleagues resigned their offices. The end of the story was not yet, but may, perhaps, be indicated here. In 1859, Prussia laid before the Federal Diet a declaration in favour of the restoration of the Hessian constitution of 1831; but, in 1860, the Elector insisted on bestowing on his subjects one preferred by himself, for which, however, he could, in the end, not even

obtain the approval of Austria. In 1862, he was forced, with certain reservations, to introduce the hated constitution of 1831 into his electorate; but his quarrels with his subjects were not over, and in March 1866 his Estates solemnly declared that he had broken his word and that misgovernment existed in the land. His downfall, which this fateful year soon brought about, belongs to a later period of German history. It would be difficult to parallel this record, which has necessarily passed over an infinity of *chicane*, of the Hesse-Cassel conflict, which connects itself inseparably with the Austrian reaction.

The affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, as to which there had been no substantial disagreement between the Austrian and the Prussian negotiations at Olmütz, caused no such present difficulties as beset the final settlement of the Hesse-Cassel problem; and the humiliating collapse of the endeavour to maintain the historic union between the two duchies was formally completed by the action of the two Great Powers. The Schleswig-Holstein army, after being reduced to one-third of its total (of over 40,000 men) evacuated Schleswig, which was occupied by Danish troops. The disbandment was then completed[1], and, from January 1851 to February 1852, an Austrian force, together with a Prussian division, occupied Holstein. On January 28th, 1852, after the reconstruction of the Danish Cabinet in a moderate sense, though the astute C. A. Bluhme retained the chief influence over the conduct of affairs, a royal manifesto proclaimed the future organisation of the Danish monarchy under a common constitution, which should, however, leave to the provincial Estates of the

[1] A considerable proportion of the force afterwards, in the days of the Crimean War, took service under General Richard von Stutterheim (late Chief of the Staff in the Schleswig-Holstein army) in the Foreign Legion formed by the British Government, and may have shared the subsequent fortunes of part of the legionaries.

duchies, with the right of resolution, the control, under separate Ministers, of affairs not common to the monarchy as a whole. In the case of Schleswig, a special provision was added, ensuring the equal treatment and protection of the German and the Danish nationalities; but the question of the union between Schleswig and Holstein was passed over in silence, except as to certain non-political interests, such as their joint relation to the University of Kiel. This manifesto was sent to Vienna and Berlin, accompanied by a note in which King Frederick VII's entire agreement with the expressed views of the Austrian Government as to the non-incorporation of Schleswig in the Danish monarchy was explicitly declared. The two Great Powers could thus regard themselves as satisfied as to the intentions of the Danish Government on this head, and in the following July made a communication in this sense to the Federal Diet, of which the Danish envoy signified his approval. On February 18th, the government of Holstein was formally made over to the King of Denmark. The constitution promised in the manifesto of January 28th, 1852, was imposed on the whole monarchy on July 31st, 1854, but modified on October 2nd, 1855, so as to leave the decision as to what business was to be accounted common to the monarchy in the hands of its Parliament and Council of State, in both of which Denmark commanded a majority. Thus the promises of the constitutional manifesto were step by step perverted; and for both duchies—and more especially for Schleswig—a period of utter helplessness ensued in the face of the Danish process of carrying out the new order of things, which, on May 10th, 1852, had been introduced by an amnesty with many exceptions. This condition of affairs, as will be seen, lasted till the war of 1864. It should be added here that in the London Protocol, of May 8th, 1852, the Great Powers, including together with Austria and Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain, but

not including the Germanic Confederation, after declaring the integrity of the entire Danish monarchy a European necessity, recognised the succession in the whole of it of Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg and his male line. To the significance of this agreement, taken in conjunction with the Danish promises which had preceded it, we shall find it necessary to return. This result had been achieved with great difficulty, on account of the protracted negotiations concerning the claims of Duke Christian August, as head of the Sonderburg-Augustenburg line, to the succession in Schleswig and Holstein. These claims[1] were supported by widespread sympathy both in the duchies and in Germany at large, and more especially in the smaller states; nor would either King Frederick William IV or Queen Victoria consent to their being ignored. Thus the expedient was adopted of attempting to buy off the Duke; and it was not till he had consented to accept the sum offered him (one and three-quarter million dollars for his estates, with a second million in addition), in return for the promise for himself and his family not to reside in the monarchy or in any way oppose the order of succession or the organisation of the monarchy established by the King, that the protocol could be passed. It was afterwards found, or asserted, that the Duke's resignation was not binding on his sons, who were of age when it was made. On July 31st, 1853, the new law of succession was promulgated. The Estates of Schleswig and Holstein were not consulted about it; and they made no protest, nor indeed were they in a position to make any. The consequences of this imperfect settlement must be left over for the present, as they were at the time by the German Great Powers. Austria had no wish to take any further step in the

[1] They rested on the Augustenburgs standing first in order of succession among the heirs male of Christian I of Denmark, and their rights not being liable to abrogation by royal letters patent.

matter, to which she was not obliged by public opinion; Prussia was content to abide her day; the duchies stedfastly bore the pressure put upon them by the Danish Government; and the German people, with its official organ, the Confederate Diet, continued indignant and impotent.

An immediate result of the termination of the Danish war, with which this chapter of failures may not inappropriately close as symbolising the frustration of the continual aspirations on which Olmütz had practically closed the door, was the shameless sale of the German fleet. It had been called into being in 1849, and, through the contributions of several of the German states (of which Austria was not one) and subscriptions enthusiastically added from private sources, had reached respectable proportions: it now consisted of four steam-frigates, two sailing vessels of the line, six sloops and a number (variously stated) of gunboats. But, inasmuch as the Germanic Empire had not yet been recognised by any of the European Powers, these ships had no internationally acknowledged owner, and the German navy was without a flag. No sooner, therefore, had the Confederation and its Diet been revived, than the question arose how to deal with what was held to be its property, though not property which it might use for Federal purposes. Austria and Prussia, accordingly, moved that the Diet should declare against the further retention of the fleet; and, in the autumn of 1851, a commission of experts was appointed to consider how to deal with it. Some very natural suggestions for dividing it up among the Governments chiefly interested in the protection of the German sea-coast were offered; but there was so hopeless a difference of opinion on the subject that, on January 1st, 1852, the Diet resolved to make over the ships to an association which should be formed for employing them, or to get rid of them by sale. Meetings for the formation of such an association (from which Hanover, which took a special interest in the

matter, naïvely proposed to exclude Austria and Prussia as Great European Powers) were held at Hanover in the early part of the year, and of course arrived at no result. On April 2nd, the Federal Diet decided to close the question by putting up the ships to sale, and entrusted the execution of this shabby job to Dr Hannibal Fischer, formerly an Oldenburg official of reactionary views, whom in 1848 popular opinion had obliged to withdraw from his post[1]. He carried out the greater part of his commission in such a way as to cover himself with an odium which he could in no case have altogether escaped. When the business, which was carried to its conclusion by other hands, was finished, it is said that the total proceeds of a fleet which it had cost 8 million florins to construct and to maintain amounted to about one-fifth of that total. The Prussian Government had bought the two best ships, the *Barbarossa* and the *Gefion*—the latter the frigate captured from the Danes at Eckernförde; and Fischer was said to have sold her anchor-chain, the token of victorious capture, as old iron. That iron, if one may so say, entered into the soul of the German nation in this its season of humiliation.

No nation, however, is doomed which does not despair of itself. The fact that in the years 1852–4 emigration from Germany reached an unprecedented height, rising, it is stated, to a total of more than half a million, is not without significance. But, though the generations which had witnessed the collapse of the aspirations described in these chapters, or which were growing up under the vigilant eyes of the triumphant reactionary were oppressed, they were not unmanned by their sense of the failures of the past.

[1] Cf. p. 386, *ante*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY TO VOL. I

No attempt has been made in the following bibliography to furnish a list of MS. and printed sources of the period of German history treated in this volume, or of works concerning it in auxiliary sciences, such as geography and topography, and philology.

Political pamphlets are only noted when of exceptional importance. Literary works proper are only mentioned when they had a direct political bearing or influence. Under the heading *General and Introductory* only such publications are included as are likely to be of immediate interest or use to the student of the period here treated, or have been largely consulted by the writer of this volume in preparing it. The titles of a few books dealing with the general history of the period have been added.

For a complete bibliography see Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte, 7th ed., ed. Erich Brandenburg, Leipzig, 1906, with the supplementary volume, 1907; 8th ed., 1912. To this the reader is referred for lists of journals and other periodical publications devoted to the treatment of German history in general or to the history of particular states, territories or places, including the records published by state and local archives.

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